

A HISTORICAL
COMMENTARY ON
ARRIAN'S
HISTORY OF
ALEXANDER

BY
A. B. BOSWORTH

VOLUME II
COMMENTARY ON BOOKS IV-V

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PREFACE

The first volume of this commentary appeared in 1980, and inaugurated an outpouring of work on Arrian. It is fair to state that more substantive contributions have been made in the past fifteen years than in the entire preceding century. The new Loeb edition by P. A. Brunt is now complete, and the Artemis edition by G. Wirth and O. von Hinüber (Munich and Zurich 1985) has at last appeared. In addition, there is an elegant French translation by P. Savinel (*Arrien: Histoire d'Alexandre* (Paris 1984)), and two full studies of Arrian, by P. A. Stadter and H. Tonnet, have rendered obsolete my complaint that Arrian was largely ignored as a writer in his own right. As a result there is far more appreciation of the complexity of Arrian's style and understanding of his historiographical milieu. This increased depth of perception has been materially assisted by the technological revolution in data processing. In 1980 the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* was at an early stage, and, though one could be exhaustive in examining Arrian's style and word usage, it was not possible to survey the whole corpus of Greek literature. Now the stylistic models of Arrian and—still more—his impact upon later writing can be analysed with a sophistication that was previously unthinkable.

The principles enunciated in my first volume have been relatively easy to maintain. The method of comparative source criticism is the only way of elucidating the enigmas of the reign of Alexander, and the first step is appreciation of the aims and methods of the primary authors. I have attempted to examine Arrian's methodology and historical stance in my monograph *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford 1988), and the detailed commentary in this volume deepens and enlarges the picture. I am perhaps more sympathetic in my evaluation of Arrian than I was fifteen years ago. In some respects it is genuine admiration for a master of Greek prose and a human being who, even more than his exemplar, Xenophon, inspires affection as one becomes familiar with him, but one must also concede that the quality of Arrian's work improves as it progresses. Books IV and V are written on a broader canvas, and show a much greater capacity for moral criticism and historical exegesis. In these books Arrian's narrative tends to be fuller and, on the whole, more informative than that of Curtius, and the record is impressively detailed. He is still at the mercy of his sources, which are encomiastic and occasionally tainted, but the nature of the material, particularly the episodes of Cleitus and Callisthenes, imposed a more critical approach. Here Alexander was the traditional villain, and the exposition could not

PREFACE

be entirely laudatory. In consequence the historical writing acquires depth and colour, and the use of sources becomes more varied and subtle.

As in the first volume I have avoided long excursions and kept my discussion firmly anchored to the text. There are a large number of cross-references, and the index, as before, is constructed to aid consultation. In addition I have combined the general bibliography of short titles with reasonably complete sectional bibliographies. The intention is to give the most important and influential contributions, not an exhaustive catalogue of literature (for which one may now consult the remarkably full compendium by J. M. O'Brien, *Alexander the Great: the Invisible Enemy* (London 1992) 241–322). Even so, it was impossible to include everything of relevance, and I particularly regret that Waldemar Heckel's *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London 1992) reached me too late to use systematically. It should be stated here that this work replaces Berve as the first resource for the prosopography of Alexander's court and high command.

A large part of this volume was written during a year's study leave in 1991, for which I must warmly thank my own University. I owe much to the generous hospitality of Wolfson College, which made research at Oxford a wholly undiluted pleasure, and once again the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton offered superb facilities, warm collegiality, and intellectual tranquillity. I could not have been more richly endowed with the amenities for study. In the context of Western Australia I must acknowledge the continuous support of my University, which still encourages the Humanities against a national climate of increasing philistinism, and in particular the Inter-Library Loans section of the Reid Library, which provides this isolated outpost with a vital link with the great centres of academic thought. On a more technical level this book could not have been prepared for publication without the word-processing skills of Carol Freele, and I owe the maps and illustrations to Julie Kennedy. Finally, I must thank the Oxford University Press for its tolerance of years of delay and for what can only be termed its author-friendly attitude, the Australian Research Council for financial support, and my colleagues at home and abroad, who have contributed encouragement and criticism. The last word, however, must belong to my wife, Jo, who has been the indispensable support for it all.

A.B.B.

January 1994

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SHORT TITLES

<i>AWW</i>	<i>Anzeiger der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phil.-hist. Klasse</i>
<i>AC</i>	<i>L'Antiquité classique</i>
<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
Altheim-Stiehl	F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, <i>Geschichte Mittelasiens im Altertum</i> (Berlin 1970)
<i>AncSoc</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i> (Louvain)
<i>AncW</i>	<i>The Ancient World</i> (Chicago)
<i>ANET</i>	<i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts: Relating to the Old Testament</i> , ed. J. B. Pritchard (3rd edn.: Princeton, NJ 1969)
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> , ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase (Berlin and New York 1972-)
Anspach	A. E. Anspach, <i>De Alexandri Magni expeditione Indica</i> (Leipzig 1903)
<i>ASNP</i>	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa</i> (classe di lettere e filosofia)
<i>Ath. Mitt</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts: athenische Abteilung</i>
Atkinson	J. E. Atkinson, <i>A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4</i> (Amsterdam and Uithoorn 1980)
Avenarius	G. Avenarius, <i>Lukians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung</i> (Meisenheim am Glan 1956)
Aymard, <i>Études</i>	A. Aymard, <i>Études d'histoire ancienne</i> (Paris 1967)
<i>BAB</i>	<i>Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres de l'Académie Royale de Belgique</i>
<i>BABesch</i>	<i>Bulletin Antieke Beschaving</i>
Badian, <i>Studies</i>	E. Badian, <i>Studies in Greek and Roman History</i> (Oxford 1964)
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</i>
<i>BE</i>	J. and L. Robert, <i>Bulletin épigraphique</i> (published initially in <i>REG</i> and reprinted as a series with indexes, Paris 1972-)
Beloch	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> (2nd edn.: 4 vols.: Strasburg-Berlin and Leipzig 1912-27)
Berve	H. Berve, <i>Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage</i> (2 vols.: Munich 1926)
Bickerman, <i>Institutions</i>	E. Bickerman, <i>Institutions des Séleucides</i> (Paris 1938)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Billows	R. A. Billows, <i>Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State</i> (Berkeley, Calif. 1990)
<i>BMC Ionia</i>	B. V. Head, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Ionia</i> (London 1892)
<i>BMC Palestine</i>	G. F. Hill, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Palestine: Galilee, Samaria, and Judaea</i> (London 1914)
Bosworth, <i>Conquest and Empire</i>	A. B. Bosworth, <i>Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great</i> (Cambridge 1988)
Bosworth, <i>From Arrian to Alexander</i>	A. B. Bosworth, <i>From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation</i> (Oxford 1988)
Breebart	A. B. Breebart, <i>Enige historiografische Aspecten van Arrianus' Anabasis Alexandri</i> (Leiden 1960)
Breloer	B. Breloer, <i>Alexanders Kampf gegen Poros</i> (Bonner Orientalische Studien 3: Stuttgart 1933)
Briant, <i>L'Asie Centrale</i>	P. Briant, <i>L'Asie Centrale et les royaumes proche-orientaux du premier millénaire (c. VIII^e-IV^e siècles) avant notre ère</i> (Paris 1984)
Briant, <i>État et pasteurs</i>	P. Briant, <i>État et pasteurs au Moyen-Orient ancien</i> (Cambridge and Paris 1982)
Briant, <i>RTP</i>	P. Briant, <i>Rois, tributs et paysans: Études sur les formations tributaires du Moyen-Orient ancien</i> (Paris 1982)
Brown, <i>Onesicritus</i>	T. S. Brown, <i>Onesicritus: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography</i> (Berkeley, Calif. 1949)
Brunt, <i>Arrian</i>	P. A. Brunt, <i>Arrian</i> (2 vols.: Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge, Mass. and London 1976-83)
CA	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
CAH	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i>
Caroe, <i>Pathans</i>	Sir Olaf Caroe, <i>The Pathans</i> (London 1962)
Cartledge, <i>Agasilaus</i>	Paul Cartledge, <i>Agasilaus and the Crisis of Sparta</i> (London 1987)
Casson, <i>PME</i>	L. Casson, <i>The Periplus Maris Erythraei</i> (Princeton, NJ 1989)
Casson, <i>Ships and Seamanship</i>	L. Casson, <i>Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World</i> (Princeton, NJ 1971)
Cauer	F. Cauer, 'Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes', <i>Jahrbücher für classische Philologie</i> Suppl. 20 (1894) 1-79
CE	<i>Chronique d'Égypte</i>
CHI	<i>The Cambridge History of India</i>
CHIran	<i>The Cambridge History of Iran</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
GRAI	<i>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres</i>
CW	<i>The Classical World</i>
Dahlquist	A. Dahlquist, <i>Megasthenes and Indian Religion</i> (Uppsala 1962)
Denniston	J. D. Denniston, <i>The Greek Particles</i> (2nd edn.: Oxford 1951)
Denniston, <i>Greek Prose Style</i>	J. D. Denniston, <i>Greek Prose Style</i> (Oxford 1952)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Diels/Kranz H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th edn.: rev. W. Kranz: 3 vols.: Berlin 1951-2)
- Dihle, *Antike und Orient* A. Dihle, *Antike und Orient: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ed. V. Pöschl and H. Petermann (Heidelberg 1984)
- Dobesch G. Dobesch, *Der Panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v. Chr. und der 'Philippos' des Isokrates* (Untersuchungen zum Korinthischen Bund 1: Vienna 1968)
- Droysen J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (2nd edn.: 3 vols.: Gotha 1877-8)
- EcHR* *The Economic History Review*
- Edson Studies* *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles F. Edson*, ed. H. J. Dell (Thessaloniki 1981)
- Eggermont, *Al. in Sind* P. H. L. Eggermont, *Alexander's Campaigns in Sind and Baluchistan* (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 3: Louvain 1975)
- Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Blackwell, Oxford 1938)
- EMC* *Échos du monde classique/Classical Views*
- Engels D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley, Calif. 1978)
- Entretiens Hardt* *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* (Fondation Hardt: Vandœuvres-Geneva)
- FD* *Fouilles de Delphes*
- FGrH* F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden 1923-)
- Foucher A. Foucher, *La Vieille Route de l'Inde de Bactres à Taxile* (Paris 1942)
- Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (3 vols.: Oxford 1972)
- Frumkin G. Frumkin, *Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia* (Leiden 1970)
- Fuller J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London 1958)
- GJ* *Geographical Journal*
- Goodwin W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (London 1889)
- Goukowsky P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre* (2 vols.: Nancy 1978-81)
- Goukowsky, *Diodore xvii* *Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque historique, Livre xvii*, ed. P. Goukowsky (Budé: Paris 1976)
- Goukowsky, *Diodore xviii* *Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque historique, Livre xviii*, ed. P. Goukowsky (Budé: Paris 1978)
- GRBS* *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
- Greece & the E. Mediterranean* *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in History and Prehistory*, Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr, ed. K. H. Kinzl (Berlin 1977)
- Green P. Green, *Alexander of Macedon* (London 1974)
- Grundmann H. R. Grundmann, *Quid in elocutione Arriani Herodoto debeatur* (Berliner Studien 2 [1886])

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Billows	R. A. Billows, <i>Antigonus the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State</i> (Berkeley, Calif. 1990)
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CHIran	<i>The Cambridge History of Iran</i>
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CRAI	<i>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres</i>
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Denniston	J. D. Denniston, <i>The Greek Particles</i> (2nd edn.: Oxford 1951)
Denniston, <i>Greek Prose Style</i>	J. D. Denniston, <i>Greek Prose Style</i> (Oxford 1952)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

<i>JS</i>	<i>Journal des Savants</i>
Karttunen	K. Karttunen, <i>India in Early Greek Literature</i> (Studia Orientalia 65: Helsinki 1989)
Kent, <i>Old Persian</i>	R. G. Kent, <i>Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon</i> (American Oriental Series 33: New Haven, Conn. 1953)
Kienast, <i>Philipp II</i>	D. Kienast, <i>Philipp II von Makedonien und das Reich der Achämeniden</i> (Munich 1973)
Kock, <i>CAF</i>	Th. Kock, <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> (3 vols.: Leipzig 1880–8)
Kornemann	E. Kornemann, <i>Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten</i> (Leipzig 1935)
Kraft	K. Kraft, <i>Der 'rationale' Alexander</i> , ed. H. Gesche (Kallmünz 1971)
Kromayer–Veith	J. Kromayer and G. Veith, <i>Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer</i> (Munich 1928)
Kühner–Gerth	R. Kühner and B. Gerth, <i>Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache</i> (2 vols.: 4th edn.: Leverkusen 1955)
Lane Fox	R. Lane Fox, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (London 1973)
Lassen	Chr. Lassen, <i>Indische Altertumskunde</i> (2nd edn.: 4 vols.: Leipzig, Bonn, and London 1861–74)
Launey, <i>Recherches</i>	M. Launey, <i>Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques</i> (2 vols.: Paris 1949–50)
<i>LCM</i>	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
Lepper and Frere	F. A. Lepper and S. S. Frere, <i>Trajan's Column: A New Edition of the Cichorius Plates</i> (Gloucester 1988)
Leuze, <i>Satrapeneinteilung</i>	O. Leuze, <i>Die Satrapeneinteilung in Syrien und in Zweistromland von 520–320</i> (Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft: Geisteswiss. Klasse 11 [1935])
<i>LIMC</i>	<i>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</i> (Zurich 1981–)
<i>LSJ</i> ⁹	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, <i>A Greek–English Lexicon</i> (rev. edn. with Supplement: Oxford 1968)
Luckenbill	D. D. Luckenbill, <i>Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia</i> (2 vols.: Chicago 1926–7)
<i>Macedonia and Greece</i>	<i>Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times</i> , ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (Studies in the History of Art 10: Washington, DC 1982)
<i>Macedonian Heritage</i>	<i>Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage</i> , ed. W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (Washington, DC 1982)
Marsden, <i>Artillery</i>	E. W. Marsden, <i>Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development</i> (Oxford 1969)
Marsden, <i>Technical Treatises</i>	E. W. Marsden, <i>Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises</i> (Oxford 1971)
Mayrhofer	M. Mayrhofer, <i>Onomastica Persepolitana: Das altiranische Namensgut der Persepolis-Täfelchen</i> (Sitzungsberichte der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse 286: 1973)

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Meiggs/Lewis	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century BC</i> (Oxford 1969)
Moretti	L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i> (Florence 1967-)
Müller, GGM	C. Müller, <i>Geographi graeci minores</i> (2 vols.: Paris 1855-61)
NC	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
Niese	B. Niese, <i>Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea</i> (3 vols.: Gotha 1893-1903).
OBodl.	<i>Greek Ostraca in the Bodleian Library at Oxford and Various Other Collections</i> (3 vols.: London 1930-64)
OGIS	<i>Orientalis graeci inscriptiones selectae</i> , ed. W. Dittenberger (2 vols.: Leipzig 1903-5)
OLP	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica</i>
<i>Orientalia Tucci</i>	<i>Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata</i> , ed. G. Gnoli and L. Lanciotti (2 vols.: Rome 1985)
PAberd.	<i>Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri and Ostraca in the Possession of the University of Aberdeen</i> , ed. E. G. Turner (Aberdeen 1939)
PACA	<i>Proceedings of the African Classical Association</i>
Page, PMG	D. L. Page, <i>Poetae melici graeci</i> (Oxford 1962)
PBA	<i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>
PBSR	<i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>
PdP	<i>La parola del passato</i>
Pearson, LHA	L. Pearson, <i>The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great</i> (Philological Monographs 20: Am. Phil. Ass. 1960)
Pédech, <i>Historiens compagnons</i>	P. Pédech, <i>Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre</i> (Paris 1984)
Prandi	L. Prandi, <i>Callistene: Uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedoni</i> (Milan 1985)
Price, Coinage	M. J. Price, <i>The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus: A British Museum Catalogue</i> (2 vols.: Zurich and London 1991)
Price, <i>Rituals and Power</i>	S. R. F. Price, <i>Rituals and Power</i> (Cambridge 1984)
PSI	<i>Papiri greci e latini</i> (Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto)
RE	<i>Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , ed. Pauly, Wissowa, Kroll (Stuttgart 1893-)
REA	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
REG	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
RFIC	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
Rh. Mus.	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
Rhodes, HCAP	P. J. Rhodes, <i>A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia</i> (Oxford 1981)
Rice	E. E. Rice, <i>The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus</i> (Oxford 1983)
Rostovtzeff, SEHWW	M. Rostovtzeff, <i>The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World</i> (3 vols.: Oxford 1941)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

de Ste. Croix, <i>Class Struggle</i>	G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, <i>The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World</i> (London 1981)
SB	<i>Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Aegypten</i> , ed. F. Preisigke, F. Bilabel, E. Kiessling, and H.-A. Rupprecht (Strasburg, Berlin-Leipzig, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, 1915-)
Schachermeyr ²	F. Schachermeyr, <i>Alexander der Große: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens</i> (Sitzungsberichte der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 285 [1973])
Schober	L. Schober, <i>Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323-303 v. Chr.</i> (Frankfurt 1981)
Schürer	E. Schürer, <i>The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC-AD 135)</i> , rev. and ed. G. Vermes, F. Millar, and M. Goodman (3 vols.: Edinburgh 1973-87)
Schwyzzer	E. Schwyzzer, <i>Griechische Grammatik</i> (4 vols.: Munich 1953-71)
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
Seibert, <i>Alexander der Große</i>	J. Seibert, <i>Alexander der Große</i> (Erträge der Forschung 10: Darmstadt 1972)
Seibert, <i>Eroberung</i>	J. Seibert, <i>Die Eroberung des Perserreiches durch Alexander den Großen auf kartographischer Grundlage</i> (Beih. zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients B 68: Wiesbaden 1985)
Seibert, <i>Ptolemaios</i>	J. Seibert, <i>Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I</i> (Münchener Beiträge 56: Munich 1969)
SIFC	<i>Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica</i>
SIG ³	<i>Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum</i> , ed. W. Dittenberger (3rd edn.: Leipzig 1915-24)
SNR	<i>Schweizerische numismatische Rundschau/Revue suisse de numismatique</i>
SO	<i>Symbolae Osloenses</i>
Stadter	P. A. Stadter, <i>Arrian of Nicomedia</i> (Chapel Hill, NC 1980)
Stein, <i>Alexander's Track</i>	Aurel Stein, <i>On Alexander's Track to the Indus</i> (London 1929)
Stein, <i>Archaeological Reconnaissances</i>	Aurel Stein, <i>Archaeological Reconnaissances in North-West India and South-East Iran</i> (London 1937)
Strasburger	H. Strasburger, <i>Ptolemaios und Alexander</i> (Leipzig 1934)
Strasburger, <i>Studien</i>	H. Strasburger, <i>Studien zur Alten Geschichte</i> , ed. W. Schmitt-henner and R. Zocpffel (3 vols.: Hildesheim 1982-90)
<i>Studia Naster</i>	<i>Studia P. Naster oblata</i> , ed. S. Scheers and J. Quaegebeur (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 12-13: Louvain 1982)
<i>Suppl. Hell.</i>	<i>Supplementum Hellenisticum</i> , ed. H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons (Texte und Kommentare 11: Berlin and New York 1983)
SVF	<i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> , ed. H. F. von Arnim (4 vols.: Stuttgart 1903-24)
Syme, <i>Roman Papers</i>	R. Syme, <i>Roman Papers i-</i> (Oxford 1979-)
TAM	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tarn	W. W. Tarn, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (2 vols.: Cambridge 1948)
Tarn, <i>GBI</i>	W. W. Tarn, <i>The Greeks in Bactria and India</i> (3rd edn., ed. F. L. Holt: Chicago 1984)
Thomson	J. O. Thomson, <i>History of Ancient Geography</i> (Cambridge 1948)
Timmer	B. C. J. Timmer, <i>Megasthenes en de indische maatschappij</i> (Amsterdam 1930)
Tod	M. N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , ii (Oxford 1948)
Tonnet	H. Tonnet, <i>Recherches sur Arrien: Sa personnalité et ses écrits alticistes</i> (2 vols.: Amsterdam 1988)
<i>ΤΟΠΟΙ</i>	<i>ΤΟΠΟΙ Orient-Occident</i> (Maison de l'Orient Méditerranéen, Lyon)
Tscherikower	V. Tscherikower, <i>Die hellenistische Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die Römerzeit</i> (<i>Philologus Suppl.</i> 19.1: Leipzig 1927)
von Schwarz	F. von Schwarz, <i>Alexanders des Großen Feldzüge in Turkestan</i> (Munich 1893; 2nd edn. 1906)
Wheeler, <i>Chārsada</i>	M. Wheeler, <i>Chārsada, a Metropolis of the North-West Frontier: Being a Report on the Excavations of 1958</i> (Oxford 1962)
Wilcken	U. Wilcken, <i>Alexander the Great</i> , with Introduction and Notes by E. N. Borza (New York 1967)
Wirth, <i>Kampfuverband</i>	G. Wirth, <i>Der Kampfuverband des Proteas: Spekulationen zu den Begleitumständen der Laufbahn Alexanders</i> (Amsterdam 1988)
Wirth, <i>Studien</i>	G. Wirth, <i>Studien zur Alexandergeschichte</i> (Darmstadt 1985)
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>
<i>Zu Alexander d. Gr.</i>	<i>Zu Alexander dem Grossen: Festschrift G. Wirth</i> , ed. W. Will (2 vols.: Amsterdam 1988)

NB. References to the ancient sources follow the standard conventions. Where Diodorus Siculus is cited by chapter and section alone the reference is to Book 17.

INTRODUCTION

This brief foreword has two functions. It gives a summary review of the life and writing of Arrian in the light of the research of the last fifteen years and a somewhat fuller introduction to the specific content of Books IV and V. It is intended to be self-contained, but it is necessarily brief and related primarily to the subject-matter of this volume of commentary. For a more extended discussion the reader should consult the Introduction to volume i.

1. ARRIAN AND THE ALEXANDER HISTORY

In recent years there have been several reviews of Arrian's career, notably by Sir Ronald Syme.¹ As a result the outline has sharpened and the areas of dispute clarified. Some enigmas remain, in particular the date of Arrian's entry into the Roman senate and the number and nature of his pre-consular posts, but there is a large measure of agreement. The details may be summarized as follows:

- | | |
|------------|---|
| AD 85-90 | L. Flavius Arrianus born at Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he holds the priesthood of Demeter and Kore and (probably) civic office. |
| c.108 | Study at Nicopolis under Epictetus, whose <i>Diatribae</i> he summarizes and later publishes. |
| c.110 | Service in the <i>militia equestris</i> , in Noricum and Pannonia. |
| c.112 | Attested in the <i>consilium</i> of C. Avidius Nigrinus, imperial legate in Achaëa: familiar with the young Hadrian. |
| c.120 | Adlection to the Roman senate, probably <i>inter praetorios</i> . |
| c.125 | Proconsul of Baetica. |
| 129 or 130 | Suffect consul. |
| 131-7 | Legate of Cappadocia, touring the Black Sea coast in 131/2 and defending his province against invasion by the Alani in 135. |
| 145/6 | Eponymous archon in Athens, where he is resident. |

Arrian's literary corpus is incompletely attested.² He wrote in

¹ Syme, *Roman Papers* iii 1436-46; iv 21-49. For my own recent contributions see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 16-25; *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 226-75, esp. 226-33. See also Stadter 1-18; Tonnet i 7-59.

² The fullest treatments are those of Stadter 22-59, 133-63, and Tonnet i 60-101. There is discussion of the minor works, the *Periplus*, *Essay on Tactics*, *Order of Battle against the Alani*, and *Cynegeticus* in *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 226-337 (contributions by Bosworth, Silberman, and Devine).

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several genres, including philosophy, and he was in fact celebrated as a philosopher in his lifetime. However, apart from his record of Epictetus' doctrine and a few fragments of a treatise on meteorology that side of his work is entirely lost. Even our record of his historical work is incomplete. A bare reference in Photius reveals the fact that he described the achievements of Dion and Timoleon;³ an isolated statement in John the Lydian attests a history of the Alani,⁴ and Arrian's younger contemporary, Lucian, writes enigmatically of his record of the Mysian brigand, Tillorobus.⁵ What is attested of his works may therefore represent a fraction of the actual corpus. The following list provides a summary of known titles. A date is provided when it is reasonably certain, and works preserved in fragmentary form are marked with an asterisk.

A. Philosophy

- (i) *Diatribae*. Four books purporting to provide a verbatim transcript of Epictetus' lectures (before AD 140).
- (ii) *Encheiridion* ('Manual'). A digest of the salient features of Epictetus' teaching.
- (iii) **Meteorologica*. Six fragments survive, four of them substantial, dealing with the physical explanation of weather and the classification of comets.

B. History

- (i) **Monographs on Dion and Timoleon*.
- (ii) *History of Alexander* in seven books, and the monograph on India (*Indike*).
- (iii) **Bithyniaca*. A history, in eight books, of Arrian's native province from mythical times to the Roman annexation.
- (iv) **Parthica*. A history, in seventeen books, of the Parthians, from their origins to the end of Trajan's campaigns.
- (v) **History of the Successors or Events after Alexander* (τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον). A history, in ten books, of the four-year period from the death of Alexander to the spring of 319 BC.⁶

³ Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 93: 73^b5-13 = Arr. *Bithyn.* F 1. 2-3 (Roos). From Photius' meagre description of the works it would seem that *res gestae* is a better designation than *Lives*. As in the Alexander history Arrian documented the memorable (ἀξιαφ-ήγητα) achievements.

⁴ Lyd. *de mag.* 3. 53, p. 214. 22 (Bandy) = Arr. *Parth.* F 6 (Roos); Jacoby, *FGrH* 156 F 13, 37. On the dubious value of this passage see Bosworth, *CQ* 33 (1983) 265-71.

⁵ Luc. *Alex.* 2. See the Introduction to vol. i 36-7.

⁶ This work is the only one to have been enlarged by recent discoveries. A papyrus fragment (*PSI* xii 1284; printed in Wirth's revised edition of Roos's *Arriani Scripta Minora et Fragmenta* 323-4) has given us a brief and puzzling *aperçu* on Eumenes' campaigns against Ncoptolemus and Craterus, and a recently published palimpsest

C. Miscellaneous

- (i) *Periplus of the Black Sea* (shortly after AD 131). An account of the Black Sea littoral, based on a tour of inspection made as governor of Cappadocia.
- (ii) *Essay on Tactics* (Τεχνή τακτική), written in AD 136/7. An exposition of the military tactics of the Graeco-Macedonian period, combined with a description of the contemporary training exercises of the Roman cavalry.
- (iii) *Order of Battle against the Alani* (Ἑκταξίς κατὰ Ἀλανῶν). A record of Arrian's dispositions and battle plan to combat the threatened Alan invasion of AD 135.
- (iv) *Cynegeticus*. A recreation of Xenophon's treatise, taking account of contemporary conditions and the introduction of the Celtic greyhound (after AD 140).

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Arrian is his declared emulation of Xenophon. He was celebrated in his lifetime as the 'New Xenophon' and so he styled himself in several of his extant works. His indebtedness to Xenophon is indeed profound. Arrian admits that he had the same preoccupations as his namesake: hunting, generalship, and culture (*Cyneg.* 1. 4). His writing reveals Xenophon's influence at every level. Epictetus was his Socrates, Alexander his Agesilaus; and as a stylistic model Xenophon is omnipresent. The imitation may be small-scale, like the isolated echoes in the speeches for Alexander,⁸ or it may amount to elaborate pastiche, like the *Order of Battle against the Alani*, which is based on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*⁹ and sets Arrian (termed 'Xenophon') in the role of Xenophon's ideal king, Cyrus. The *Cynegeticus*, which he wrote late in life at Athens, is a detailed meditation on Xenophon's treatise on hunting adopting its vocabulary and presupposing detailed knowledge of the original (but, unlike Xenophon's work, suffused with real love for his dogs and sympathy for the quarry).¹⁰

Xenophon's influence was not, however, all-pervasive. Arrian's

provides a mangled but largely comprehensible description of the operations of winter 320/19 BC (J. Noret, *AC* 52 (1983) 235-42; S. Schröder, *ZPE* 71 (1988) 75-90). There is a translation (excluding the Göteborg palimpsest) and brief commentary by W. J. Goraliski, *AncW* 19 (1989) 81-108.

⁷ See further W. Ameling, *Epigraphica Anatolica* 4 (1984) 119-22; Bosworth, *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 272-5.

⁸ On the echoes in Alexander's Opis speech see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 104-5, 107. On the Hyphasis speech see below, 5. 26. 1, 9; 27. 1 nn.

⁹ The model, foreshadowing Arrian's blend of third person imperatives and accusatives and infinitives, is *Cyrop.* 5. 3. 34-45. For details see Bosworth, *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 264-6.

¹⁰ Stadter 53-9 (cf. *GRBS* 17 (1976) 157-67); Bosworth, *ANRW* 34.1 (1993) 234-8.

earliest exercises in history, the lost monographs on Dion and Timoleon, have no obvious parallel in his works, and the Alexander history owes as much in style and inspiration to Herodotus and Thucydides as it does to Xenophon.¹¹ It is written as an encomium of Alexander, its declared aim to match Xenophon's immortalization of the Ten Thousand, but there is no explicit model in Xenophon's work except (at a distant remove) the *Cyropaedia*. Arrian's Alexander does recall the idealized Cyrus of Xenophon, and his vocabulary often echoes the phraseology of the *Cyropaedia*.¹² However, the work as a whole evokes the entire spectrum of Xenophon's work, from the *Agésilas* to the *Anabasis*.¹³ For that reason the traditional title of Arrian's history, *Anabasis Alexandri*, is inappropriate. Xenophon's *Anabasis* does not provide a narrative model, and it is not a predominant source of stylistic inspiration. The older designation of Arrian's work, that used by Photius, is preferable: τὰ κατὰ Ἀλέξανδρον.¹⁴ By contrast the title *Anabasis* is late, used first in Stephanus of Byzantium and in vogue by the twelfth century, when the codex Vindobonensis, the origin of all extant manuscripts of Arrian, was copied. It has no support from Arrian himself and is best avoided.

The Alexander history came relatively early in the sequence of Arrian's historical works. It followed the monographs on Dion and Timoleon but preceded his major, non-extant histories: the *Bithynica*, the *Parthica*, and the *History of the Successors*.¹⁵ If the relative sequence is assured, the absolute date of the Alexander history remains a stumbling block. Certainty is hardly attainable, but the cumulative evidence of a number of passages strongly suggests the period of Hadrian's accession:

(i) The ignorance of Cappadocian geography, which is avowed at 7. 16. 3-4 and implicit at 5. 3. 2 (see note), best fits the period before Arrian's legateship.

(ii) The curiously qualified language used in relation to Roman bridging of the Tigris and Euphrates (5. 7. 2 with note) points to the period immediately after Trajan's conquests, when Hadrian renounced further annexation.

(iii) There are some indications that Arrian was unfamiliar with the topography of Rome and Baetica (cf. 1. 16. 4; 2. 16. 4, with

¹¹ On Arrian's debt to Herodotus Grundmann (vol. i 35 n. 4) remains fundamental. On the stylistic influence of Thucydides see now Tonnet i 283-96.

¹² See, for instance, 1. 1. 1; 4. 11. 9, 29. 7; 5. 4. 5, 26. 1 nn.

¹³ Tonnet i 258-81 (esp. 261-6) gives a good survey, although to my mind he underestimates the importance of the *Cyropaedia*.

¹⁴ Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 91: 68^b1; cod. 58: 17^a24; cf. cod. 93: 73^b12. For full documentation see vol. i 7-8.

¹⁵ Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 93: 73^b11-14 = Arr. *Bithyn.* F 1. 3 (Roos). On the interpretation of this passage see Bosworth, *CQ* 22 (1972) 178-82; *From Arrian to Alexander* 28-9. For more sceptical approaches see Wirth, *Studien* 32, 240-1; Stadter 181-2.

notes). These references are inconclusive, perhaps the result of deliberate archaizing. Arrian *may* have ignored contemporary conditions (as for instance, when he describes the extinct silphium crop of Cyrene as a present reality),¹⁶ but it is more likely that, when he wrote, he had no direct knowledge, and was familiar neither with Rome nor with Baetica.

The most eloquent evidence remains the 'Second Preface' (1. 12. 5), which has attracted considerable attention in recent years.¹⁷ There Arrian writes emphatically, assuring his readers that the works he has produced mean everything to him. They surpass his country (*πατρίς*), his family (*γένος*), and the offices (*ἀρχαί*) he has held. The latter he qualifies as offices 'in my own country' (*ἐν τῇ ἐμᾶυτοῦ*), which can only be the local offices held in Nicomedia before adlection to the Roman senate. It is not absolutely certain that Arrian was writing before he rose to senatorial office, but his terminology is consistent with the internal evidence of his history. It looks as though his work was planned in the high tide of Trajanic expansion, when Alexander was seen as a forerunner and a model, and completed after Hadrian renounced the conquests beyond the Euphrates. As the role model of the deified Trajan, Alexander necessarily retained a charismatic aura, but his appetite for conquest, trenchantly denounced by the Indian gymnosophists (7. 1. 4-6), was no longer fashionable and could be treated somewhat critically (cf. 2. 26. 3; 4. 21. 3; 5. 24. 8; 7. 19. 6).

The 'Second Preface' is not merely of chronological importance. It defines the tone of the work. Alexander has never had his Homer, his Pindar, or his Xenophon. As a result he has not dominated the popular imagination, as Clearchus and the Ten Thousand have managed to do, despite the relative insignificance of their achievements (1. 12. 1-3). Consequently Arrian considers it his task to create a lasting literary memorial for Alexander, one in keeping with the unsurpassed magnitude of his achievements. Because of his literary talents, displayed in his published work, he has achieved a pre-eminence in Greek letters which matches that of Alexander in arms, and therefore he can invest Alexander with the fame he deserves. He echoes Callisthenes (see below, 4. 10. 2 n.) in his literary claims, and places his literary ability alongside the military expertise of Alexander.

What emerges is a literary memorial to the Macedonian conqueror,

¹⁶ *Ind.* 43. 13; cf. 3. 28. 7 with note.

¹⁷ Stadter, *Illinois Classical Studies* 6 (1981) 157-71; J. L. Moles, *JHS* 105 (1985) 162-8; J. M. Marincola, *JHS* 109 (1989) 186-9; V. J. Gray, *JHS* 110 (1990) 180-6. In what follows I summarize views which are fully expounded elsewhere (see particularly Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 32-7), and for the most part I dispense with annotation.

designed to show his achievements to their greatest effect. Overt and unashamed in the peroration (7. 27. 1-30. 4),¹⁸ the encomium pervades every aspect of the narrative. The record of military success is punctuated by examples of Alexander's forethought, and the staggeringly low cost in Macedonian casualties is emphasized at every level. Arrian's narrative is lucid and evocative, at its best (for instance in the description of the battle of the Hydaspes or the Indus voyage) a model of *ἐνάργεια*. The narrative technique is enhanced by skilful echoes of earlier historiography, notably Thucydides (see the subtle borrowings in the account of the Hydaspes: 5. 11. 1, 12. 3, 17. 2-3 with notes), and the alert reader in antiquity would have picked up the allusions consciously and subconsciously. The overwhelming impression would have been of a historical narrative on the grand style, emulating the great masters of the past, and the subject of the narrative was necessarily endued with an aura of glory. Style and content alike enhance the encomium.

There is little doubt that Arrian chose the sources which allowed him greatest scope for eulogy. In the *Praefatio* he names Ptolemy and Aristobulus as his primary sources, whom he considers more trustworthy than the rest. His grounds are simple: they were contemporaries, participants in the campaign, and wrote after Alexander's death, when there was no constraint or inducement to distort the truth. The strong implication is that both sources were eulogistic, but Arrian accepts the eulogy as justified, given the fact that neither could expect favour or reprisals at Alexander's hands. What can be identified of the characteristics of the two bears out the primary impression: Ptolemy emphasized his own achievements in the reign out of all perspective and was set on propagandizing the military efficiency of the Macedonians, while there was a strong apologetic vein in Aristobulus' work.¹⁹ Given that Arrian accepts the consensus of his main sources as absolute truth, there is a preponderance of what can only be termed propaganda.²⁰ For all its effectiveness as narrative his history needs the corrective of other sources, in particu-

¹⁸ For full discussion see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 135-56.

¹⁹ See the *mise au point* in vol. i 26-32.

²⁰ I leave aside the question of the 'Royal Ephemerides', which many have seen as a court journal, deriving from the secretariat of Eumenes of Cardia and describing the official events of the reign on a day-to-day basis. I argued against this theory in vol. i 23-4, and expanded the case some years later (*From Arrian to Alexander* 157-84). In the meantime the traditional view has been restated on numerous occasions by N. G. L. Hammond (*Three Historians* 4-11; *GRBS* 28 (1987) 331-47; *Historia* 37 (1988) 129-50; *Sources* 200-5; for criticism see E. Badian, in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* 610-25). Full discussion must be reserved for the final volume of this commentary (7. 25. 1-26. 3); but I should emphasize here that my views of the encomiastic nature of Ptolemy's and Aristobulus' work are quite unrelated to the question of their archival derivation. Both authors, I presume, were selective, and, like Arrian, chose what material best suited their interpretation of Alexander and his regime.

lar the so-called 'vulgate' tradition, the common source for large segments of Curtius Rufus, Diodorus, Justin, and the Metz Epitome.²¹ This tradition most probably derives from Cleitarchus of Alexandria, writing in the first generation after Alexander's death, and, though it inclines to the sensational, it provides material which can supplement and correct Arrian. No source is beyond criticism or rejection, and the modern historian must weigh the balance of evidence in every episode, accepting or rejecting the variant traditions on a basis of cumulative probability.

Arrian also draws on material which he considers of secondary importance. As a general rule it is of very late provenance, related to the declamatory exercises of the rhetorical schools, and it is comparatively rarely used.²² In the *Praefatio* (3) he states that he will only recount material outside Ptolemy and Aristobulus when it is worthwhile and has some credibility and that he will cite it as 'sayings only' (ὡς λεγόμενα μόνον). It is worth emphasizing that Arrian is restricting himself to the secondary tradition. Whenever he uses it, he says, he will signalize the fact. That does not entail the converse, that the *only* material he designates as 'sayings' is the secondary material. From his own caveat at the beginning of the *Praefatio* we should assume that he had reservations when his main sources diverged and forced him to make a choice on grounds of probability and narrative appeal. In fact he consciously imitates Herodotus in expressing reservations about his source material, and he may on occasion use indirect speech to refer explicitly to the common tradition of Ptolemy and Aristobulus.²³ His procedure, as always, is varied and sophisticated, and it cannot be reduced to any simple formula. In any case the *Praefatio* is a general prescription, not an invariable statement of method. Ptolemy and Aristobulus are undoubtedly Arrian's principal sources but their works are not the only material which he uses without qualification. Eratosthenes and Nearchus, his named sources for the *Indike*, are woven into the fabric of the exposition, and Nearchus becomes almost a third narrative source in the last two books of the Alexander history.²⁴

²¹ See, at greater length, Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 8-13. I repeat my caveat that I use the expression 'vulgate' only in the sense of a shared tradition. I do not imply that *everything* in Curtius (or even Justin) derives from a single source. There is, however, considerable narrative overlap in sources other than Arrian, an overlap which can only be ascribed to a common tradition.

²² For full discussion see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 61-75, enlarging on the brief comments in the Introduction to vol. i 20-2.

²³ See particularly 2. 12. 3-6; 3. 26. 1, 27. 1, where Arrian is explicit. In the present volume see the commentary on Cleitus' murder (4. 8. 1-9. 4) and the visit to Nysa (5. 1-2).

²⁴ See the Appendix, pp. 361-5 below.

BOOKS IV AND V

2. BOOKS IV AND V

Books IV and V form the subject-matter of this volume of commentary. They present an interesting contrast. Both combine narrative with extended, complex digressions, but the nature of the digressions is very different. Book IV is dominated by a long moral appraisal of Alexander (4. 7. 4-14. 4). It is anchored to the dark episode of the mutilation of Bessus, which Arrian claims is an example of oriental arrogance and illustrates Alexander's fundamental lack of moderation. This deficiency, which rendered him incapable of true happiness, is then illustrated by the famous episodes of the murder of Cleitus (4. 8. 1-9. 6) and the experiment with *proskynesis*, both of which served as standard examples of Alexander's immoderation. Arrian deliberately recounts the two episodes out of chronological sequence and presents them as causally related: Anaxarchus' cynical justification of Cleitus' murder encouraged Alexander's pretensions to godhead (4. 8. 8-9). The whole digression serves the function of a sermon on the evils of intemperance, its headings neatly summarized in the reported speech of Hermolaus, which concludes the section (4. 14. 2). Arrian reproves the standard faults in Alexander's character, as he was bound to do in the interests of truth and moral utility (7. 30. 3), but the reproof is curiously muted. The brunt of his denunciation is born by the flatterers of Alexander's court and even by the victims, Cleitus and Callisthenes, who were largely responsible for their own downfall (4. 8. 5, 9. 1, 10. 1, 12. 6). It is an elaborate literary construction, and Arrian's use of sources is particularly complex. He uses reported speech in the main, but diverges into direct discourse to underscore moments of high drama (4. 8. 8, 13. 8). Aristobulus is cited four times on matters of detail (in every case apologetic)²⁵ and Ptolemy twice, in the context of the Pages' Conspiracy;²⁶ and Arrian clearly drew upon his subsidiary sources as well. The account of Cleitus' murder presupposes at least three separate traditions (4. 8. 8-9 nn.), woven into a composite narrative, and in these episodes, where source material was super-abundant, Arrian's selection and combination of data is at its most elusive.

The long digression on immoderation has a counterpart in the smaller excursus in praise of Alexander's sexual restraint (4. 19. 5-20. 3). Here again Arrian digresses chronologically with the retrospective story of Darius' wife, but the digression serves the purpose of encomium. A brief but vivid example of moderation, praised even by Alexander's adversary, mitigates and counteracts the longer digression which preceded, and re-establishes the prevailing tone of

²⁵ 4. 8. 9 = *FGrH* 139 F 29; 4. 13. 5-6 = F 30; 4. 14. 1 = F 31; 4. 14. 3 = F 33. See the notes ad locc.

²⁶ 4. 14. 1, 3 = *FGrH* 138 F 16-17.

admiration. It consolidates and develops the earlier tribute to Alexander's treatment of the royal ladies of Persia (2. 12. 3-8).

Between the digressions comes the military narrative, arranged in three main sections: first the revolt in Sogdiana in the summer of 329 (4. 1-6), next the crushing of rebellion over 328 and the spring of 327 (4. 15. 1-22. 2), and finally the campaigns to the north of the Cophen valley in the latter months of 327 (4. 22. 3-30. 9). The narrative of the central section is distorted by the separation of the murder of Cleitus from its chronological setting, and the campaign histories in the primary sources were obviously discrepant. Arrian's record here is thin, and more than usually at variance with the narrative of Curtius Rufus, which is for this period full and well integrated. By contrast Arrian's account of the invasion of India is far more detailed and informative, thanks predominantly to the personal record of Ptolemy, who distinguished himself in the fighting and took care that we should know it. Consequently Arrian's accounts of the siege of Massaga and the conquest of Mt. Aornus rank among the high points of his history.

The opening of Book V marks a sharp, deliberate break. Arrian has reached the Indus and is poised for his narrative of the campaign in the Punjab. Here he sets another digression, retrospectively retailing the events at Nysa, the small community in the Kunar valley which ascribed its origins to Dionysus. The episode is described at length and makes a deliberately exotic introduction to the Indian adventure. Alexander acknowledges the prior conquest by Dionysus and follows in his footsteps (5. 1. 5-2. 1). The digression allows Arrian the opportunity to underscore the irrational in Alexander's motivation, and also comment in Herodotean style on the status of myth in historical discourse (5. 1. 2, 3. 1). That in turn leads to an appreciation of Eratosthenes' strictures on the Macedonian manufacture of myth and Alexander's perverse readiness to see traces of his mythical ancestors wherever he went (5. 3. 1-4). The first three chapters present a rich background of heroic emulation, which has been hinted at in earlier books (3. 3. 1-2; 4. 28. 1-4) and is presupposed in the *proskynesis* debate (4. 10. 6, 11. 6-7). They introduce the exotic subject-matter of the Indian campaigns and simultaneously address the problems of Eratosthenes' brutal rationalization of the legends of Heracles and Dionysus.

Eratosthenes' rationalism leads to Eratosthenes' geography. Arrian sets the Indian campaigns in their geographical framework, harping on the prodigious dimensions of the Indian rivers. They rise from the central belt of mountains which in Eratosthenes' geography divided the world from west to east (5. 5. 2-5), and create an alluvial plain cognate to but far greater than the river valleys of Asia Minor (5. 6. 4-8). Here the detailed exposition of Nearchus is

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fused with the wider geographical system of Eratosthenes, and the overall impression is one of size. India is by far the largest of the four segments of Eratosthenes' Asia (5. 6. 2-3) and her rivers are beyond comparison greater than the rivers of Europe and Asia Minor (5. 4. 1-2, 6. 7-8). The conquests of Alexander consequently gain importance according to the dimensions of the territory he acquired and the rivers he crossed. If the aim of the work is to do justice to Alexander's achievements, then the scene setting at the beginning of Book V gives one a presentiment of unsurpassable aggrandizement. The digression is shaped as a commentary on the conquests. Arrian reserves further mythological, geographical, and ethnographical discussion for a separate monograph, the *Indike*, which he advertises at 5. 4. 3-5. 1. That will be a digest of the institutions and natural curiosities of the Indian lands: the present work concentrates on the proper background for Alexander.

The impressive prelude follows naturally on to a rich historical narrative. The *pièce de résistance* is the battle of the Hydaspes (5. 8. 4-19. 4), the most dramatic and detailed of all Arrian's military narratives, in which Alexander's planning and battle tactics appear to their best advantage. The king foresees all possibilities, and his calculations are wholly vindicated in the event. After this crushing victory Arrian deals with the campaigns in the Punjab and the crossings of the Acesines and Hydraotes. The narrative is largely built around the siege of Sangala, which was illuminated by the personal record of Ptolemy (5. 23. 6-24. 3), and the great scene at the river Hyphasis, which forms the climax of the book (5. 25. 1-29. 2). The latter is presented as a contest of will. Alexander has unlimited ambitions, but his men see only an accumulation of fruitless labour. Both perspectives are expounded in the great exchange of speeches between Alexander and Coenus: the king sees his mission as unlimited world-wide conquest, a prospect which demoralizes his men, who demand a limit to expansion and a return home. The exposition in these speeches is Arrian's own, and is based on standard rhetorical models. However, it expresses Arrian's appreciation of his hero's unlimited will to conquer, and makes it clear that all that frustrated his ambitions was lack of spirit in his men. The book began with Dionysus' precedent firing the troops for the invasion of India (5. 2. 1), and ends with their complete disillusionment. It is an evocative picture, and Arrian chooses his material to supplement it. The soldiers cannot match Alexander's ambitions, which are represented as feasible. By contrast the vulgate sources give a vivid and convincing description of the monsoon rains of 326 which rotted equipment and sapped morale, and make it clear beyond cavil that the troops were practically exhausted by the time they reached the Hyphasis. The details were mentioned by Arrian's

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sources (5. 20. 8-9, 29. 5 with notes) but are relegated to the periphery of his narrative. His aim is to set the achievements of the king in the best possible light, and that was hardly served by emphasizing the appalling campaigning conditions. Better to make a simple contrast between the king's indomitable spirit and his men's lesser appetite for danger and fatigue. The climax, in which the conquests of Alexander are expounded to great effect (5. 25. 3-5), serves as a focus for Arrian's literary eulogy, and makes an appropriate conclusion to the book. The Punjab is conquered, the rest of India preserved from conquest only by the weakness of his men, and for the moment he is poised on the banks of the Hydraspes awaiting the next great adventure, the Indus voyage.

The textual transmission of Arrian's Alexander history is outlined in volume i (38-42). My commentary is geared to the standard text by A. G. Roos (i: *Alexandri Anabasis*: 2nd edition, revised by G. Wirth, Leipzig, 1967), the first to be based on the readings of the codex Vindobonensis gr. 4 (A), the demonstrable exemplar of all other extant manuscripts. As before, I have taken the Greek lemmata exclusively from Roos whether or not my interpretation agrees with his reading. The most serviceable translation is in P. A. Brunt's Loeb edition (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1976-83), where text and translation are marked off by paragraph numbers on facing pages. Brunt uses Roos's text, with a few alterations (as do G. Wirth and O. von Hinüber in the Artemis edition, *Arrian, Der Alexanderzug, Indische Geschichte* (Munich and Zurich 1985)), and his edition is the most convenient for the Greekless reader to use in conjunction with my commentary.


BOOK IV

1. 1-2. *Reception of Saca Embassies (summer 329)*

See also *Itin.* 81 (derivative); Curt. 7. 6. 11 f. has a similar story but with additions and divergences which imply a different source. The consensus of modern authority is that Arrian here followed Aristobulus (Schwartz, *RE* ii 913; Strasburger 39; Kornemann 137), but there is no cogent evidence. The story of the Bactrian convention does seem derived from Aristobulus (cf. 4. 1. 5 n.) but the following two chapters patently reproduce Ptolemy (cf. 2. 6, 3. 5 nn.). Either source might have been used for the Saca embassies.

1. 1. Σκυθῶν τῶν Ἀβίων Homer (*Il.* 13. 4-6) mentions the Abii as a people far to the north of Troy; he refers to Thracians, Mysians, καὶ ἀγαυῶν ἱππημολγῶν | γλακτοφάγων Ἀβίων τε δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων. In the Homeric criticism of the Hellenistic age there was intense debate over the interpretation of the passage, in particular the question of which words are proper names and which epithets. The majority of authorities took Ἀβίων as an adjective agreeing with one of the preceding words (Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀβιοί; Nic. Dam., *FGrH* 90 F 104; cf. H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* iii (Berlin 1974) 393 f.). Some, however, including the great Aristarchus, took the word as a proper name (M. van der Valk, *Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad* ii (Leiden 1964) 590-2). Diophantus (*FGrH* 805 F 2) placed the Abii by the river Abienus, and Strabo identifies them generally with the Scyths and Sarmatians of the north (7. 3. 2 (296); 12. 3. 26 (553)—from Apollodorus). Much earlier Aeschylus had taken the Abii as a people—the model for the blissful ‘Gabii’ of the *Prometheus Unbound* (F 329 Mette), and clearly that was the interpretation adopted by Alexander and his entourage. Assuming as they did that the Syr-Darya was identical with the upper reaches of the European Tanais (cf. 3. 30. 7 nn.), it was natural for them to equate the Saca nomads of the area with the European Scyths (cf. 3. 8. 3 nn.). When approached by a poor (and apparently highly respected) Saca tribe they identified them with Homer’s Abii, perhaps understanding the name to mean ‘without livelihood’ (cf. Erbse iii 394). The fact that Arrian locates them in Asia suggests that their territory lay south of the Syr-Darya (see Map 1). Von Schwarz 58 plausibly suggests that they were a nomad people of the Kyzyl Kum, the desert north-west of Samarkand.

Nothing more is known of the Abii, except that they recur much



MAP 1. The campaigns in Sogdiana (summer 329 BC)

later in Ammianus' gazetteer, located north-east of Hyrcania in the steppes east of the Caspian (Amm. Marc. 23. 6. 53; cf. 61 f.).

αὐτόνομοι Curtius is more specific. The 'Abii' had been free since the time of Cyrus the Great. They refrained from war unless provoked, and nobles and commoners enjoyed relations of equality. Arrian's description is commonplace. Their poverty deterred aggressors (cf. 4. 11. 9) and their traditions inspired respect; both guaranteed their independence.

τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Σκυθῶν This people apparently lived north of the Syr-Darya (Curt. 7. 6. 12). If Alexander accepted the theory of the Tanais dividing Europe from Asia, he would automatically assume that the peoples north of the river were European Scyths and that if he followed the course of the river he would eventually reach the Sea of Azov (cf. 3. 30. 9 n.). In fact he seems to have thought the Crimea relatively near (Curt. 7. 6. 12; 8. 1. 7).

οἱ δὲ ... ἐποικοῦσιν If we accept the received reading, Arrian is stating that the people who approached Alexander were in fact the largest tribe of European Scyths. The expression is somewhat pleonastic but paralleled by 3. 8. 3 (Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῶν τῇν Ἀσίαν ἐποικούντων Σκυθῶν). Even so the repetition of Europe is very ponderous in this context, and Schmieder may have been right to delete Σκυθικόν as a marginal gloss. In that case Arrian is merely repeating the platitude that the Scyths are the most populous race in Europe (cf. Thuc. 2. 97. 5 f. with Gomme's note ad loc.)

2. τῶν ἐταίρων Both here and at 4. 15. 1 Arrian speaks of a number of ambassadors. Curtius, however, names a single man, Derdas (?), who was sent to the 'European Scyths' alone (7. 6. 12; 8. 1. 7; cf. Berve no. 250). Presumably Alexander sent out a number of ambassadors to outlying peoples, including the Abii (τούτοις refers to both Scythian embassies); and it was their activity which impelled the Chorasmian king to make his overtures in 328 (cf. 4. 15. 4 n.).

ὁ δὲ νοῦς κτλ. For a similar commission compare 7. 20. 10 (orders to Hieron of Soli in 323).

1. 3-5 *Planning of Alexandria Eschate. The First Sogdian Revolt*

3. ἐπενόει πόλιν οἰκίσαι This foundation (named Ἀλεξανδρέσχατα by Appian *Syr.* 57. 298) has been universally located near modern Khodzhen (cf. Droysen i² 2. 50; Tomaschek, *RE* i 1389; von Schwarz 47 ff.; Tschirikower 106). Throughout history Khodzhen has been the only settlement of any size along this stretch of the Syr-Darya; its distance from Samarkand (c. 290 km.) corresponds exactly with the 1,500 stades of Arrian 4. 6. 4, and it is on a highly strategic site, dominating the western access to the Fergana basin. Unfortunately the exact site has not been located, but it is of some interest

IV. 1.3 ALEXANDRIA ESCHATE; FIRST SOGDIAN REVOLT

that 4 km. south of Khodzent is Čorsu-Gozien, an ancient urban site where several archaeological finds have occurred, notably the neo-Attic Leninabad Krater (B. A. Litvinskij and N. O. Tursunov, *East & West* 24 (1974) 89 ff.). It may be the site of Alexandria Eschate.

What Arrian meant by ἐνεβόλει ('intended') is a somewhat vexed question. According to a recent detailed study (E. F. Bloedow, in *Hellenistische Studien: Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson*, ed. H. H. Schmitt (Munich 1991) 21-6; see also *PdP* 46 (1991) 53-4), 'the idea of building a city was still only in [Alexander's] mind' and, as such, not even known to the Sogdian natives. But intentions may be publicly proclaimed. When Alexander conceived the idea of colonizing the Arabian coast, he immediately sent agents as far afield as the Levantine coast to recruit rowers (Arr. 7. 19. 5). In the case of Alexandria Eschate he had apparently chosen the site of the city before the Sogdian revolt broke out (Curt. 7. 6. 13, 25), and it is more than likely that the fact had been advertised. But that does not justify the radical scenario constructed by Holt (54-8), who claims that the foundation of Alexandria Eschate severed traditional connections between the Sogdians and the Saca tribes. Alexander in effect created an artificial frontier, and the Sogdian revolt was a reaction against the new line of demarcation. If that is true, our sources—and Arrian in particular—have totally misrepresented the cause of the revolt, for no apparent reason. What is more, Holt's hypothesis, largely adapted from the work of Briant (see below, 17. 5 n.), smooths over the explicit evidence for hostility and conflict between the Sogdian population, static in their domiciles along the great rivers, and the nomad Sacae (see further *JHS* 110 (1990) 257; Bloedow, *PdP* 46 (1991) 44 ff.). Alexander is more likely to be following an Achaemenid precedent of containment and deliberately expanding the network of cities along the frontier. The announcement of the new city might have evoked justified fears that existing settlements (and nobles) would lose territory to it and so contributed to the outbreak of revolt. But the news cannot have travelled far by the time of the rebellion and is unlikely to have been its main inciting cause. It would certainly not explain the spread of the insurgency to Bactria, hundreds of kilometres from the frontier area.

Arrian's description is the most detailed evidence for any city foundation by Alexander, fuller than the comparable passage on Alexandria in Egypt (3. 1. 5 nn.; cf. 4. 24. 7). It is evident that military considerations were paramount (cf. Tscherikower 148 ff.). There is no hint of economic motives; Alexander's prediction of future greatness is based only on the large number of potential inhabitants and the glory of his own name. What Arrian has omitted is the function of the new foundation as a garrison centre,

the aspect most stressed by the vulgate sources (Curt. 7. 6. 13; cf. 7. 10. 16; Diod. 17 index κδ).

τῆς ἐπὶ Σκύθας . . . ἐλάσεως The possibility of Alexander invading Saca territory beyond the Syr-Darya is carefully presented as hypothetical (εἴ ποτε ξυμβαίνοι: Curtius 7. 6. 13 implies that an invasion was planned). In a later passage also (4. 15. 5-6) Alexander rejects suggestions that he push westwards from the Syr-Darya; his ambitions against India were more pressing. The tradition that he erected altars at the Syr-Darya also implies that he regarded the river as the terminal point of his empire in the north-east (Pliny *NH* 6. 49; cf. W. W. Tarn, *JHS* 60 (1940) 92).

τῆς προφυλακῆς . . . βαρβάρων The threat from the Saca nomads was probably considerable. In the early third century BC Alexandria in Margiana was destroyed by barbarians and refounded by Antiochus I, probably while he was regent in the east for his father, Seleucus (Pliny *NH* 6. 47; cf. Strabo 11. 10. 2 (576)). Alexandria Eschate may have suffered the same fate. Seleucus I is alleged to have founded the city in honour of Alexander (App. *Syr.* 57. 298), and, if the tradition is not wholly corrupt, what is at issue is a second foundation. The Seleucid general, Demodamas of Miletus, crossed the Syr-Darya some time before 300 and erected altars to Apollo of Didyma (Pliny, *NH* 6. 49; cf. Holleaux, *Études* iii 99 ff.; Jacoby, *FGH* 428). His activity may have been the response to a nomad incursion which destroyed Alexandria Eschate. See further, Tarn, *JHS* 60 (1940) 90-4; J. Wolski, *Klio* 38 (1960) 113-15; L. Robert, *BCH* 108 (1984) 467-72 (now fundamental).

4. τοὺς τε τὰ φρούρια . . . ἔχοντας We hear specifically of garrisons at the Bactrian citadel of Aornus (3. 29. 2 n.), at a fortress a few days' march from Bactra itself (4. 16. 4 f.), and at the Sogdian capital of Maracanda (4. 3. 7; *Metz Epit.* 9). It would seem from this passage that every settlement of any size had its garrison. If so, it was a surprisingly large commitment of second-line troops and indicates that the Sogdians' attitude to Alexander was overtly hostile from the start. His control was more visible and oppressive than the rule of the Achaemenids had ever been.

5. τῶν συλλαβόντων Βήσσον Cf. 3. 30. 5 n. Curtius 7. 6. 13-15 has a similar story, naming Spitameres and Catanes as the authors of the defection and claiming that Alexander first thought that the revolt could be stopped by their agency. The two accounts agree that there were several stages in the insurrection. First the communities near the Syr-Darya massacred their garrisons. Next came more generalized revolt in Sogdiana at the instigation of Spitamenes, and lastly the Bactrian nobles were drawn into the movement by the sinister rumours about the convocation at Bactra.

Arrian (like Curtius) has little about the motives of the rebels

IV. 1.5 ALEXANDRIA ESCHATE; FIRST SOGDIAN REVOLT

other than vague fears of Alexander's intentions. Modern speculation can hardly fill the gap. Local suspicions of his plans for the frontier district of the Iaxartes do not explain the generality and intensity of the rebellion (see above, 1. 3 n.). Nor is it likely (as argued by E. F. Bloedow, in *Hellenistische Studien: Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson* 26-30) that Alexander's provision of remounts from the local livestock (cf. 3. 30. 6) created a national spirit of resistance. In all probability there was a variety of motives, individual and communal. Spitamenes and Catanes may have felt that their services in surrendering Bessus had been inadequately rewarded, and the rest of the nobles of the joint satrapy had some reason for alienation. The satrap imposed upon them, though a Persian, had dynastic connections with Hellespontine Phrygia, at the opposite end of the Empire, and a network of garrisons was being imposed, which were an immediate expense and a potential curb upon local independence. Alexander's impact upon Bactria and Sogdiana was much greater than it had been upon central Iran, where he had passed quickly with minimal interference, and it would not be surprising if the numerous annoyances inflicted by the invading army had a cumulative antagonistic effect. It may have been the depredations near the Iaxartes and the rumour of the new foundation which sparked the first uprising, but there was clearly a deep feeling of antipathy throughout the satrapy and it took little agitation for the rebellion to become general.

δείσαντες The traditional correction, *δείσαντας* (Yxem, Pflugk, Krüger), is unnecessary. What is at issue is the attitude of the Sogdian insurgents. Either they had genuine fears of Alexander's motives or invented possible dangers to justify the revolt. The correction, referring the fear to the Bactrians, spoils the antithesis and produces bad sense.

τοὺς ὑπάρχους An important piece of evidence for the administration of Bactria (not Sogdiana, as is sometimes assumed; e.g. Berve i 267; Schachermeyr² 342). The satrapy was largely in the hands of a landed nobility, who held sway over their districts from baronial strongholds. Their numbers were large: according to Curtius (7. 6. 14f.) they formed a cavalry élite 7,000 strong. Alexander's motives for summoning them to Bactra are unknown, but the suspicions of the participants may have been partially justified. The relative independence of the Bactrian nobility can hardly have been palatable to him; and he may have intended to depose many of them, or at least to place them more directly under satrapal government. These *ὑπαρχοί* had their counterparts in Sogdiana, where there are frequent references to the great baronial strongholds (cf. 4. 18. 4, 21. 1 with notes); and the rock of Choriene is said to have been the refuge for a good many hyparchs (4. 21. 2). The number of local

rulers was presumably comparable to that of Sogdiana. See now Briant, *RTP* 241-4, and *L'Asie Centrale* 82-6.

Ζαρίασσα The alternative name of the capital, Bactra (cf. 3. 25. 4 n.). The fact that the form *Βάκτρα* occurs at 3. 30. 5 in a fragment of Ptolemy suggests that *Ζαρίασσα* was the name used by Aristobulus, and that this passage is derived from him. See also 4. 7. 1, 16. 5-6.

2. 1-3. 5. *Capture of Seven Sogdian Cities*

Cf. *Itin.* 82 f. (derivative); Curtius 7. 6. 16-24.

2. 1. κατὰ λόχους The infantry *λόχος* appears to have been the primary unit of command. Note Alexander's later procedure in Carmania and at Babylon (6. 27. 6; 7. 24. 4).

Γάζα The city is mentioned (without its name) by Curtius 7. 6. 16. Von Schwarz 54 identifies it with Nau, the second-largest modern city of the area, 27 km. from Khodzhent.

2. Κυρούπολιν Curtius 7. 6. 16 gives the common Latin transcription, Cyropolis (cf. J. Wackernagel, *Glotta* 14 (1925) 38). Strabo 11. 11. 4 (517) has the form *Κῦρα*; other sources have *Κυρέσχατα* (Ptol. 6. 12. 5; Steph. Byz.; Amm. Marc. 23. 6. 59). E. Benveniste, *Journal Asiatique* 224 (1943/5) 163-6, suggests that the form *Κυρέσχατα* corresponds to a local toponym **Kuruš-kaθa* ('city of Cyrus'), so that Arrian's version of the name is a direct translation (see already Weissbach, *RE Suppl.* iv 1127). In that case there was a local tradition, probably justified, that the city was founded by Cyrus the Great during his last campaign on the Syr-Darya early in 530 (cf. Altheim-Stiehl 165). It has been located at Ura-Tyube, the largest fortress of the area, whose citadel corresponds exactly to the description at Arrian 4. 3. 4 (von Schwarz 51 f.; Brunt, *Arrian* i 505). But Ura-Tyube is some 50 km. south of the Syr-Darya, hardly located on the river, as Strabo says of Cyropolis. It seems more plausible that the modern Kurkat, 40 km. west of Khodzhent, was the ancient city; the name at least seems derived from the ancient toponym (Benveniste 165 f., followed by Lane Fox 301 f. (who seems to confuse the site with Alexandria Eschate)). Ura-Tyube may have been Curtius' city of the Memaceni (see below); Benveniste 166 can hardly be right that the name Gyreschata was transferred in the course of time from Ura-Tyube to Kurkat.

3. γῆινω For Turcoman mud-wall construction, which cannot have differed radically from the time of Alexander, see von Schwarz 50.

4. οὕτως ... προστεταγμένον Cf. Curtius 7. 6. 16. Arrian emphasizes that the massacre was an act of policy, to deter resistance and encourage surrender elsewhere. According to Curtius, Alexander advertised his *clementia* to those who surrendered; but, if we may

believe Ptolemy (cf. 4. 3. 5), the rebels who did capitulate were kept in chains as prisoners of war. In Alexander's eyes the Sogdians had renounced his sovereignty, and he was implacable. Depopulation and transplantation were to be the hallmarks of his policy in Sogdiana (cf. 6. 5 n.).

5. τοὺς ἱππέας ἐκπέμπει Here Curtius differs radically (7. 6. 17-19). Instead of an effortless capture of successive strongholds he tells of a protracted campaign against a people named 'Memaceni', who first massacred a squadron of cavalry (50 strong) sent to negotiate their surrender, withstood a siege by Perdiccas and Meleager, and finally fell to Alexander himself, inflicting the famous neck wound (see below, 3. 3 n.). Ptolemy and Arrian have omitted the entire episode. They mention the dispatch of cavalry, but maintain that in both cases they were successful. Curtius' cavalry troop was massacred. Two points deserve consideration:

(i) Arrian/Ptolemy implies that exactly the same happened at both rebel strongholds. The inhabitants fled directly into the advancing cavalry. That this happened twice and simultaneously is implausible.

(ii) Aristobulus claimed that the city captured after Cyropolis was taken by storm and its inhabitants slaughtered (below, 3. 5 n.). This is exactly what happened at the city of the Memaceni and Curtius places the sack immediately after Cyropolis (7. 6. 23). Aristobulus, then, appears to have followed the tradition of Curtius (cf. Hammond, *Three Historians* 142).

There is at least a possibility that Ptolemy conflated a successful and an unsuccessful operation, omitting the Memaceni altogether and implying that the campaign was a sequence of effortless victories. In that case we have a deliberate falsification, comparable to the suppression of the action against Madates and the Uxii (cf. 3. 17. 2 n.). It is more difficult to dismiss Curtius, whose story is clear and circumstantial; and, where it suits him, Berve accepts his account without question (cf. Geyer, *RE* xix 605).

3. 2. οὐ ξυνεχεῖς τοῖς τεύχεσιν As late as the nineteenth century the Turcomans built their defensive mud walls directly over water-courses on a crude foundation of logs. Von Schwarz 51 remarks that Ura Tyube in his day was intersected by a stream and in the dry season it was perfectly easy to squeeze underneath the walls in the manner described by Arrian. That is not a reason in itself for locating the action at Ura-Tyube (cf. 4. 2. 2 n.); the stratagem was presumably possible at any Sogdian fortress with mud walls of this type.

τοὺς τε σωματοφύλακας κτλ. This is a surprisingly large force for a concealed attack; one would have thought that it would have

alerted the defenders. It is strange also that the Sogdians were not aware that their defences were vulnerable where the walls crossed the watercourse. According to Arrian, they only realized their danger when the gates were open and the attackers were in possession of the lower city.

3. βάλλεται λίθω Curtius 7. 6. 22 states that the wound was inflicted at the city of the Memaceni after the fall of Cyropolis (Plutarch *Mor.* 341 B erroneously locates it in Hyrcania). If, as we probably should, we accept Curtius' general account of the two sieges, it would seem that Arrian has wrongly placed the wound at Cyropolis. Ptolemy presumably conflated incidents from both sieges. The wound affected Alexander more seriously than Arrian implies. It impaired his vision for some time (Plut. *Al.* 45. 5; *Mor.* 341 B; Curt. 7. 6. 22) and rendered him almost inaudible (Curt. 7. 7. 5, 20, 9. 11). Suffering as he did from his earlier fracture of the leg (cf. 3. 30. 11 n.) it is hardly surprising that Alexander was *hors de combat* until the Scythian challenge (Curt. 7. 8. 3 f.).

4. ἐνδεία ὕδατος Von Schwarz 52 observes that in his day many of the Sogdian fortresses were ill-supplied with water, functioning more as garrisons than citadels proper.

The fate of the defenders is not stated, but at best they were enslaved and kept in chains (see below). Both Strabo 11. 11. 4 (517) and Curtius 7. 6. 20 f. agree that Alexander destroyed Cyropolis in spite of his veneration for Cyrus. It *may* have been refounded later with a nucleus of Macedonians (cf. Ael. *NA* 16. 3).

5. τὴν δὲ ἑβδόμην κτλ. The variant has been taken as evidence that the accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus were virtually identical at this point (Strasburger 15, 39; cf. Kornemann 11). But the immediate context is merely the fate of the city captured after Cyropolis. Both authors went on to describe another engagement, Ptolemy telling of a surrender, Aristobulus of a capture by storm. The figure of seven comes from Ptolemy, and we have no reason to think that Aristobulus gave the same number of minor strongholds. What is certain, however, is that Aristobulus had the same tradition as Curtius regarding the fate of the city captured after Cyropolis (cf. 4. 2. 5 n.), and nothing warrants dismissing his account as an 'unjustified generalization' (Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 505). If there is a bias, it is likely to be in Ptolemy, deliberately understating the resistance of the rebels.

Πτολεμαῖος δὲ κατανεῖμαι Whether or not Ptolemy is correct about the fate of this last city, he is presumably well-informed about the treatment of rebels who capitulated. They were to be kept in chains in the army and disposed of (i.e. sold as slaves) only after Alexander had left the area (one cannot determine how extensively *χώρα* is to be understood). Some prisoners were in fact liberated, to

join the underprivileged mass of settlers at Alexandria Eschate (cf. 4. 4. 1 n.), but Alexander still considered it necessary to isolate potential rebels from their homeland. When he invaded India he took with him large cavalry forces from the north-eastern satrapies (cf. 5. 11. 3; 12. 2 nn.); and the *Epigoni*, that body of Iranian infantry levied to serve as hostages and auxiliaries, were also recruited from the upper satrapies, in particular from Alexander's new city foundations (7. 5. 1 n.; cf. Curt. 8. 5. 1). In both cases the troops were effectively transplanted from their homes and could be used with relative safety as auxiliary troops. See further Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 17-18.

3. 6-6. 7 *Sortie across the Tanais and the Débaîcle against Spitamenes*

6. τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Σκυθῶν Living, as they did, north of the Tanais/Syr-Darya, these Sacae should properly be described as European (Brunt, *Arrian* i 345 n. 1; cf. 4. 1. 1 n.). Possibly Arrian's source only understood the Tanais as the continental boundary in its lower reaches, where it was thought relatively close to the Maeotis (cf. 4. 1. 1, 16. 4 nn.); the Saca tribes due north of Alexandria Eschate therefore belonged to Asia. Alternatively the looseness of expression may be due to Arrian; he seems to have believed the Sacae to be a self-contained class of Asiatic Scyths, distinct from their European counterparts (cf. 3. 8. 3). In either case there is little doubt that these Sacae came from the territories due north towards Tashkent (von Schwarz 60 f.). They had not been approached by Alexander's embassies to the peoples further west.

ἀκούσαντες According to Curtius 7. 7. 1 the Sacae were sent to destroy Alexandria Eschate, which their king saw as a threat, and to drive the Macedonians back from the river. *Metz Epitome* 8 speaks more conservatively of orders to prevent a crossing by Alexander. Both sources agree that they were commanded by the king's brother Carthasis (Berve no. 413). None of this is inconsistent with Arrian, who merely stresses the aggressiveness of the Sacae, implying that they had no reason to fear an attack across the Tanais (cf. 4. 1. 3 n.) and that the provocation was all on their side. That is later underlined in the Saca king's apology (4. 5. 1).

λόγου ὃν ἄξιον The MS reading (ἄν ἄξιον) should be retained. Arrian provides an exact parallel for this combination of ἄν and the optative (*Cyneg.* 7. 1, where Hercher similarly deleted ἄν), and the usage is not uncommon in a protasis expressing a present condition with some likelihood of fulfilment (Goodwin § 506; Kühner-Gerth ii 481 f.; Schwyzler ii 685 f.). The Sacae, Arrian says, intend to cross if (which is likely) there should be revolt on a large scale.

τοῦς ἐν Μαρακάνδοις . . . ἐν τῇ ἄκρᾳ The citadel of Maracanda

had its own defensive circuit within the city (Curt. 7. 6. 10; cf. P. Bernard *et al.*, *CRAI* 1990. 367; 1992. 276–82). The citadel proper was small, no more than seventy to eighty metres square, but the Achaemenid fortifications which surrounded it may have ringed the northern plateau of Afrasiab, protecting an area of some fourteen hectares (Bernard, *CRAI* 1990. 368–9). Separated from the rest of the plateau by a ravine (see below, 8. 9) and protected by hills to the north, this inner defence could be held by relatively few men. Arrian's account has the action take place at Maracanda itself (cf. 5. 2–3, 6. 3–4). Curtius, however, implies that the garrison was expelled from Maracanda (7. 6. 24). That may mean only that it was driven from the residential area of the city into the smaller complex of fortifications around the citadel; but, when Curtius later reports Spitamenes' fears of being trapped within the walls of Maracanda (7. 7. 31; cf. Arr. 5. 3), there is no hint of any Macedonian force within the citadel. Indeed *Melz Epitome* 9 is explicit that the garrison was routed and the survivors took refuge in a stronghold elsewhere in the satrapy. That may be a misunderstanding of the geography of Maracanda, the inner citadel being taken as a separate stronghold outside the capital. If, however, the information is correct, we must assume that Arrian's source (which must here be Ptolemy) was eager to obscure the fact that Maracanda was temporarily lost to the insurgents and represented the garrison holding out in the citadel.

7. Ἀνδρόμαχόν τε ἀποστέλλει The composition of this force recalls the successful expedition against Satibarzanes in Areia (cf. 3. 28. 2 n.). There are several commanders and an Iranian is associated with them. One (Caranus) had actually participated in the Areian campaign. Curtius' report (7. 6. 24) roughly coheres. He agrees on the 800 cavalry but gives an infantry figure of 3,000 (twice that in Arrian); and he names only one commander, Menedemus (cf. 7. 7. 31; *Melz Epit.* 13). Of Arrian's three commanders (there is no evidence for E. Carney's hypothesis (*GRBS* 22 (1981) 155–7) that there was a fourth commander—Andronicus, son of Agerrhus), Caranus is singled out as leader of the mercenary cavalry (cf. 4. 5. 7, where ἱππάρχης is used in a non-technical sense (cf. 3. 27. 4 n.)). Andromachus figures earlier in the campaign as a commander of mercenary cavalry (3. 12. 5, 25. 4), and Berve (no. 75) may have been right to infer that he was leader of the sixty Companions. It is equally possible, however, that he had responsibility for the entire cavalry, with Caranus subordinate to him. Menedemus (Berve no. 504) is unknown outside this episode. He was probably a mercenary commander with responsibility for the infantry (cf. Berve i 148). He is not mentioned in the excerpt from Ptolemy's battle narrative, where a certain Aristomachus appears to be in charge of the foot

(see below, 5. 5 n.). The commanders named here are those who figure in the variant from Aristobulus (below, 6. 1-2), who is probably the source for this present passage (*contra* Strasburger 39; Kornemann 64).

ἐπιτάσσει δὲ αὐτοῖς Φαρνούχην Pharnuches (Berve no. 768), despite his alleged Lycian origins, was clearly a noble of Iranian stock. It is difficult to see how he acquired his expertise in Sogdian unless he had lived in those parts (cf. Briant, *L'Asie Centrale* 94-6). His name, moreover, is Iranian, derived from **farnah* ('glory') with the suffix *-uka* (Mayrhofer 214). It is a relatively rare name, but the etymologically cognate name Pharnaces is attested in Lycia during the Roman period (*TAM* 2. 1128; 1146 (Olympus); *IGR* 3. 592 (Sidyma); *BE* 1953. 195, p. 178 (Xanthos)), and the individuals concerned were probably the descendants of Iranian landowners settled in Achaemenid times. Pharnuches may well have been established in Lycia after the Hecatomnids acquired suzerainty over the area in the third quarter of the fourth century BC (cf. 1. 24. 4 n.). He probably attached himself to Alexander during the king's passage through Lycia (winter 334/3) and enjoyed the high favour accorded to the early deserters, men like Mithrines and Amminapes (1. 17. 4; 3. 16. 5, 22. 1 with notes). His son, Bagoas (Berve no. 194) was also prominent at court, the only oriental trierarch attested at the Hydaspes (*Ind.* 18. 8). See below, 4. 6. 1 n.

Arrian's wording suggests that Pharnuches was placed in charge of the whole expedition. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 516, and Berve ii 380 n. 1 argue that there is some ambiguity in Arrian's use of ἐπιτάττειν (perhaps meaning 'attach to'). But Arrian's usage is consistent. In similar contexts the word unambiguously means 'place in charge' (cf. 1. 24. 1; 3. 24. 5; 4. 16. 2, 24. 10; 6. 21. 3), and clearly in our passage he understood that a Greek force with three Macedonian officers was placed under the overall command of the Iranian Pharnuches. This is quite exceptional. The closest parallel appears to be Artabazus' role in the expedition against Satibarzanes (3. 28. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 2), but Artabazus was then an attaché, the overall command in the hands of Alexander's general, Erigyus. Later Artabazus apparently shared command in Bactria with Coenus (4. 17. 2-3), but he certainly did not have precedence. The outstanding position of Pharnuches is a major difficulty. In addition the later narrative of Ptolemy reads as though Andromachus (or Aristomachus) was the effective commander, of cavalry at least (4. 5. 5, 7 with notes); and, although Arrian there twice refers to Pharnuches and his forces (5. 3, 5), he nowhere indicates that Pharnuches played any role for good or ill in the débâcle (Jacoby loc. cit.; Pearson, *LHA* 209 n. 88). In fact this introductory passage coheres closely in content and vocabulary with the variant from Aristobulus

(cf. 4. 6. 1), and it is the kernel of Aristobulus' story that Pharnuches was commander-in-chief. I assume that Arrian's story of the appointment of commanders is also taken from Aristobulus (*contra*, Jacoby, *FGrH* 138 F 34; Strasburger 39) and that the two references to Pharnuches in the Ptolemaic narrative are an addition by Arrian, who doubtless remembered that he had earlier reported Pharnuches as commander of the expedition against Spitamenes.

The story of Pharnuches' command seems unique to Aristobulus and is an integral part of his contentious narrative of the affair. The generals who failed at the Polytimetus became the butt of court propaganda, Alexander apparently being eager to lay the débâcle at their door, rather than risk criticism of his own judgement of the danger from Spitamenes (Plut. *Al.* 50. 8; cf. Schachermeyr² 366). Ptolemy accordingly ascribed the reverse to lack of co-ordination in command and indiscipline. Aristobulus went further and accused them of total abdication of responsibility; Pharnuches attempted to resign his command but the others declined the offer, so causing the disaster (6. 1-2). There may even have been some intention of transferring the burden of guilt to a non-Macedonian commander. At all events the overall responsibility of Pharnuches is the key feature of Aristobulus' picture, and it is highly contentious. It is better to reject the tradition and to assume that Pharnuches was merely attached to the expedition as an interpreter and diplomat with no titular command over troops. The role of Artabazus in 330 was probably similar.

ἐρμηνεῖα Curtius 7. 10. 4 confirms that Alexander used interpreters for his dealings with the Sogdians; and the king apparently communicated with Persians through interpreters down to the end of his reign (Curt. 10. 3. 6). This passage of Arrian gives some hint of the distinguished background of these men and the power and prestige they enjoyed at court (cf. Berve i 64).

τῆς τε φωνῆς κτλ. Pace Briant, *L'Asie Centrale* 95, there is no way of deciding whether Arrian understood the local Sogdian to be a language in its own right or merely a dialect of Persian. *φωνή* in Arrian can designate either (6. 30. 3; *Ind.* 7. 3; *Cyneget.* 3. 6; *Tact.* 37. 4 (language); 6. 13. 5 (dialect)). The precise distinction, as with Greek and Macedonian, is probably irrelevant. The Persians and Sogdians apparently shared a lingua franca (Strabo 15. 2. 8 (724)), but the local variations could have been complex. Arrian places some emphasis upon Pharnuches' linguistic expertise, and there were evidently few people who could communicate effectively with the Sogdian insurgents.

4. 1. ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι Curtius 7. 6. 25 f. claims that the circuit of walls (60 stades in extent) was completed in precisely 17 days (so

Justin 12. 5. 12). No doubt this first fortification was a hasty construction of mud (von Schwarz 48f.).

τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων κτλ. The mix of population, Graeco-Macedonian and native settlers, is the same as at *Alexandria in Caucaso* (cf. 3. 28. 4 n.). Here Arrian (or his source) is out to draw a contrast between the disabled Macedonians, who had no choice in the settlement, and relatively free settlers. The distinction between volunteers and disabled recurs later (4. 24. 7; 5. 29. 2; 7. 21. 7); and it seems that Alexander's standard practice was to leave sick, wounded, or enfeebled soldiers in city foundations, to act as permanent settlers when they recovered. Similarly, in the case of garrison troops, the sick were left behind, to strengthen the garrison on recovery (cf. 5. 8. 3). These unfortunates clearly had no choice in their fate, whereas Arrian implies that the mercenaries were to some extent free agents (so Diod. 83. 2). Even so, there was probably some compulsion. Justin 12. 5. 8 implies that settlement in the colonies was a punitive measure, and the mercenary settlers were notoriously discontented with their lot, deserting the new cities as soon as reports of Alexander's death reached them (Diod. 99. 5f.; 18. 7. 1 ff.; Curt. 9. 7. 1-11; Arr. 5. 27. 5; cf. Tscherikower 192; Schachermeyr² 356f.; Holt 81-91; E. F. Bloedow, *PdP* 46 (1991) 67-8).

The status of the native population is more problematic. Arrian alleges that they were volunteers, like the Greek mercenaries; but the vulgate sources indicate that the native population was composed of prisoners of war, inhabitants of Cyropolis and neighbouring cities, who were first enslaved and then liberated to become *incolae* of the new foundation (Justin 12. 5. 12; Curt 7. 6. 27; cf. Arr. 4. 3. 5 with note). There is a similar action attested later, after the capture of the rock of Ariamazes (Curt. 7. 11. 29), and the draconian measure fits in well with Alexander's general policy of repression and transplantation after the Sogdian revolt (4. 2. 4, 3. 5 nn.)—the rebels were to be settled as a subject rural populace, supporting a military élite of Graeco-Macedonian settlers (cf. Briant, *RTP* 244-7). It is not impossible that there were some volunteer settlers, recruited from Sogdians who had remained loyal, but it seems to me more probable that Ptolemy was wrongly referring back Alexander's practice in India, where the locals do seem to have been invited to join the new foundations (cf. 4. 24. 7; 5. 29. 3). But even in India it is unlikely that the natives, volunteer settlers though they may have been, enjoyed the same status as the Graeco-Macedonian colonists. More probably they formed a pool of underprivileged labour, as the natives certainly did in Bactria and Sogdiana. At Ai-Khanum it appears that the rich hinterland, developed by irrigation during the Achaemenid period, was divided by the conquerors into manorial

domains, owned by Greek colonists and worked by natives attached to the land. The archaeological evidence is as yet incomplete, but thus far it coheres with the picture of the vulgate (P. Bernard, *CRAI* 1974. 286; Briant, *RTP* 247 f.).

θύσας . . . ποιήσας Alexander's usual reaction to happy events (7. 14. 1, 24. 4; cf. Berve i 85-90). There were similar celebrations at the foundation of *Alexandria in Caucaso* (3. 28. 4—no games recorded).

2. οὐ πλατύν Von Schwarz 47 estimated the width of the Syr-Darya at Khodzhent at 840 ft. (250 m.); but the river's course, and presumably its width, has changed constantly throughout the millenia. Indeed, if Alexandria Eschate is correctly sited at Čorsu-Gozien (cf. 4. 1. 3 n.), it seems probable that the river ran some distance south of its present course.

ὅπῳ τούτων παροξυνόμενος The decision to cross, according to Arrian, was made as a response to the taunts of the enemy—a reaction which he reports in several other contexts (4. 18. 6; cf. 2. 16. 8, 1. 7. 10 nn.). Curtius, however, tells of a carefully prepared attack and the rejection of a formal embassy of twenty Saca nobles, of which there is no trace in Arrian (Curt. 7. 8. 8 ff.). This is in keeping with the vulgate tradition that Alexander intended from the first to cross the Iaxartes and invade Saca territory (cf. 4. 1. 3 n.). Arrian may well be right that he was provoked by the insults, but the decision to cross probably had deeper grounds, as is implied by his speech in Curtius (7. 7. 10-19). See below, 4. 3 n.

τὰς διφθέρας Cf. 3. 29. 4 n. The vulgate tradition agrees that the light troops were ordered to cross the river on skin floats but emphasizes that the majority of troops, cavalry and infantry, were transported on *boats* (Curt. 7. 8. 6-8; *Metz Epit.* 10). The story is taken up in the account of the crossing, in which the boats play a key role (see below). This is a vivid and detailed tradition which is impossible to disprove. Ships' timber seems to have been readily available. Even in modern times there are small stands of poplar along the banks of the main rivers, and, as late as AD 1017, there is a record of boats being built on the Amu Darya for the conquest of Khorezm (W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*³ (London 1968) 278).

In Alexander's day the vegetation was far more luxuriant; and it is clear from both Arrian and Curtius that there were abundant woodlands throughout ancient Sogdiana (Arr. 4. 21. 3; Curt. 8. 1. 11, 2. 24, 37 f., 4. 7-14; *Metz Epit.* 26). Such woods would have been at their densest by the great rivers, and it is worth recalling that the main reason for identifying the Iaxartes with the European Don was the growths of silver fir along its banks (Polycleitus, *FGrH* 128 F 7), a wood prized for shipbuilding (Theophr. *HP* 5. 7. 1). There is no

reason to doubt that Alexander had ships built, but hardly in the numbers given by the vulgate (12,000 Curtius; 2,000 *Metz Epit.*). Note that Bessus had crossed the Oxus by boat earlier in the year (3. 28. 9).

3. **θυομένῳ δέ κτλ.** Curtius' story (7. 7. 8f., 22-9) has several significant differences. He mentions two sacrifices but implies that they took place on the same day, the first alone presaging danger for Alexander. He also gives a very circumstantial account of Erigyius' role in the affair and in passing reveals, no doubt correctly (cf. Tarn ii 106 f.), that it was customary for the seers to inspect the entrails in private, communicating the results later to the king.

καὶ αὖ ἐξ κίνδυνον Arrian does not elsewhere use *σημαίνεισθαι* impersonally (cf. 1. 25. 8; 3. 7. 7); Castiglioni's emendation, *καὶ αὐθις* (accepted by Roos and Brunt), is elegant and convincing. For the repetition of *αὐθις* compare 2. 8. 1-2; 3. 15. 5.

καθάπερ Δαρείος For Darius' abortive campaign against the European Scyths, now dated to 519 BC, see Hdt. 4. 83ff. with J. M. Balcer, *HSCP* 76 (1972) 99-132 and G. C. Cameron, *Acta Iranica*: 2^{ème} Sér. i (Leiden 1975) 77-88. The débâcle is mentioned in Callisthenes' speech at 4. 11. 9; and there is every reason to believe that, like Cyrus' defeat in 530, it was constantly in Alexander's mind. The desire to excel his Persian predecessors may well have affected his decision to engage the Saca nomads (cf. 6. 24. 2-3 with notes).

Ἀρίστανδρος δὲ οὐκ ἔφη The seer's role in Curtius' account (7. 7. 26-9) is much less heroic.

4. **αἱ τε μηχαναὶ κτλ.** According to Arrian, the Macedonian artillery was stationed on the river bank and the crossing only took place after the barrage had achieved its effect (4. 5). Curtius, however, alleges that the artillery was mounted on ships, defended by a screen of shield-bearers; similarly the cavalry transports and their rowers were protected by shields, while the ships themselves formed a protective barrier for the troops crossing on skins. The barrage began just before landing and cleared enough space for the infantry to form a bridgehead (Curt. 7. 9. 2-9; so, briefly, *Metz Epit.* 11 f.). This divergence has been largely ignored. Tarn i 68 and Fuller 237 f. conflate the two accounts without discussion, whereas Marsden (*Artillery* 165) opts for Arrian's account because of its circumstantial nature and suggests that Curtius may be influenced by his experience of Roman practice. It seems to me that Arrian's account, though circumstantial, contains a number of serious difficulties. The range was long (*τὴν διὰ μακροῦ ἄφεςιν*) and it would *a fortiori* take the Macedonians a long time to cross the river, surely long enough for the Saca horsemen to recover from their demoralization and attack the landing party while the artillery could not retaliate for fear of hitting the Macedonians. Even if salvoes were

fired periodically during the crossing (Marsden 166), the current in this narrow stretch of the Iaxartes (emphasized by Curt. 7. 9. 6) would have taken the troops and their skins far downstream, out of the range of their catapults and at the mercy of the nomads.

On the other hand Curtius puts the barrage where it is needed, immediately before the landing, and the strategy he describes is paralleled elsewhere, notably during Caesar's landing on the British coast (Caes. *BG* 4. 25. 1-2; cf. *B. Al.* 19. 3). Ptolemy himself used ships equipped with catapults to prevent a Nile crossing by Antigonus and Demetrius (Diod. 20. 76. 3; cf. Paus. 1. 6. 6), and Alexander had probably anticipated his strategy at the Danube crossing in 335 (cf. 1. 3. 6 for the use of Byzantine warships). The vulgate account seems the more probable. We must therefore assume that Arrian's source either failed to mention the ships or mentioned them so cursorily that Arrian overlooked them and assumed wrongly that the artillery was mounted on the bank. There is a hint that the latter was the case in the use of ἀποβιβάσας ('disembarked': cf. Hdt. 8. 76. 1-2; Thuc. 7. 29. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 1. 4. 22) at 4. 5—a word far better suited to troops landing from boats (as at Curt. 7. 9. 9) than to men swimming with floats of skin. The source, then, is most likely to have been Aristobulus, who, writing in his old age (see above, vol. i 27), may have laid great emphasis on the dramatic effects of the catapults but failed to make it precise that they were carried on boats. 5. τοὺς τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας According to Curtius (7. 9. 9), the first to engage were the shield-bearers at the prows of the landing-craft. But, as they threw javelins, we can assume that they were light infantry. Alexander may have interspersed them with archers and sling men, so that their barrage could be continued after landing and a bridgehead cleared.

6. μίαν ἵππαρχίαν . . . ἱλας τέσσαρας For the reorganization of the cavalry into hipparchies see 3. 29. 7 n. This passage is the only evidence that the mercenary cavalry were also grouped in hipparchies, but it is reasonable to assume that each of the separate mercenary commands, numbering at least three at this period (those of Erigyius, Andromachus, and Philippus: cf. 3. 20. 1, 25. 4 with notes), was termed ἵππαρχία. Now Arrian juxtaposes four ἱλαί of *sarissophoroi*, and his variation of expression has been taken as proof that the Scouts (for the equation of πρόδρομοι and σαρισσοφόροι see 1. 12. 7 n.) had not as yet been reorganized as hipparchies and absorbed into the Companions (so G. T. Griffith, *JHS* 83 (1963) 71). But the change of expression may be due solely to Arrian's reluctance to repeat the term 'hipparchy' three times in the same context; and he can use ἱλη in the most general sense, as he does τάξις in infantry contexts, to refer to a cavalry formation of any size (cf. 5. 17. 4: πᾶσα ἡ ἵππος . . . ἐς μίαν ἱλην συνηγμένη). There is,

however, a possibility that ἱλη is here used technically, to refer to a subgroup of a hipparchy (cf 6. 21. 3, 27. 6). If it is correct that the Scouts were reorganized in late 330 and divided into two specialities, *hippakontistai* and *sarissophoroi* (3. 24. 1 n.), Alexander may have assigned an *ile* of *sarissophoroi* to each hipparchy, to give the Companions a permanent resource of heavy cavalry. The *hippakontistai*, here and later (6. 17. 3, 23. 1), appear to have been organized as a separate corps. Perhaps they retained the old functions of the *prodromoi* (scouting and skirmishing) and were brigaded as a discrete unit, sometimes employed, as the *prodromoi* had been, in conjunction with the Agrianians and archers (4. 26. 4; 6. 17. 4; cf. 3. 12. 3, 18. 2).

Alexander's intention was presumably to use his heavy cavalry to extend the bridgehead, driving back the Sacae by sheer weight of armament while the main cavalry force massed for the decisive charge. Curtius (7. 9. 10) implies that this vanguard was prepared for the assault at the very moment of landing.

ὦν Βάλακρος ἦρχεν A unit of javelin men (cf. 3. 12. 3, 13. 5).

ἀναμίξας τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν Fuller's suggestion (238 f.) that the light infantry was intended as a protective screen is sheer fantasy. Arrian twice states unambiguously that infantry and cavalry were intermingled (*ἀναμίξας/ἀναμεμυγμένοι*), exactly as they had been at the Granicus (1. 14. 6, 16. 1 nn.). The infantry force comprised archers and javelin men, and its function was clearly to provide artillery support, shooting at the Saca cavalry as it attempted to circle and attack the flanks (*οὐκ εἴων τὰς ἐπιστροφάς . . . ποιεῖσθαι*). Presumably the Macedonian infantry commanded a greater range than the Sacae operating from horseback, and could effectively keep them at a distance. This tactic would only be effective as long as the Saca cavalry held their ground close to the river. As soon as the pursuit proper began the Macedonian light troops would inevitably have been left behind, rendering the pursuing cavalry vulnerable again to Saca outflanking tactics.

7. ὀρθαίαις ταῖς ἵλαις 'with his squadrons in column' (as opposed to extended line—cf. 5. 15. 2; 3. 15. 2). Alexander deployed the three Companion hipparchies and the *hippakontistai* to keep the Sacae occupied on a broad front, while he used the rest of the cavalry, drawn up in column, to cut a swathe through the Saca line. He probably attacked diagonally from the flank. We are not told what happened to the vanguard of mercenaries and *sarissophoroi*. They may have continued to fight on a second front, or, more probably, the survivors of the mauling retreated to the river as the main body of cavalry took the offensive.

8. ἐξ χιλίους κτλ. Curtius (7. 9. 16) gives no precise figures, but states that there were more Saca prisoners than dead. He adds that the Macedonians acquired 1,800 horses in the pursuit (consistent

with Arrian's figures for the dead and captured), for the loss of 160 dead and 1,000 wounded.

Satraces (Berve no. 698) is otherwise unknown; he may have been identical with Carthasis, the commander of the Sacae in the vulgate tradition (Curt. 7. 7. 1; *Metz Epit.* 8).

διὰ καύματος πολλοῦ Von Schwarz 59 notes that the area of Khodzhen is a notorious heat trap, with the sun reflected from the slopes of Mogul-Tau, the range which rises 1,600 m. immediately north of the Syr-Darya (see Map 1). Maximum temperatures in high summer regularly rise above 40°C, and the climate cannot have been greatly different in Alexander's day.

Curtius (7. 9. 11; cf. *Metz Epit.* 12) records an 80-stade pursuit (100 stades in Plut. *Al.* 45. 5; 150 in *Mor.* 341 c), as far as the *termini Liberi patris*—a series of stone cairns regularly separated and ivy-wreathed trees. Engels 103 f. is probably right that they were the burial *kurgans* of Sacae chieftains which the Macedonians thought were boundary markers established by Dionysus at the end of his northern progress (cf. also Pliny *NH* 6. 49: *arae ab Hercule ac Libero Patre constitutae*). The exact route cannot of course be determined; von Schwarz 60 may be correct in taking the pursuit as far as the main pass over the Mogul-Tau (so Seibert, *Eroberung* 132 n. 26).

9. **ῥεῦμα . . . γαστέρα** 'A violent flux swept down on his stomach.' Plutarch (*Al.* 45. 5; *Mor.* 341 c) speaks simply of diarrhoea, and Arrian is clearly referring to the same ailment in more picturesque language, reflecting Thucydides' description of the plague (Thuc. 2. 49. 8: κατέσκηπτε . . . ἐς αἰδοῖα). Rather strangely, Arrian envisages the flux entering rather than leaving the stomach. In ancient medical theory diarrhoea originated in the lower γαστήρ (Galen ii 159 K) and was caused by superfluous liquid being evacuated into the intestines (Galen xvii/1 349 K). The flux would first have to attack the stomach before it could be discharged.

Curtius (7. 9. 11) knows only of the debilitating effect of Alexander's neck wound (cf. 3. 3 n.) and claims that he retired at an early stage of the pursuit.

ἐπὶ πάντων Σκυθῶν The text as it stands can only mean 'the pursuit did not extend to all the Scyths' (Brunt), a phrase somewhat incongruous, in that initially all the Sacae took flight and *were* pursued. The ingenious correction ἐπὶ πᾶν τῶν, first suggested by Pflugk, gives excellent sense ('the pursuit of the Scyths did not continue *à outrance*') and corresponds to Arrian's usage elsewhere (cf. 2. 24. 3; 8. 30. 1; *Cyneg.* 23. 2; *PSI* xii 1284, col. ii 16).

5. **πὰρ τοῦ Σκυθῶν βασιλέως** Curtius (7. 9. 17 ff.) tells of an embassy from the *Sacae*, a people distinct from the '*Scythae*' defeated on the Iaxartes. He may have blundered, conflating a source which

referred to the nomads as *Sacae* with one which termed them Scythys; but it is quite possible that, as he says, the moral effect of the victory was such as to drive neighbouring peoples to make their peace. There is no reason to doubt that the defeated king also sent an embassy.

ἀπὸ <τοῦ> κοινοῦ The definite article, supplied by the earliest editors, implies that there was some common council of the Sacae which authorized actions of importance. The archetype, however, reads ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, which gives excellent sense; the king claimed that the provocation on the Iaxartes was not the concerted action of his people but the work of a body of privateers. The excuse conflicts with the vulgate story that he personally ordered the attack (cf. 3. 6 n.); but we need not believe that the king was totally ingenuous or that Alexander believed him. Arrian's final comment suggests that both sides were concerned to withdraw with the minimum loss of face.

φιλάνθρωπα Alexander is said to have released the Saca prisoners without ransom (Curt. 7. 9. 18).

2. οἱ δὲ ἐν Μαρακάνδοις Arrian takes up the story from 3. 6–7, following Ptolemy in the first instance and appending variants from Aristobulus at 6. 1–2 (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 507 f, 515; Pearson, *LHA* 167 f.). The vulgate account, as given by Curtius 7. 7. 31–9 and *Metz Epitome* 13, has only the vaguest points of similarity. See below 6. 1 nn.

3. ἐς τὰ βόρεια The archetype reads ἐς τὰ βασίλεια, which von Schwarz argued (41 f.) should be retained. He pointed out that traditionally the emirate of Bukhara used Samarkand as the summer palace only, retiring west to Bukhara for the winter. Furthermore Arrian (3. 30. 6) refers to Maracanda as a palace of Sogdiana, implying that there was more than one. Unfortunately the present passage uses the definite article, implying that Spitamenes' objective was the only palace of the satrapy (cf. 1. 17. 6; 3. 25. 8; 6. 24. 1); and von Schwarz was forced to argue that the palace was in fact named Sogdianē, exactly as the name Bactra can refer to the satrapy or its capital (cf. 3. 25. 4 n.). His retention of the MS reading has been generally approved (Jacoby, *FGrH* 138 F 34; Berve ii 359; Brunt, *Arrian* 505), but it seems to me vulnerable. Arrian's text is not naturally construed, 'the palace named Sogdianē'; one would expect a phrase such as οἷς ὄνομα Σογδιανή. More seriously, Arrian's subsequent narrative suggests that Spitamenes was not concerned to reach any populated centre of Sogdiana but to leave its boundaries and join forces with the Sacae of the steppes (ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρια . . . πρὸς τῷ ἐρήμῳ). In fact he seems to have diverged into the desert a long way east of the Bukhara oasis (see below).

Emendation is required, and the sense to be produced is that Spitamenes withdrew to the borders of Sogdiana. None of the earlier emendations listed by Roos are palaeographically satisfactory, and Schenkl's ἀβασίλευτα, though superficially attractive, cannot stand—all of Sogdiana was under royal sway and even the Saca nomads had their kings. I tentatively suggest ἐς τὰ ἀβαρα ('into the inaccessible regions of Sogdiana'), which at least corresponds with Arrian's usage elsewhere (cf. *Ind.* 37. 4; 40. 7). The alpha of ἀβαρα could have been lost through haplography and the letters remaining read as a contraction of βασιλεια.

τοὺς Νομάδας τοὺς Σκύθας Spitamenes' auxiliaries were the Dahae (Curt. 7. 7. 32), the westernmost of the Saca tribes (3. 8. 3 n.), who ranged the steppes of the Kyzyl Kum between Sogdiana and Chorasmia (Curt. 8. 1. 8). Earlier in 329 they had served in Bessus' forces alongside Spitamenes (3. 28. 8–10), and they were natural allies for him now. The fact that Spitamenes impinged on their territory implies that the direction of his flight was west from Samarkand. Von Schwarz (62) may not be far from the truth when he locates the battle with the Macedonian force close to modern Ziadin, midway between Samarkand and Bukhara (see Map 1).

5. καὶ ἐπελαυνόντων κτλ. The same tactics as were used by the Sacae at the Iaxartes (cf. 4. 6 n.). Unlike Alexander, the expeditionary force had neither artillery nor archers and was totally vulnerable to the circling attacks of the Saca horse archers.

τοῖς δὲ ἀμφὶ Ἀνδρόμαχον The archetype reads Ἀριστόμαχον, which Palmerius and Blancardus emended to restore consistency with 3. 7 and 6. 2, where it is stated that the commander's name was Andromachus. But it is dangerous to emend names in Arrian merely to restore consistency (cf. 3. 11. 9 n.), especially when the effect is to make a passage from Ptolemy consistent with Aristobulus (see above, vol. i 17–18). Here the process of corruption is not easy, and nine lines later the name Andromachus recurs without error. Given the many divergences in Ptolemy's narrative, it is surely possible that he gave the name of the cavalry commander as Aristomachus and assigned Andromachus a different role, perhaps replacing Menedemus as commander of the foot. At any rate the failure of communications at 5. 7 is best understood if Ptolemy envisaged Andromachus commanding the infantry next to Caranus. Seeing their cavalry plunge unexpectedly into the river, the men assumed them to be deserting and panicked.

6. ἐς πλαίσιον ἰσόπλευρον This square formation was adopted by the Ten Thousand in response to similar harassment from a much larger force; it was presumably regular procedure (Xen. *Anab.* 3. 4. 19 ff.; cf. Arr. *Tact.* 29. 7–9).

τὸν Πολυτίμητον The modern Zeravshan (see below, 6. 6 n.).

Ptolemy is the only source to mention the river in this context, but the detail is no doubt correct. After an encounter of this nature, with relatively few survivors, reports of the battle would have been a series of *aperçus* from the various eyewitnesses, with no general picture emerging. Ptolemy has concentrated his narrative on the fighting in the river, which was presumably only a part of the total battle.

6. 1. Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ ἐνέδρα (*FGrH* 139 F 27) Curtius (7. 7. 32 f.) also speaks of an ambush, which he describes in slightly different terms and uses as the setting for the *aristeia* of Menedemus. The story has been dismissed as a romantic concoction which either Aristobulus adapted from Cleitarchus (Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 516) or Cleitarchus from Aristobulus (Pearson, *LHA* 166). It is far preferable to assume (with Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 374) that there were two versions of the ambush, which was a genuine feature of the battle and was omitted by Ptolemy (or his informants). Ptolemy in any case places his emphasis on the errors of the generals, their rash advance with tired horses and Caranus' unpremeditated sortie. The ambush was something more unpredictable, and it weakened the case for placing responsibility for the disaster on the shoulders of the generals alone. There is a remarkable parallel in the tradition of the battle of Sardes (395 BC). One branch of the tradition claims that it was decided by an ambush (*Hell. Ox.* 11. 5-6 (Bartoletti); Diod. 14. 80. 2 f.); but the whole story is omitted by Xenophon (*Hell.* 3. 4. 22-4), and it is assumed that his informant either had no precise knowledge or recorded only a partial view of the battle (I. A. F. Bruce, *A Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynčia* (Cambridge 1967) 155 f.; Cartledge, *Agesilaus* 215-7).

ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ 'In the actual engagement' (cf. 1. 20. 9; 2. 11. 2; 5. 15. 2; 6. 27. 2). Arrian implies that the ambush was sprung in the course of the battle and determined it fatally. Pearson, *LHA* 165, wrongly assumes that he is referring to a river crossing.

παραχωρεῖν τῆς ἡγεμονίας Cf. 3. 7 n. There is no hint of this attempt to abdicate command in any other source, and it seems unique to Aristobulus. By contrast the vulgate sources stress that Menedemus died a heroic death (Curt. 7. 7. 34-7) and received honourable burial from Alexander (*Metz Epit.* 13). The story is certainly well adapted to romantic embellishment (so Jacoby and Pearson) but that is no reason to dismiss it out of hand. It was an aspect of the battle to be minimized by sources who ascribed the defeat to culpable negligence.

Μακεδόνας . . . καὶ ἐταίρους βασιλέως This contrast is instructive. Even an Iranian of Pharnuches' distinction, whose son became the sole oriental trierarch at the Indus (3. 7 n.), did not belong to

the ranks of the Companions. As yet, the only Persian known to have been so honoured was Oxyathres, brother of Darius (Plut. *Al.* 43. 7; Curt. 6. 2. 11); otherwise Persians were not associated with the Macedonian court élite until the last years of the reign (cf. Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 12–14).

2. *ἰππείας μὲν ... τριακοσίους* Curtius 7. 7. 39 gives casualty figures of 2,000 infantry and 300 cavalry out of a total force of 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry (cf. 7. 6. 24). Even given that Aristobulus' figures for the force were lower (cf. 3. 7), his proportion of casualties is much higher.

3. *τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριῶνας* A regular component of Alexander's rapid-moving detachments (cf. 1. 6. 9; 3. 18. 5, etc.), but after the recent débâcle (5. 5 n.) they were all the more essential.

κουφωτάτους Cf. 3. 21. 2 n.

4. *ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις* This dash of some 290 km. (cf. 1. 3 n.) would be the most dramatic forced march of the entire campaign. The report has been widely believed (cf. Tarn i 69 f.; Wilcken 159 (but see Borza's note); Lane Fox 305; Engels 104; Seibert, *Eroberung* 133), but the marching rate seems incredible for a force largely composed of infantry. It also seems most unlikely that after such a supremely arduous march Alexander would have pressed immediately in pursuit of Spitamenes, as Arrian claims he did. Brunt (*Arrian* i 505 f.) draws attention to Curtius (7. 9. 21), who also mentions a march of four days *from* Maracanda to the scene of disaster, and suggests that Arrian has confused the two marches. If he were conflating Ptolemy with Aristobulus, that is at least a serious possibility. On the other hand the marching rate may be deliberately exaggerated.

ὑπὸ τῇν ξῷ Alexander must have done most of his strenuous marching in the cool of the night.

5. *ἐπὶ ῥοθίῃ τὴν χώραν κτλ.* The main body of the army under Craterus had now caught up, and Alexander divided his forces into roving columns, devastating the Sogdian countryside. He was as ruthlessly repressive as he had been in the area south of Khodzhen (cf. 2. 4 n.). The vulgate hints that 1,200,000 died in this extended massacre (Diod. 17 index *κγ*).

πᾶσαν ... ἐπέρχεται The Zeravshan valley was the central and most fertile part of Sogdiana, its agriculture totally dependent on irrigation. The area west of Bukhara, near the dry delta at Karakul had been irrigated since the second millennium BC (R. A. Lewis, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 56 (1966) 486 f.; Frumkin 121) and must have been flourishing in Alexander's day. The army, or a column of it, certainly penetrated the whole length of the river in 329.

6. *ἵνα δὲ ἀφανίζεται κτλ.* This is a transitional phrase, leading to

a geographical excursus, apparently adapted from Aristobulus. Strabo (II. 11. 5 (518) = *FGrH* 139 F 28a) cites Aristobulus' description of the Polytimetus, mentioning its disappearance into the desert sands and adducing the Areius as a parallel. The disappearance of the Polytimetus was clearly a *topos* of Alexander literature, as is shown by Curtius' comparable description (7. 10. 2-3), and might have been found in any source. It is the list of similar phenomena which points to Aristobulus' authorship, and we must assume that Strabo merely gave a digest of his original, mentioning the Areius alone (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 516f.; Pearson, *LHA* 168). Strabo, however, adds that the Macedonians gave the river its Greek name (no doubt because they were impressed by its crucial importance in irrigating and fertilizing the land: Engels 100), and Aristobulus presumably gave etymological details about the rivers he named. These details Arrian in his turn has omitted, emphasizing the size of the rivers and the paradox of their disappearance.

καίπερ πολλοῦ ὄν The Zeravshan has a course of some 877 km. Its largest flow is in late summer, when it is fed by melted snow from the Zeravshan glacier and at its maximum reaches a level of 690 cubic metres per second. During its course, irrigation canals drain off its flow, so that it stops short some 45 km. from the Amu Darya, draining into the sands by the village of Karakul.

ὃ τε Ἑπαρδος The name does not occur elsewhere (*Itinerarium* 87 is derivative but through haplography gives the name as *Pardis*). The river passed through the land of the Mardi, who cannot be the Mardi of the Elburz (3. 24. 1 n.), for any river passing through their territory would discharge into the Caspian. It is the Persian Mardi (3. 15. 1 n.) who are at issue here, and we are dealing with a river which rises in the Zagros and flows into the inland salt desert. The only present-day candidate is the Zayendeh Rud, which waters the oasis of Isfahan and eventually disappears into the salt marsh (*CHI*Iran i 271f.). In the spring its flow is as high as 1,700 cubic metres per second, and it was in the spring of 330 that Alexander would have crossed the river (cf. 3. 19. 2 n.). Strabo II. 13. 6 (524) states that the Mardi were neighbours of the Persians and the Uxii in the headwaters of the Karun. In that case the Mardi were probably located east of the Zagros watershed (the Zayendeh rises in the same range as the source of the Karun) and so contiguous with the Uxii to the north of Persis. For Alexander's Mardian campaign, see Curtius 5. 6. 17-19.

Ἄρειος The Areius is the modern Hari Rud, which waters Herat and finally turns north into Turkmenistan. North-west of the town of Tedzhen its waters are distributed into numerous channels and disappear into the sands of the Kara Kum. For the rich archaeological history of the delta area see Frumkin 135 ff.

Ἐτύμανδρος For the orthography see Roos's apparatus with Kiessling, *RE* vi 806f. The Etymandrus is the modern Helmand, which rises in the vicinity of Kabul and flows south-west, discharging into the inland lake complex of Sistan (cf. L. W. Adamec, *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan* ii (Graz 1973) 114 ff.). This river certainly did *not* disappear into the sands, but it is included in Aristobulus' list as one of the principal rivers of central Asia, the lifeline of Arachosia. For the Euergetae (or Ariaspian) see 3. 27. 4 n. 7. **πολύ . . . ἔστι** 'But the Polytimetus is far greater in comparison with the Peneius.' The idiom (*μείζων ἢ κατά*) recurs at 6. 22. 4, again in an extract from Aristobulus, but the recurrence is probably coincidental, another Herodotean mannerism of Arrian (cf. Hdt. 4. 95. 2; 8. 38).

The Peneius is certainly modest in comparison with the Zeravshan. Its course is a mere 200 km. and, except for its passage of the vale of Tempe and periods of flood, its flow is relatively sluggish.

7. 1-3. *Winter at Bactra* (329/8)

Arrian concludes his extract from Aristobulus with the report of Alexander's arrival at Bactra. The list of arrivals which follows partly reduplicates material later assigned to the following winter (see below, 18. 1), and it is best explained on the hypothesis that Arrian reverted to Ptolemy (cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 23; so already Strasburger 40).

7. 1. **ἐς Ζαρίασπα ἀφίκετο** On the nomenclature see above 4. 1. 5 n. In the parallel passage Curtius (7. 10. 10) refers simply to Bactra, yet another corroboration of the equation. How Alexander reached the capital from the western Zeravshan is not stated; he may have crossed the desert to the Oxus (von Schwarz 65-8; Seibert, *Eroberung* 134) and followed the river south-east to Bactra or, more probably, he withdrew to Maracanda (where he will have left Peucolaus with his 3,000 garrison troops (Curt. loc. cit.; Berve no. 636)) and then took the main road south to Bactra. The accoutrements of his court were established there (see below, 16. 6 n.) and it was the ideal base for the winter season.

τὸ ἀκμαῖον τοῦ χειμῶνος The phrase is repeated at 4. 18. 1, but nowhere else. It has no literary pedigree, and the nearest parallel to this temporal usage is in Polybius (3. 102. 1). We may for once have a piece of Aristobulus' vocabulary transcribed by Arrian.

The general sense of the passage must be: 'he waited there until the most intense period of the winter had passed'. The parallels (5. 9. 3; 6. 15. 1; *Cyneg.* 31. 5) are unambiguous and exclude the recent suggestion by J. N. Khlopin (*AncSoc* 11/12 (1980/1) 166-7)

that Arrian was recording only Alexander's *intention* to remain there for the winter ('he intended to wait for winter to pass'). On Khlopin's reconstruction of events there was no winter halt at Bactra/Zariaspa; Alexander arrived there in autumn and spent several months in further campaigning before he reached Nautaca in midwinter (cf. 4. 18. 1). That creates the interval which Khlopin needs to extend the campaign in Parthyaëa and Areia (see above, 3. 25. 1-8 with notes) over the greater part of a year, from autumn 330 to autumn 329 (Khlopin 161-4). Accordingly Alexander does not enter Bactria until the late spring of 328. But this interpretation violates the text of Arrian, which contains no suggestion of an unfulfilled intention. Rather he states explicitly that Alexander *did* spend midwinter at Bactra and the following winter at Nautaca. Khlopin would need to argue that Arrian misunderstood his sources, possibly conflating a tradition which placed the arrival of Phrataphernes and Stasanor in Bactra (in autumn) with another which described it in the context of the winter halt in Nautaca. That would not be impossible, but the hypothesis is quite unnecessary. The fact that Diodorus (74. 1) places all events after the death of Darius in the archon year 329/8 and has Alexander cross the Hindu Kush at the beginning of 328/7 (82. 1) is no help (*pace* Khlopin 158-9). Diodorus begins Book XVII with Alexander's accession already dated to the archon year 335/4, nine months late (2. 1), and many key dates are consequently retarded by as much as a year (cf. Goukowsky, *Diodore xvii*, p. xlv). The archon year 326/5 begins more or less at the correct point (87. 1), but Khlopin's assumption that 330/29 was the year in which Diodorus corrected the error is unproven and involves the further assumption that Alexander spent the winter of that year stationary in northern Parthyaëa. There is no hint of such a delay in any source. On the contrary Alexander is represented moving fast and events follow quickly (Arr. 3. 25. 4-5; Curt. 6. 6. 18-21). The hypothesis of a winter in Parthyaëa is best forgotten. The conventional view that Alexander crossed the Hindu Kush in the spring of 329 is overwhelmingly the more probable (see above, 3. 28. 1 with note).

Φραταφέρνης τε ... καὶ Στασάνωρ Compare 18. 1-3 where there is a second report of Stasanor and Phrataphernes arriving at winter quarters (Nautaca, 328/7) and receiving additional mandates. It seems very unlikely that they made two visits to court in successive winters (as assumed (e.g.) by Droysen i² 2. 77, Schachermeyr² 349 n. 416, and Seibert, *Eroberung* 134). Stasanor had to restore order in Areia, arrest his predecessor, and return to Bactria all in the space of approximately six months. Phrataphernes is also likely to have been in difficulties during 329. He was unable to send assistance to counter Satibarzanes' insurgency in Areia (cf. 3. 28. 3 n.), and the

fact that he had to assert himself against a rival satrap named by Bessus suggests that he had serious fighting on his hands. The army defeated in Areia could fall back into Parthyaëa, and both Bessus and (later on) Spitamenes could enlist their Sacan auxiliaries to raid the western satrapies. That in part explains the importance of Alexander's alliance in 328 with the Chorasmian king (see below, 15. 5 n.). It seems, then, unlikely that either satrap would have had the opportunity to report success as early as winter 329/8. The grim and difficult task of pacification will have lasted well into 328, and the dating of their arrival to 328/7, as reported by both Arrian and Curtius, seems the proper one (so Berve ii, 401, no. 814; Bosworth, *JHS* 101 (1981) 19-23). The latter passage is probably taken from Aristobulus (see below 18. 1), and we must assume that Ptolemy erroneously anticipated the successes of Phrataphernes and Stasanor, attaching their arrival to the reports of the great mercenary convoys from the coast. It is possible (though perhaps improbable) that he digressed to describe the operations in Areia and Parthyaëa and took the story as far as the victorious arrival of the satraps at court, not noting that the campaigns took a year to complete. Whatever the explanation, there is certainly a doublet in Arrian.

Βραζάνην ... τῆς Παρθυαίων σατράπην Brazanes (Berve no. 204) is otherwise unknown. His name is rare, but attested in Ctesias (Diod. 2. 1. 8 = Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 1 (6)), who gives the more acceptable Iranian form Barzanes (hence, despite the reading of the Vindobonensis, the vulgate tradition of Arrian, accepted until Roos, may for once be correct). There can be no doubt that he was a counter-satrap, appointed by Bessus during his offensive of 330/29 (Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 6; 101 (1981) 19-23). W. Heckel (*LCM* 6 (1981) 66-9) has speculated that Brazanes was in fact the ex-chiliarch and regicide, Nabarzanes (cf. 3. 21. 1, 23. 4 with notes), and that Arrian's text should be emended. But one would have expected some explanation from Arrian—and the appointment would be somewhat of a demotion for Nabarzanes. It is less problematic to concede that 'Brazanes' was an *ignotus* who raised forces in Parthyaëa in support of the self-proclaimed Artaxerxes V.

καί τινες ἄλλους These insurgents are not identified or mentioned elsewhere, nor is it stated whether one or both of the satraps had arrested them. There was presumably significant support for Bessus in the central satrapies and it would have taken time to defeat and capture the local leaders of the revolt.

2. ἦκον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ The three army groups are also mentioned by Curtius (7. 10. 11-12), who agrees that they arrived in winter 329/8 and adds that there was a large contingent (8,000 including 600 cavalry) of Greek troops sent by Antipater. The total figure is huge: 22,000, including 2,600 cavalry. Alexander had drawn off a

huge mass of mercenaries from the west of his empire. After the successful termination of the Aegean War in 331 and Agis' war in Greece Alexander could insist on the incumbent satraps bringing the bulk of their satrapal armies to fuel his insatiable appetite for troops, particularly for local garrisons and city foundations. Their successors could then recruit on the spot and build up their depleted forces. It was an anticipation of what was to happen on a larger scale in 325/4 when Alexander demanded the dissolution of the existing mercenary armies in the west and had the bulk of the troops conveyed to court by their commanders (see now Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 148-9). In this earlier exercise the troops had further to go and were more localized in their origins. It is possible that they were organized into a gigantic convoy in Syria and Cilicia (that may well have been one of the functions of Menes: see *CQ* 24 (1974) 63), and marched up country in a single contingent, beginning late in 330 or early in 329. The process had started with the recall of Asander in summer 331 (see above, 3. 6. 7) and gathered momentum after the dismissal of allied Greek troops from Ecbatana. Antipater ended Agis' career at the battle of Megalopolis in spring 330 and dispatched mercenary forces east soon afterwards; given the circumstances, they might have been taken from the enemy armies (Bosworth, *JHS* 106 (1986) 7; Holt 79-80). At all events Antipater's contingent was probably last to reach the Levant for the great journey to Bactria (see further 18. 3 below).

Ἐπόκιλλος καὶ Μελαμνίδας καὶ Πτολεμαῖος (Berve nos. 301, 493, 673). Curtius (7. 10. 11) mentions only Ptolemy and 'Maenidas' (which suggests that 'Menidas' (cf. 18. 3) may be the correct form: cf. J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* 5 (1955) 217), and notes that they brought mercenary forces (4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry) with them. In the earlier report of the demobilization of the Greek allies Arrian (3. 19. 6) only mentions Epocillus as the officer in charge. Menes was given his commission months earlier, when he was sent from Susa with 3,000 talents from the treasury (3. 16. 10). The escort for the bullion train is not mentioned, but we may assume that it was Ptolemy, or Melamnidas/Menidas (or both). But what of the mercenary forces which Curtius mentions? Ptolemy may supply the clue. Arrian terms him 'general of the Thracians' and Berve (no. 673) assumes that he commanded the entire Thracian contingent from 334 onwards. That is difficult. There are numerous references to Thracian troops during the early years of the campaign, and a number of commanders are reported (Sitalces: 1. 28. 4; 2. 5. 1, 9. 3; 3. 12. 4; Agathon: 1. 14. 3; 3. 12. 4), but not Ptolemy. It is moreover difficult to identify the Thracians who might have been under Ptolemy's command. The national contingent appears to have been left with Parmenion at Ecbatana, where it formed the bulk of the

Median garrison (see above, vol. i 337-8). But Thracians are attested in the army later, and they comprised the garrison of northern India in 326/5 (see below, 6. 15. 2). These will have included the small troop brought to India by Phrataphernes (5. 20. 4) and also the large body of cavalry which arrived after the return from the Hyphasis (Curt. 9. 3. 21). But one might argue that there was an earlier troop of Thracians, led by Ptolemy, which arrived in winter 329/8. This group of Thracians could have been despatched by Antipater after the armistice he arranged in 331 (Diod. 63. 1; cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 201-2). In that case Ptolemy was the general in charge and, when he reached Cilicia, he associated his forces with troops raised locally by Epocillus and Menidas, and travelled up to Bactria with them.

Ἄσανδρος . . . καὶ Νέαρχος See above, vol. i 130, 156-7. Asander was recalled in 331, and he may have had some intermediate commission before he joined the convoy for Bactria. Wirth (*Studien* 56) suggests that he and Nearchus recruited troops in the Greek mainland. Alternatively he may have helped Nearchus in local operations (against Pisidia (?)) before moving east with him. Both could have assisted Antigonus in Asia Minor or intervened in Cilicia to contain any troubles which may have followed the death of Balacrus (see next note).

†Βήσσος τε . . . Ἀσκληπιόδωρος ὁ ὑπαρχος *A locus conclamatus.* It is almost universally accepted (Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 444-56, is an eccentric exception) that the name 'Bessus' is corrupt, a *lapsus calami* due to a scribe's preoccupation with the regicide Bessus, who is mentioned in the preceding and following sentences. The original name of the satrap of Syria has therefore been omitted, and Asclepiodorus who is elsewhere attested as *satrap* of Syria is here termed hyparch, a supposedly subordinate position. Various solutions have been proposed. Most have been variations on Schmieder's suggested transposition: Ἀσκληπιόδωρος τε ὁ σατράπης καὶ Μένης ὁ ὑπαρχος ('Asclepiodorus the satrap and Menes the hyparch'). That has the undoubted advantage of restoring a previously named satrap and a previously named hyparch (3. 16. 9), but there is no obvious palaeographical reason for the elaborate transposition posited. More recently Brunt (*Arrian* i 360-1, n. 3) has argued that Menes should indeed be restored to the text, but as the original name replaced by 'Bessus'. On this hypothesis Asclepiodorus was temporarily under the command of Menes, who had a wide-ranging, multi-satrapal command. That comes close to my own reconstruction (see below), but, as Brunt admits, it has the disadvantage of giving Menes a very short term in office; he returned to Bactria with the very men who had escorted him to the coast (and, one may add, since Menes' name occurs a mere three lines earlier, it is unlikely to have been

overridden in transmission). The chronology is even more truncated on Goukowsky's hypothesis (i 181) that Menes died in office (in 329!) and was then replaced by Asclepiodorus as hyparch, while a 'pseudo-Bessus' took over the satrapy. The solution is probably irretrievable, but some points are highly pertinent:

(i) ἀπὸ θαλάσσης must be taken with what follows ('these too bringing an army from the sea'). It cannot be taken with ὑπαρχος ('the hyparch from the coast') as is presupposed by Roos's punctuation (corrected in the Artemis edition (translation only) and Brunt's revised Loeb (text only)). There are exact parallels elsewhere for the delayed demonstrative (4. 18. 3: ἐπὶ σατραπείᾳ καὶ τοῦτον τῇ Μήδῳ; 6. 27. 3: τὴν πολλὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ οὗτοι ἄγοντες; cf. 4. 8. 6; 6. 14. 1) and it is clearly an idiom favoured by Arrian. That means that there is no specification of the hyparch's functions or his area of competence. Given the close association in the text with the satrap of Syria one would assume that the hyparch was active in the same area (cf. 5. 20. 7 with note).

(ii) The problematic phrase occurs in a catalogue which is characterized by the variation of expression so common in Arrian. The word order is carefully manipulated and we should expect variation of vocabulary also. Now, there are several passages where ὑπαρχος is used in proximity to σατράπης and is demonstrably a simple variant (1. 12. 8, 16. 3; 4. 18. 3; see fully *CQ* 24 (1974) 57). The obvious solution would be that there is variation here as well. Asclepiodorus, who is attested satrap (3. 6. 7) and is later referred to as an ex-satrap (4. 13. 4: τοῦ Συρίας σατραπεύσαντος; the aorist participle indicates that he had ceased to be satrap, not that he was demoted), is referred to as hyparch for the sake of variety. Compare 4. 18. 3, where Mazaeus, unimpeachably attested satrap of Babylonia (3. 16. 4; 7. 18. 1), is termed hyparch, again solely for stylistic reasons.

(iii) On this interpretation there were two satraps in Syria who commanded independently and conveyed troops to Bactria from their separate provinces. Now, two appointments are recorded in 331: that of Asclepiodorus and, a little earlier, that of 'Memnon', who replaced Andromachus in the south (Curt. 4. 8. 11). Whether or not this latter commander was identical with Menon, son of Cerdimmas, the original satrap of northern Syria (2. 15. 7 n.; cf. Atkinson 370-1), is immaterial. There were two officials apparently acting independently at the time of Gaugamela and two officials are recorded two years later bringing troops to Bactra. It is most economical to assume that they were identical. In that case the anonymous satrap of Syria at 4. 7. 2 is the 'Memnon' recorded by Curtius.

I therefore conclude that there was some satrapal reorganization in 331/o. Nearchus' satrapy we know was absorbed into Antigonus'

Phrygian command (see above, vol. i 156), and it seems as though Cilicia and the Syrian commands were united in a solid bloc and placed under Menes. Balacrus, satrap of Cilicia, had died in battle (see above, vol. i 219) and the Syrian officials were transferred to the east with reinforcements. It has recently been objected (Goukowsky i 179; *Diodore xviii* 134) that the considerable coinage issued by Balacrus precludes his dying as early as 331. The coinage, however, is ambiguous. Many of the early Alexandrine issues from the Tarsus mint (both silver tetradrachms and Persian staters) bear the letter *B*. In 1964 Hans von Aulock published a stater which had the same obverse die as an existing issue but bearing the satrap's name *ΒΑΛΑΚΡΟΥ* instead of the simple mint mark (*JNG* 14 (1964) 79-82; see now Price, *Coinage* 370). He and most other scholars therefore concluded that all coins bearing the letter *B* were issues of the satrap Balacrus. But the picture is not so simple. In his definitive survey of the mint of Tarsus under Alexander, E. T. Newell proved that there were two simultaneous emissions of tetradrachms, both with a mint mark below the throne of the seated Zeus; one group is marked by the letter *A*, the other by *B* (*Tarsos under Alexander* (New York 1919) 4-14). Newell therefore assumed that the letters were the mark of the minting official. What is more there is a third symbol *Γ*, which first appears directly above the *B* (Newell 27-8, pl. iv 1-3) and then replaces it. The letter *B*, then, will not denote the satrap, who would hardly allow his monogram to be shared or usurped. It is sheer coincidence that it also happened to be the first letter of Balacrus' name. We are left with a single named issue, which tells us nothing about the satrap's period of office. It might have been a tentative experiment, rapidly abandoned, or it could be another pointer to Balacrus' early death. There is nothing to refute the hypothesis that Balacrus was killed some time before late 331, and the simplest explanation of Menes' appointment is that, like Mazaeus in the 340s, he was given the satrapal administration of both Syria and Cilicia.

3. *ξύλλογον ἐκ τῶν παρόντων* This appears to have been an *ad hoc* assembly of the inhabitants of Bactra. Like the gathering of hyparchs which Alexander had planned the previous year (4. 1. 5 n.), it was convened for a specific function, to witness a summary act of justice which Alexander wished to enjoy the maximum of publicity. The assembly of Medes and Persians, which was to be the venue for the actual execution, was equally informal. Arrian's use of the definite article does not imply that there was an institutionalized assembly at Ecbatana (as argued by Briant, *L'Asie Centrale* 85; see already Schachermeyr² 348 n. 415), still less one with judicial functions. Arrian is referring to a gathering of the population for a single occasion (compare 1. 12. 10, where the council-of-war before the

Granicus is termed ὁ σύλλογος τῶν Περσῶν). Bessus' execution was to be a major spectacle, like that of the usurper kings of Media and Sagartia whom Darius I had pinioned in the gates of Ecbatana and Arbela, so that 'all the people saw <them>' (Kent, *Old Persian* 124 (DB col. ii, 73-8; 88-91)).

τὴν Δαρείου πρόδοσίαν See above, 3. 30. 4 with note. Arrian stresses the avenging of Darius, which was Alexander's self-imposed duty as the king's successor and made good propaganda. But other regicides had been spared (3. 23. 4 n. (Nabarzanes); 3. 21. 10 n. (Satibarzanes)), and Bessus alone had usurped regal status (3. 25. 3 n.). He was now punished in the manner of usurpers in the past, notably Fravartīš and Ciçantakhma who had claimed to be descendants of the great Cyaxares of Media (see note immediately above). The mutilation disqualified him for rule, and it was imperative that his humiliation was witnessed by the greatest popular audience, particularly his peers who might be deterred from following his example. At the same time an act of treachery was punished and the agent of punishment was appropriately the brother of the murdered king (Diod. 83. 9; Curt. 7. 5. 40-2; Justin 12. 5. 11).

ἐς Ἐκβάτανα . . . ἀποθανοῦμενον Curtius (7. 10. 10) has a similar note which may also derive from Ptolemy. Both he and Arrian state that the execution was to take place at Ecbatana, the Median capital, and not too far removed from the actual site of Darius' murder (cf. Curt. 7. 5. 43). There the exemplary punishment could be viewed by an appropriately large audience. Ptolemy, it would seem, said nothing about the mode of execution and merely reported the preliminary mutilation which he presumably witnessed at Bactra. Details of the final scene are furnished elsewhere. In an earlier passage Curtius has a Grand Guignol description of Bessus being first mutilated, then crucified and finished off with arrows (7. 5. 40: the mutilation of ears and nose at least coheres with Arrian). Some of this could rest on authentic information. The bizarre insistence that not even birds touch the body might reflect the Magian belief that rending (of the intact corpse) by bird or dog was a necessary preliminary to burial (Hdt. 1. 140. 1-2; cf. Mary Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism* i (Leiden 1975) 109-22, 325-30). If we may believe Diodorus (83. 9), Bessus' corpse was dismembered and the pieces scattered. That simple story is embroidered in Plutarch (*Al.* 43. 6), who has Bessus torn asunder by bent saplings in the manner of the legendary Sinis (cf. Pearson, *LHA* 10). That is presumably fantasy, based on the rare word διασφενδονᾶν, which we also find in Diodorus (see also Xen. *Anab.* 4. 2. 3; Plut. *Marc.* 15. 4; Dio 56. 14. 2, where it appears in a more conventional sense). Diodorus' source mentioned only dismemberment without the embellishment of the saplings, and the description impressed him enough

to reuse it in the context of the outrage contemplated for the body of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (Diod. 26. 16. 1). The story may indeed be true. There is a macabre parallel in the abominable collective punishment visited by Assurbanipal upon Babylonian prisoners, allegedly as an act of vengeance for the death of Sennacherib: 'their dismembered bodies I fed to the dogs, swine, wolves and eagles, to the birds of the heavens and the fish of the deep' (Luckenbill ii 304, no. 745). Unlike his Achaemenid peers, who were embalmed and laid to rest in funerary chambers (cf. 6. 28. 5 with notes), Bessus was denied any dignity in death or felicity in the afterlife.

7. 4-14. 4 *The Great Digression*

Here, at the exact centre of his work (Stadter 83), Arrian deliberately breaks the stream of his narrative and embarks on a sustained moral commentary, which stands outside the chronological sequence of the Sogdian campaigns. The mutilation of Bessus is the peg for a denunciation of the orientalizing traits of Alexander's court which in turn serves as an introduction to the larger theme of the king's lack of moral balance. The following chapters are devoted to episodes which had become stock themes of rhetoric and moralizing philosophy. First the murder of Cleitus illustrates the king's drunken irascibility, a combination totally incompatible with σωφροσύνη (4. 8. 4, 9. 1). The Cleitus episode culminates in the amoral advice of Anaxarchus, that all actions of a king should be considered by definition just (9. 7-8). That once again serves as a fulcrum. Arrian introduces the *proskynesis* episode as an illustration, comparable to the adoption of Persian court dress, of Alexander's disregard of the traditional norms of conduct (9. 9); and in Callisthenes' speech Alexander's departure from Heraclid tradition is indicted exactly as Arrian in his own person indicts the assumption of Persian court dress (11. 6; cf. 7. 4). *Proskynesis* leads in its turn to the Pages' Conspiracy, where the king's drinking figures again, this time (13. 5-6) in providential fashion; and the episode culminates in a report (from the secondary sources) of a speech by the ringleader, Hermolaus, who recapitulates all the preceding themes and in addition refers even further back to the deaths of Philotas and Parmenion (14. 2). This section, then, has an unusual coherence of theme, and the internal links are carefully arranged. The chronology, as Arrian repeatedly warns us (8. 1, 14. 4, 22. 2), is deliberately disregarded so that the moral issues can be fully expounded.

The topics of the digression are taken up in the final chapters of the history. There Arrian resumes the themes of uncontrolled anger (7. 29. 2), divine sonship (29. 3), orientalizing at court (29. 4), and excessive drinking. However, the tone is strongly defensive (cf.

Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 140–8). Arrian even adopts the rhetorical technique of euphemia, where one mitigates a known fault by claiming a virtue for it (see below, 7. 29. 3 n.). That was possible in an overtly encomiastic peroration but hardly so in a formal historical exposition. Omission (*παράλειψις*) was another possibility: according to the Aristidean *ars rhetorica* (1. 12. 2. 6 = Spengel, *Rhetores graeci* 2. 505, lines 20 ff.), one might enumerate the conquests of Alexander but leave aside the murder of Cleitus, the enthusiasm for drink, the assumption of Median dress, and the experiment with *proskynesis*. This was a canonical list (cf. Livy 9. 18. 4; Dio Chrys. 1. 6–7, 64. 20) and could not be ignored by any historian with any scruples about truth and moral utility (7. 30. 3 n.). Accordingly Arrian combined the themes in a single digression, illustrating the virtue of *σωφροσύνη* and the misery its absence can cause. In this he was not unique, and the basic idea may be quite old. Diodorus, so the index (17 κζ–κη) informs us, juxtaposed the deaths of Cleitus and Callisthenes in defiance of the actual chronology (which Curtius carefully preserves). Similarly Plutarch (*Al.* 48–55) runs together the deaths of Philotas, Parmenion, Cleitus, and Callisthenes in a single sequence (the assumption of Persian dress is mentioned a few chapters earlier (*Al.* 45. 1–4)). The moral slant of the digression in Arrian seems a novelty, as does the condemnation of the mutilation of Bessus. Elsewhere the atrocity is recorded factually without any explicit censure. For Arrian the mutilation is an example of the corrupting oriental tendencies at court and it leads directly to the assumption of Persian dress, one of the standard *exempla* of Alexander's intemperance. The rest of the digression is an elaborate illustration of the theme.

The king's intemperance is not the only theme. Arrian also singles out Alexander's capacity for contrition (9. 6), which he regards as a mitigating factor. That is emphatically repeated in the peroration (7. 29. 1), where the theme is connected with that of the corrupting effect of flattery. Flattery and its effects is one of the major considerations of the digression. The language of the peroration is foreshadowed in the account of the banquet at Maracanda (8. 3 n.), and the pernicious role of Anaxarchus is repeatedly emphasized (9. 8–9, 11. 6). If the king lacked self-control, he was aided and abetted by his courtiers, who also deserve condemnation. But the strongest language is reserved for the people who gave direct provocation: Cleitus' drunken insults were nothing less than an outrage (9. 1), while Callisthenes was personally immoderate (10. 1–2) and offensively outspoken (12. 7). In a real sense both of Alexander's victims brought their fates upon themselves. Alexander's actions are not thereby justified, but it is emphasized that there is a reverse side. The dead men were not simple innocents but deserved censure

themselves. None of the actors is free from fault, but it is only Alexander who has redeeming features—his readiness for remorse and his general magnanimity. As a result the digression reads more penetratingly than a simple indictment of vice. The standard categories of rhetorical condemnation are not suppressed but they are placed in a context which palliates them, and there are foils to absorb the brunt of criticism. One already traces the message of the peroration, that the transgressions of Alexander were relatively trivial and most definitely venial.

To a limited degree Arrian does follow his pretensions, and criticizes the central figure of his history, as was demanded by conventional historical theory: one must divorce oneself from personalities and criticize their actions without prejudice (Polyb. 1. 14. 5–8; 8. 8. 7–8; cf. Walbank *ad locc.*; Avenarius 157–63). The actions are duly criticized as actions, but, as Arrian admits (7. 30. 3), it does not affect his admiration for Alexander himself, which is duly expressed in the highly wrought peroration where the man is given his meed of praise (cf. Polyb. 18. 41. 1). Even in the moralizing digression the criticism is generally muted and qualified, and contrasts markedly with the unqualified praise of Alexander's sexual *σωφροσύνη*, where the encomium rises above the immediate context of the narrative (cf. 4. 19. 5 n.). This 'second digression' is clearly intended to balance and neutralize the earlier strictures on Alexander's *lack* of *σωφροσύνη*. Fortune and flattery may have induced him into regrettable acts of immoderation but he nevertheless retained the virtue of *σωφροσύνη*, which was most perfectly exemplified in his treatment of Darius' wife but was still present and effective in his sexual restraint towards Rhoxane.

4. καὶ ἐγὼ κτλ. 'I do not commend this excessive punishment inflicted upon Bessus. Rather I consider the mutilation of the extremities to be barbaric, and I agree that Alexander was attracted to emulation of Median and Persian luxury and the mode of life practised by barbarian kings which eschews equality with their subjects. In no way do I commend the fact that he, a Heraclid, assumed Persian vestments in place of his ancestral Macedonian dress nor the fact that he had no scruples in taking the Persian *kitaris* the insignia of the vanquished, in place of the regalia which he, the conqueror, used to wear. None of this can I commend, but I consider the achievements of Alexander to be the supreme proof....'

This passage, as its pivotal position demands, is very carefully constructed. It is an elaborate re-creation of Herodotean style. The epanalepsis (studied repetition) is very apparent (cf. Grundmann 227) and has the effect of reinforcing Arrian's condemnation (οὐτε

... ἐπαινῶ, οὐδαμῇ ἐπαινῶ, οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπαινῶ). At 7. 5 (τὰ Ἀλ. μεγάλα πράγματα, τῷ τὰ μεγάλα . . . πράγματα πράξαντι) it emphasizes Alexander's military achievement, along with the triple battery of conditionals (εἰ δὴ τις, οὐδὲ εἰ, οὐδὲ εἰ). There is also a resumptive anacoluthon at the beginning of 7. 5 (οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπαινῶ: cf. 6. 9. 5: ἔγνω δὲ . . . ταῦτα γνούς, with Grundmann 225).

The text as it stands is deficient. A second ὅτι is required for balance and grammar in the clause following οὐδαμῇ ἐπαινῶ. Roos in his *editio minor* and Wirth in the Artemis edition follow Reiske in reading <ὅτι> ἀντί. Arrian's usage elsewhere would support Krüger's <ὅτι> οὐκ ἐπηδέσθη (cf. 6. 30. 2) or even καὶ <ὅτι> τὴν κίταριν (cf. 1. 7. 3, 10. 3).

τὴν ἄγαν ταύτην τιμωρίαν . . . βαρβαρικὴν εἶναι Arrian has two criticisms: the mutilation was excessive and it was barbaric. The sentiment is striking and not found elsewhere in the Alexander literature. Bessus' mutilation is not used as a rhetorical example; the favourite illustration appears to have been Lysimachus' outrageous treatment of Telesphorus (Sen. *de ira* 3. 17. 3-4; Athen. 14. 616c; Plut. *Mor* 606b), whose offence, compared with Bessus', was trivial. Mutilation was certainly not unknown under Roman rule—as a punishment for desertion or rebellion (cf. Livy 22. 33. 1; 26. 12. 19), or in the later Empire an additional penalty for criminals condemned to the mines (cf. F. Millar, *PBSR* 52 (1984) 141). One might think that the treatment of Bessus compared favourably with (say) Caesar's mass mutilation of the defenders of Uxellodunum (Hirtius, *BG*, 8. 44. 1-2). But the Roman practice concerned people of lower status. For men of superior *dignitas* the humiliation would have been intolerable (see the instructive story in Livy 29. 9. 7-10), and it may have been Bessus' social position that compounded Arrian's revulsion. Mutilation of the nose and ears is admittedly found in Homer (*Od.* 18. 85-7; 21. 300-1; 22. 474-7), but its infliction upon leading members of society was probably recognized as peculiarly Persian, and it was condemned by Arrian as an exceptionally barbarian act (compare Plut. *Mor.* 113b on the barbarian custom of cutting off ears and nose as a mark of mourning). It made a very apposite introduction to the general theme of orientalizing.

ὕπαρχθῆναι . . . ξύμφημι ἐς ζῆλον Arrian's language (ξύμφημι: cf. *Cyneg.* 16. 6) suggests that he is retailing *communis opinio*. Alexander emulated the luxury and despotism of the Persian court, the most striking illustration of which was the adoption of Persian dress, the victor assimilating the mores of the vanquished. All this—and the motif of intemperance—is reproduced in Curtius' comment at the time of the first experiment with eastern court dress: 'His self-restraint and continence . . . degenerated into arrogance and dissipation . . . he began to ape the Persian royalty with its quasi-divine

status' (Curt. 6. 6. 1-2). Similar comments are found in Diodorus (77. 2: emulation of Persian luxury) and Justin (12. 3. 8-10: luxury and adoption of customs of the vanquished); and I have no doubt that the general sentiment derives from the vulgate and was already present in Cleitarchus (so Hammond, *Three Historians* 59, 102, 136). But Arrian is clearly independent of Cleitarchus, as his description of the court dress proves (see below). He is more likely to be reproducing a standard literary and rhetorical *topos*, as does Livy (9. 18. 1-4) in a passage very similar to Arrian (see also, for the general principle, Cic. *ad Alt.* 13. 28. 3). The theory of Alexander's corruption by barbarian luxury was a platitude which owes nothing to Peripatetic theory (cf. E. Badian, *CQ* 8 (1958) 154-7; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 144-5), and Arrian is reshaping a standard *exemplum* for his own purposes without necessarily referring to any specific historical source (cf. 6. 11. 3-6 with notes, and the full discussion in Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 61-3).

ἔσθητά τε ὅτι Μηδικήν Alexander had assumed Persian court dress in the autumn of 330, at roughly the same time that he heard of the usurpation of Bessus (Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 6; see, however, J. R. Hamilton, in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* i 473-4). The vulgate sources (see note above, with Plut. *Al.* 45. 1) unanimously locate the episode in Parthyaëa, after the campaign on the Caspian shore (above, 3. 23-4), and Bessus was reported to have assumed the upright tiara about the time that Alexander met Satibarzanes on the border of Parthyaëa and Areia (Arr. 3. 25. 3 (ἐν τούτῳ); Curt. 6. 6. 13). Alexander was demonstrating his own claims to be the legitimate successor of Darius and adopted certain items of the regalia of the Great King as a manifesto to his subjects, particularly his Asian subjects. He took selected garments—the diadem, the white-striped tunic, and the girdle—and these he combined with distinctively Macedonian dress. That was recorded by Eratosthenes (Plut. *Mor.* 330A = *FGrH* 241 F 30) and by the contemporary Ehippus (Athen. 12. 537E-F = F 5) and is presumably authentic information (cf. H. H. Ritter, *Diadem and Königsherrschaft* (Munich 1965) 57-8). Plutarch also states that Alexander assumed only the more unobtrusive Persian accoutrements and avoided Median dress (*Al.* 45. 2; *Mor.* 329F: cf. Diod. 77. 5; Strabo 11. 13. 9 (526)) as excessively provocative. Arrian, however, makes no distinction between Persian and Median dress (cf. 4. 9. 9; 7. 6. 2, 8. 2), and he goes no deeper than the standard motivation, namely emulation of Persian customs. Later (7. 29. 4) he hints at the actual political aim, to make the new regime more acceptable to Alexander's oriental subjects (so Plut. *Al.* 45. 1; *Mor.* 330A), but here he keeps to the standard moralizing interpretation, which leads naturally to the wider theme of σωφροσύνη (cf. Tonnet i 520).

Ἡρακλείδης ὧν The fact that Alexander is a lineal descendant of Heracles (see above, 2. 5. 9, 3. 3. 2 with notes) exacerbates his disregard of Macedonian custom (cf. Curt. 6. 6. 2; Justin 12. 3. 8). The point is made at greater length in Callisthenes' speech against *proskynesis* (4. 11. 6).

καὶ τὴν κίταριν Cf. 6. 29. 3, where Arrian uses the alternative spelling, *κίδαρις* (Herodian, *ap. Lentz, Grammatici graeci* iii 2. 533). That is taken from his source. Here he uses the form common to Herodotus (7. 90) and Plutarch. The word is used synonymously with *tiara* to designate the royal head-dress of the Persian kings (see above, 3. 25. 3 n. with Atkinson 128-30). Arrian is in error on two counts. First the tiara (or *kitaris*) was not Persian but Median in origin (Hdt. 7. 2. 1 (cf. 61. 1); Strabo 11. 13. 9; Plut. *Al.* 45. 2, *Mor.* 330 A). More seriously Alexander did not assume the regal tiara but confined himself to the diadem, the purple ribbon striped with white which was worn around the head-dress (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 3. 13; Curt. 3. 3. 19). All other historical sources are explicit on the subject (Plut. locc. cit.; Diod. 17. 77. 5; Curt. 6. 6. 4; Justin 12. 3. 8). Ephippus (*FGrH* 126 F 5 = Athen. 12. 537 E) alleged that the Persian diadem was combined with the distinctively Macedonian *kausia* (cf. E. A. Fredricksmeier, *TAPA* 116 (1986) 215-17; *contra* B. Kingsley, *CA* 10 (1991) 59 ff.), a statement which is incidentally confirmed by Aristobulus (see below, 7. 22. 2 with note). One cannot avoid the conclusion that Arrian is reproducing a rhetorical error of the type he later criticizes (6. 11. 3-6), and refers casually to the upright tiara as *the* standard item of Persian court dress (cf. Dio Chrys. 4. 69, 13. 24). Similarly Lucian (*Dial. Mort.* 12. 4) claims that Alexander adopted both the upright tiara *and* the long flowing robe of royalty (*kandys*). This was presumably a common mistake and, when Arrian writes without reference to his primary sources, he falls carelessly into it, just as he writes casually of the battle at Arbela in his necrology for Darius (3. 22. 4 with note).

5. ὥς οὐτε τὸ σῶμα κτλ The discussion now enters a philosophical mode, based on the Stoic conception of the primacy of virtue. The most succinct statement is probably Epictetus' digest of the teaching of his master, Musonius Rufus (Stob. 2. 8. 30 = Musonius F 38 (Hense); Epict. F 4 (Schenkl)): happiness depends upon what is under our control, correct use of external impressions. That gives freedom and serenity—also justice, law, *σωφροσύνη*, and all virtue. Other things, whether children, country, or one's body, are beyond our control and inessential (cf. Epict. *Diss.* 1. 22. 10; 2. 8. 6; 3. 22. 26-7). These inessentials, though not a condition of happiness, must be properly handled (*Diss.* 2. 5. 1-12); one needs a blend of attentiveness to material things and indifference to their outcome. Otherwise happiness is impossible (*Diss.* 2. 5. 9; cf. 1. 2. 37 with

Brunt, *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 29-30). For Alexander that blend was totally lacking. Deficient in *σωφροσύνη*, he could not make the best use of his material success. As the sequel was to show, his absolute power brought him not happiness but misery. The sentiment is not inconsistent with Arrian's general admiration for Alexander. Rather it adds an element of tragedy. For all his gifts and virtues the king had a fatal flaw which made felicity unobtainable.

καθάπερ οὖν ἐπενόει Arrian looks ahead to his essay on Alexander's imperial ambitions (7. 1. 2-4; cf. 4. 15. 6 n.), which he here takes as an established fact, as did the popular rhetorical tradition. Dio Chrysostom, for instance, views Alexander as set on becoming king of Europe, Asia, Libya and the islands in the Ocean (4. 49) and represents Diogenes discounting imperial ambition as worthless if carried out for sheer vainglory (4. 52-9; cf. J. R. Moles, *CA* 2 (1983) 272-4). Arrian may well have known the work of the Bithynian sophist, but the general idea is relatively trite. Seneca concisely expresses the view that Alexander's conquests brought him no happiness: *agebat infelicem Alexandrum furor aliena vastandi* (*Ep. Mor.* 94. 62, cf. *de ben.* 1. 13. 3; Brunt, *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 43); and Arrian is merely giving it a general expression, relating it to the general theme of *σωφροσύνη*. Without the fundamental virtue of self-control no conquest can of itself bring happiness.

8. 1-9. 8 *The Murder of Cleitus*

Other sources: *Itin.* 90-2 (derivative); Plut. *Al.* 50. 1-52. 2; Curt. 8. 1. 20-2. 12; Justin 12. 6. 1-16.

This famous episode is recounted at length by Plutarch, Curtius, and Arrian, all of whom clearly used a *mélange* of sources. Different aspects of the quarrel are stressed in each account (cf. Kaerst i³ 567-9). Arrian lays heavy stress upon Alexander's divine aspirations, partly to anticipate the major theme of the *proskynesis* episode but also because it was prominent in the tradition. The motif is not unique to him (see below, 8. 2 n.). Denigration and defence of Philip's achievements also recur in other sources, as does Cleitus' championship of the Macedonian rank-and-file (see below, 8. 5 n.). Given the confused recollection of the symposium which must have prevailed after the event, it is not surprising that different sources have different emphases. The wonder is that there is so much unanimity. It is inappropriate to isolate any single source as preferable. The clear favourite among modern scholars is Plutarch, whose account is supposed to be based upon the court chamberlain, Chares of Mytilene (Berve ii 207 n. 1; Schachermeyr² 364-5 n. 439; Kornemann 249-50), but there is no solid ground for the preference.

On the contrary all sources have something to contribute and each perspective has its value.

Arrian works up his narrative from a number of authorities (cf. Hammond, *Sources* 243). As usual, the use of indirect speech is no evidence that he has discarded his primary sources (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 62–5). Aristobulus is expressly adduced for a variant (8. 9), and there is no substance to the common view that Ptolemy omitted the entire episode (so Schwartz, *RE* ii 1240; Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 517; Brunt, *Arrian* i 535; *contra* Kornemann 139–42; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 313–15). One would expect him to have said something about an incident of such notoriety (cf. Pearson, *LHA* 191 n. 20); and indeed some of Arrian's exposition has an apologetic stamp that is best attributed to him (8. 8 n.). Most probably he used both Ptolemy and Aristobulus and at least one other source (see his discussion of variants at 8. 8–9). This extra material cannot be identified. There is a wide range of choice, and even Nearchus cannot be excluded. We have no idea of the *termini* of his work, and Nearchus, who had recently arrived at court (7. 2 n.) would have been an eyewitness or at the very least the recipient of firsthand reports from observers. He may well have included his own account of the affair.

For a survey of modern literature, which has not greatly illuminated this sombre episode, see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 141–3. The most important contributions are Cauer 38–58; Berve ii 207–8, no. 427; Aymard, *Études* 51–7; Schachermeyr³ 362–70; see also E. Carney, *GRBS* 22 (1981) 149–60.

8. 1. ὀλίγον ὕστερον Cleitus' death came in autumn 328, while Alexander was enjoying rest and recreation at Maracanda before moving south to winter quarters at Nautaca. It is unambiguously dated by Curtius (8. 1. 19, 2. 13; cf. Diod. 17 index κζ; Justin 12. 5. 13–6. 1), and would have occurred in Arrian's campaign narrative at 4. 17. 3, had he cared to preserve the chronological sequence.

ἡμέραν ἱερὰν τοῦ Διονύσου The neglected sacrifice to Dionysus is connected thematically to the story of Alexander's remorse, when he gladly ascribed Cleitus' death to the wrath of Dionysus (cf. 9. 5 n.). The latter motif appears in Curtius (8. 2. 6), who confirms that the annual sacrifice to Dionysus (cf. W. Baege, *De Macedonum sacris* (Halle 1913) 78 ff.) was neglected but suggests that the omission was noted some time after the event. Plutarch (*Al.* 50. 7) reports the sacrifice to the Dioscuri but says nothing about its displacing a ceremony for Dionysus. The juxtaposition of the two events may be misleading. Arrian mentions the neglected sacrifice to pave the way for the later invocation of the god's anger.

2. ἐξ ὅτου . . . θυσίαν Again very Herodotean in flavour. Note

particularly the epanalepsis (above, 7. 3 n.), the use of the deponent *ἐπιφράζομαι* (3. 2. 1 n.) and the indefinite expression *οὔτου δή* (cf. Hdt. 1. 86. 2; 3. 145. 1, etc.). It fits well into the typically Herodotean context of reported speech.

Neither Arrian nor his source gives any explanation for the sacrifice to the Dioscuri, nor does Plutarch, who mentions the ceremony in passing. It is the only act of worship for the Dioscuri mentioned in the history of Alexander, and their cult, as far as is known, was not popular in Macedon (temples are incidentally attested in neighbouring Torone (Thuc. 4. 110. 1) and Pherae (Dem. 19. 158)). Nor was the occasion one for which the Dioscuri would be particularly appropriate. Land-locked Sogdiana was not the place to invoke the *παῖδες σωτήρες* (*Hymn. Hom.* 33. 6–16, cf. Epict. *Diss.* 2. 28. 19), the patrons of mariners. The sacrifice may well have been connected with Alexander's increasing preoccupation with his supposed divine origins. Like Heracles, the Dioscuri had a double paternity, divine and human (see below), and their relationship with Zeus was comparable to that which Alexander envisaged for himself. The sacrifice, a public ceremony, broadcast the implicit message, and, if Arrian's account may stand, the conversation at the ensuing symposium continued the theme. It may well have been preparation for the experiment with *proskynesis* which Alexander planned with some care (compare Plutarch's comment (*Al.* 45. 1) on the assumption of Persian court dress).

ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον νεωτέριστο 'Alexander's drinking habits had now changed to a more barbarian mode.' The symposium is a recurrent backcloth in the 'great digression' (10. 6, 12. 3–5, 13. 5–6), and Hermolaus' reported speech culminates in condemnation of Alexander's drinking and drunken stupor (see below, 14. 2 n.). Arrian comments that there had been a change, and classes the excessive drinking with other instances of orientalizing (*ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον* is emphatically repeated at 8. 4). This is problematic. Excessive drinking had always been a feature of symposia at the Macedonian court, and the debauches in Philip's reign were notorious (Theopompus described the king as 'always equipped with many tools for the symposium' (Athen. 10. 435 c = *FGrH* 115 F 236, cf. F 162, 225)). The customs of the previous reign were continued by Alexander (see E. N. Borza in *Ancient Macedonia* iii (Thessaloniki 1983) 44–55; *In the Shadow of Olympus* (Princeton, NJ 1990) 241–2), and the great *komos* at Persepolis (cf. 3. 18. 11 n.) suggests that the drinking had lost none of its full-blooded intensity. Arrian, however, had not reported the tradition of the Persepolis debauch, and the Cleitus affair is the first appearance of the symposium in his work. He may have assumed that the drinking became more frequent and uninhibited in the north-east—and given the high temperatures

and the poor water (cf. von Schwarz 43-5), that would not be surprising. But the inference is probably Arrian's own; the observation does not occur elsewhere.

It is curious that Arrian views the propensity to drink as an oriental trait. The Macedonian habit of drinking wine unmixed was famous and traditionally classed as barbaric, the mark of the bibulous Thracians and of northern barbarians in general (cf. Hdt. 6. 84; Pl. *Leg.* 1. 637 E). But Persians were also notable for their addiction to wine (Plat. loc. cit.; cf. Hdt. 3. 34. 2), and the Alexander historians commented on the fondness for wine encountered among the peoples of the east. The Indian Calanus indeed invited the Macedonians to celebrate his demise with a memorable carouse (Chares, *FGrH* 125 F 19; cf. Baeton, *FGrH* 119 F 1 on the Tapurians). All this may have encouraged Arrian to categorize the great debauches of Alexander's court as oriental excess, but the idea was his own, suggested by the immediate context.

ἐς Δία . . . ἀφαιρεθείσα Τυνδάρεω Arrian follows the tradition of Hesiod (F 24 Merkelbach and West) whereby both Castor and Polydeuces were sons of Zeus (so *Hymn. Hom.* 33. 1-2). Like Heracles they had a divine and human parentage. The other tradition, represented by Pindar (*Nem.* 10. 80-8) and early genealogists, is that Polydeuces alone was son of Zeus and chose to blend his immortality with his brother's mortality, so that they spent alternate days with the gods and below the earth (*Od.* 11. 302-3 has a more complex version in which they alternate death with life below the earth). For Arrian's (and Alexander's) purposes the details are unimportant. What mattered was the divinity of the Dioscuri, the sharing of Olympus with the gods (Pind. *Nem.* 10. 84-8), and the belief that they achieved their immortality through their virtue on earth (Xen. *Symp.* 8. 29; Chrysippus F 1009 (*SVF* ii 300). The parallel with Alexander, who ascribed his own birth to Zeus (see above, 3. 3. 2 n.), was very apposite, and it could be argued that the actual achievements of the Dioscuri, including the sordid abduction of the daughters of Leucippus, were neither impressive nor indeed particularly creditable. Isocrates (10 [*Helen*], 61) suggests that they won their place among the gods through the beneficence of their sister, not from any action of their own. That made a peculiarly pertinent starting-point for the discussion of Alexander's own merits and his claims to immortality, which could easily be made to eclipse theirs.

The Dioscuri do not figure in the other reports of the quarrel (see below 8. 6 n.). Both Plutarch (*Al.* 50. 11) and Curtius (8. 1. 42) claim that Cleitus scoffed at Alexander's pretensions to divine sonship and the disrespect to Philip which they encouraged. That is consistent with a climate at court which encouraged speculation on the divine origins of Alexander, and the sacrifice to the Dioscuri made

an excellent starting-point for discussion. The other sources do not make a feature of the theme of immortality, and it may not have featured in the quarrel proper. But all reports allude to Cleitus' denigration of Alexander's presumed origins, and we may well believe that discussion was rife well before the issue of *proskynesis* was formally broached.

3. οὐποτε παύσσονται Alexander's flatterers (see below, 9. 9 with note) exert the same deleterious effect that Darius' advisers had before Issus (above 2. 6. 4 with note), and Arrian repeatedly emphasizes that flattery is an inevitable concomitant of monarchy (see also 7. 29. 1). That is a common enough sentiment, but Arrian goes further and stresses its destructive effect (*ἐπιτρίβοντες* is a strong word; cf. Dio 52. 10. 4). The thought is trivial; the flatterer is particularly dangerous for men in power, for he works on their natural vanity and entices them into over-extravagant and ruinous ambitions (cf. Sen. *de ben.* 6. 30. 5-6; Plut. *Mor.* 49 c; Dio Chrys. 3. 22). To some degree Arrian is reflecting the mood of his age, where flattery was dispensed with the trowel. Julius Pollux (1. 40-1) compiled his celebrated list of fifty-two terms of praise for a king, and Marcus Aurelius praised his adoptive father's immunity to adulation as an unusual trait (*M. Ant.* 1. 16. 2-3). But Alexander's susceptibility to flattery was a standard theme of rhetoric. Plutarch (*Mor.* 65 D) makes it responsible for the deaths of Callisthenes, Parmenion, and Philotas; and Curtius (8. 5. 6) echoes the words of Arrian ('pernicious adulation, the ever-present evil of kings, whose power is more often overturned by flattery than the enemy force') in precisely the context of the king's divinity. The theme of flattery was already present in the source tradition, but Arrian's use of it provides a foil to set against Alexander's excesses. The flatterers were more culpable than he (above, pp. 46-7).

οὐδὲ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους Heracles was a more intractable precedent than the Dioscuri; he was the paradigm of excellence, and his services to humanity had secured him apotheosis (cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 283-4). Isocrates had confronted Philip with the model of Heracles, raised to immortality by his divine father (5. 132; cf. 1. 50, 6. 17), but he insists that there is no question of emulating his achievements—that would be out of the reach of some of the gods (5. 114; cf. Dobesch 145-6). But by 328 Alexander's courtiers were prepared to argue that their king had eclipsed Heracles himself in his conquests and benefits to mankind (10. 6 below, with Curt. 8. 5. 8, 11). He could confidently expect the same apotheosis.

φθόνον . . . τοῖς ζῶσι This is the critical threshold. The flatterers imply that Alexander's achievements justify the acknowledgement of his divinity during his lifetime: there was no point in waiting for death when he could be heroized and honoured with the appropriate

cult establishment—or indeed deemed to have joined the gods (cf. 10. 7). Something similar, overlaid with imperial rhetoric, occurs in Curtius (8. 5. 11; see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 116–17), and the sentiment could well go back to Alexander's day. Philip had certainly attempted to associate himself with the gods; he was involved in the cult of Zeus at Eresus (Tod 191, line 6: see above, vol. i 179) and allegedly had his image paraded with the twelve Olympians in his capital (Diod. 16. 92. 5, 95. 1; cf. E. A. Fredricksmeyer, *TAPA* 109 (1979) 52–6 and in *Macedonian Heritage* 94–5; for a minimizing interpretation see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia* ii 692–5). Alexander could have felt that he had far outstripped his father and achieved the excess of virtue (*ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολή*) which would qualify him to make the transition from mortal to god (cf. Arist. *NE* 7. 1145a 18–27). Some cult honours at least might be thought appropriate. If a lesser general like Lysander could have the Samian national festival renamed after him, paeans sung in his honour, and altars erected for him (Plut. *Lys.* 18. 4–10 = Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 71; Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 243–4; see, however, Badian, in *Edson Studies* 34–7), then Alexander could surely receive the panoply of divine honours. So at least his courtiers will have argued.

4. *πάλαι ἤδη ἀχθόμενον* Plutarch (*Al.* 50. 9) emphasizes Cleitus' irascibility and intractable nature and suggests that his criticisms of Alexander were nothing new (51. 1: *ἐκάστοτε λέγων*). It is likely enough that he had already incurred the king's displeasure. His nomination to the satrapy of Bactria and Sogdiana (Curt. 8. 1. 19, 35; see below, 17. 3 with note) occurred shortly before the banquet and was no doubt intended to rid the court of an eminent and uncomfortable personage. It was ominously reminiscent of Parmenion's assignment to Media, and there is no wonder that Cleitus was in a truculent mood, disposed to vent his spleen in a display of drunken opposition. E. Carney (*GRBS* 22 (1981) 155–8) suggests that Cleitus was connected to one at least of the commanders who perished at the Zeravshan (see above, 3. 7 n.) and were the butt of court gossip (Plut. *Al.* 50. 8), and so had a strongly personal reason for his anger. But there is no evidence to back the supposition, and the extant sources give ample reason for Cleitus' outburst.

χάριν ταύτην ἄχαριν προστιθέναι 'nor by belittling the achievements of the heroes of old to invest Alexander with this glory which was no glory'. The regular interpretation 'to confer upon Alexander a service which was no service' cannot stand. *προστιθέναι χάριν* normally has the sense of *adding* a flavour or charm (Plut. *Mor.* 100 c 669 A, 1065 c; cf. Arr. 7. 29. 3), and in this case Cleitus would seem to be arguing that the denigration of respected cult figures might be used to give Alexander the added aura of divinity, but that aura was offensive in that it derived from profanation of accepted values.

The oxymoron (χάρῳ . . . ἄχαρῳ) is sharply crafted and clearly inspired by tragedy (Aesch. *Ag.* 1545; Eur. *IT* 566; cf. Leonidas, *Anth. Pal.* 9. 322).

5. οὐκ οὖν μόνον καταπράξαι This is the only reference in Arrian to a major theme in Plutarch and Curtius. For Plutarch it was gratuitous criticism of the commanders at the Zeravshan which provoked Cleitus to his outburst (*Al.* 50. 8–9), and at the climactic moment of the quarrel Cleitus launches into a provocative extract from Euripides' *Andromache* (693 ff.: Plut. *Al.* 51. 8), criticizing the pretensions of generals who monopolize the kudos of victory. The verses are alluded to indirectly and inaccurately by Curtius (8. 1. 27–8), who has Cleitus utter them *à mi-voix* at the start of the quarrel, before he went on to champion the career of Philip. That comes closer to the placing in Arrian, and it does not sit too comfortably with Alexander's criticisms of his father—the immediate context in Curtius (8. 1. 23–6; cf. Aymard, *Études* 52–6; H. U. Instinsky, *Historia* 10 (1961) 251–2). It would seem that the defence of the common Macedonian was one of the features of Cleitus' tirade upon which all traditions agreed, and it comes in slightly different contexts—in Arrian after the protest against deification and in Curtius after the attack on Philip. But the *immediate* trigger is the same, deflation of excessive claims made for Alexander's achievements, and it is highly probable that Cleitus did emphasize the contribution of the rank-and-file and used the quotation from the *Andromache* to make his point.

ἀλλὰ ἱκανὸν γάρ Arrian here speaks for himself, as he does—in very similar language—at 12. 6. The message is simple. If one has chosen the role of courtier, one must play one's part (τὸ καθ' αὐτόν . . . ἔχειν) accordingly. If the scenario is morally reprehensible, one should not condone it, but equally one should not undermine one's superior by public criticism. That does not exclude frankness, but the frankness must be displayed at the right season and tempered with a modicum of tact, if it is not to be counter-productive. According to Plutarch (*Mor.* 71 c) it was the publicity of the affront even more than the wine which exasperated Alexander against Cleitus, and the example is only one of a large number devoted to the theme of unseasonable reproach (*Mor.* 66 v): 'παρρησία should be combined with good manners and there should be reason in it to take away its excess and intensity'; cf. 68 c–d (παρρησία and hard drinking do not go together), 29 c–d, 810 c). Dio of Prusa (77/8. 38) also outlines the proper behaviour of the philosopher at court, not sacrificing personal liberty and freedom of speech, but preserving his role (τὸ καθ' αὐτόν . . . διαφυλάττειν) in proper fashion, supporting and encouraging virtue by praise or blame, and admonishing individuals privately (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 70 f–71 c). That is not unlike

Thrasea's behaviour in the early years of Nero (Tac. *Ann.* 14. 12. 1) and perfectly compatible with Stoic theory.

Cleitus' behaviour was hubristic in the extreme (cf. 9. 1), and Alexander's exasperation is understandable. He is alleged to have distinguished *ὑβρις* and *παρρησία* when others were involved (Plut. *Eum.* 2. 3), and he was naturally more sensitive when he himself was the butt of criticism.

τῶν Φιλίππου τινὲς ἔργων According to Curtius (8. 1. 22-6) and Justin (12. 6. 2) it was Alexander himself who denigrated his father's achievements. Curtius alleges that he claimed personal credit for the victory at Chaeronea, to have saved Philip's life during a dispute between Macedonians and Greek mercenaries, and to have defeated the Illyrians without help or encouragement. The last two episodes are not attested elsewhere and are desperately obscure, but for that very reason they are most unlikely to be Curtius' own invention. They must come from his source, which may preserve some authentic record of the boasting at the banquet. The scornful thrust which follows, that Philip was viewing the mysteries at Samothrace when he should have been devastating Asia (Curt. 8. 1. 26), refers to the tradition of his meeting with Olympias while still a youth (Plut. *Al.* 2. 2). Alexander was contrasting his father's relatively inglorious minority with his own; and there may be something deeper. The Dioscuri were also initiates at Samothrace along with other Argonauts (Diod. 5. 49. 6; cf. Ap. Rhod. 1. 915-21). The slight to Philip also concerned them, and Alexander may have been indirectly belittling their achievements. By contrast Alexander's own deeds surpassed belief (Curt. 8. 1. 26). Arrian reports only the basic fact that there was criticism of Philip and does not associate Alexander directly with it. That may be exculpatory, but it is equally possible that there were variant accounts of the quarrel—agreement that Philip's exploits were minimized to the greater glory of his son but disagreement about Alexander's role in the conversation.

7. αὕτη σε ἡ χεῖρ Plutarch (*Al.* 50. 11) also has Cleitus break into direct speech with a reference to his services at the Granicus (cf. 1. 15. 7-8 with notes). But the context is different. In Plutarch Cleitus' championship of the defeated commanders provokes an accusation of cowardice, which in turn gives rise to the riposte: 'this cowardice delivered you, the scion of the gods.' The phrasing and sentiment are similar and the *mot* is placed at a significant moment in both authors. An authentic echo may once again have been placed in different contexts by different sources. In Curtius (8. 1. 39) the subject is raised by Alexander, who alleges that Cleitus has often boasted in the past of saving his life, and the theme (as in Arrian and Plutarch) is voiced at the point when Alexander first takes issue directly with Cleitus.

ἀλλὰ ἀναπηδᾶν γὰρ ξὺν ὀργῇ Other sources (Plut. *Al.* 51. 4; Curt. 8. 1. 31–2, 38–9) suggest that Alexander was able to control his anger for some time after the first angry exchange, and only broke after Cleitus had continued and intensified his abuse. That would suit Arrian's general tendency to shift the blame for the incident on to the victim, and it is strange that he omits it. He seems to have been unaware of the tradition.

ὕπὸ τῶν ξυμπινόντων Plutarch (*Al.* 51. 5) claims that the Bodyguards restrained Alexander; Aristophanes (Aristonous (?); cf. K. Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.* 84 (1935) 379–80; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 143; W. Heckel, *Klio* 64 (1982) 378–9) had removed his dagger, and the rest surrounded him and attempted to calm him. Curtius (8. 1. 45–6) explicitly names Ptolemy, Perdikkas, Lysimachus, and Leonnatus, all Bodyguards (see below, 6. 28. 4 with note). This is intrinsically probable, and Aristobulus (below, 8. 9 n.) confirmed that Ptolemy played a significant part in the episode.

8. καλῶν τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς So Plutarch (*Al.* 51. 6), who adds that Alexander called out in *Macedonian*—a sign of great agitation. It was not the use of Macedonian (as is usually assumed) that was the sign of agitation. Macedonian was the normal language of command—and in later years Eumenes took good care that a vital message was conveyed to the enemy phalanx in Macedonian (*PSI* xii 1284, col. ii 18–20; cf. Badian, in *Macedonia and Greece* 41 with n. 64). Alexander used Macedonian to get the most immediate response from his guard. The sign of agitation was of course his shouting for the guard, with the intention of arresting Cleitus, as he later arrested the most prominent of the Opis mutineers (see below, 7. 8. 3). The unusual feature of the episode was the king's need to shout, not his use of Macedonian. Arrian has the same emphasis, explicitly stressing the king's shouting (ἐβόα ἄρα). The particle (ἄρα) (which Roos was the first to read in the Vindobonensis: other texts had read ἀνακαλῶν) is significant, denoting something new and surprising (as at 4. 9. 8, 10. 3, 20. 3; 7. 18. 6; cf. Denniston 32–5); Alexander 'actually shouted'. It is fair to suppose that Arrian's source (like Plutarch's) suggested that his behaviour was unusual.

Like most scholars (cf. W. Heckel, *Phoenix* 30 (1986) 285) I take it that the hypaspists provided Alexander's court guard, supplementing the élite group of Bodyguards attached to his immediate person. However, N. G. L. Hammond (*Historia* 40 (1991) 377–9) has recently argued that the hypaspists were in camp during the symposium and that the guard was a separate corps, specially recruited from the phalanx at large. I find this hypothesis singularly unconvincing (see below, 5. 13. 4 n.), and in the present context it makes nonsense of the situation. The hypaspists were present at the symposium, and for that reason he shouted for them to intervene. When

they failed to respond, he attempted to raise the camp. They were clearly the guard, as are the group later described by Diodorus as 'the court hypaspists' (οἱ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν ὑπασπισταί, Diod. 110. 1; cf. 77. 4, 101. 3). From the sequel it appears that they retained their cumbersome *sarisae* on guard duty (which surely tells against M. M. Markle's theory (*AJA* 82 (1978) 491-3; cf. *Macedonia and Greece* 99-104) that they also used the hoplite spear), while the élite Bodyguards carried a light javelin (see also Curt. 8. 1. 45) even in the relaxed atmosphere of the symposium.

ἐς ταῦτά ... Δαρεῖω So Curtius 8. 1. 47. In his intoxication Alexander imagined that his Bodyguards were in collusion with Cleitus and were set on usurping his power. At this point he instructed the trumpeter to rouse the camp (Curt. loc. cit.; Plut. *Al.* 51. 6), which was potentially the most dangerous moment of the entire quarrel; a massacre could easily have occurred. It is not surprising that the Bodyguards stopped restraining their king, and the trumpeter who disobeyed the command—in the face of Alexander's wrath—deserved his commendation.

οὐκ οὐν ἔτι οἴους τε εἶναι κατέχειν In Arrian's account the affair now reaches its climax. The restraints are shaken off and the killing ensues directly. But there were clearly other versions. In the variant from Aristobulus which Arrian cites next there is a hiatus; Cleitus is removed from the symposium but returns to confront the king. Plutarch (*Al.* 51. 8) also states that Cleitus was forced out of the hall only to reappear at another entrance. The details differ from Aristobulus but there is a core of agreement, that Cleitus left the scene but subsequently returned. In Curtius (8. 1. 40-1) Cleitus is dragged away but continues his abuse. The climax comes later; the king ignores his Bodyguard and bursts out to the entrance hall of the palace where he waylays Cleitus and murders him (8. 1. 49-52)

The reports are confused and confusing, but one thing is clear. Most versions have an interval between Alexander's struggle with his Bodyguard and the actual killing. That interval would have been embarrassing to the king's close entourage who manifestly failed to mitigate his wrath during Cleitus' absence and were unable to prevent the killing. In Arrian's first version of the incident there is no interval. The king threatens his Bodyguard, breaks physically free of them and strikes down Cleitus at the height of his frenzy. That exculpates his fellow symposiasts as far as is possible, and implicitly frees Ptolemy from any reproach. It is a story which would not come amiss from him. In Aristobulus there is also apologetic. The interval is accepted but it is used to denigrate Cleitus, who wilfully turned back to his death and despised the good offices of Ptolemy (see below). It seems highly probable that Cleitus *was*

removed from the hall and *did* return soon afterwards. The king then struck him down, unimpeded by his Bodyguards. It is unlikely that there was malice aforethought, for Cleitus was already destined to be separated from the king's presence (as satrap of Bactria/Sogdiana) and there was no obvious advantage to be gained from his death. The more charitable explanation is that they were appalled by Alexander's reaction against their earlier attempt at restraint and felt that Cleitus' death was a lesser evil than the consequences of laying hands on the king again.

οἱ μὲν λόγῃην . . . οἱ δὲ σάρισσαν The variant serves as a transition to the account of Aristobulus. The version that he seized a javelin from a Bodyguard follows from the preceding scene where Alexander shakes off the constraint of his entourage and moves directly to the murder. The more common version is that he took the weapon (*sarisa*) of one of the guards (cf. Curt. 8. 1. 49 (*hasta ablata*); Plut. *Al.* 51. 9; Justin 12. 6. 3). That is no doubt true. The seizure of the lance looks like an apologetic overlay, tailored to the picture of Alexander bursting from the knot of Bodyguards directly to the killing, and it may be derived from Ptolemy. Other sources had less reason to exculpate the Bodyguards. Aristobulus agreed that the killing was done with a *sarisa* (8. 9 *fin.*), but, if (as is likely) the detail is correct, the variant need not be taken from him. Arrian noted divergences in two of his sources, who gave roughly similar stories, and then appended Aristobulus' story, which was quite different (as at 13. 5; for simpler examples compare 2. 3. 7; 3. 30. 5; 4. 6. 1-2).

9. Ἀριστόβουλος δέ Aristobulus' version is clearly apologetic (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 517; Pearson, *LHA* 169-70), emphasizing Cleitus' obstinate insistence upon having the last word. He did not merely leave the hall, as in Plutarch, but was taken outside the palace complex, beyond the wall and moat of the acropolis (cf. Curt. 7. 6. 10). Even then he returned and confronted the king in his rage. It was unnecessary provocation, and this Aristobulus stressed, while ignoring the conversation at the symposium which had originally provoked Cleitus.

πρὸς Πτολεμαίου . . . σωματοφύλακος Only Aristobulus had this story. In Curtius (8. 1. 45, 48) Ptolemy is fully engaged with his fellow Bodyguards in restraining Alexander, and it is Cleitus' fellow symposiasts who attempt to drag him away (8. 1. 40; so Plut. *Al.* 51. 8 (οἱ φίλοι)). Aristobulus gave Ptolemy the entire credit and near success in saving Cleitus. It is a contentious account (cf. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 18-19). The Bodyguards are shown to be incapable of preventing the killing, but Ptolemy alone is exculpated. It would seem that Aristobulus had reason to place Ptolemy in the most favourable light and may have been looking for reward and

patronage from that connoisseur of literature. In that case he was probably writing at a period of relative détente between Macedon and Egypt. The years immediately following Cassander's death would be one possibility (see below 7. 18. 5 n.).

9. 1. Ἀλέξανδρον δέ . . . οἰκτεῖρω The wording comes as a shock. It resumes and continues the sentiment at 4. 7. 5, that happiness is impossible without σωφροσύνη. Here Arrian emphasizes that the king was victim to anger and drunkenness, two vices totally incompatible with self-control. That his state was pitiable would be a common enough view. Malefactors, according to Epictetus (*Diss.* 1. 18. 3; cf. 4. 6. 2), should be the object of pity rather than anger because of their confusion between good and evil. That in turn is a corollary of the Stoic tenet that the person who does an injury in fact injures himself (Chrysippus, *SVF* iii 71, F 289). But Arrian strikes a warmer note of sympathy, contrasting sharply with Seneca's round condemnation of Cambyses' vicious combination of drunkenness and anger (*de ira* 3. 14; cf. Hdt. 3. 35). Seneca indeed explicitly commends Prexaspes' dictum that drunkenness is more disgraceful for a king because of his exemplary position (*de ira* 3. 14. 1), which is a view Arrian ought to have shared (cf. *Praef.* 2). Instead he offers Alexander the same pity in his misfortune that Alexander offered the Persian princesses (cf. 2. 12. 8 n.), representing him (unlike Cleitus) almost as the victim of the episode. There is a conscious sophistry: the injured man becomes the aggressor and receives censure, while the author of the murder is pitied for his lack of self-control—a virtual reversal of the normal verdict (cf. Sen. *de ira* 3. 17. 1; Val. Max. 9. 3, *ext.* 1).

2. τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε αὖ ἐπαινῶ Arrian turns with relief to encomium. The muted criticism is contrasted with explicit praise of Alexander's recognition of fault. The theme is expounded at §6 below and worked up more fully in the peroration (7. 29. 2; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 146–7). Once more there is a play on paradox. Repentance, or the need for repentance, is often represented as the mark of the base individual, ignorant of moral values and unstable of disposition (Arist. *NE* 7. 1150^b 30; Chrysippus, *SVF* iii 149, F 563; cf. 100. 32, F 414; M. Ant. 11. 29). At best Alexander's repentance should have shown that he had the capacity for self-improvement (Plut. *Mor.* 82 A–C), but that was hardly something to praise. Arrian seems to be concentrating on Alexander's recognition of his act in its full horror. The tendency (illustrated by Anaxarchus' intervention) was to exculpate and gloss over the murder—or even claim that it was justified (compare Sen. *de ira* 3. 14. 3–4). Alexander could call a murder a murder even when he was the agent; flattery had not totally destroyed his sense of reality.

The expression of pity is comparatively rare in ancient historiography. Normally it is reserved for the victims of sudden, unforeseen visitations of fate (e.g. Thuc. 7. 29. 5, 30. 3 on the sack of Mycalessus). Those who suffer disaster by their own actions merely reap their deserts (for a succinct statement see Polyb. 2. 7. 2-3, echoing Thuc. 3. 67. 4; the words of Nicias at 7. 77. 4 are special pleading). Plutarch (*Al.* 50. 2) does indeed represent Cleitus' death as an act of god, which uses the king's anger and intoxication to work the marshal's destruction, but that is rhetorical sophistry. Few would have seen Alexander's behaviour as anything other than culpable and eminently avoidable (cf. Sen. *de ira.* 3. 13. 5), and Arrian's pity seems totally misplaced. His verdict rises above the circumstances of the murder and rests on the general point repeated from 4. 7. 5: for all his good qualities Alexander could not achieve self-control and the emotional stability which is the precondition of happiness.

καὶ λέγουσιν εἶσιν οἱ [τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου] Krueger deleted τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου, bringing the passage into line with 9. 7 and 10. 3 below (see also 7. 22. 5, 24. 4). This produces a slight monotony, and it might be preferable to supplement the text in the manner of Vulcanius and read εἶσιν οἱ <τῶν ἀναγραφάντων> τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου (7. 22. 4; cf. 2. 12. 3). Whatever the reading, the sense is clear. One (cf. 7. 24. 4) or possibly more of Arrian's sources gave the story of Alexander's attempted suicide, which was omitted by his primary authorities. But the rest of our extant sources refer explicitly to Alexander turning the *sarisa* upon himself and go on immediately to Arrian's majority version of the king's self-reproaches (Plut. *Al.* 51. 11; cf. *Mor.* 449 E; Curt. 8. 2. 4; Justin 12. 6. 8). The unanimity of the vulgate suggests that this was the version of Cleitarchus (so Hammond, *Three Historians* 104). Either Arrian used some branch of the vulgate or a source from which the vulgate was derived: Chares or (conceivably) Nearchus himself. Ptolemy and Aristobulus presumably omitted the attempted suicide. There was no role for the *sarisa* in Ptolemy's story and in the version of Aristobulus there was little scope for remorse. On the other hand the attempted suicide highlighted the role of the Bodyguards who could frustrate Alexander's designs on himself (Plutarch and Justin loc. cit.) but were unable or unwilling to prevent the murder (see above, 8. 9 with notes).

3. Λανίκην τὴν Δρωπίδου (Berve no. 462) The sister of Cleitus is only known from this context. Alexander's *σύντροφος* (milk-brother) was the notorious toper Proteas (Ael. *VH* 12. 26; cf. Hippolochus *ap.* Athen. 4. 129 A) who outlived Alexander and played a mischievous role in the last fatal banquet (Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F 3 = Athen. 10. 434 A-B). There is no reason to identify him with Proteas, son of Andronicus, who distinguished himself at Siphnos in 333 (cf. 2. 2. 4-5, 20. 2), nor is there any ground for the identification of Lanice's

husband (cf. Wirth, *Kampfverband* 3-4), still less for any political speculation on that assumption (*contra* E. Carney, *GRBS* 22 (1981) 152-3).

Alexander's self-incrimination is reported in much the same terms by Curtius (8. 2. 8-9) and Justin (12. 6. 10-11), and there may be a common source (see below). But the invocation of Lanice was presumably a historical fact and could have been reported in similar terms by independent sources.

4. ἐπεὶ δὲν ἀποθανόντας According to Curtius (8. 2. 8) two of Lanice's sons had perished at Miletus, back in 334 bc. That no doubt is true, but Curtius spoils the effect when he claims that Lanice was now bereft of male relatives. In fact her son Proteas survived (see above), and there may have been another son, Theodorus (cf. Berve no. 862). The mistake is probably not Curtius' own rhetorical elaboration, for Arrian too implies that Lanice lost all her sons in Alexander's service (τοὺς μὲν παῖδας κτλ.). The common error implies a common source.

ἔστε ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας So Curtius (8. 2. 10: *triduum iacuit*) and Justin (12. 6. 15: *quadriduo*). According to Plutarch (*Al.* 52. 1) Alexander's paroxysm of guilt and grief lasted a night and day.

5. μῆνιν ἐκ Διονύσου ἦδον An echo, surely deliberate, of the first line of the *Iliad*. Achilles' descendant had shut himself away, the victim of the gods' anger and indirectly of his own (cf. T. S. Brown, *AJP* 90 (1949) 240).

Plutarch (*Al.* 52. 2) claims that it was the intervention of the seer Aristander which brought Alexander back to his normal habits, but he referred back to the sinister portents on the eve of the symposium (50. 3-6), suggesting that Cleitus' death was predestined. For Arrian it is the wrath of Dionysus that is important. The neglect of the sacrifice is mentioned by Curtius (8. 2. 6) as an idea which occurred to Alexander himself in the immediate aftermath of the murder. Arrian's source made the theme more central, the critical factor in Alexander's acceptance of his actions. The episode ended in a sacrifice of reconciliation with the ultimate responsibility firmly attributed to the god.

Some sort of retrospective justification *was* probably given. The explanation of the neglected sacrifice may indeed have been given at the time, and, if Curtius (8. 2. 12) is correct, the Macedonian assembly declared Cleitus' death justifiable homicide and it required the king's intervention to have the body interred (cf. Badian, *Studies* 198; R. M. Errington, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 108). That, unlike most of the details of the Cleitus affair, was a public transaction, performed in cold sobriety, and it is likely to be true.

κακῶς ἐθεράπευσε 'He paid some grudging attention to his body's needs.' If the manuscript reading is to stand, Arrian implies

that the king took inadequate care of his bodily needs (as opposed to none during the three days of fasting). But *κακῶς* is a colourless and infelicitous word (which elsewhere in Arrian has its full force), and emendation may be justified. Pflugk's *ἀναγκαίως* ('perforce') seems the best guess so far, or conceivably a negative has fallen out (e.g. <οὐκετι> *κακῶς ἐθεράπευσε*).

οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἄκοντι ἦν This somewhat spoils the effect of Arrian's *apologia*. Alexander was happy enough to shuffle off the moral responsibility of the crime on to the god, whose agent he was. He had moved from his unqualified remorse immediately after the murder, when 'he acknowledged that he had erred as a human might' (9. 6), and represented himself as the instrument of divine retribution, not wholly culpable. He did not boast about the murder or represent it as a virtuous act, which would indeed have been the ultimate abomination, but he was willing to palliate its criminality.

6. *κακίονα* ἔστι . . . τοῦ ἀμαρτηθέντος 'nor as its champion and advocate did he become yet more evil than the crime itself'. The word order suggests strongly that the final genitive is to be taken with the preceding comparative. On the sentiment compare Seneca's denunciation of Prexaspes, who praised the archery which killed his son (*de ira* 3. 14. 4).

The combination of *προστάτης* and *συνήγορος* is striking, reminiscent of Theophrastus' characterization of the *philoponeros* (*Char.* 29. 5), who is the champion of the immoral and advocate of villainy (the parallel in Arrian supports Immisch's emendation). See also the allegation that 'Euripides' (i.e. Critias) made Sisypheus the champion and advocate of atheism (Critias B 25; cf. Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 14. 16. 1; [Plut.] *Mor.* 880 E).

ἄνθρωπὸν γε ὄντα The qualification is deliberate and effective. Arrian contrasts Alexander's actual mortality with the pretensions to divinity encouraged by the court flatterers (8. 3) and broadcast by the experiment with *proskynesis*.

7. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λέγουσιν κτλ. The anecdote recurs with identical detail and very similar wording in Plutarch (*Al.* 52. 3-7; *Mor.* 781 A-B). The main difference is that in Plutarch Callisthenes also plays a role (so Justin 12. 6. 17), unsuccessfully attempting to soothe Alexander's remorse by gentle persuasion. That is excised by Arrian (as indeed it is by Plutarch at *Mor.* 781 B), who is concerned with the moral damage inflicted by Anaxarchus. The remonstrations of Callisthenes were not relevant to the main theme. There is certainly a common source, as assumed by Cauer 45, Brown (*AJP* 90 (1949) 240), and Hamilton (*Plut. Al.* 145), but its identity eludes speculation. Peripatetic hostility has been alleged, but that is only plausible if the anecdote is fiction. The antagonism between Callisthenes and Anaxarchus is well enough attested (cf. Berve nos. 70, 408), and any

source could have described it in the terms used by Plutarch (*Al.* 52. 7), which display no philosophical bias. Nor is there any reason to dismiss the story of Anaxarchus' consolation. It coheres well with the rest of the anecdotal tradition about Anaxarchus (see below), which is certainly not total fabrication. In that case our anecdote could derive from any of the main Alexander sources, except Ptolemy (who was not used directly by Plutarch).

Ἀνάξαρχον τὸν σοφιστὴν The Democritean philosopher from Abdera (Berve no. 70; E. N. Borza, in *Edson Studies* 73–86. Testimonia and fragments in Diels/Kranz ii 235–40, no. 72). His relations with Alexander are attested in a number of anecdotes, which concentrate around the scandals of Cleitus' murder and *proskynesis*. Anaxarchus was present at Tyre in the spring of 331, when he alienated King Nicocreon of Salamis (Plut. *Al.* 28. 4–5; Diog. Laert. 9. 58; Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 6. 251 A. See the ingenious and convincing exegesis by P. Bernard, *JS* 1984. 3–49, esp. 6 ff. (so Borza 78)). Later he displayed considerable foresight in acquiring firewood in anticipation of a march through timberless country, probably the Hindu Kush (cf. Strabo 15. 2. 10 (725); Arr. 3. 28. 6 with note), and was able to offer Alexander an unexpectedly warm billet (Ael. *VH* 9. 30). After the events in Bactria and Sogdiana he is next attested in 323, overriding the forebodings of the Chaldaean astrologers who had warned Alexander not to enter Babylon (Diod. 17. 112. 4; Justin 12. 13. 5). For his gruesome and heroic death at the hands of Nicocreon see the full discussion of the evidence by Bernard (*art. cit.*).

Anaxarchus is alleged to have been the teacher of Pyrrhon and the spiritual father of scepticism (Diog. Laert. 9. 61; cf. von Fritz, *RE* xxiv 94–5). Little enough can be salvaged of his doctrines. In a very relativistic manner he compared reality with painting or the visions of sleep and madness (Sext. *Emp. adv. m.* 7. 88), and apparently discoursed on the possibility of an infinite number of universes (Plut. *Mor.* 466 D Val. Max. 8. 14, *ext.* 2). In the moral sphere he allegedly claimed that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) was the end of human life ([Gal.] *H. ph.* 4 (A 14 Diels/Kranz)), and he may have practised a thorough-going hedonism (see the hostile anecdote of Clearchus, *ap.* Athen. 12. 548 B). His sobriquet *Εὐδαιμονικός* was well earned. Apart from two brief quotations from his *On Kingship* (see below) our information about him is almost entirely anecdotal, and a series of apophthegms is recorded, concentrating on the subject of Alexander's divinity (cf. 10. 6 n.). These dicta are by and large extremely witty and combine overt flattery with a degree of sarcastic iconoclasm. As ancient commentators observe, the sharpness made the flattery more acceptable (Philodem. *Herc.* 1675 col. iii. 32 ff. = A 7 Diels/Kranz)—and it suited the persona of Anaxar-

chus to treat nothing as sacred (see below, on 10. 6). This streak of nihilism is certainly not Peripatetic fabrication, as was passionately argued by Theodore Gomperz ('Anaxarch und Kallisthenes', in *Commentationes Philologicae in honorem Th. Mommseni* (Berlin 1877) 471-80) and has been repeated many times since (cf. Kaerst, *RE* i 2080; Berve ii 34-5). The apophthegms can in some cases be shown to be highly apposite to their historical context and too ingenious to have been readily fabricated (Bernard, art. cit.). They are an authentic reflection of the personality of Anaxarchus, acidic but for all that supportive of Alexander.

ἐπιγελάσαντα Plutarch (*Al.* 52. 5) agrees that Anaxarchus assumed an air of arrogance, deriding the king, the wonder of the world who lay wailing like a slave.

τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον Plutarch adds Themis to Dike as an assessor of Zeus, and properly so. Both are traditionally associated with the ruler of Olympus. In Pindar (*Ol.* 8. 22) Themis is the *paredros* of Zeus and in Sophocles (*Antig.* 798) Dike is his *ξύνεδρος*. The inspiration clearly comes from Hesiod (*Erg.* 255-60), who has Dike take her seat beside Zeus (*πὰρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη*) and inform him of mortals' transgressions. The scene was dramatized by Aeschylus (*F* 530 (Mette)) and became a theme of Orphic literature (*Orph. Hymn.* 62. 1-3; [Dem.] 25. 11). In late antiquity it occurs frequently in rhetoric (cf. Themist. 123 A; Himer. 46. 10) and even philosophy (Plotin. 5. 8. 4 (lines 40-2); cf. *P. Leg.* 4. 716A). The interest lies in the use made by Anaxarchus of this well-worn imagery. Alexander is the counterpart of Zeus on earth and has the same absolute powers. Indeed in Plutarch, Anaxarchus equates regal power with justice: the king should be the law and the criterion of justice for his subjects. That is how Xenophon represents his Cyrus, the embodiment of law in Persia (*Cyrop.* 8. 1. 22; cf. J. N. Farber, *AJP* 100 (1979) 504-5), and it was natural to extend the concept to the Macedonian monarchy. Alexander did embody law for his subjects, as indeed did his Hellenistic successors (on the development of the concept see A. Steinwenter, *AAWW* 83 (1946) 250-68). The most memorable instance is probably Stratocles' decree of 304 acknowledging every command of Demetrius Poliorcetes as 'righteous towards the gods and just towards men' (Plut. *Demetr.* 24. 9; cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschen*² 48-50).

But there were inevitable pitfalls in the ideology. Most Greeks would equate unrestricted monarchy with tyranny. So argued Hyperides (*Epitaph.* 20), claiming that defeat in the Lamian War would have placed the world under one master 'whose whim Greece would of necessity observe as law'. This unpalatable situation could only be avoided if the king were schooled morally, so that even his instinctive actions would provide a model for his subjects to imitate (so already

Xenophon's *Cyrus*). That is fully expressed in Diotogenes' treatise on kingship, where 'the king would begin by fixing in his own life the most just limitations and order of law' (*YCS* 1 (1928) 71; cf. *Plut. Mor.* 182 c for the sentiments of Gonatas). Anaxarchus, however, drew the opposite conclusion, that any action of a king was *ipso facto* just and should be accepted as such by ruler and subjects alike. It was a travesty of political thinking, a sharp contrast with (say) Archytas of Tarentum, who distinguished between the king as animate law and the body of statute law: 'when the law is transgressed, the king is a tyrant, the rulership unjust. . .' (*YCS* 1 (1928) 59). For Anaxarchus the primacy of the king's will was absolute. Whether he actually believed his argument is dubious. Anaxarchus is accredited with a treatise *On Kingship* (B 1-2 Diels/Kranz) and he may well have expounded views about the relationship between royal power and law. But the one substantial fragment (B 1) is a short sermon on the importance of the right moment (*καίρος*), which for him is the criterion of wisdom. Even prudent advice is viewed as folly if given inopportunistly (*ἔξω καιροῦ*). Faced with an Alexander crippled by remorse, Anaxarchus deliberately tailored his message to the moment and cleverly perverted the common doctrine: as the counterpart of Zeus Alexander could not err, for his acts were just by definition. Remorse was not only unprofitable but totally inappropriate to his exalted position, which (he implied) was that of a god among men.

8. εἴπερ οὖν . . . ἔγνω Arrian clearly thought that Alexander *did* accept the advice at face value. The next sentence with its emphatic connective, ἐπεὶ καί (cf. 7. 2. 1, 16. 8, 18. 1), makes an explicit link with the previous episode. Alexander was led to believe that whatever he did was just; for that reason (so it is alleged) he wished to be the object of *proskynesis*. Anaxarchus, not Alexander, is ultimately responsible for the next episode of immoderation.

9. 9-10. 4. *The Experiment with Proskynesis*

9. προσκυνεῖσθαι ἐθέλειν All sources agree in placing this episode shortly before the invasion of India (see below, 4. 22. 2 n.) and it is claimed that Alexander had long since set his heart on the experiment (*Curt.* 8. 5. 5; *Justin* 12. 7. 1). What exactly it was and what it implied has been the subject of intense controversy, which shows little sign of abating.

The crux of the matter is the significance of the gesture of *proskynesis*. In both Greece and the ancient Orient it was a simple ritual kiss, with the right hand brought up to the mouth (see the full discussion by J. Horst, *Proskynein* (Gütersloh 1932), esp. 44-51; cf. also A. Delatte, *BAB* 37 (1951) 423-50, esp. 430-2). In Greece,

however, the gesture was confined to acts of worship, offered exclusively to deities, whereas in the near east it had a social as well as a religious connotation. *Proskynesis* could be offered by a commoner to his or her hierarchical superior. Above all it was the gesture of respect paid to a ruler, and for the Greeks the receiving of *proskynesis* was as much the characteristic of the Great King as the upright tiara (above, 3. 25. 3 n.). But by the fourth century BC there was general acceptance by the Greeks that the Persian *proskynesis* did not imply worship as such, although the practice could create acute discomfort. Isocrates (4. 151) writes disparagingly of the Persians 'offering *proskynesis* to a mortal and addressing him as a *daimon*'. This is overtly polemical and may reflect earlier explanations of the act—as the image of god on earth the king deserved *proskynesis* (Plut. *Them.* 27. 4). In practice the Greeks had a fairly clear idea of the secular nature of the Persian kingship. Xenophon refers some dozen times to *proskynesis* as an act of official greeting and there is no suggestion that it implied belief in divinity. On the contrary Xenophon (*Anab.* 1. 6. 17) is perfectly aware that *proskynesis* was practised between hierarchical unequals in Persian society and was not unique to the king; and he also maintains that Greeks reserved *proskynesis* for the gods (*Anab.* 3. 2. 13; cf. *Hell.* 4. 1. 35). That encapsulates the principal dilemma. In attempting to impose *proskynesis* upon his Greek and Macedonian subjects did Alexander envisage it as an act of worship or simply a piece of court protocol to be imposed upon all subjects, Greek and oriental alike?

Since the classic article by J. P. V. D. Balsdon (*Historia* 1 (1950) 376–7) there has been a large measure of support for the view that *proskynesis* as planned by Alexander was a rationalization of court procedure (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 151). That runs against the consensus of the extant sources, particularly Arrian, Curtius (8. 5. 5–6), and Justin (12. 7. 2–3), which see the primary purpose of the innovation as recognition of Alexander's godhead through the act of *proskynesis*. Arrian is aware of the argument for uniformity of protocol (see below, 11. 7), but it is a secondary consideration. The key point is the implication of the act for a *Greek*. Whatever *proskynesis* meant to a barbarian, for a Greek it implied recognition of divinity and, if the act was demanded by a fellow Greek, it could only mean that he had aspirations to divinity (a point forcefully established by Badian, in *Edson Studies* 52–3). Alexander will surely have been familiar with the story of the Spartan scapegoats, sent to Susa to appease the wrath of Talthybius, who were physically forced to the ground but still refused to perform the act—οὔτε γὰρ σφίσι ἐν νόμῳ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον προσκυνέειν (Hdt. 7. 136. 1), and the connotations cannot have escaped him. If his Greek subjects greeted him with *proskynesis*, it

would inevitably have implications that he was a god, and the implications cannot have been unwelcome.

There is another dilemma, whether or not the act of *proskynesis* involved full prostration: physical abasement before the ruler. In both cultures this was a possibility. Although Greeks normally offered prayers when standing, they might fall on their knees in supplication (Xen. *Anab.* 3. 2. 9) or self-abasement (Theophr. *Char.* 16. 5). Similarly in the near east one might stand (or slightly stoop) and raise one's hand to the mouth with fingers curved to blow a kiss. That is the gesture depicted on the Persepolis Treasury relief and is the mode of greeting of Sennacherib's general at the capture of Lachish (E. J. Bickerman, *PdP* 18 (1963) 251-2; R. N. Frye, *Iranica Antiqua* 9 (1972) 102-7; see Fig. 1). Alternatively one might abase oneself fully if one were a suppliant or markedly inferior in status (like most Greek visitors to the Great King). It is difficult to make a decision. Bickerman (247-50) argued that Alexander's experiment did not necessarily involve prostration; but Curtius (8. 5. 5) claims that Alexander did intend his subjects to revere him, *prosternentes humi corpora*; and the laughter of Leonnatus (12. 2n.) implies that the Persians abased themselves in a very thorough-going way. P. von Straten (*BABesch* 49 (1974) 159-61) has observed that for a Greek the gesture of kissing one's hand was not in itself counted as one of the normal honours to gods. But the tradition of Demosthenes' death (Luc. *Enc. Dem.* 49; cf. *de Salt.* 17) strongly indicates that it was the kissing which was primary and that it would normally be performed standing (cf. Apul. *Met.* 4. 28. 3; Pliny, *NH* 28. 25). If that is correct, it would be possible to argue that Alexander did not insist on the full abasement, which his courtiers might well have found intolerably humiliating, but allowed them to remain standing. That would have made it easier for Callisthenes to escape detection at the symposium (cf. 12. 4n.). Curtius then will have wrongly inferred that Alexander planned the more familiar act of complete prostration (so Livy 9. 18. 4). Whichever alternative one adopts, it remains true that the *proskynesis* was intended by Alexander as an act of worship as much as court ceremonial, and that is how his courtiers interpreted it.

ὑπούσης . . . μᾶλλον τι ἢ Φιλίππου δόξης The belief in divine sonship is paramount, more important than emulation of Persian customs. Alexander's claim to divine paternity is a common theme, recurring in the abuse of the mutineers at Opis (7. 8. 3) and most recently in the drunken effusion of Cleitus (Plut. *Al.* 50. 11; Curt. 8. 1. 42). Comparison with Heracles and the Dioscuri was apparently common in court conversation at this period (see above, 8. 2-3 with notes), and the suggestion was clearly being made that Alexander



FIG. 1. Representation of *proskynesis*: Sennacherib receiving the surrender of Lachish. He is greeted formally by his vizier, while the prisoners prostrate themselves in supplication. (By permission of the British Museum)

had as good a claim to divinity in his own right as any other figure who could boast a dual paternity. The belief in his divine origins

goes back to the early part of the reign; they were broadcast and well known even before the visit to Siwah (cf. 3. 3. 2 n.; Bosworth, in *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 67-75). By now a second stage had been reached. Long recognized as the offspring of Zeus Ammon, he was ready to take the next step, acknowledgement of his personal divinity (cf. 10. 6; Curt. 8. 5. 8).

οὐκ ἐνδεῆσαι . . . ἐνδιδόντας So Curt. 8. 5. 6: *non deerat talia concupiscenti pernicioſa adulatio* (see above, 8. 3 n.).

καὶ Ἄγιν' Ἀργεῖον (Berve no. 16) Apart from his few appearances at the court of Alexander nothing is recorded of Agis and (perhaps mercifully) none of his epic poetry has survived (cf. *Suppl. Hell.* 17). Curtius (8. 5. 8) also mentions him as a protagonist in the *proskynesis* debate, and he was clearly an associate of Anaxarchus. Indeed Plutarch (*Mor* 60 B) attributes to him an apophthegm which is elsewhere ascribed to Anaxarchus himself (Philod. *Herc.* 1675, cols. iii-iv = Anaxarchus A7 (Diels/Kranz)) and which promotes Alexander's divine paternity. As for Anaxarchus there is a collection of anecdotal material, centring on the king's pretensions to divinity or divine sonship. Some (e.g. Ael. *VH* 9. 37 = A8) are ironical, others less so, and one at least is found in a context which argues strongly for its authenticity (Bernard, *JSt* 1984. 4-20; see also E. N. Borza, in *Edson Studies* 78). In fact Anaxarchus seems to have specialized in systematic ambiguity. When hit by an apple at a symposium he threatened to retaliate with his goblet and quoted Euripides (*Or.* 271: 'one of the gods is going to be smitten by mortal hand'). On the surface this was gross flattery, provided that one did not probe the context; in Euripides the speaker (Orestes) is demented and confuses his very mortal sister with one of the Olympians. Anaxarchus was clearly prepared to promote Alexander's divinity but he made no secret of his personal opinion that it was a fiction. Unlike Callisthenes, who directly opposed the introduction of *proskynesis*, Anaxarchus supported the innovation and justified it publicly. That did not prevent his debunking the very concept of Alexander's divinity, if the atmosphere was sufficiently relaxed and the circumstances right for irony.

10. 1. Καλλισθένην . . . ὑπαγροικότερον On the life and works of Callisthenes see particularly Jacoby, *RE* x 1674-1707; *FGrH* 124 (testimonia and fragments); Berve ii 191-9, no. 408; Pearson, *LHA* 22-49; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 15-69; Prandi. For additional bibliography see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 11-12, to which add D. Golan, *Athenaeum* 66 (1988) 99-120.

Callisthenes was born at Olynthus, at some indeterminate date before the city was destroyed in 348. His connections with Aristotle are well attested. He was the son of Hero, one of the female relatives of the philosopher (Plut. *Al.* 55. 8 = *FGrH* 124 F 2), and spent some

time in his entourage. In the late 340s he made the acquaintance of Hermias of Atarneus and subsequently composed an encomium in his memory (*FGrH* 124 F 2-3), and at much the same time he became friendly with Theophrastus who in his turn was to commemorate Callisthenes' own death in a monograph on grief (*Καλλισθένους ἡ περὶ πένθους*: Diog. Laert. 5. 44). There Theophrastus deplored the fate of his comrade and criticized Alexander's intemperance (Cic. *Tusc.* 3. 21; cf. Badian, *CQ* 8 (1958) 154; Bosworth, *Historia* 19 (1970) 407-8), a clear indication that Callisthenes was close to the Peripatetic school. According to Arrian he heard Aristotle's lectures, but whether or not he was involved in technical philosophy is uncertain (cf. 13. 2 below). He was certainly accomplished in epideictic oratory, as the *proskynesis* debate amply shows (see also Plut. *Al.* 53. 3-6 with Brown, *AJP* 70 (1949) 247; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 147-8), but his major contribution was in the field of history. Here some collaboration is attested, notably in the great Delphian *pinax* which Callisthenes and Aristotle jointly compiled, listing all Pythian victors and describing the origins of the games (*FD* iii 1. 400 = Tod, *GHI* no. 187; cf. J. Bousquet, *BCH* 97 (1984) 374-400). That was a very substantial work; two *minae* were disbursed for its inscription in 327/6 (*FD* iii 5. 58, l. 42) and there may have been three subsequent payments, the last as late as autumn 324 (Bousquet 375). The work was presumably finished by Aristotle after Callisthenes had left Europe; there is little likelihood that, as was once assumed (Jacoby, *RE* x 1685-6), Callisthenes acted as a kind of research student for his great relative. His historical production, the ten-book *Hellenica* which covered the period 386-356 and the monograph on the Sacred War (Cic. *ad Fam.* 5. 12. 2; *FGrH* 124 F 1; cf. Prandi 66-8), was very much his own work, and its success inspired Alexander to invite him to join the campaign as his historian (Justin 12. 6. 17; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 1043 D). He *may* have been recommended by Aristotle (Diog. Laert. 5. 4; Plut. *Al.* 55. 7; cf. *Historia* 19 (1970) 411; Prandi 19-22), but he clearly had a very substantial reputation in his own right. Nor is it by any means certain that Callisthenes had close ties with his great relative at the time that he joined Alexander. We have a dubious and uncorroborated story that he sent Aristotle a batch of astronomical records from Babylon at Aristotle's own request (Simplic. *in Arist. de cael.* 2. 12 = *FGrH* 124 T 3; cf. S. M. Burstein *EMC*, ns 3 (1984) 71-4; Prandi 17-18), but otherwise there is no attested connection.

Arrian's characterization of Callisthenes ('somewhat boorish in manner') is most unflattering and there is a more intemperate verdict still at 13. 7. Other sources mention a studied austerity (Plut. *Al.* 52. 7, 53. 1) and an insistence upon plain speaking (Curt. 8. 5. 13; Diog. Laert. 5. 4), which allegedly led Aristotle to remark

that his relative had much eloquence but no sense (Plut. *Al.* 54. 1; cf. Lyd. *de mens.* 4. 77, p. 131 (Wünsch) = *FGrH* 124 T 5). But the harshness of character was clearly not displeasing to Alexander, for Callisthenes enjoyed his favour consistently and was instrumental in producing the celebrated recension of Homer which Alexander considered his greatest treasure (Strabo 13. 1. 27 (594); cf. Plut. *Al.* 8. 2, 26. 1-2; Prandi 76-82). The alienation came relatively late, if Plutarch is right that he was the first to be enlisted to console Alexander after Cleitus' death (Plut. *Al.* 52. 3; cf. Justin 12. 6. 17), and it clearly centred on Callisthenes' resistance to the acknowledgement of Alexander's divinity. His opposition was first manifested in disapproving silence (Plut. *Al.* 53. 2) and gradually became vocal. In turn Alexander made his disapproval of Callisthenes explicit, most ominously in a quotation from Euripides' *Bacchae* (Plut. *Al.* 53. 4 = Eur. *Bacch.* 266-7), which cast Callisthenes in the role of Pentheus—a silver-tongued speaker with no substance to his message and ultimately doomed. Indeed Callisthenes allegedly foresaw his own death (Plut. *Al.* 54. 1 on which see Hamilton ad loc.). The evidence is anecdotal but it is consistent. The great matter was the worship of the living monarch and its imposition at court. That Callisthenes could not stomach and he was forthright in his opposition. The astringency which he had previously used against his colleagues and rivals was now directed at the king—with fatal results.

εἴπερ ἀληθὴ ξυγγέγραπται Arrian makes no direct use of Callisthenes' work (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 4-7), and here he reports some tendentious statements from his source concerning the Olynthian historian's high claims for his work. It is hardly likely to be a pointed digest of Callisthenes' prologue to the *Praxeis Alexandrou* (so Jacoby, *RE* x 1691; cf. 1702-3). More probably these are purported utterances of Callisthenes, no doubt inspired by his encomiastic portrayal of Alexander (see below) but shaped to give the sharpest impression of his overweening arrogance. Arrian seems to be following a tradition akin to that of Philodemus, who contested the view that Callisthenes was a truly plain-spoken philosopher and emphasized the contradiction between Callisthenes' literary apotheosis of Alexander and his opposition to *proskynesis* (Philod. *Herc.* 1675, col. iv = *FGrH* 124 T 21). Somewhat earlier Timaeus had claimed that Callisthenes was justly punished for corrupting Alexander, 'investing a mortal nature with the aegis and thunderbolt' (Polyb. 12. 12b. 2-3 = *FGrH* 566 F 155). That is not unlike Arrian's presentation. He cannot but agree with Callisthenes' disapproval of *proskynesis*, but he immediately nullifies any implicit commendation by giving lurid examples of the historian's conceit and insinuating that he was ready to propagate the idea of Alexander's divinity in

his published work. At the same time he gives a palmary illustration of the overbearing stupidity which is the main element in his characterization of Callisthenes (below, 12. 7).

ὅφ' αὐτῷ . . . Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα 'he declared that Alexander and Alexander's exploits depended upon him and his history'. The *topos* is familiar enough. The capacity of the poet to convey immortality is one of the most famous themes of Pindar. The paradigm was Homer, who invested his heroes with everlasting glory (*Isthm.* 3/4. 55-60; cf. *Nem.* 7. 20-3); and Alexander himself allegedly envied Achilles his herald (cf. 1. 12. 1 with note). Indeed what Callisthenes is made to say is not far from the claims of Arrian himself in his 'Second Preface' (1. 12. 2-4); and similar sentiments may have occurred in the preface of the *Philippica* by Callisthenes' contemporary and rival, Theopompus of Chios, who (like Arrian) claimed primacy in Greek letters and was attracted by Philip's uniqueness (*FGrH* 115 F 25, 27; cf. J. Marincola, *JHS* 109 (1989) 186). Callisthenes also may well have advertised his talents and boasted that he had the literary ability to immortalize Alexander's achievements. But to claim that Alexander's fame depended upon his history was an improbable piece of arrogance for an associate and courtier. Even Arrian claimed that there was a symbiotic relationship: his history immortalized Alexander and Alexander's fame enhanced the dignity of his own work (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 33-5). For Arrian's Callisthenes the king was a beneficiary—something which the historical Alexander would have found hard to digest.

2. τοῦ θεοῦ μετουσίαν It is certain that Callisthenes propagated Alexander's divine sonship in his history. At Siwah he made the officiating priest declare explicitly that Alexander was son of Zeus (and explicitly represented Ammon as Zeus); and he also recorded oracles from Branchidae and Erythrae relating to the king's divine origins (*FGrH* 124 F 14a; cf. *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 73-5; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 54-8; Prandi 94-6). Later, on the eve of Gaugamela, he had Alexander pray to Zeus as son to father (Plut. *Al.* 33. 1 = *FGrH* 124 F 36; cf. *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 57-60). All this indicated close relations between the Macedonian king and the king of the gods; Alexander was engendered by Zeus and enjoyed his favour. But that did not make him divine in his own right, any more than (say) Memnon or Sarpedon. Nor did the *proskynesis* of the Pamphylian sea, which according to Callisthenes arched itself before Alexander and in a sense prostrated itself (*FGrH* 124 F 31). Alexander had then passed the boundaries of the Persian empire as they were accepted in the fifth century and the barbarian sea offered its characteristic act of homage (cf. *JHS* 110 (1990) 8; *contra* Prandi 100). Alexander was appropriately honoured by his barbarian subjects (see below 11. 8), for whom the act of *proskynesis*

had no necessary religious connotations. For Callisthenes, in so far as we can interpret the fragmentary detritus of his work, there was no question of Alexander being divine himself, and it appears a misrepresentation to have him championing Alexander's 'participation in divinity'. That is akin to the tendentious allegations of Timaeus and Philodemus which have him deifying his royal patron (see above).

ἐξ ὧν Ὀλυμπιάς ... ψεύδεται On Olympias' claims about Alexander's parentage see Plut. *Al.* 3. 3-4. According to Eratosthenes (*FGrH* 241 F 28), she made a secret revelation to her son on the eve of his departure; and, though stories about Alexander's birth were rife (cf. Plut. *Al.* 2. 6 with Hamilton *Plut. Al.* 4-5; Justin 11. 11. 3-6), there is little evidence that Olympias fomented them. It is grossly implausible that the historical Callisthenes could have mentioned her views on Alexander's birth; still less could he have branded them as lies.

3. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ ... ἀνέγραψαν Arrian again changes sources and selects an anecdote which shows Callisthenes in a more sinister light, actively encouraging regicide. The ultimate source may be the slander which linked Callisthenes with the Pages' Conspiracy (see below, 12. 7 n.). That slander represented him giving very similar encouragement to Hermolaus (Plut. *Al.* 55. 3; cf. Curtius 8. 7. 25), and it is only too likely that it was also insinuated that he abetted the convicted traitor, Philotas. In that case the story could derive from Aristobulus or even Ptolemy. Both claimed that Callisthenes was a party to the Pages' Conspiracy (14. 1), and either could have provided 'evidence' that Callisthenes was a malcontent of long standing, as indeed they had done with Philotas himself (3. 26. 1 n.). Arrian to his credit recognizes it as a contentious issue and reports the story as a *logos*.

ὅτι τὸν ἕτερον ... κατέλυσαν The cult of the tyrannicides is well attested at Athens. Arrian himself supplies evidence about the commemorative statue of Antenor (3. 16. 8 with note; 7. 19. 2), and they received state offerings at the hands of the polemarch (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 58. 1; cf. Rhodes, *HCAP* 651-2). Their descendants received *ateleia* and the right of dining in the prytaneum (*IG* i³ 131, lines 5-9). For discussion see I. Calabi Limentani, *Acme* 29 (1976) 9-27.

Arrian echoes the wording of the celebrated Attic *skolia* which commemorated Harmodius and Aristogeiton for having killed the tyrant and placed Athens under equal laws (Page, *PMG* 893, 896, cf. 895; M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1969) 130-6). This popular view, despite its condemnation by Thucydides (1. 20. 3; 6. 54-5), continued to enjoy a vogue in rhetoric (Arist. *Rhet.* 2. 1401^b11; cf. Pl. *Symp.* 182c) and popular historiography (e.g. Parian Marble, *FGrH* 239 A 45), where Hip-

parchus is represented as tyrant and his death marks the end of the tyranny. That is almost the version of Arrian. However, his account is peculiar in that it mentions a *pair* of tyrants (τοῖν τυράννοις). This must be a reference to the story of Diodorus (10. 17. 1) which has one of the Peisistratids (Thessalus) renounce the tyranny, leaving his two brothers, Hippias and Hipparchus, to share the regime. Diodorus' source was certainly Ephorus, whose work would have been familiar at Alexander's court and might well have been used to provide detail for the calumny against Callisthenes: he had encouraged Philotas to kill his king and (presumably) end the monarchy.

4. καὶ πρὸς Εὐρυσθέα πολεμήσαι The Athenians had appropriated from Thebes the credit for the defeat of Eurystheus and the deliverance of the Heraclidae (Pindar, *Pyth.* 9. 79-81; cf. Wilamowitz, *Kleine Schriften* i (Berlin 1935) 73-5). The story is found in Herodotus (9. 27. 2) and forms the basis of Euripides' *Heraclidae*. In fourth-century Athens it was a recurrent patriotic theme, a favourite of epitaphic orations (Pl. *Menex.* 239 B; Lys. 2. 11-15); and Isocrates used it several times (4. 54-60; 6. 42; 12. 194), notably in his open letter to Alexander's father (5. 34). The analogy is very unflattering to Alexander. A Heraclid himself, he is assimilated to the legendary persecutor of his family, who (in one version) ended up a suppliant in the hands of his enemies (Eur. *Heracl.* 861 ff.; Isocr. 4. 59, 12. 194).

10. 5-12. 6. *The Debate on Proskynesis*

The story recurs in Curtius (8. 5. 5-6. 1) with similar content but some divergence of detail (see below), and Plutarch (*Al.* 54. 3) preserves its nucleus, that Callisthenes' opposition was instrumental in having the experiment quashed. Both Arrian and Curtius devote the majority of their exposition to the arguments of Callisthenes, which both present as direct speech. The consensus in modern scholarship has been to dismiss both versions as rhetorical fabrications and to condemn the entire context as unhistorical, because of its alleged incompatibility with Chares' story of the private introduction of *proskynesis* (see below, 12. 3-5) and the tendency to believe that *proskynesis* was wholly secular in intention (see above, 9. 9 n.). But the tradition of the staged public debate is not inconsistent with Chares' version of a limited introductory experiment, and the evidence is overwhelmingly strong that Alexander's divinity was a burning topic during the spring of 327. What is more the debate is attested, independently it would seem, by Arrian, Curtius, and Plutarch; and it is most likely that there was public advocacy of *proskynesis* and explicit opposition from Callisthenes. The historical core was variously adapted. In Curtius the sentiments voiced are

clearly anachronistic, rhetorical platitudes of the early Empire (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 116-7). Arrian's material is more Hellenistic in flavour and could well echo the contemporary debate on the propriety of deifying a living man (see below, *passim*). The source (or sources) is beyond identification.

Of modern opinions of the debate the negative view is best represented by Jacoby, *RE* x 1679 ('reine Mache'); T. S. Brown, *AJP* 70 (1949) 240-4; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Historia* 1 (1950) 372-9; Brunt, *Arrian* i 536-8. For more favourable assessments see Tarn ii 287; L. Edmunds, *GRBS* 12 (1971) 386-90; Badian, in *Edson Studies* 28-32, 48-54; Goukowsky i 47-9; Prandi 28-9; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 113-23.

5. **ξυγκεῖσθαι . . . δοκιμωτάτους** Curtius (8. 5. 9-10) agrees that the scenario was carefully rehearsed and that the guests at the symposium comprised Persians as well as Greeks and Macedonians. The sophists were to give a philosophical justification of *proskynesis*, which it was hoped would be greeted with acclamation (cf. 11. 1), after which the Persians would set the example of *proskynesis* for the rest of the guests. Indeed they continued in their role even after the experiment was aborted (cf. 12. 2 n.).

6. **ἄρξαι . . . Ἀνάξαρχον** In Curtius (8. 5. 10) the chief speaker is the Sicilian Cleon (Berve no. 437), who is closely associated with Agis the poetaster (Curt. 8. 5. 8; see above, 9. 9 with note), and he plays exactly the role that Arrian gives to Anaxarchus. There was no reason to invent a personage so obscure, and it is likely that Cleon was one of the main proponents of *proskynesis*. That does not exclude Anaxarchus having taken part. Arrian (11. 1) suggests that there were several speakers in favour of the motion and Anaxarchus was probably one. Aware of the tradition of hostility between Callisthenes and Anaxarchus (cf. Plut. *Al.* 52. 7-9) his source turned Anaxarchus into the chief protagonist, the man of straw swept aside by Callisthenes.

δικαιότερον . . . Διονύσου τε καὶ Ἡρακλέους This resumes and expands the discussion at Maracanda (8. 3 with notes). Anaxarchus is concerned with Dionysus and Heracles as gods in their own right. Heracles is taken as the type of an (apparent) mortal elevated to heaven because of his merits, the one Greek example of genuine apotheosis (cf. H. A. Shapiro, *CW* 77 (1983/4) 9-15). On the other hand Dionysus is undeniably a deity, even though born of a mortal mother (Hes. *Theog.* 942: ἀθάνατον θνητῇ); although a god, he assumed a mortal form (Eur. *Bacch.* 4) and the thunderbolt which delivered him translated Semele to heaven (cf. Pindar *Ol.* 2. 25; *Pyth.* 11. 1). Alexander is placed above both, in the first place because of the multitude and magnitude of his achievements and then because of his Macedonian origins. As the next sentence shows, the thrust of

the argument is to justify recognition of Alexander as a god manifest, to be acknowledged as such then and there.

7. ἀπελθόντα γε ἐξ ἀνθρώπων The terminology is familiar in descriptions of Heracles' divine state (cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 9–12) and was used to describe Alexander's own departure from mortality (*OGIS* 4. 5; Diod. 18. 56. 2; Parian Marble, *FGrH* 239 B 8; cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 199–200); death was simply a change of state (see also 7. 27. 3 with note). It is more than likely that Alexander's later apotheosis was openly foreshadowed by court discussions in his lifetime. But the crux is certainly the worship of the *living* Alexander. In court flattery Heracles was the example to avoid, the god who had to wait for divine honours until he transferred his domicile to heaven.

ὥς θεὸν τιμήσουσι The confidence may be misplaced. What is envisaged here is much the same as the ritual established by Eumenes for his Alexander tent: there before the king's throne, sceptre, and armour the commanders burned incense on a ceremonial table and 'offered *proskynesis* to Alexander as a god' (Diod. 18. 61. 1; Polyaen. 4. 8. 2). That in part echoes the ceremonial of Alexander's lifetime, when incense was indeed burned before him (Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F 5) and *proskynesis* may not have been totally abolished (cf. 12. 1, 14. 2 nn.). Eumenes did all he could to evoke the aura of Alexander, the past and present deity, and slurred over the fact of mortality. Elsewhere the controversy continued. Antipater apparently considered the cult of Alexander an impiety ('Suda' s.v. Ἀντίπατρος), and even Ptolemy at first confined his recognition of Alexander to heroic honours appropriate to the founder of Alexandria (Diod. 18. 28. 3)—whose mortal remains were firmly in his possession. Despite the parallel of Heracles, death remained an embarrassment for the proponents of Alexander's divinity; it was the tangible criterion which separated men from gods, and there was a contradiction in terms if it was claimed that the king had died but nevertheless become a god. One could argue that the divine being had shrugged off its corporeal prison and resumed residence in heaven, but the god was always immanent. A mortal could not prove his mortality by dying and then assume immortality as a god.

ἥπερ τελευτήσαντα ἐς οὐδέν ὄφελος Anaxarchus here stresses the fact of death, and plays upon it; if Alexander is deified, he will be unaware of the honour, for he will be dead and unable to appreciate it. That motif pervades Curtius' account of the debate, even Callisthenes' speech (Curt. 8. 5. 15–16), and clearly echoes the thought patterns of the early Empire, when the official state cult was inaugurated after the ruler's death and apotheosis (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 117). As Arrian phrases it, the sentiment is anachronistic. 'Anaxarchus' may well have maintained that Heracles

was unfortunate not to have his divinity recognized by contemporaries (cf. Curt. 8. 5. 11), but Arrian has taken the cynicism one step further and expressed it in terms which are self-evidently absurd. His scepticism is firmly embedded in the exposition (cf. 3. 3. 2: *φήσων γε ἐγνωκένας*; 7. 23. 2).

11. 1. τοὺς Μακεδόνας δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς Plutarch (*Al.* 54. 3) agrees that Callisthenes voiced the opposition of all the older Macedonians (so Curt. 8. 5. 20). As the anecdote from Chares reveals (12. 4-5), some of the younger Macedonians were prepared to compromise and offer *proskynesis*. For the elder officers (it is clearly the *hetairoi* who are in question) it was an outrage. Philip might have associated himself with the twelve Olympians and received divine honours (of a sort) in the Greek world (cf. Badian, in *Edson Studies* 40-1, 68-71, with Fredricksmeyer's comments in the same volume (146-56) and in *Macedonian Heritage* 94-8) but there is no suggestion that Macedonian nobles were encouraged to offer him worship. Public acknowledgement of Alexander's godhead, embodied in the offensive act of *proskynesis*, was simultaneously an affront to their religious sensibilities and an elevation of the person of the king beyond any semblance of equality. Yet there is agreement that they were resigned to it. It was only Callisthenes' outright (and unscheduled) opposition that provided a catalyst for their sentiment.

2. δοῖαι ξύμμετροι ἀνθρώπῳ 'Honours which fit the measure of man.' Callisthenes (or Arrian) may be playing with and inverting the Protagorean dictum that man is the measure of all things (Protagoras B1, ii 262-3 Diels/Kranz; see the earlier inversion by Plato, *Leg.* 4. 716 c). Divine honours are inappropriate to the nature of man, which cannot cope with them any more than for Aristotle it could cope with overwhelming terror (Arist. *EE* 3. 1229^b10). Worship of a living man is therefore not only offensive but unnatural.

διακεκρίσθαι . . . θειαί The sharp division of divine and mortal honours is conservative, reflecting Pindar's insistence on the absolute gulf between god and man. Even the most felicitous of mortals cannot ascend to the brazen heaven (*Pyth.* 10. 27; see also *Nem.* 11. 15-16 and the numerous parallels adduced by E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die isthmischen Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968) i 77-8). Although divine honours had occasionally been offered to mortals, notably Lysander (see below, 11. 3 n.), they were rare before the time of Alexander (cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 280-1) and clearly provoked controversy. In the Hellenistic period sacred and profane honours tended to be conferred in combination and there was no clear-cut division (cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 211). By Arrian's day there was a feeling that rulers should not insist upon or promote their worship: better the spontaneous veneration which makes the whole earth

one's precinct, all cities one's temples (Dio 52. 35. 4-36. 2; contrast Luc. *Apol.* 13, where the emperor's universal repute is manifested by worship (τὸ . . . προσκυνεῖσθαι) for his benefactions, by statues, temples, and sacred precincts). But the fact of the omnipresent imperial cult was taken for granted (G. W. Bowersock, *Entretiens Hardt* 19 (1973) 187. 'Greek writers . . . appear both to accept it and to ignore it'; cf. also Price, *Rituals and Power* 114-15), and the distinction between divine and human honours was not an apposite one (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 117-20).

τεμένη . . . θύεται In Aristotle's famous discussion of τίμη (*Rhet.* 1. 1361^a34-7) sacrifices (θύαίαι) and precincts (τεμένη) are embodied in a list of purely secular honours, such as privileged seating (προεδρίαί), meals at public expense, and literary memorials: But this is not necessarily a confusion of the sacred and divine. Aristotle's usage elsewhere (*Pol.* 3. 1285^b10-19) suggests that the sacrifices here are not sacrifices *to* the individual but sacrifices *by* him: the honour was the priesthood, the privilege of offering sacrifice for the community. Similarly τεμένη may have a secular sense too—the precincts awarded to Homeric kings as a mark of honour (e.g. *Il.* 12. 310-14, where the τέμενος is associated with pride of place at public feasting). The list is consistent; Aristotle does not envisage divine honours for humans, and, though he adds *proskynesis* to the catalogue, it is as a peculiarly barbarian custom, not applicable to the Greek world (cf. 11. 7 with note).

Arrian is in error that τεμένη were unique to the gods. Apart from the Homeric use, obsolete in the classical period, there were apparently public domains (τεμένη δημόσια) in certain cities ([Arist.] *Oec.* 2. 1346^b15) as well as the precincts regularly voted to city founders (Thuc. 5. 11. 1; Pindar *Pyth.* 5. 93). But the vast majority of τεμένη were precincts of the gods and the general point is valid.

3. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους φιλεῖσθαι The kiss of welcome was not as widespread in the Greek world as it later became at Rome, where a serious skin disease (so it was alleged) reached epidemic proportions because of the prevalence of the social kiss in the upper classes (Pliny, *NH* 26. 3; cf. Syme, *Roman Papers* iiii 1376-7). At Athens Pericles caused comment when he invariably greeted Aspasia with a kiss (Plut. *Per.* 24. 9), and the Persian practice of welcoming equals with a kiss on the mouth (Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 4. 27-8 (see below, 12. 3); Hdt. 1. 134. 1) was an embarrassment for Greeks (Xen. *Ages.* 5. 4). But people long separated might still mark their meeting with a kiss (Aristoph. *Ran.* 754-5, 788; cf. Kroll, *RE Suppl.* v 513, 515), and it was a natural enough conceit to contrast the kiss direct which was used between mortals with the indirect kiss appropriate for the veneration of divinity.

καὶ παιᾶνες ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς The paean, originally an invocation of Apollo in his aspect of healing, developed into a standard lyric form, the vehicle for choral performances in honour of any deity (cf. A. Fairbanks, *A Study of the Greek Paean* (Cornell Studies in Class. Phil. 12 (1900)) 25-55; von Blumenthal, *RE* xviii 2354 ff.). Interestingly the paean was one of the first divine honours to be attached to mortals. Duris (*FGrH* 76 F 71) claimed that Lysander was the first to have paeans sung in his honour and he quoted the opening of a poem in which Lysander is invoked with the characteristic refrain *ἢ Παϊάν* (cf. Pindar *Paean* 6. 121). Athenaeus (16. 696 E-697 A) gives a list of paeans composed for mortals, all with the standard refrain. The most notable instances (apart from that to Lysander) are a composition in honour of Craterus (to be performed at Delphi (in 322?) to lyre accompaniment (696 E-F = *Suppl. Hell.* 312)) and a competition at Athens to pay homage to Antigonos and Demetrius (Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 165; cf. Demochares, *FGrH* 75 F 1). But the innovation was controversial. Aristotle was prosecuted for impiety on the grounds that his verse encomium for Hermias of Atarneus was a paean (Athen. 15. 696 A; cf. Diog. Laert. 5. 5; Didymus in *Dem.* col. 6. 19). This was a contentious issue even in antiquity. Aristotle, as Athenaeus notes, did not use the 'paeanic refrain' (which was in any case not invariable in paeans), emphasized the mortality of Hermias (cf. 697 A-B), and addressed the poem not to the mortal Hermias but to the abstract Arete. On the other hand the hero of the poem is clearly Hermias and the inspiration for it was Ariphron's paean to Hygieia (Page, *PMG* 813; cf. R. Renehan, *GRBS* 23 (1982) 258-64). Aristotle's trial was politically motivated and his prosecutors may well have misrepresented his intentions, but at the base of the misrepresentation was the conviction, clearly widely shared, that paeans could only be sung to a god.

The sentence reads clumsily. It has no antithesis providing mortal honours to match the divine, and the climax marked by the contrast of human salutation and *proskynesis* is lost. The text may well be defective (as at 11. 5 below).

ἥρωσιν ἄλλαι For the distinction between the cult of heroes and worship of the gods see A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford 1972) 576-82 (tending to minimize the differences); Habicht, *Gottmenschen*² 200-5. The most striking instance for our purposes is the case of Thasos where the worship of Heracles as hero and as god was kept separate (Hdt. 2. 44. 5; cf. Paus. 2. 10. 1), and the rituals were carefully formulated so as not to impinge upon each other (H. Seyrig, *BCH* 51 (1927) 193 ff.; H. Launey, *BCH* 61 (1937) 398-9; cf. Robert *et al.* *BE* 1939. 291). In Alexander's day there was a clear separation between his own cult as god manifest and the heroic honours demanded for Hephaestion (*Hyper. Epitaph.* 21; see

below 7. 14. 6, 23. 6). Later instances of the hero cult are less clear-cut. By the end of the century the living courtiers of Demetrius were offered heroic honours at Athens, as well as paeans (Demochares, *FGrH* 75 F 1; cf. Habicht 55–8), an unholy conflation of the divine and heroic. Heroic honours were already emerging as a subclass of the divine, second-class awards for acolytes of the ruler-god. The sentiment in Arrian derives from an earlier period, when the distinction was firm and meaningful.

4. τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους . . . τιμῶντας Once more the language echoes the tone of contemporary criticisms. Philippides the comic poet satirized Stratoles for his extravagant proposals for Demetrius; he invited the anger of the gods by transferring their honours to men (τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς ποιῶντ' ἀνθρωπίνας: Plut. *Demetr.* 12. 7). Similarly Theopompus predicted divine punishment for Harpalus' deification of Pythionice (Athen. 13. 595 c = *FGrH* 115 F 253), and Hyperides (*Epitaph.* 22) claims that the introduction of honours for living men has destroyed religious observances, so that the Athenian dead earned divine gratitude by their resistance to the dissolution of the honours of the gods (τοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν θεῶν καταλυομέναις βοηθήσαντας: *Epitaph.* 43). Callisthenes strikes the same note, implying that *proskynesis* arrogates the gods' preserve. It smacks of *hubris* and invites retribution.

χειροτονία ἢ ψήφῳ Callisthenes envisages regal honours being offered to a commoner by Alexander's own subjects, voting by show of hands or secret ballot. It is not usurpation as such, but a non-king honoured with royal prerogatives alongside Alexander himself. The political analogy is found (e.g.) in Dio 52. 35. 5 and Plut. *Rom.* 28. 10, both of whom deny that gods can be created by mortals' election. But in neither case is there a contradiction of the basic principle that overwhelming excellence can achieve divinity. In Arrian, however, there is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Alexander could not envisage a commoner receiving regal honours; how much less would the gods tolerate a mortal honoured as themselves? As the next paragraph emphasizes, Alexander for all his unsurpassable qualities is a mortal and should be honoured as such.

5. πόρρω τοῦ ἱκανοῦ 'Far from what is sufficient', i.e. 'pre-eminently the best of good men in actuality and reputation, the most kingly of kings and of generals the most worthy of command'.

The sentiment, expressed in strongly Xenophontean language (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 24), is incomplete. The logic of the passage requires a qualification: despite his unsurpassable qualities Alexander remains a mortal and should be content with the highest of mortal honours. One is tempted to posit a lacuna.

6. Αἰακίδῃ For Alexander's Molossian origins, derived on his mother's side from Andromache and Neoptolemus (great-grandson

of Aeacus), see above, 1. 11. 8 with note. Having mentioned the king's Aeacid lineage Arrian plays exclusively upon his paternal, Heraclid descent, which is the more apposite to the question of deification. There is no attempt to draw conclusions from his relationship to Achilles and Neoptolemus. His source presumably made more of it.

ἐξ Ἀργεῶν ἐς Μακεδονίαν From here onwards the speech is strongly reminiscent of Isocrates' *Philippus*, where the Argive origins of Macedonian royalty are emphasized (5. 32, 105-8). Like Isocrates Arrian leaves the founder of the house anonymous (cf. Hdt. 8. 137-8; Justin 7. 1 for variant accounts) and contents himself with tracing the Greek origins of the Macedonian kings. Alexander's heritage was neither barbarian nor despotic. Demosthenes might have conveyed a different message: for him Philip was a barbarian (3. 17), and his subjects were his slaves (9. 31-2).

οὐδὲ βίαι, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ A platitudinous antithesis, little more than a contrast between tyranny and responsible government (Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 44-5; Lys. 2. 19; Isocr. 4. 40, 80; Plut. *Rom.* 16. 1, *Arat.* 26. 4). For a good contemporary parallel see the Delphian dedication by Daochus of Pharsalus whose grandfather ruled Thessaly for twenty-seven years οὐ βίαι ἀλλὰ νόμῳ (*SIG³* 274 no. 6).

The phrase tells us nothing of the actual character of the Macedonian monarchy (Errington, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 80-3, *contra* Aymard, *Études* 154-5); it is a rhetorical flourish, underlining the general message that the Macedonian kings were the polar opposites of the classic despots of Persia.

7. πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ... ἐπιθεσπισθῆναι The Delphic oracle for Heracles is only attested elsewhere by Aelius Aristides (5 (*Heracles*), 58 D; 13 (*Panath.*), 174 D; cf. H. W. Parke, *Greek Oracles* no. 560), but it may have an early pedigree. In Aristides it is directed to the Athenians, who established the first cult of Heracles as a god. That presumably refers to the cult at Marathon, which was allegedly the first in the Greek world (Paus. 1. 15. 3, 32. 4) and certainly commemorated in the Attidographic tradition. The influence of Delphi might have been a feature current in the fourth century BC.

Callisthenes crudely contrasts the worship of the 'dead' Heracles with the absence of cult in his lifetime. Aristides uses the more conventional language of apotheosis (ἀπῆλθεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων: see above, 10. 7 n.), which was appropriate for the deified Heracles. Callisthenes, however, emphasizes the hero's mortality and implies that his divine status was questionable.

βαρβαρικά ... τὰ φρονήματα Callisthenes now addresses the cultural aspect of *proskynesis*. Was it appropriate that Alexander, now king of the Persian empire, received the characteristic obeisance of the Persian court? It seems accepted that *proskynesis* from Persians,

long habituated to the act, caused no offence to Greeks—and Callisthenes himself had represented the barbarian sea prostrating itself before Alexander (*FGrH* 124 F 31; see above, 10. 2 n.). The sentiment is familiar enough from tragedy. Helen, so states Hecuba, relished receiving *proskynesis* at Troy (Eur. *Tro.* 1021), and Orestes (like Agamemnon before him) recoils from prostration as incongruous on Greek soil but acceptable in Phrygia (Eur. *Or.* 1509; cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 919–20). *Proskynesis* as such was appropriate when offered by orientals in their own territory, and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1. 1361^a36–7) categorizes it without comment as a barbarian mark of honour. The problem is the extension of *proskynesis* to peoples to whom it was alien and indeed sacrilegious. For Callisthenes this is unacceptable. He is prepared (at a pinch) to have the Macedonians forced to *proskynesis* (see below), but the ideal is ‘to be honoured by Greeks and Macedonians in a mode appropriate to men and to Greeks and to accept barbaric honours from barbarians alone’ (11. 8).

ἥς ἔνεκα ὁ πᾶς στόλος This picks up the official justification of the campaign: to take revenge for Persian sacrilege (Diod. 16. 89. 2; 17. 4. 9; see above, vol. i 46–8) and to liberate the cities of Asia Minor (Diod. 16. 91. 2). It is true enough that Greece provided the *casus belli* (cf. 2. 14. 4), and it was appropriate for Callisthenes to point out that Alexander was infringing the freedom which he had conquered half a world to protect. But the qualification ‘to add Asia to Greece’ is incongruous. This was never a declared aim of the campaign (see, however, Fredricksmeier, in *Macedonian Heritage* 90–2), and in no way could it be said that the conquest of Asia made it subject to Greece. The clause may be Arrian’s own addition, an attempted clarification which in effect confuses the issue.

8. Μακεδόσι . . . ἀτιμίαν The division between Greek and Macedonian is striking and recalls Isocrates’ categorization of the Macedonians as non-Greeks and therefore amenable to despotic rule (Isocr. 5. 106–8; cf. Dobesch 227–35; Badian, in *Macedonia and Greece* 42–3). That is a distinction which might have been made in Callisthenes’ time, but it is hard to envisage the historical Callisthenes suggesting to an audience of Macedonians that they might have *proskynesis* imposed upon them while Greeks received a dispensation.

9. λέγεται πρῶτον This is a direct reference to Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 8. 3. 14), an allusion by Arrian himself. Tonnet’s scepticism (i 234–5) is unjustified. Admittedly Xenophon only states that no Persian had done obeisance before (cf. *Cyrop.* 7. 5. 32); but it was a natural inference that Cyrus was the first mortal to receive *proskynesis*, just as it was (from *Cyrop.* 6. 1. 27–30) that he was the first to introduce scythed chariots (Arr. *Tact.* 19. 4). Arrian was well acquainted with the *Cyropaedia* (cf. 1. 1. 1 n.) and imitated it closely in his *Order of Battle against the Alani* (Bosworth, in *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 264–6).

This passage makes a very awkward transition from Callisthenes' qualified toleration of *proskynesis* by barbarians. Here the very idea of *proskynesis* is rejected: it is an act of hubris which invites catastrophe. The rhetoric seems to be Arrian's own. The peroration is his addition maladroitly tacked on to the outline he took from his source. It contains one internal cross-reference (see below) and has the mandatory allusion to Clearchus and the Ten Thousand (cf. 1. 12. 3; 2. 7. 8-9).

πένητες ἄνδρες καὶ αὐτόνομοι This echoes the description of the Abii at 4. 1. 1, and is hardly apposite to the Massagetae, the agents of Cyrus' destruction, who were governed by a monarch, the formidable Queen Tomyris (Hdt. 1. 205. 1). Arrian is probably using the concept of autonomy not as the antithesis of tyranny but to connote freedom from external domination (which is consistent with monarchy at home: cf. Bosworth, *SIFC* 10 (1992) 124-7).

Arrian had some interest in the fate of Cyrus and studied the tradition of his death (5. 4. 5 n.). Here he is only concerned with the contrast between Cyrus the despot and the poor but independent Sacae who thwarted and killed him. It is a rhetorical flourish not wholly consonant with the situation in the spring of 327, when Alexander had forced most of the Sacan tribes to submission and was accepted spontaneously by the rest (4. 1. 2, 5. 1, 15. 1-5, 17. 7).

12. 1. πέμψαντα κωλῶσαι This implies that Alexander was not personally present at the debate. The same scenario appears in Curtius (8. 5. 21), who has Alexander absent himself from the symposium but listen to the discussion in hiding (cf. Plut. *Al.* 49. 11); he then sends word that only the barbarians should offer prostration (*barbaros tantum . . . procumbere suo more*). That virtually guarantees the reading *Μακεδόνας* which occurs in the Vindobonensis but is omitted in the *excerpta de sententiis*. Alexander sent word preventing the *Macedonians* from paying any further attention to *proskynesis*; the barbarians continued according to the programme. It is clear that the context of the prohibition was the banquet itself. Alexander could have continued the experiment at other venues (cf. 14. 2: οὕπω πεπαυμένην). Plutarch (*Al.* 54. 2), however, claims that Callisthenes 'turned aside *proskynesis*' (cf. Justin 12. 7. 3: *explosa adoratione*), and it is a reasonable inference, given the absence of any subsequent reference to *proskynesis*, that there was no attempt to impose the practice upon Greeks or Macedonians after the abortive experiments of the 'Bactrian spring'.

2. ἀλλὰ σιγῆς γὰρ κτλ. 'But (that did not apply to all), for after a silence . . .' The same story occurs in Curtius (8. 5. 22-6. 1), who alleges that it was Polyperchon who ridiculed the Persian's posture. That is more likely. Leonnatus the Bodyguard continued in

high favour; he was close to Alexander's person at the time of the Pages' Conspiracy (Curt. 8. 6. 22) and was active during the advance to India (4. 23. 3, 24. 10, 25. 3). He certainly suffered no check to his career (as was argued by Badian, *TAPA* 91 (1960) 337; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 54, 206; Heckel 96-8). If a Leonnatus did intervene on this occasion, it can hardly have been the Bodyguard. Berve (ii 235, no. 467) may have been right to suggest an identification with Leonnatus, son of Antipater, later a trierarch at the Hydaspes (*Ind.* 18. 6; see below, 5. 16. 3 n.).

On the other hand Polyperchon could well have lost favour. His mission to Bubacene (see below, 22. 1 n.) might have been intended to remove him from court for a period (see, however, Heckel 190-1). Later he was Craterus' lieutenant, second-in-command of the veterans discharged at Opis (7. 12. 4; cf. Justin 12. 12. 8), and, like Craterus himself (*Plut. Eum.* 6. 3; cf. Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 7), he might have been opposed to the orientalizing tendencies at court. One of the older Macedonians (Berve ii 325-6, no. 654) and prone to frivolity in his cups (Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 12), he could well have expressed his opposition through derision and suffered for it both then and later. A similar story is told of Cassander (*Plut. Al.* 74. 2-3) and is likely to be authentic, not simply a confused doublet. New at court in 323, he might have exploded in spontaneous laughter at his first view of *proskynesis*. If so, given his bitter experience in 327, Alexander's violent reaction against Cassander is only too likely.

οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ According to Curtius it was the full prostration, with the chin touching the ground (Curt. 8. 5. 22), which gave a ludicrous effect. Diogenes the Cynic was unfavourably impressed by prostration in the Greek context, which he clearly thought sexually suggestive, and actively discouraged worshippers adopting the posture (Diog. Laert. 6. 37-8). The merriment evoked by the clumsy prostration would seem to indicate that full abasement was not usual at court, even among the Persian nobility (see above, 9. 9 n.).

χαλεπήναντα τότε Curtius (8. 5. 22-4) claims that Alexander's anger erupted in physical violence. He threw Polyperchon face down on the ground (in involuntary prostration) and placed him in custody. This story is usually dismissed as a gross exaggeration, but Alexander was in his cups and the anger which had destroyed Cleitus might well have induced him to inflict on Polyperchon a humiliation appropriate to his offence (so Schachermeyr² 385).

3. ἀναγέγραπται δὲ δὴ κτλ. Plutarch also gives the story as an appendix to the main debate which witnessed the open opposition of Callisthenes (*Plut. Al.* 54. 4-6) and he attributes it to Chares of Mytilene, Alexander's chamberlain (*FGrH* 125 F 14a). Arrian's version is almost identical in outline and even vocabulary, and it has often been argued that it is taken directly from Chares (cf.

Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 435-6, who claims that Plutarch's is the more accurate version; Brunt, *Arrian* i 536; Badian, in *Edson Studies* 49). Alternatively the slight differences in emphasis which we find in Arrian (see below) have been traced to an intermediary source (e.g. Aristobulus: Schachermeyr² 379 n. 454). That is unnecessary. There is no contradiction in substance, nothing that cannot easily be explained as the result of differing extracts from a longer original; and the close similarity of wording (as at 9. 7 above) suggests that both authors used the same direct source. Plutarch, who cites Chares repeatedly, is unlikely to have used an intermediary.

The story is circumstantial and is not inconsistent with the tradition of the debate (cf. Goukowsky i 48; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 113-14). It was a limited experiment with a number of intimates, not apparently including Persians, and there was no debate. It was also partially successful; Callisthenes was the only dissenter, and even he attempted to be discreet in his refusal. The symposium described by Chares may well have preceded the formal introduction and given some presage of success. Neither Arrian nor Plutarch connect Chares' story explicitly with the wider scene; it is a separate anecdote which gives a somewhat different view of Callisthenes' opposition. Chares, it can be inferred, did not record the (later) debate in which Callisthenes spoke decisively. He confined himself to the less conclusive episode (which he possibly witnessed in person). Quite probably he had some animus against the very unlikeable Callisthenes (cf. 14. 3 n.) and chose to record an incident which showed him behaving in an unheroic and provocative way (so Badian, in *Edson Studies* 50-1). But that does not prove the episode fictitious. The events may have taken place much as Chares alleged. Modern scholars are quite correct in accepting the story (e.g. Balsdon, *Historia* i (1950) 379-81; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 150; Schachermeyr² 379-85) but wrong to reject the tradition of the debate as a consequence (Schachermeyr² 384-5 grafts on to Chares' anecdote Arrian's previous story of the laughter of Leonnatus which (like Badian 52) he considers most influenced Alexander to drop the experiment).

πρὸς οὐστίνας ξυνέκειτο Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 1) agrees that there was some preparation (as there was for the debate: cf. 10. 5 n.): Hephaestion alleged that Callisthenes had agreed to do *proskynesis* but then reneged. It is not certain from Arrian's version whether or not Callisthenes belonged to the group which had been primed beforehand. There is nothing in the text as it stands to correspond to *πρώτοις μὲν*. One assumes that the rest of the symposium was to follow the lead of the group privy to the planning, but there is no way of telling (from either Arrian or Plutarch) how far the *proskynesis* went. The procedure was followed by all in turn (*ἐφεξῆς διὰ πάντων*

χωρήσαι) but 'all' could refer to the totality of the symposiasts or merely the subgroup of those in the know. It seems most plausible that *all* guests offered *proskynesis* and that a clause has fallen out of Arrian's text: 'first to those with whom he had agreed on the practice of *proskynesis* and then to the rest of the symposiasts'. In that case Chares implied that Callisthenes was not privy to the experiment and presented Hephaestion's allegations as calumny.

προσκυνήσαι τε ἀναστάντα Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 4) adds that each guest rose to face the hearth (*πρὸς ἐστῆλιν ἀναστήναι*), drank, and offered *proskynesis*. The hearth has had an important role in modern discussions, many of which have seen it as the repository of the sacred fire burning before the Persian king (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 152 for bibliography, to which add Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 38-48). Against these 'specimens of the pathology of scholarship' (Badian, in *Edson Studies* 50 n. 33) English critics have tended to accept L. R. Farnell's view (*JHS* 49 (1929) 79-81) that the *hestia* was part and parcel of the furniture of a Greek symposium and had no intrinsic significance for the offer of *proskynesis*. Given that it is only an incidental feature of Plutarch's version and omitted altogether by Arrian, that would appear the more reasonable approach.

καὶ φιληθῆναι The Achaemenid kings are occasionally attested giving a kiss in recognition of meritorious service (1 Esdras 4: 47; cf. Xen. *Agas.* 5. 4; Bickerman, *PdP* 18 (1963) 253-4), and Alexander was to extend the privilege to the Persian 'kinsmen' he established at Opis (7. 11. 1, 6). It must have been deliberate imitation of Persian procedure. Alexander accepted *proskynesis* and responded with the kiss conferred by the king upon his closest and most meritorious friends. When *proskynesis* was abandoned, the kissing of necessity had to stop.

4. οὐκ οὖν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν Whether the inadvertence was genuine or assumed in the hope of avoiding an embarrassing confrontation, it follows that the act of *proskynesis* was not obtrusive. If it had involved complete prostration (see above, 9. 9 n.), Callisthenes could hardly have escaped notice, however intense the king's tête-à-tête with Hephaestion.

5. Δημήτριον . . . τὸν Πυθώνακτος (Berve no. 258) Plutarch (*Al.* 54. 6) omits the patronymic and claims that Demetrius was surnamed (*προσονομαζομένου*) Pheidon, presumably to satirize his stinginess (for Pheidon as a stock comic name see Ar. *Nub.* 65, 134; Antiphanes F 191. 21 (Kock, *CAF* ii 90)). He was also notorious as a court flatterer along with Hagnon, likewise a Companion (*Plut. Mor.* 65 D; cf. Berve no. 17) and an enemy of Callisthenes (*Plut. Al.* 55. 2). The fact that Chares chose to portray him as an officious talebearer suggests that he had no love for him. Accordingly he

identified him both by his patronymic and his rather opprobrious sobriquet; Arrian recorded the former and Plutarch the latter.

οὐ παρασχεῖν φιλήσαι The insult direct. In Persia the denial of the kiss amounted to *atimia* (Plut. *Ages.* 5. 5); Callisthenes was thereby excluded from the circle of Alexander's 'kinsmen'.

6. αἰξοντα . . . οὐκ ἀπηξίωσεν The counterpart to the verdict on Cleitus' equally misplaced *παρησία* (cf. 8. 5 with notes). One does not have to assume the role of courtier, but, if one does, one must act appropriately. What is morally reprehensible should not be condoned, but one's opposition should not be public and frankness should be used in its proper context, not as a vehicle for abuse and self-aggrandizement (Plut. *Mor.* 66 A-B). Callisthenes' *parrhesia* was untimely (compare Deinarchus' strictures on Demades in the fictitious dialogue *PBerol.* 13045, lines 126-35 = *Berliner Klassikertexte* vii (1923) 21), an act of arrogant stupidity (cf. 10. 1). But his opposition was only counter-productive in so far as it ensured his own destruction; it was effective enough in putting a stop to *proskynesis*.

12. 7-14. 4. *The Pages' Conspiracy*

7. τεκμαίρομαι μὴ χαλεπῶς πιστευθῆναι Arrian here retails as his own view what he later (14. 1) states is the record of the majority, and he (correctly) rejects the statements of Aristobulus and Ptolemy, that Callisthenes did in fact incite the pages to assassination. No doubt he did detect the apologetic motives of his main sources (see below), and his assessment of Callisthenes' (and Alexander's) character made it only too likely that the most extreme allegations would appear credible. But, when he dealt with similar slanted reports against Philotas (3. 26. 1), Arrian simply followed Ptolemy and Aristobulus, noting their authorship (a possible sign that he had reservations: see above, vol i 16) but accepting the record. Here he accepts the story of his subsidiary sources (in contravention of the principles announced in the *Praefatio*) on grounds of probability. That may indicate that his secondary material was less unreliable than in the past (see above, p. 52).

Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 1) agrees that Callisthenes' gradual loss of favour (see Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 153 on the meaning of *ὑπογινόμενης*) was accompanied by calumnies, so that the fatal allegation that he had encouraged Hermolaus was readily believed. For Curtius (8. 6. 1) the conspiracy gave Alexander the opportunity for vengeance, even though Callisthenes was not named as a conspirator (8. 6. 24-5; cf. Justin 12. 7. 2: *sub specie insidiarum*).

13. 1. ἐκ Φιλίππου 'It had been customary since the time of Philip . . .' Arrian does not state in so many words that the pages

originated with Philip (as is widely assumed: cf. Berve i 37; Kienast, *Philipp II* 28; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia* ii 401). His language is consistent with Philip having adopted and systematized an earlier practice. Aelian (*VH* 14. 48) describes Philip's rigorous discipline but does not state or imply that he was the first king to have pages about his person. Curtius on the other hand suggests a custom of long standing (8. 6. 2: *mos erat . . . liberos regibus tradere*; cf. 8. 8. 3), and it is likely enough that previous monarchs were attended by pages from the nobility (so Hammond, *Historia* 39 (1990) 261–4; cf. *The Macedonian State* 56—though some of the passages adduced (Diod. 14. 37. 6; Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1311^b8–20; Ael. *VH* 12. 43) need not, and probably do not refer to pages). Philip's innovation was to draft (*καταλέγεσθαι*) the younger members of powerful houses into his service, so that the institution ceased to be on an informal voluntary basis. It helped override the territorial jealousies which had plagued Macedonia in the past, and at the same time the king's young charges served as guarantors of their fathers' good behaviour.

Curtius gives two complementary descriptions of the functions of the pages (5. 1. 42; 8. 6. 2–6), which may be adaptations of the same source (so Hammond, *Three Historians* 129). There is also considerable overlap with Arrian. Every detail he gives has its counterpart in Curtius, and there is no contradiction. But we cannot assume that they used the same source. Curtius' subsequent narrative of the conspiracy also coheres closely with Arrian, but there are divergences which preclude any common source. The facts were fairly well established and the outline conveyed was similar in all traditions. The same will apply to the details about the pages. Many authorities will have described the institution and there is nothing surprising in their agreement.

ὄσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακιεύοντο 'who were passing through adolescence to manhood'. A curious phrase. *μειρακιεύεσθαι* is apparently unparalleled in this sense (it generally means 'to act childishly'); and the usage could be Arrian's own coinage on the analogy of *νεανισκεύεσθαι* in Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 1. 2. 15; cf. Pollux 2. 20). The pages served while they were *μειράκια*, the time of life which began at puberty (Hippocrates, cited by Philo, *de opif. mund.* 105), at fourteen or thereabouts, and continued until manhood (*ἐς ἡλικίαν*: cf. Diod. 18. 57. 2; 19. 105. 1; 20. 4. 5). What that meant in Alexander's Macedon we cannot say: Hammond claims that the pages were between fourteen and eighteen (*Historia* 39 (1990) 266; *The Macedonian State* 56), which is a reasonable guess, but a guess none the less. Curtius (loc. cit.) terms them *liberi adulti*, which implies that they had reached puberty but were not of military age (cf. Livy 27. 19. 8–12).

How the pages continued to be recruited during the campaign is

a mystery. Most, if not all, of the corps which crossed with Alexander in 334 would have been absorbed into the Companions within a few years. In late 331 a new draft of fifty pages from Macedon arrived to supplement the numbers (Diod. 17. 65. 1; Curt. 5. 1. 42), and Hermolaus and his fellow conspirators will have belonged to this contingent (they were presumably at the younger limit when sent to Asia, to allow them several years of service). There is no record of any similar influx earlier or later, and Hammond (*Historia* 39 (1990) 265–8) has argued that the contingent of 331 was the first group of pages to serve with Alexander. That necessitates discarding the evidence of Diodorus (36. 5), who describes the royal pages preparing a bath and meal for the king after Issus (as we should expect pages to do: cf. Curt. 5. 1. 42). Having rejected this text (on the apparent ground that no statement based on Cleitarchus should be believed) Hammond then asserts on no evidence that from 331 onwards ‘each graduating year’ of pages joined Alexander. Now, there is a total absence of any record of reinforcements from Macedonia in the period after 331 (see further *JHS* 106 (1986) 7–8), and, if there were no large-scale convoys of Macedonian troops, it is highly improbable that recruits to the pages would travel in isolation, particularly to the far east. It is more than likely that the corps was denuded in numbers by the time of the conspiracy, and those who survived Alexander’s reprisals were gradually transferred to other duties. For the rest of the reign there is no record of pages individually or collectively (cf. Berve i. 39), and they re-emerge in Babylon in the aftermath of Alexander’s death (Curt. 10. 5. 8, 7. 16). Some pages may have been attached to the great convoy from the west which reached India late in 326 (Diod. 95. 4; Curt. 9. 3. 21); there is no reference to Macedonian troops, but Antipater may well have sent a number of noble adolescents along with the mercenaries and allied troops. More probably came after the return from India, when Alexander was relatively accessible and travel comparatively safe. Cassander, for instance, may have brought a group of pages when he arrived in Babylon (Plut. *Al.* 74. 2).

καὶ κοιμώμενον φυλάσσειν So Curtius 8. 6. 3. The pages were apparently divided into shifts with seven-day intervals between duty. They would wait outside the symposium to escort the king to his chamber and spend the rest of the night on vigil (Curt. 8. 6. 13, 15).

τοὺς ἵππους . . . τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον Curtius (5. 1. 42; 8. 6. 4) is more specific: the pages take the royal horse from the grooms and present it to the king (cf. Diod. 17. 76. 5). Neither passage has anything about helping the king to mount, and there was a separate official, termed the *anaboleus*, who must have performed the service under normal circumstances (cf. 1. 15. 6 n.). If the pages regularly

assisted the king, they must have done so in the absence of the usual official.

The 'Persian style' of mounting is recommended by Xenophon as appropriate for the aged or infirm (*Eq.* 6. 12, 16; *Eq. Mag.* 1. 17; cf. J. K. Anderson, *Ancient Greek Horsemanship* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961) 82-3), and it is clear that the phrase was common currency in the fourth century. It does not mean that the custom was directly borrowed from Persia (as argued by Kienast, *Philipp II* 29). Rather it had developed in both Persia and Macedon as a mark of honour for the reigning king, who was perfectly competent to mount unaided.

της ἐπὶ θήρᾳ φιλοτιμίας Curt. 8. 6. 4 claims that they accompanied the king when hunting and in battle. There is no actual record of pages present in battle with the king (*contra* Hammond, *Historia* 39 (1990) 266) and there is some suggestion that they were kept out of hostilities (see below, 16. 4 n.). We may be dealing with a false inference by Curtius. His source perhaps described the pages bringing the horse for battle (cf. 5. 1. 42: *equos ineuntibus proelium admovent venantesque comitantur*), and he assumed that they accompanied the king in battle as well as in the hunt.

2. Ἑρμόλαος (Berve no. 305) Nothing is known of the background of Hermolaus. His father, Sopolis, is usually identified as the son of Hermodorus, the ilarch from Amphipolis (1. 2. 5), who was sent to Macedon in the winter of 328/7 (see below, 18. 3). If Curt. 8. 7. 2 is not sheer rhetorical invention, Hermolaus' father was present at his trial in spring 327 (which Berve, who accepts the identification, is compelled to transfer to 328 (ii 369, 407, etc.)). In that case there were two Macedonians named Sopolis, the officer sent to Macedonia with Menidas and Epocillus, and Hermolaus' father (who could even so be the ilarch).

Καλλισθένην θεραπεύειν This seems established. Arrian (14. 1) states that the majority of writers alleged that Callisthenes was suspected of complicity because of his friendship with Hermolaus. Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 3-4) and Curtius (8. 6. 24-5) record allegations that he gave sinister or ambiguous advice to Hermolaus. There is no hint what philosophy either Callisthenes or Hermolaus espoused. Plutarch (*Al.* 53. 1) claims that Callisthenes was a cult figure among the young because of his eloquence (*διὰ τὸν λόγον*) but says nothing of philosophical debate (cf. 10. 1 n.).

λόγος κατέχει The story of the hunt and its sequel is given briefly by Curtius (8. 6. 7). It was uncontroversial and was probably reported in similar terms by all sources, including both Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who gave some account of the conspiracy (14. 1 n.). Ptolemy is often identified as the main source (cf. Kornemann 142-3; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 311-12) and certain details could well

derive from him (cf. 13. 7 n.). But, as with the Philotas affair (cf. vol. i 21), the account is likely to be an amalgam, with details extracted from either source.

ἐχαλέπηνε τῷ Ἑρμολάῳ For a similar recent episode involving Lysimachus see Curt. 8. 1. 14-18 (with Berve ii 240). Lysimachus merely threatened to anticipate the king, and for that he was ignominiously dismissed from the hunt. Hermolaus' offence was deeper and the condign punishment he suffered is not surprising. There is no need to invoke Persian precedent (Berve, *Klio* 31 (1938) 153; Kienast, *Philipp II* 29 n. 71), where the offence could be capital (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 14. 43; cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 4. 14).

πληγὰς λαβεῖν So Curtius (8. 6. 7), who claims that the king alone could authorize corporal punishment (cf. 8. 8. 6; Ael. *VH* 14. 48). The physical outrage and humiliation led Hermolaus to plan assassination, as in an earlier age it turned Decamnichus against Archelaus (Arist. *Pol.* 5. 1311^b 30-5; cf. E. Carney, *PdP* 38 (1983) 262-3, 274). But Decamnichus need not have been a page. Only a king could flog a page, but that does not entail that only pages were flogged by the king! For a similar, perhaps apocryphal, story about the murder of Jason of Pherae see Val. Max. 9. 10, *ext.* 2.

3. **Σώστρατον τὸν Ἀμύντου** (Berve no. 732) Nothing is known about Sostratus, and his father's name is too common for any identification. Arrian sets him in the role of Aristogeiton, affronted by the outrage to his lover and prepared to inflict retribution at any price. In Curtius (8. 6. 8) his influence is more sinister. He has reasons of his own for hating Alexander (*forsitan olim ob aliam quoque causam regi infestus*) and sets Hermolaus irrevocably upon the path of regicide. There must be some truth to this: the personal insult to Hermolaus does not explain the involvement of the other pages, who (Sostratus apart) had no reason for defending his honour (E. Carney, *CJ* 76 (1981) 230). Hermolaus' grievance was a catalyst for more general discontent. All may have had their personal motives or even have joined the conspiracy through factional loyalty—and given our total ignorance of the conspirators' background this cannot be discounted. The only hint of a more general motivation comes in the vulgate tradition of Hermolaus' defence, which has him inveigh against the killings at court and Alexander's orientalizing (see below, 14. 2 with notes). There might be some truth in this. The conspirators were comparative newcomers to court (above, 13. 1 n.), and may well have been shocked by the deaths of Philotas and Parmenion, which came less than a year after their arrival. Some at least of them will have been left at base during the elaborate campaigning of 328 (16. 6) and accordingly relieved of close contact with Alexander and the excesses of court life. When their association resumed, in the spring of 327, it may have been a deeply unpleasant experience;

and the experiment with *proskynesis* was the last in an increasingly intolerable series of impositions. The elder Macedonians may have been the group most resistant to the innovations at court, but one cannot discount the impact of the changes upon a group of youths brought up conservatively in Macedon and suddenly exposed to a court where all traditional values were in the melting-pot. Their alienation may have been profound and, when personal grievances supervened, it was enough to impel them into conspiracy.

4. Ἀντίπατρον . . . σατραπεύσαντος (Berve no. 93) Curt. 8. 6. 9 makes two conspirators out of Antipater and his father (as does *Itin.* 94 with Sostratus and Amyntas). For Asclepiodorus' tenure of Syria and his recent arrival at court see 3. 6. 8, 4. 7. 2 with notes. He is the only father whose position is defined, and he may have been the only person of any eminence among the parents of the pages. On the other hand his satrapy may be mentioned because it was contextually relevant. Antipater may well have joined his father during his years in Syria (just as the young Demetrius lived at his father's court in Phrygia: Diod. 18. 23. 4) and travelled with him to Bactria. In that case he had been with the pages for little more than a year at the time of the conspiracy.

Ἐπιμένην τὸν Ἀρσαίου (Berve no. 300) Epimenes and his brother Eurylochus (Berve no. 322, who erroneously makes him brother of Charicles) are only known in this context. The father's name is rare, if not unique (cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 180), but there is no other mention of him. There is no way of tracing background or regional affiliation. The same applies to Anticles (Berve no. 88).

Φιλῶταν τὸν Κάρσιδος τοῦ Θρακός (Berve no. 801) Philotas again is otherwise unknown. It is interesting that he has a Thracian father (the name recurs in a contingent of Thracians in mercenary service at Athens around 300 BC: *IG* ii² 1956, line 27; Launey, *Recherches* ii 1196). Carsis had been accepted into the Macedonian nobility, and his son has a distinctively Macedonian name. Almost certainly he was one of Philip's Companions, the only known Companion of Thracian extraction, and he may have married a Macedonian wife (so Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 180). How he came to the Macedonian court is unknown. Possibly he was an exile of regal blood, the Thracian counterpart of Artabazus (above, 1. 12. 9 n.), who enjoyed Philip's hospitality and patronage and perhaps helped him in his dealings with the Thracian kingdoms.

According to Curtius (8. 6. 9) Philotas and Antipater along with a certain Nicostratus (Berve no. 570) were the first to be recruited by Sostratus. They then won over the rest: Anticles, Epimenes, and 'Elaptonius' (clearly corrupt: read 'Tleptolemus' (?)).

ἡ νυκτερινὴ φυλακὴ According to Curtius (8. 6. 10-11) the pages served in groups according to a fixed schedule (which is likely

enough); and it took thirty-two days to rearrange the roster so that the watch was entirely manned by conspirators. Whether Alexander did come as close as this to assassination we shall never know. The allegations made before and at the trial of Hermolaus will have exaggerated the danger, and after the event nobody had an interest in refuting the official story. An assassination was doubtless discussed and even planned, but no physical attack was carried out. That Alexander only survived by chance may be a figment of Eurylochus' highly charged imagination.

5. **αὐτομάτως λέγουσιν** This is the version of the majority, doubtless including Ptolemy, who had no problems with Alexander's normal drinking habits. That the potations were prolonged past dawn is only too likely. Compare the reports of the banquet of Medius (7. 24. 4-25. 1; Plut. *Al.* 75. 5), at which Alexander apparently drank for a night and a day.

Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ ᾤδε (*FGrH* 139 F 30) Aristobulus (enthusiastically followed by Hammond, *KCS*² 278-80) tried to mitigate the tradition of excessive drinking, claiming that Alexander's symposia were protracted because of his love for fellowship, not wine (7. 29. 4 n.: Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 183); and he claimed that his fever at Medius' banquet came on *before* not after the drinking (Plut. *Al.* 75. 5 = *FGrH* 139 F 59). Here the story of a spontaneous night-long debauch was evidently displeasing, and Aristobulus brought on a *vates ex machina*, who urged drink upon him as a divine imperative. The soothsayer recurs in Curtius (8. 6. 16-17), who appears to graft Aristobulus' story on to the vulgate account of the drinking until dawn. It seems better to assume contamination (so Schwartz, *RE* ii 911) rather than to suppose that Aristobulus was affected by Cleitarchus or vice versa (so Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 517; Pearson, *LHA* 170 n. 108).

Σύραν γυναῖκα Inspired spontaneous prophecy was a familiar phenomenon in the semitic areas of the near east (cf. A. Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination among the Hebrews and Other Semites* (London 1938) 42 ff.; H. Ringgren, in *Israel's Prophetic Tradition*, ed. R. Coggins, A. Phillips, and M. Knib (Cambridge 1982) 1-11), and it was taken in deadly earnest by the royalty. There is a remarkable series of oracles delivered to Esarhaddon of Assyria in which the gods address the king through the medium of various women (and one man). All are named; the majority come from Arbela and one (Ishtar-bel-daini) seems attached to the king in a quasi-official capacity (see most conveniently *ANET*³ 605). Evidently the Syrian prophetess was attempting to perform the same function for Alexander, and she succeeded in obtaining recognition at court. She was clearly a figure of some prominence, well enough known for Aristobulus to make her the vehicle of Alexander's salvation, but whether she

made an appearance on the fatal night may well be doubted (*pace* Hammond, *KCS*² 200).

κάτοχον ἐκ τοῦ θείου 'possessed by the divine'. Like the women who prophesied to Esarhaddon, the Syrian prophetess was completely taken over by the divinity whose message she enunciated (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 758 E). Alexander may well have experienced such matters with his mother, who aspired to Bacchic possession (Plut. *Al.* 2. 9: *ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμούς*).

6. θεῖόν τι . . . νομίσαντα Curtius (8. 6. 17) has Alexander turn the matter into a joke (*per ludum*): the gods gave good advice.

7. Χαρίκλει τῷ Μενάνδρου (Berve no. 824) There is no possibility of identifying the father. It is the merest guess that he was the satrap of Lydia (see above, 3. 6. 8 n.), as Berve suggested (so E. D. Carney, *CJ* 76 (1981) 229). More probably he was the Companion later executed for leaving the command to which he was assigned (Plut. *Al.* 57. 3; the connection is suggested by Lane Fox 357); if so, his son's ambiguous attitude may not have helped his cause.

Curtius (8. 6. 20) ignores Charicles. He has Epimenes reveal the plot directly to his brother; both then go to confront the king. In Arrian Eurylochus goes by himself, probably to protect his brother from immediate arrest. Charicles was not an informant and might even have been deemed to have withheld information.

Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Λάγῳ Ptolemy's key role is confirmed by Curtius (8. 6. 22) who has Leonnatus on guard with him. That is almost certainly true. If, as is likely, Arrian's material is derived from Ptolemy himself, Ptolemy annexed for himself the entire credit for apprising Alexander of his danger (Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 19).

στρεβλούμενοι . . . κατεῖπον Arrian's account is very abbreviated, and it is difficult to reconstruct the sequence of events. That is partly because his major interest is the fate of Callisthenes, but it seems that neither of his principal sources recorded the judicial hearing at which the pages were condemned. They focus on the admissions made under torture and state that others were implicated. That may well have been the context in which Ptolemy and Aristobulus claimed that Callisthenes was responsible for encouraging the conspirators; they will have alleged that the pages incriminated him while under duress. Arrian is clearly uncomfortable, and rightly so. Other sources are categorical that no linkage was made. According to Curtius (8. 6. 24) Callisthenes was named as sympathetic to criticisms of Alexander, but, although he was arrested with the conspirators, he was not tried at the same hearing and suffered separately (8. 6. 27, 29, 7. 8-9, 8. 19, 21). Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 5) maintains that none of the pages could be coerced into naming Callisthenes, and quotes a letter from Alexander to the generals in Pareitacene (see below, 22. 1 n.) stating that the boys had admitted

their guilt under torture and that there was no other conspirator (*Al.* 55. 6). The details about the troop commanders are accurate and *recherché* and the letter may well be genuine (Hamilton, *CQ* 5 (1955) 319-21; *Plut. Al.* 155; so Badian, in *Edson Studies* 51 n. 16). If it is a forgery, the forger had access to good and detailed information.

The fact of the torture is agreed, but only Curtius places it in context, after the judicial hearing before Alexander's expanded *consilium* (8. 8. 20). That would accord with the tradition that Philotas was also tortured after his conviction (*Curt.* 6. 11. 9-11 (on the advice of the king's friends); *Diod.* 17. 80. 2; cf. *Plut. Al.* 48. 11-12). Condemnation probably cancelled any civil rights the accused may have had, leaving him liable to the most extreme treatment. Torture may have been sanctioned by Macedonian custom, but its infliction upon these immature adolescents is repugnant. It was an atrocity which no reason of state can justify.

14. 1. οἱ δὲ πολλοί See above, 12. 7 n.

ἦδη δέ τινες . . . ἀνέγραψαν 'There have been some who gave the following account.' A formula for introducing a variant, usually one which Arrian finds unconvincing (6. 28. 1 (οὐ πιστά); 7. 27. 3); it is borrowed from Herodotus (cf. *Hdt.* 2. 175. 5).

The variant corresponds closely to the vulgate account in Curtius. In particular the content of Hermolaus' speech reproduces point by point the rhetorically elaborated speech in Curtius (proof, if proof were needed, that his speeches are not complete invention). The authenticity of the tradition is more difficult to establish. We may concede (with Schachermeyr² 389) that Hermolaus was put on trial, and even defended himself; but the content of the speech is a different matter (Berve ii 153 categorically dismisses it as fiction; so Hammond, *Sources* 246 n. 22). It is an amalgam of the various criticisms made of Alexander's lack of *sophrosyne* (see above, 7. 4 n.) and seems too neat a catalogue to have been retailed in a hastily prepared oration.

ἐς τοὺς Μακεδόνας The language suggests a plenary assembly (see above, 3. 26. 2), and it is usually assumed that the pages were condemned by the full army (or at least the troops at Bactra: cf. F. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung* (Münch. Beitr. 13: 1931) 46-7; Berve i 153; Schachermeyr² 389). Curtius (8. 6. 28, 8. 20) writes of a *frequens consilium*, attended by the fathers of the conspirators, themselves in peril of capital punishment. This is clearly an extension of the royal council (cf. *Curt.* 4. 11. 1, 13. 3), which Curtius elsewhere distinguishes from the *contio*, the army assembly which condemned Philotas (6. 11. 8-11). In the case of the pages Curtius' account is the more circumstantial and is credible in itself (Errington, *Chiron* 8

(1978) 108–10); the trial took place in the presence of those most directly involved. Arrian's *Μακεδόνες* could merely refer to the *consilium* (so Errington). Alternatively he or his source wrongly reported a trial before the full army.

ἐλευθέρω ἀνδρί . . . ὕβριν In Curtius, Hermolaus begins his speech with a complaint against Alexander's tyranny (8. 7. 1) and the theme recurs emphatically in the peroration (8. 7. 14: *miraris si liberi homines superbiam tuam ferre non possumus?*). It must have been prominent in his source.

τὴν τε Φιλῶτα . . . ἀποθανόντων Curtius has a rhetorically elaborated list: Attalus, Philotas, Parmenion, Alexander the Lyncestian, and Cleitus (8. 7. 4–6). The catalogue of killings may have been a favourite theme in the vulgate (cf. Justin 12. 6. 14).

καὶ οὐπω πεπαυμένην This is unique (cf. 12. 1 n.). There is no counterpart in Curtius (8. 7. 13), and no suggestion elsewhere that the experiment with *proskynesis* was continued. It looks like an imaginative elaboration by Arrian's source.

πότους τε καὶ ὕπνους Again there is no counterpart in Curtius and the theme may be superimposed by Arrian's source. But Alexander's excessive drinking and the comatose interludes which followed were familiar in the historical tradition (see above, 8. 2 n.), and the alternation of nights of drinking and days of sleeping was a recurrent theme of the *Royal Ephemerides* (Plut. *Mor.* 623 E (cf. Plut. *Al.* 23. 8); Ael. *VH* 3. 23; Athen. 10. 434 B = *FGrH* 117 F 2; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 170–3). The theme could easily be grafted on to a catalogue of complaints; but according to Curtius (8. 6. 27) Alexander spent the entire day and night after the symposium at Bactra in convalescent slumber, and the pattern recorded in the 'Ephemerides' may have been established by 327. Hermolaus, who will have had firsthand experience of his king's drinking habits, could well have made an unfavourable allusion to them.

3. καταλευσθῆναι πρὸς τῶν παρόντων This reads as though the execution (for the Macedonian practice of stoning see above, 3. 26. 3 n.) followed immediately after condemnation. That leaves no time for the torture, which we know took place (above, 13. 7), and Arrian's source seems to make the stoning a spontaneous act by the assembled Macedonians (compare Curt. 8. 8. 7 for an attempted lynching during the trial). Curtius (8. 8. 20) has the conspirators handed over to their fellow pages, who carry out the execution (after the judicial torture). This is compressed and perhaps garbled (it is unlikely that the pages themselves administered the torture—as Curtius implies), but there is probably a substrate of truth (so Errington, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 109). The distasteful business of execution served as a collective punishment and an effective deterrent against dabbling in conspiracy.

Καλλισθένην δέ κτλ. The source conflict is also recorded by Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 9), who adduces no source for the report that Callisthenes was crucified but claims that Chares (*FGrH* 125 F 15) was the authority for his imprisonment and death from disease (after seven months in custody). There is no doubt that Ptolemy's is the correct version. It recurs in Curtius (8. 8. 21: *Callisthenes quoque tortus interiit*), and there is no obvious reason for fabrication. On the other hand the story of Chares and Aristobulus is clearly tainted by apologetic, slurring over the fact that a distinguished literary figure, who had propagated Alexander's achievements, had been executed on suspicion only, after a barbarous attempt to force him into an admission of guilt. On the contrary he was to be tried (so Chares claimed) by the League of Corinth and in the presence of Aristotle (for the implausibility of this see Badian, in *Edson Studies* 50-1, *contra* Wilcken, *Berliner Akademieschriften* i 142; Prandi 32-3); only chance (assisted by obesity and lice) prevented his appearance at the tribunal. The story commended itself to Aristobulus, never one to omit an opportunity to whitewash; and the details were elaborated in increasingly bizarre variants over the centuries (cf. Justin 15. 3. 4-6; Diog. Laert. 5. 5; other sources at *FGrH* 124 T 18).

καὶ κρεμασθῆναι Crucifixion was inflicted by Alexander upon rebels (6. 17. 2), usurpers (6. 30. 2), or stubbornly resistant defenders (cf. 2. 24. 4 n.; Curt. 7. 11. 28). The only other Greek known to have been treated in this way was Glaucias, the physician held responsible for Hephaestion's death (7. 14. 4). The drastic and ignominious punishment (cf. Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 18) is a measure of the magnitude of Callisthenes' offence in Alexander's eyes.

ὅτι τῶν γνωρίμων Arrian elsewhere notes divergences between his principal sources, which may be trivial (5. 20. 2) or a matter of detail (3. 3. 6). The latter passage provoked a statement of impatience about the difficulty of establishing facts. Here Arrian is more deeply concerned and points out the paradox of eyewitnesses giving radically different versions of public and celebrated events. But he does no more than signalize the disagreement. There is no attempt to draw any general lesson or even to decide between the conflicting versions. Arrian may well echo a *topos*. What he says about Callisthenes is very similar to Livy's comment on the conflicting reports of the death of Sempronius Gracchus (25. 17. 3: *adeo nec locus nec ratio mortis in viro tam claro et insigni constat*). Neither Livy nor Arrian gives an indication where the truth may lie. Their concern is to comment on the fact that disagreement exists where there should be unanimity.

4. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ ταῦτα ἀποχρῶντα A conscious imitation of Herodotus, who frequently laid claim to knowledge of more facts than he chose to report (*Hdt.* 1. 95. 1, 177, 214. 5; 5. 65. 5; 7. 96. 1;

cf. D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Phoenix Suppl. 23: 1989) 67-9). Arrian, like Herodotus, admits that he has been selective, choosing sufficient material to suit his (largely apologetic) purposes. The material at his disposal was evidently voluminous, and he operated with considerable editorial discretion (compare the cruder statement at Curt. 8. 9. 37). Because of the controversial nature of the great digression he was probably more capricious and eclectic here than elsewhere, but the passage is a salutary warning against assuming that Arrian simply reported everything his sources alleged.

οὐ πολλὰ ὕστερον See above, 7. 4. 8. 1 with notes. Arrian closes his digression with an admission that he has anticipated events and forged ahead well beyond the killing of Cleitus (autumn 328). The story is later placed in its context with a resumptive note (22. 2) that Callisthenes' débâcle occurred at Bactria in the late spring of 327. That is exactly the chronological context in Curtius (8. 5. 2-5, 9. 1).

15. 1-6. *Reception of Sacan and Chorasmian Embassies*

Arrian resumes the campaign narrative after his great digression, reverting to winter 329/8. His source here is usually identified as Aristobulus (Schwartz, *RE* ii 913; Strasburger 41; Pearson, *LHA* 164 f.; see, however, Kornemann 143 f.), but there are no sufficient grounds. The geographical misconceptions in the passage were prevalent among Alexander's staff, hardly confined to Aristobulus; and the report of the reception of Pharasmanes, although romantically expressed, contains nothing that is demonstrably unhistorical. The story could be derived from either of Arrian's major sources.

The reception of the ambassadors is located by Arrian in the winter headquarters of Bactra/Zariaspa, which Alexander is reported leaving at 4. 15. 7. Curt. 8. 1. 7-9 has essentially the same report (without Amazonian embellishments), but he places the incident firmly at *Maracanda*, towards the end of summer 328. Given that the territory of these 'European Scyths' lay north of the Iaxartes (4. 1. 1 n.), Maracanda was a more convenient meeting point than Bactra; and Alexander's own ambassadors could easily have taken the year suggested by Curtius' narrative to discharge their wide-ranging commission (4. 1. 2; Curt. 7. 6. 12). It is most probable that the embassies are misplaced in Arrian, as is the arrival of Stasanor and Phrataphernes (see above, 4. 7. 1 n.). The source for both episodes could be Ptolemy, who had an independent field command in 328 (4. 16. 2) and possibly arrived in Maracanda after Alexander received the embassies (cf. Curt. 8. 1. 10).

15. 1. καὶ αὐθις For the first Sacan embassy of summer 329, see 4. 1. 1-2 with notes.

2. καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα κτλ. So Curtius 8. 1. 9. Plutarch (*Al.* 46. 3) reports a letter of Alexander to Antipater which mentioned the offer of the Sacan princess. Now, Plutarch uses this letter to disprove the authenticity of the vulgate story of the visit of the Amazon queen, and modern scholars (e.g. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 491 f.; Mederer 87, 92; Tarn ii 326-9) have followed him with unanimity, arguing that the historical tradition of this (rejected) offer gave rise to the romantic fiction of the visit of the Queen of the Amazons παιδοποιίας χάριν (cf. 7. 13. 3). That is improbable. Curtius reports the offer of the Sacan marriage in terms similar to Arrian's but in a totally different context at Maracanda. He is presumably following the vulgate tradition, yet he gives not the romantic fiction but the historical episode which allegedly inspired it. The vulgate story of the queen's visit is moreover triply reported (Diod. 17. 77. 1-3; Curt. 6. 5. 24-32; Justin 12. 3. 5), and, though there are minor variations of detail, all three versions locate the episode in Hyrcania after the late summer campaign of 330 (so also Strabo 11. 5. 4 (505)). There is no obvious reason for the transference of location, and it is more plausible that Cleitarchus gave two separate reports, one of the visit of the Amazon queen in Hyrcania and the other the marriage proposal of 328. Plutarch, however, begins his discussion of the Amazon queen immediately after reporting Alexander's crossing of the Iaxartes (*Al.* 46. 1); and it has been thought that the adverb ἐνταῦθα which introduces the discussion refers back directly to the Iaxartes (Tarn ii 327; Pearson, *LHA* 77; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 123). But the reference to the Iaxartes is only one of a string of anecdotes illustrating Alexander's hardihood, all loosely tacked on to the assumption of Median dress, which all sources refer to the aftermath of the Hyrcanian campaign (cf. Bosworth, *JHS* 100 (1980) 5-7), almost precisely the context of the vulgate visit of the Amazon queen. It would seem that ἐνταῦθα at 46. 1 refers back to Plutarch's point of departure at 45. 1 (so Gisinger, *RE* xxi 1705; Welles, *Diodorus* 338 n. 2). In that case there was general agreement in locating the incident in Hyrcania, as Strabo 11. 5. 4 implies (συμμῖξαι φασιν ἐν τῇ Ὑρκανίᾳ); and Plutarch is referring to the later offer of the Sacan princess as a timeless episode without exact knowledge of its temporal context.

The Amazon visit, if it is correctly anchored in Hyrcania, may not have been entirely fictitious, as most scholars suggest. Plutarch admittedly mentions a string of authorities who, he says, regarded the story as an invention (πλάσμα). Two of those authorities, however, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, did not denounce the story but simply omitted it, for Arrian does not inveigh against its historicity,

even when there was a clear reference to the tradition (cf. 7. 13. 3 n.). The parallel passage of Strabo (11. 5. 4) also states that the most truthful historians of Alexander say nothing about the episode. Strabo therefore infers that the story is deliberate fiction and continues with the famous examples from the Indian campaign which were denounced by Eratosthenes (11. 5. 5; cf. Arr. 5. 3. 1-4 with notes). Perhaps Eratosthenes criticized the vulgate tradition of the Amazon queen, listing the authors who mentioned the story and those who omitted it and concluding that it was a fiction. Plutarch presumably used Eratosthenes, whom he knows and quotes (*Al.* 3. 3 cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* pp. xxxi f.); he repeated the material compiled by Eratosthenes' prodigious erudition (Tarn ii 308 argued that Plutarch drew on a handbook for his list: so also Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 124), but he may have concluded that the denunciation of the fiction came from the primary authorities, not from Eratosthenes. In any case it is not clear what fiction is being denounced. It may not be the visit itself so much as the characterization of the visitor as an Amazon. The most probable explanation is that Alexander was visited in Hyrcania by a native princess, probably of Dahan stock, with an entourage of female warriors (so Lane Fox 276). The existence of such women among the Saca peoples of the east seems an established fact (see 15. 4 n.). Onesicritus (*FGrH* 134 F 1) was probably the first to identify them with the Amazons of the Thermodon, and Cleitarchus followed the tradition (for the geographical difficulties of his version see Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 491; Mederer 85 f.; Tarn ii 328 f.; Pearson, *LHA* 214-15 n. 14), as did numerous later writers. It was a model later repeated by Theophanes of Mytilene, who described female prisoners of war captured in Albania as Amazons proper (Strabo 11. 5. 1 = *FGrH* 188 F 4; cf. *Plut. Pomp.* 35. 5 f.; App. *Milhr.* 103. 482 f.; Justin 42. 3. 7). The Amazons were so familiar a theme of mythology that the temptation to identify them with any and every group of female warriors must have been irresistible.

3. ἀλλὰ τῶν γε σατραπῶν ... ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον Nothing is known of the internal organization of the nomadic Sacae. It is most probable that *σατράπης* is here used in an extended sense, to designate not so much a governor of a specific territory as a local chief with paramount authority over his tribe but formally owing allegiance to the king (compare the Indian dynasts, Sambus and Sisicottus: 5. 20. 7; 6. 16. 3; see below, 4. 22. 6 n.). These 'satraps' were presumably the Saca counterparts of the baronial hyparchs of Bactria (cf. 4. 1. 5 n.).

This marriage proposal seems to have influenced Alexander's later policy. Before he left Sogdiana in spring 327 he induced several of his officers to marry daughters of the local nobility (Diod. 17

index λ; *Metz Epil.* 30f.). The bridegrooms may have been the commanders left in charge of Bactria/Sogdiana and the marriages designed to underscore the Macedonian suzerainty of the area (cf. *JHS* 100 (1980) 11). Ultimately the Sacan proposal may have been the seminal event which led to Alexander's marriage with Rhoxane and eventually to the mass wedding at Susa.

4. Φαρασμάνης ὁ Χορασμίων βασιλεύς The kingdom of Chorasmia (Khoresm) was centred immediately to the south of the Sea of Aral, where the ancient course of the Oxus branched westwards to the Sarykamysch depression and the present dry bed of the Uzboi (see above, 3. 29. 2 n.). Ptolemy 6. 12. 4 places the Chorasmians firmly on the Oxus, as is implied by Curtius' description of their territory (8. 1. 8) as bordering on the Dahae and Massagetae, the peoples of the southern steppes. In Alexander's day their territory clearly comprised the river lands of the lower Oxus (E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* (Wiesbaden 1968) 325 f.), whereas in the early Achaemenid period their lands had included part of the Kopet Dag piedmont (Hecataeus, *FGH* 1 F 292 f.; Hdt. 3. 117; cf. Tarn, *GBI* 478 f.; Altheim-Stiehl, 186 f.; see below, 5. 5. 2 n.). They were accordingly incorporated in Herodotus' sixteenth satrapy along with the Parthians, Achaemenians, and Sogdians, and they fought in Xerxes' army alongside the Parthians. (Hdt. 3. 93. 3; 7. 66. 2). During the fourth century the Chorasmians shook off the Achaemenid suzerainty and formed no part of the empire (Altheim-Stiehl 188 ff.). Equally they are not again attested in the vicinity of Parthia, and it is a reasonable assumption that they secured their independence by vacating their territories south of the Kara Kum and concentrating on the lower Oxus.

According to Soviet archaeologists Chorasmia supported a more sedentary population than the surrounding nomadic lands, and a complex irrigation system had been developed by the fifth century BC (see, most conveniently, S. P. Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen Kultur* (Berlin 1953) 112 f.). The period from the fourth century BC to the early Christian era saw a great expansion of art and architecture (cf. Tolstov 124-35 with Frumkin 92 ff.). The kingdom of Chorasmia was obviously both highly civilized and relatively centralized, probably the most formidable power on the northern marches of Bactria/Sogdiana. Up to 328 it had been neutral. Bessus merely hoped for Chorasmian support (Curt. 8. 4. 6); nothing suggests that it eventuated (cf. 3. 28. 10). More seriously, Strabo (11. 8. 8 (513)) alleges that Spitamenes fled from the Bactrians to the Attasii and the Chorasmians. This cannot be correlated with any statement in the Alexander historians, and I take it to be a general reference to Spitamenes' Massagetic allies (cf. 4. 16. 3, 17. 4-7), who may have been the Attasii. There is no direct

evidence that the Chorasmians played any direct part in the hostilities. In fact their king followed the example of his Saca neighbours and made diplomatic overtures to Alexander, so guaranteeing himself against Macedonian attack.

Pharasmanes seems an Iranian name. Elsewhere it is attested primarily in the Caucasian kingdom of Iberia in the first centuries AD (cf. F. Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch* (Marburg 1895) 91). Otherwise the name only occurs once: the son of Phrataphernes, satrap of Parthia/Hyrcania, is variously reported as Pharasmanes and Phradasmanes (6. 27. 3; 7. 6. 4; cf. Berve no. 812). Interestingly Curt. 8. 1. 8 reports the Chorasmian king as Phrataphernes, presumably substituting a more familiar name for a less familiar one (Phrataphernes may have been mentioned in his immediate context: see below, 15. 5 n.). There is no possibility (*pace* Justi) that the king was in fact the son of Phrataphernes; the resemblance must be coincidental. Iranian names are otherwise found in Chorasmia: one of the mercenaries at Elephantine in 465 BC was named 'Dargman ben Harshin of Chorasmia' (apparently Persian names: A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri* (Oxford 1923) no. 6). There may well have been some racial and linguistic affinity between the Chorasmians and the Iranians of the south.

ξὺν ἱππεῶσι These were the famous mailed cataphracts who apparently originated in Chorasmia during the sixth century BC (see above, 3. 13. 4 n.).

ἄμορος οἰκεῖν . . . ταῖς Ἀμαζόσι This statement, unique to Arrian, has been variously exploited. Tolstov, following the footsteps of von Gutschmid and Barthold, has argued that the Chorasmian kingdom did in fact extend over a vast steppe land from the Sea of Aral to the Euxine, and he too has had his followers (S. P. Tolstov, *Auf den Spuren der alchoresmischen Kultur* 119 f.; cf. Altheim-Stiehl 187). But it is most implausible that the Chorasmian king would have done homage so tamely if he had controlled so huge an empire. It is more probable that the tradition has been affected by romantic interpreting and faulty geographical conceptions (Tarn ii 327 f., *GBI* 479; Brunt, *Arrian* i 525). The whole episode may have arisen from Macedonian experiences of female warriors among the Saca peoples (see above, 15. 3 n.), and their knowledge of the Greek historical tradition, in which the formidable Massagetic Queen Tomyris was a familiar figure (Hdt. 1. 214 ff.) and Ctesias had retailed stories of Saca warrior princesses with squadrons of female cavalry (*FGH* 688 F 5 (3)). Given Alexander's belief in the relative proximity of the Iaxartes and the Black Sea (cf. 3. 30. 7-9, 4. 1. 1 with notes), he was probably predisposed to believe that the Saca warrior women were related to the legendary Amazons around Colchis (see below, 7. 13. 4 n.). When told of female warriors by the side of a great sea Pharasmanes probably equated them with some of his own

neighbours either by the Sea of Aral (cf. Tarn ii 8) or, more probably, on the east coast of the Caspian. His offer to supply guidance and provisions may have been a deliberate attempt to entice the Macedonian conqueror to attack peoples on his border and expand his own realm at little cost to himself (Wilcken 173; Tarn, *GBI* 479 n. 3). The Indian princes of Gandhara tried the same tactic with more success (see below, 4. 22. 6 with notes).

5. Ἀρταβάζω... ξυστήσας 'commending Pharasmanes to Artabazus ... and the other satraps whose lands were contiguous to his'.

At first sight the passage implies that Artabazus was personally present for an introduction to Pharasmanes, in which case Curtius' location of the incident at Maracanda would be disproved (cf. Curt. 8. 1. 10). But, although *συνιστάναι* originally referred exclusively to personal introductions (Xen. *Symp.* 4. 63; *Anab.* 3. 1. 8; *Mem.* 1. 6. 14), in Arrian's time its use was extended to indirect commendations by letter or by word of mouth (Plut. *Mor.* 533 c; Dio 37. 44. 3; 55. 34. 2; Luc. *Macro.* 3). Indeed letters of introduction were technically known as *γράμματα συστατικά* (Epict. *Diss.* 2. 3. 1). Alexander may merely have sent dispatches to Artabazus and his fellow satraps, recommending that they develop friendly relations with the Chorasmian king.

The identity of the other satraps is a matter for conjecture. They must be neighbours of Pharasmanes, rather than Artabazus, as is evident from the use of ἄλλοι; and the only viable candidates seem to be the satraps immediately south of Chorasmia, Phrathernes of Parthia/Hyrcania and Stasanor of Areia. They were the only governors who could have been termed *πρόσχωροι*; and in 328 they were still locked in combat with insurgent forces sympathizing with the Sogdian and Bactrian rebels (cf. 4. 7. 1, 18. 1 nn.). Pharasmanes was in a position to send cavalry to support their hard-pressed garrisons and disrupt communications between the Parthian and Bactrian rebels. The broad expanse of the Kara Kum between the lower Oxus and the Kopet Dağ massif would have made such assistance unlikely, but Alexander would not have known the exact distances involved. In the first flush of enthusiasm with his new ally he may well have written to all the satraps, however remote, urging them to develop relations with the Chorasmians.

6. τὰ Ἰνδῶν ἔφη ἐν τῷ τότε μέλειν Alexander's plans to attack India probably date back some years. They are a standard rhetorical element in Curtius from late 330 (Curt. 6. 2. 18, 3. 9; 7. 1. 24, etc.); and it was apparently part of Bessus' propaganda that Alexander would invade India rather than cross the Hindu Kush (Curt. 7. 4. 20). He was presumably eager to complete the reconquest of the former Persian empire, and Pharasmanes' proposal of a campaign in

the desert steppes had much less attraction than the mysterious and exotic world of India (cf. Schachermeyr² 396-402).

πᾶσαν . . . τὴν Ἀσίαν By Alexander's day it was a commonplace that the Indians formed the eastern boundary of Asia. Hdt. 3. 98. 2 described them as the remotest people in the east of Asia, while Ephorus, following older Ionian geographical models, placed them at the eastern extremity of the known world (*FGH* 70 F 30; cf. Thomson 97 f.), Eratosthenes was to continue the idea, making India the easternmost and greatest portion of Asia (cf. 5. 5. 4. 6. 2 nn.).


If Arrian is correct, Alexander in 328 foresaw the conquest of Asia in its entirety, as far as the eastern ocean (not merely the old boundaries of the Persian empire, *pace* Tarn ii 398 n. 5), and he already envisaged an extension of the campaign into the Black Sea. Arrian later refers to this scheme as one of several plans of expansion mentioned by Alexander historians (7. 1. 3) and it occurs briefly in Coenus' speech at the Hyphasis (5. 27. 7). It has accordingly been emphasized as the first concrete expression by Alexander of plans for world conquest (C. A. Robinson, *AHR* 62 (1957) 336), or as the genuine nucleus of the so-called 'Last Plans' of conquest in the west (Kraft 127 f., cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 192). The west and its problems are likely to have been in Alexander's mind at the time. Given the great influx of mercenaries from the Asia Minor satrapies, particularly the forces of Asander of Lydia (4. 7. 2 n.), Alexander would have had recent first-hand reports of the troubled state of the Euxine coast. Bithynia was unconquered, its dynast, Bas, successfully repelling attacks by Alexander's satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. 1. 17. 1 n.). Paphlagonia had supported the Persian counter-offensive of 332 (Curt. 4. 5. 13) and probably was never fully pacified (cf. 2. 4. 1 n.). Further east Pontic Cappadocia was in the hands of the independent dynast Ariarathes (Strabo 12. 1. 4 (534); see above, 2. 4. 2 n.). Tarn ii 398 was certainly correct to draw attention to the mass of unconquered territory in Asia Minor, and in 328 Alexander could well have seen it as a future theatre of war in which he could use the promised assistant of Pharasmanes. The Chorasmian king could drive down the Tanais to the Crimea (cf. Curt. 7. 6. 12; 8. 1. 7) while he stormed along the Euxine coast; the campaign would culminate in a joint expedition against the European Scyths. No doubt Alexander expressed his intentions clearly and openly, for the Euxine campaign figures in the speculation about his final aims. But by the time of his death the return to Greece had been indefinitely deferred. Alexander's ambitions were fixed on Arabia and northern Africa (7. 1. 1-3), and the Euxine campaign, if it was still in his mind, had receded far into the background.

15. 7 – 16. 3. *Opening of the Campaign Season of 328*

The narrative of the advance to the Oxus is usually attributed to Ptolemy on the basis of the biographical material at 15. 8 (Strasburger 41; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 16–17). There could, however, be some contamination (see below on the variant tradition of the ‘miracle of the Oxus’).

7. ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀξόν Curt. 7. 10. 13 also begins the campaign season (see Map 2) with a four-day march to the Oxus, before a second march across the rivers Ochus and Oxus (this detail also in *Metz Epit.* 14) as far as a city named ‘Margania’ (7. 10. 15). The direction of this expedition can only be conjectured. Curtius’ text has been traditionally emended to *Margiana*, and it is assumed that Alexander’s objective was the oasis of Mary (Merv), some 350 km. west of Bactra, where an Alexandria is attested (Pliny, *NH* 6. 46; cf. Schachermeyr² 349 n. 416; Engels 104–5; P. Bernard, *JS* 1982. 129–30; Holt 24, 62). Few scholars have been prepared to envisage a desert march of these dimensions in a season dominated by revolt in both Bactria and Sogdiana, and the usual view is that Alexander sent a lieutenant, either Craterus (Schachermeyr: see below 4. 17. 1 n.) or Ptolemy (Holt 82 n. 48: see below 4. 16. 2 n.). This assumes that Curtius’ text is garbled, attributing to Alexander an operation carried out by his subordinates. Curtius is certainly capable of such a slip, but the fact remains that the spring of 328 was not the time to send an isolated contingent away from the main front on a long and hazardous journey through the desert. The sceptical view which I propounded some years ago (*JHS* 101 (1981) 23–9) still seems (to me at least) correct. The ‘Margania’ described by Curtius is not the ancient Margiana (Mary) but a location in Sogdiana north of the Oxus, where Alexander founded not one city but a network of six. The hill country described by Curtius (*in editis collibus*) cannot easily be reconciled with the alluvial plain around Mary (Bernard, *JS* 1982. 128, suggests that the foundations were established on old ‘tépés’ of mud-brick), but does fit the area north of the Oxus and Alexander’s attested city foundations there (4. 16. 3 n.). The similarity of nomenclature is probably fortuitous (cf. 4. 21. 1, 22. 1 on *Παριτάκαι*). I do not doubt for a moment that the great site at Giaur Kala, 30 km. east of Mary, is the foundation of Antiochus I, which was established, as Pliny says, on the site of an earlier Alexandria (Pliny, *NH* 6. 45; Isidorus, *FGrH* 781 F 2 (14), and Strabo 11. 10. 2 (576) mention only Antiochia). What I dispute is the assumption that Alexander founded an Alexandria in Mary in 328 and that the foundation is identical with Curtius’ Margania.

There is nothing in Curtius to counter Arrian’s explicit statement



MAP 2. The campaigns of 328 BC

that Alexander's objective was Sogdiana. Given the intensive campaigning in western Sogdiana the previous year, when the Macedonians penetrated to the furthest reaches of the Zeravshan (4. 6. 5-6), it seems most likely that the campaigns of 328 focused upon the eastern portion of the satrapy. The direction would be clearer if we could identify the Ochus, which Curtius (along with Metz Epit.) claims Alexander crossed before he reached the Oxus, but its location is a notorious crux (cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 26-7). Strabo apparently knew of two rivers of that name, one (the Atrek?) flowing into the Caspian and the other discharging into the Oxus in Bactria (11. 7. 3 (509), 11. 5 (578)). It was clearly an important river (cf. Pliny, *NH* 6. 49; 31. 75), and there are few candidates in the area south of the Oxus. My tentative suggestion that it was the present river Kunduz has been vehemently attacked by Bernard (*JSt* 1982. 130-1), who argues that no ancient text suggests a localization east of Bactra. That is true, but it is also true that (apart from Ptolemy, *Geogr.* 6. 11. 2-4, which is unreliable in detail) there is nothing to suggest that the Ochus ran to the west of Bactra. Strabo, however (like Ptolemy (and Amm. Marc. 23. 6. 57)), states that the Ochus discharged into the Oxus and there is no major river west of Bactra that can have done so in recent or ancient times. The most plausible conclusion is that Alexander moved eastwards from Bactra in 328 and went up the course of the Oxus before crossing. Whether he went as far as the Kokcha valley and the site of Aï-Khanum must remain an open question (cf. 4. 16. 1 n.) but he certainly spent some time south of the Oxus (Curtius and the *Metz Epilome* mention stages of four and eleven days' march), and it looks as though there was insurgency on a wide scale in Bactria, which Alexander was well advised to deter with his combined army before crossing the Oxus into Sogdiana (Curt. 7. 10. 13; Briant, *L'Asie Centrale* 79, underestimates the troubles).

οὐδὲ ἐθέλειν . . . ἐπετέτακτο Arrian seems to be speaking of a commander other than the actual satrap of Bactria, Artabazus, who was in the close entourage of Alexander (4. 16. 2). It looks as though there was a separate commander sent to eastern Sogdiana, who proved ineffectual when the local barons withdrew their levies to their rural strongholds.

στρατοπεδεύοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ κτλ. This famous story is reported in other sources with variant details. The closest to Arrian is Plutarch (*Al.* 57. 5-9, reproduced in Photius, *Bibl.* 396^a22-34) who locates the incident by the Oxus and describes the discovery of a seepage of petroleum, of a colour and consistency similar to olive oil. That is essentially the same story as we find in Strabo (11. 11. 5 (518)), who locates the seepage by the Ochus and confirms the oily consistency and its discovery as a result of digging. Arrian, however, seems

to envisage a *spontaneous* flow of oil and water. The spontaneity is not found in Plutarch or Strabo, but it occurs in Curtius (7. 10. 13-14). There it is a question of water only. Attempts to dig wells near the Oxus for unpolluted water were unsuccessful, until a spring appeared in the royal tent. Curtius, then, attests the spontaneous appearance of water, but he says nothing about oil. Arrian appears to conflate two separate phenomena, the appearance of a spring of water and the discovery of a seepage of petroleum. Both probably occurred, but perhaps not in such close conjunction as Arrian implies.

The location of the two springs cannot be determined. Hydrocarbons have been widely discovered south of the Amu Darya. The major finds, predominantly of natural gas, have occurred west of Bactra (Bernard, *JŚ* 1982. 134 with literature), but hydrocarbons have also been detected as far east as Kunduz. Seepages of petroleum have always been common, and in the 1930s they led to test drillings near the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The phenomenon is consistent with a line of march either east or west of Bactra.

8. Πτολεμαῖω τῷ Λάγῳ Ptolemy's role as intermediary is unique to Arrian. Plutarch (*Al.* 57. 5) claims that the discovery of the oil was made by Proxenus, the official in charge of the royal bedding (ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν στρωματοφυλάκων; Photius *Bibl.* 396^a 23 reads ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων (i.e. in charge of the slaves), an evident slip). This is circumstantial and is generally accepted. But Ptolemy may have played a part (cf. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 17). The tradition of the fall of Philotas and of the Pages' Conspiracy suggests that access to the king was normally effected through a senior officer (cf. 3. 26. 2 with note and 4. 13. 7, where Ptolemy again acts as intermediary). Ptolemy presumably mentioned that he passed on news of the discovery and laid less emphasis on the actual discoverer.

ἔθουεν . . . ἐξηγοῦντο For the procedure compare 6. 3. 1 (sacrifices to the river Hydaspes). Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 9) agrees on the interpretation of the oil seepage but says nothing about the particular role of Aristander. Apart from his warning before Cleitus' death (Plut. *Al.* 50. 5) this is the seer's last appearance in the history of the reign, and Berve (ii 62, no. 117) may be correct that he died around 327 BC.

16. 1. Διαβὰς οὖν κτλ. The crossing-point cannot be precisely determined. Bernard (*JŚ* 1982. 131) has argued that Alexander crossed at the same point as he did in 329, near Kelif (cf. 3. 29. 3 n.). His argument is based on the assumption that the fivefold division of the army was the prelude to a simultaneous push up the four major river systems of Tadzhikistan. A march to the east would unnecessarily prolong the itinerary of the majority of the columns (see also

Holt 60-1). This may be true, but it remains an assumption. We have no information about the number and location of the Sogdian (and Bactrian) areas of insurgency. The five columns had separate objectives, but they were not necessarily linked with the river systems north of the Oxus. Indeed there is good reason to doubt that there was an *immediate* division into five groups (see below 16. 2). Nor can we necessarily state that there was no strategic point in a march to the east up the Oxus valley. As Curtius states (7. 10. 13), there were pockets of local resistance to be broken, and the presence of the army in force presumably had a strong deterrent effect. On the other hand Curtius and the *Metz Epitome* (see above, 15. 7 n.) suggest that Alexander marched for a considerable distance south of the Oxus, and Spitamenes' attack on Bactra/Zariaspa (16. 4-17. 2) indicates that the western sector of Bactria was somewhat denuded of troops. The weight of evidence is in favour of an initial march eastwards up the Oxus with the united army, profiting from the lush spring growth. Then the army was divided into columns to deal with the various rebel strongholds to the north and south of the river.

Πολυπέρχοντα . . . Μελέαγρον All four appear to have been phalanx commanders. Attalus and Gorgias are first attested with infantry *taxeis* in 327 (4. 22. 1, 7), but, given their association with Polyperchon and Meleager, *taxis* commanders of long standing, it is a reasonable inference that they held that rank in 328 also. Attalus may well have assumed command of the battalion of his brother Amyntas after the latter's death in late 330 (3. 27. 3 n.). We are not informed what forces were assigned to them, and it is most unlikely that Alexander detached four entire infantry battalions for service in Bactria. The four commanders were probably assigned mercenary troops and temporarily separated from their *taxeis*, as was to happen at the Hydaspes (5. 12. 1 n.).

ἐν Βάκτροις Clearly (as the sequel shows) this refers to the geographical area of Bactria (as at 7. 16. 3 and (probably) 5. 27. 5) not to the city of Bactra. Bactria was clearly in a volatile state with the unrest still widespread (*τοὺς ἐτι ἀφεστηκότας*), and there was a danger of renewed insurgency in districts already pacified. Small, mobile columns were necessary as much to the south as to the north of the Oxus, and Arrian does not give the complete total. He later reveals that Craterus was active in the vicinity of the capital (17. 1 n.). Presumably he was given separate instructions when Alexander left his winter quarters; the initial commission is omitted, and as a result Craterus simply appears out of nowhere.

2. ἐς πέντε μέρη Arrian's narrative is here at its most contracted. He describes a fivefold division of the army and says nothing about the specific objectives of each group. There is a second partition of

forces after the whole army is reassembled at the Sogdian capital of Maracanda (16. 3), with Hephaestion, Coenus, and Alexander once more going their separate ways. Curtius, however, has a somewhat different account. He records one division only: Coenus and Hephaestion were sent on their mission after the reduction of the citadel of Ariamazes, between the Oxus and Maracanda (8. 1. 1). Alexander reached the capital first and remained there until Hephaestion and Artabazus arrived (8. 1. 10). Next came the excursion to the game reserve of Bazaira and the murder of Cleitus which followed immediately. Finally, some ten days after Cleitus' death, Curtius notes the advent of winter (8. 2. 13-14) which is recorded by Arrian at 16. 3. Nothing in Curtius suggests that Alexander stayed for a protracted period at Maracanda or that he went out from Maracanda on a second expedition, returning to base later in the year (so Holt 61-2, 65). On the other hand, Arrian's account is manifestly disturbed, thanks to his decision to anticipate the report of Cleitus' death (see above, p. 52), and he seems to have no coherent picture of the campaign of 328. It is possible that we are faced with a doublet (see further *JHS* 101 (1981) 33-4): Ptolemy briefly recorded the multiple divisions of the army in 328, and listed all the separate missions sent out during the Sogdian campaign of that year. On the other hand, Aristobulus (like Curtius) noted only the most important: those of Hephaestion and Coenus. Arrian wrongly assumed that they were separate missions (for other instances see vol. i 18-19) and made two divisions out of one. If that is correct, we cannot assume that Alexander divided his forces into five immediately after crossing the Oxus. The contingents were detached as they were needed, and Ptolemy grouped them together for narrative convenience.

ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα The route is a matter of guesswork. If Alexander was operating in eastern Sogdiana, modern Tadzhikistan, it is most likely that he crossed the Hissar range by the Anzob pass (see Map 2) and then moved westwards down the Zeravshan towards Maracanda (cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 36).

3. τὰς ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πόλεις συνοικίζεν Apart from Alexandria Eschate Arrian mentions no city foundations in Sogdiana. Curtius (7. 10. 15), however, records six settlements in the vicinity of 'Margania', founded north of the Oxus (see above, 15. 7 n.), just before the attack on the citadel of Ariamazes; and the index to Diodorus 17 (κς) notes that the king established cities strategically placed for the repression of rebellion. The note is placed immediately after the campaign in Bactria and immediately before the capture of the rock (see also Justin 12. 5. 13). Curtius also states that the luckless defenders of Ariamazes' citadel were presented to the settlers of the new cities (7. 11. 29; cf. Briant, *RTP* 72-3), no doubt as an agrarian workforce tied to the soil, and in the next sentence he records the

separate command of Hephaestion (8. 1. 1). That fits admirably the commission as recorded by Arrian, which was to *add population* (for *συνοικίζειν* in this sense see 4. 24. 7; 5. 29. 3; 6. 17. 4, 22. 3) to cities already in existence (*contra* Holt 62 'to settle the Sogdians into new cities'). Hephaestion was sent back to the embryonic foundations already established north of the Oxus and swelled their population with the newly captured prisoners of war.

Κοτνον . . . ἐς Σκόθας As the sequel shows, Spitamenes' Sacan allies were the Massagetae, whose territory lay west of Bactria, along the course of the Oxus (Strabo 11. 8. 8 (513)). He had widened his alliance beyond the Dahae who had helped him annihilate the Macedonian mercenaries in the Zeravshan (see above, 5. 3 n.). The news of the fresh threat reached Alexander before Spitamenes had been beaten away from Bactra (17. 2 n.), and he obviously considered it desirable to strengthen his defences on the western frontier. In the event the mission of Coenus and Artabazus was superfluous. Craterus' victory secured the western districts of Bactria (see below 17. 4 n.), and Coenus and his expeditionary force could withdraw to rejoin the main army at Maracanda (Curt. 8. 1. 10). Whether they actually invaded Sacan territory we cannot say.

16. 4-17. 2. *Spitamenes' Invasion of Bactria*

Arrian's source for this episode is probably Aristobulus, as is suggested by the use of the name Zariaspa for the satrapal capital (see above 4. 1. 5 n.) and the general tenor of the narrative. Three incidents are reported: first a successful raid on a Macedonian-held garrison point, next the destruction of a mercenary squadron led by convalescent Macedonians from Bactra/Zariaspa, and thirdly the invaders' defeat at the hands of Craterus. Curtius (8. 1. 3-6) has a similar story, but there are significant variants. In particular the chief actor on the Macedonian side is an Attinas, *praefectus regionis*, who fell into an enemy ambush while repelling the nomad invasion. He is usually identified with the unnamed phrurarch in Arrian, the first victim of Spitamenes' invasion (cf. Berve no. 185). That is impossible; the details in the two stories are totally different. Arrian's phrurarch was taken by surprise (οὐδὲν πολέμιον προσδεχομένῳ) and captured alive. What Curtius records seems rather to be another version of the Macedonian sortie from Bactra (so Holt 76 n. 112). It is a counter-attack after the devastation of the neighbouring districts and centres upon the enemies' booty. What is more, Attinas (a most respectable Macedonian name: cf. Moretti, no. 109; *BE* 1950. 222) appears an important personage, and there is a notable absentee in Arrian's account—the garrison commander of Bactra. His narrative reads as though the sortie was an impromptu affair, organized on

the spur of the moment by the Macedonian convalescents. Curtius, however, suggests that it was planned retaliation, led by the area commander and that inadequate scouting brought disaster (*clades*). Arrian smooths over any suggestion of a failure of command. He describes a heroic enterprise, which failed precisely because there *was* no command (*ἄτε οὐδέενος ἐξηγουμένου*). If Aristobulus is the source, it is of a piece with the account of the disaster in the Zeravshan (see above 3. 7, 6. 1-2 nn.). Instead of a formal expedition, poorly led, we have an improvised and heroic sortie, and once again it is the lack of clear-cut leadership which brings disaster. Aristobulus apparently suppressed the role of the actual commander and focused upon the convalescent Macedonians and the citharode Aristonicus, who was posthumously honoured by Alexander (see below, 16. 7 n.). Attinas himself may well have been one of the butts of court gossip at Maracanda some months later (Plut. *Al.* 50. 8), and the apologetic Aristobulus felt that his role needed to be slurred over.

4. ἐς τῶν Σκυθῶν τῶν Μασσαγετῶν . . . χώραν If Eratosthenes was correct in locating the Massagetae along the Oxus, it is a reasonable conjecture that Spitamenes moved southwards from his sphere of operations in the Zeravshan and persuaded the Massagetan chiefs to give assistance. What mattered was booty (see below, 17. 5); Spitamenes' allies expected some tangible reward for their efforts. In that case the sufferers were likely to be the unfortunate Bactrian natives, caught between the hammer of the nomadic incursion and the anvil of the Macedonian occupation (see below, 17. 7). They would be unlikely to view Spitamenes as a liberator.

ἱππέας ἑξακοσίους Curtius (8. 1. 3) gives a total of 800. That could include Spitamenes' entourage of refugee Sogdians as well as the 600 Massagetae mentioned by Arrian.

πρὸς τι φρούριον This garrison point is not named but clearly lay between Bactra and the western border of Bactria. It is hardly likely to be Aornus (so Holt 76 n. 111), which was to the east (cf. 3. 29. 1 n.). Alexander probably installed the garrison late in 329, when he returned to Bactra for the winter (cf. 7. 1 n.).

5. προσβαλεῖν ἀπέγνωσαν Bactra/Zariaspa was a formidable fortress in the time of Antiochus III, and its unsuccessful siege between 208 and 206 became one of the *lopoi* of Hellenistic historiography (Polyb. 10. 49. 15; 29. 12. 8). In Alexander's day its fortifications were an adequate deterrent for Spitamenes and his nomadic followers.

6. νόσῳ ὑπολελειμμένοι Alexander seems to have made it a practice to leave his sick troops in the satrapal capitals, to join the main army after their convalescence (cf. 3. 19. 8 (Cleitus)). Only officers

of standing are mentioned by name, but troops of all ranks were included in the convalescent arrangements (5. 8. 3).

Πειθὼν ὁ Σωσικλέους Peithon (Berve no. 622) is not attested elsewhere. His position is a curious one, in charge of the royal court at Bactra. *θεραπεία* in Arrian, as in Herodotus and later in the Seleucid period, strictly denotes the personnel of the court ('l'intendance du cour': Bickerman, *Institutions* 36; cf. 2. 12. 5; 4. 13. 1, 20. 2 with Hdt. 5. 21. 1; 7. 55. 1, 186. 1, and Polyb. 5. 56. 7). The formidable battery of court ushers, eunuchs, and concubines, which Alexander had inherited from Darius, was installed safely in the capital during the serious campaigning, with a Macedonian official (apparently not a Companion) in charge.

Ἀριστόνικος ὁ κιθαρωδός Aristonicus (Berve no. 132) of Olynthus was one of the leading citharodes of his day and had acquired an international reputation by 350 (Polyaen. 5. 44. 1: on the date see A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934) 123 n. 1). He was then an associate of Memnon of Rhodes and probably went with Memnon to the Macedonian court, where he became one of the close intimates of Philip (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 236). As a member of the king's entourage he will have crossed with Alexander into Asia (so Berve) and found himself at Bactra along with the other non-combatants.

μισθοφόρους ἱππέας ἐς ὀγδοήκοντα This seems a surprisingly small garrison for a satrapal capital. Curtius (8. 1. 3) claims that Attinas had 300 cavalry, a rather more credible figure. Aristobulus may have deliberately underestimated the size of the defeated force. Alternatively Arrian could have omitted some of its components.

τῶν παίδων τινὰς τῶν βασιλικῶν These appear to be royal pages (cf. Diod. 17. 79. 4), who were part of the court retinue (*θεραπεία*) of the king, and the younger members at least will have been left with the non-combatants. Not surprisingly Bactra was the scene of the Pages' Conspiracy of 327 (cf. 4. 22. 2 n.).

7. οὐδὲν ὑποτοπήσας Curtius (8. 1. 5) claims that the looting party deliberately invited attack, in order to lure the Macedonians into a prepared ambush.

Ἀριστόνικος . . . αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει His death was commemorated by Alexander, who commissioned a statue of him for Delphi, with lyre and couched spear (Plut. *Mor.* 334F). Arrian merely comments that 'he showed bravery beyond the measure of a citharode'. That echoes the conventional judgement on the manliness of musicians in general (*μαλθακίεσθαι ἐδόκει, ἅτε ὦν κιθαρωδός*, Pl. *Symp.* 179D; for another conscious reference to the *Symposium* (180A, 280D) see *Peripl.* 22. 4.). Plutarch typically uses the incident as proof of the inspirational virtues of music.

17. 1. ὥς Κρατερῷ ἐξηγγέλθη So Curt. 8. 1. 6. In both accounts Craterus appears out of nowhere. He had presumably been given his commission when Alexander left Bactra at the beginning of the campaigning season. His role may not have been unlike Coenus' in Sogdiana over the winter of 328/7 (see below, 17. 3 n.); based at the satrapal capital he had general responsibility for the occupying forces in Bactria (Schachermeyr² 349 n. 416 suggested that he was engaged far to the west, in the oasis of Margiana (see above, 15. 7 n.) and cut off Spitamenes' retreat). When Spitamenes invaded, he was presumably operating against rebel communities to the south and east of Bactra, out of the line of the enemy advance. His troops were sufficiently numerous to force the nomads immediately into flight.

ἄλλοις ἰππεῦσι Μασσαγετῶν According to Curtius (8. 1. 6) the reinforcements were Dahae, not Massagetae. That is not impossible. The Dahae had been Spitamenes' chief allies in 329 (see above, 5. 3 n.), and they may well have sent a contingent in 328, which arrived at the Bactrian frontier only when Spitamenes was in full flight. Arrian does not mention the Dahae in the context of the campaigns of 329/8, although he notes the presence of Dahan horse archers in Alexander's army at the Hydaspes (5. 12. 2), and his source here may have made no distinction between the two peoples.

2. μάχη . . . καρτερά No details are given, as in the case of Coenus' even more impressive victory (17. 6 below), but it is clear that Craterus relieved the western frontier of Bactria from further pressure from the steppes and then allowed the survivors to melt away into the desert. The events of 329 were an object-lesson not to run risks with tired troops and horses.

17. 3-7. *Coenus' Activities in Sogdiana (Winter 328/7)*

The material is unique to Arrian and cannot be attributed with confidence to either of his major sources (for arguments in favour of Aristobulus see *JHS* 101 (1981) 34). His narrative is supplemented by Curtius (8. 2. 13-19; cf. *Metz Epit.* 19), who (*pace* Holt 65) appears to record quite different incidents. Arrian is curiously skimpy. The appointments he records at 17. 3 have no explicit setting, nor is there any indication where Alexander directed his movements after leaving Amyntas and Coenus in winter quarters. It only emerges at 18. 1 that his destination was Nautaca. Curtius is much more helpful. He confirms that the starting-point was Maracanda, where Amyntas was left as satrap, and that Alexander went to Nautaca (see Map 2) for the winter after a detour to eliminate a nest of Bactrian rebels at Xenippa (Karshi (?); cf. E. V. Rtveldadze, in *Kavkaz i Srednjaja Aziya v drevnosti i srednevekoz'e*, ed.

B. A. Litvinskij (Moscow 1981) 95-101; Bernard, *JS* 1982. 138). Arrian, it seems, was reaping the harvest of his anticipation of the killing of Cleitus (see above, 4. 8. 1). He resumed the campaign narrative at the beginning of winter, immediately after the death of Cleitus (Curt. 8. 2. 13), and failed to supply the background detail necessary to explain the administrative decisions he records. He was also (for once) more attracted by the exploits of Alexander's subordinates than by the relatively mundane actions of the king himself, who was not actually involved in the battles against the rebel forces.

3. Ἀρτάβαζον μὲν . . . διὰ γῆρας According to Curtius (8. 1. 19) Artabazus was first replaced by Cleitus—an appointment deeply resented by the appointee (8. 1. 35; see above, p. 56); Amyntas was only elevated after Cleitus' death (Curt. 8. 2. 14). Arrian agrees on the time of Amyntas' appointment but says nothing about Cleitus, perhaps echoing the silence of his source (Cleitus' assignment to Sogdiana could be seen as an act of ingratitude). Artabazus' request for dismissal on grounds of age is repeated by Curtius and looks authentic. Even so, it is suspicious. Artabazus could not have been born before 387 (cf. Plut. *Al.* 21. 9 for his royal lineage and Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 28 with Plut. *Artox.* 27. 7 for the date of his parents' wedding), and he was under sixty when he abdicated his satrapy (Curt. 6. 5. 3 claims that he was in his mid nineties—a gross exaggeration). In that case his old age is likely to have been a diplomatic excuse (Brunt, *RFIC* 103 (1975) 24-5; Hornblower, *Mausolus* 173). Bactria was no longer the relatively docile province it had appeared in 329. After Alexander's departure the satrap was to operate with one of the largest regional armies in the Empire (see below, 22. 3) and he had a network of Greek-dominated military settlements to supervise. It is hardly surprising that the command was seen to require a senior Macedonian.

Ἀμύνταν δὲ τὸν Νικολάου (Berve no. 60) Nothing is known of Amyntas' background. The common patronymic suggests that he was brother of Pantauchus of Alorus (Berve no. 604), one of the trierarchs of the Indus fleet (*Ind.* 18. 6) and therefore one of the wealthier and more prominent members of court.

Κοῖνον δὲ ἀπολείπει Recently returned from his mission against the western Sacae (16. 3 n.), Coenus was now commissioned with the defence of northern Sogdiana. He was based at Maracanda (Arrian writes vaguely: αὐτοῦ ('there') must refer to the capital; see above) with a substantial force of Macedonians (two phalanx battalions and a large segment of the cavalry). Like Craterus in Bactria, he had overriding authority for the period of the military emergency. Compare Leonnatus' appointment in Oreitis over winter 325/4,

with instructions to pacify the territory sufficiently for the satrap to be able to exercise his authority (see below, 6. 22. 3).

τοὺς ἵππακοντιστάς . . . ἐτάχθησαν '(i) all the mounted javelin men, (ii) some of the Bactrians and Sogdians, and (iii) the other troops who had been assigned to Amyntas'. Three contingents are at issue, the latter two under Amyntas' command. The text of this passage has had an unfortunate history. For centuries the καί between Σογδιανῶν and ὅσοι (linking (ii) and (iii)) was erroneously omitted from the printed editions, and, even when it was properly restored, in the nineteenth century, translations of the passage tended universally to ignore the final connective (the Artemis edition by Wirth and von Hinüber is an honourable exception). That had two unfortunate implications, firstly that Amyntas' command comprised *only* Bactrians and Sogdians and secondly that the ἵππακοντισταί were of oriental extraction ('the mounted javelin men and those other Bactrians and Sogdians who had been assigned to Amyntas'). But the final καί must be disjunctive: elsewhere καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι tends to denote the final item in a series (cf. 3. 18. 1, 19. 7). The partitive genitive (Βακτρίων τε καὶ Σογδιανῶν) stands as a direct object, with τινάς understood. The usage has a good literary pedigree (Xen. *Anab.* 3. 5. 16) and Arrian elsewhere employs it immediately before a relative clause (4. 4. 1: ξυνοικίσας . . . τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων μισθοφόρων καὶ ὅστις τῶν προσοικούντων βαρβάρων ἐθελοντῆς μετέσχε).

It is clear that the javelin men belonged to Coenus' command and returned with him to base (cf. 18. 1). Amyntas' forces included native Bactrians and Sogdians and some other unspecified units, probably mercenaries. The recruitment of natives is of some interest, given the prolonged and bitter resistance to Macedonian rule. But some of the local tribesmen may well have thrown in their lot with the invaders from the outset and could not afford to desert their new masters (like Vlasov's Russians who fought for Hitler). In any case by the end of 328 Spitamenes' activities might have been so destructive to the settled areas of Sogdiana that it was worth siding with the occupying power (see above, 16. 4 n.).

διαχειμάζειν Cf. Curt. 8. 2. 13: Hephaestion had been sent in advance to Bactria, to stockpile provisions for the winter. Strategic and logistical considerations alike demanded a division of forces.

εἴ πη ἄρα sc. δύναιντο. For an identical ellipse see 4. 30. 6 and, for earlier examples, Thuc. 4. 20. 1; Xen. *Anab.* 6. 4. 12.

4. πάντα κατεῖλημμένα ἐώρων This comes better after the cleaning out of the band of Bactrian rebels at Xenippa. Alexander drove them north (?) from their previously safe haven, to be repressed by Amyntas—at considerable cost (Curt. 8. 2. 15–17). Craterus had already secured the western borders of Bactria (cf. 17. 2 above), and

the obvious area to strike was the north-west of Sogdiana, where Coenus' troops may have been thinly spread. The strategy of containment was obviously working.

ἐς Γαβάς No identification seems possible. The two candidates advanced, 'Gaza' (see above 2. 1 n.) and 'Gazaba' (Curt. 8. 4. 1; *Metz Epit.* 28), are not easily reconciled with Arrian's general location. 'Gabae' was clearly a border fortress, and, if Massagetic territory bordered the Oxus (above, 16. 3 n.), the frontier zone would have been the western portion of the Zeravshan valley (so Engels 106, after von Schwarz), the area devastated by Alexander a year previously (see above, 6. 5). In that case there would have been slender pickings for Spitamenes' nomad allies and no enthusiasm from the local Sogdians, who had to support the invading army.

5. οὐτε πόλεις . . . ὥς δειμαίνειν A *locus classicus* for the rhetorical distinction between nomads and sedentary urbanized peoples. The distinction is one of Arrian's favourite *topoi* (cf. 7. 9. 2; *Ind.* 7. 2-7; *Bithyn.* F 54; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 108-10). However familiar a rhetorical theme this 'mirage nomade' may have been (Briant, *État et pasteurs* 39-40, 102-11; Holt 31, 56-7), it is not a simple superimposition by Arrian. The basic antithesis already occurred in the Alexander sources. What Arrian writes here recurs almost word for word at *Ind.* 40. 8, where he records Nearchus' version of the 'civilizing' of the Cossaeans (see below, 7. 15. 2), and the ideal of the noble savage, poor but virtuous, is clearly embodied in the story of the embassy to the Abii (see above 4. 1. 1 n.; Curt. 7. 8. 10-11). The Greeks of Alexander's time may indeed have had a stereotyped view of the Sacae, which did little justice to the complexity and variety of Sacan culture (cf. Briant, *État et pasteurs* 219-20 for evidence of peaceful coexistence between nomadic and agricultural societies in a state of 'cultural interpenetration'; so Holt 31). But with regard to the Massagetae and Dahae Arrian's observations seem justified. Plunder was their main motive (cf. 16. 5, 7, 17. 7), and the victims were the Bactrian and Sogdian subsistence farmers. Not surprisingly, the problem persisted long after Alexander (see below, 1. 3 n. on the fate of Alexandria Eschate), and as late as 206 bc the Bactrian ruler, Euthydemus, warned Antiochus III of the constant danger of nomadic invasion which would 'barbarize' the entire region (Polyb. 11. 34. 4-5). However overstated it may have been, there is a kernel of truth in the old theory of constant friction between agricultural and non-agricultural populations on the fringes of the steppes (cf. P. Daffinà, *Il nomadismo centrasiatico* (Rome 1982) 26-38).

6. ὑπὲρ τοὺς ὀκτακοσίους . . . δώδεκα Even if these are propaganda figures, Coenus' victory was a very substantial achievement. It caused the immediate dissolution of Spitamenes' army.

Βακτρίων οἱ πολλοί Elsewhere (16. 3) Arrian mentions only Sogdian supporters of Spitamenes. He might have recruited Bactrian dissidents during his campaign earlier in the year, and some of the survivors of the exile force defeated by Amyntas (Curt. 8. 2. 17-18) may have attached themselves to him. Given that their Saca friends considered it worth while plundering their baggage train, it would seem that their insurgency had not been unprofitable.

7. ἐν ὁρμῇ ὦν Cf. Curt. 8. 3. 1, placed towards the end of winter 328/7.

ἀποτεμόντες . . . τὴν κεφαλὴν According to Curtius (8. 3. 1-15; cf. *Metz Epit.* 20-3) Spitamenes was murdered by his wife, who personally delivered his head to Alexander. That may well be a romantic fabrication, but it is followed by the circumstantial report that Spitamenes' fellow rebel, Dataphernes (cf. 3. 29. 6; 4. 1. 5; Berve no. 246), was surrendered to Alexander by the Dahae (Curt. 8. 3. 16; *Metz Epit.* 23). By contrast Arrian is very brief, and it is possible that he has conflated the stories of Spitamenes (who was beheaded) and Dataphernes (who was betrayed by his allies).

18. 1-3. *Winter at Nautaca* (328/7)

The record of appointments seems taken principally from Aristobulus (see below, 18. 2), and the bulk of the material recurs in Curtius (8. 3. 16-17). Indeed the similarities are so close that there might be a common source (see, however, Atkinson 61-4, questioning direct use of Aristobulus in Curtius).

18. 1. ἐξ Ναύτακα Curt. 8. 2. 19 (so *Metz Epit.* 19; Diod. 17 index κθ) confirms that Nautaca was Alexander's base over winter. It was located in the vicinity of modern Shakhrisyabz (see above 3. 28. 9 n.; P. Bernard, *Studia Iranica* 19 (1990) 27). For Alexander's operations in the vicinity see below, 21. 1-22. 10 with notes.

οἱ ἀμφὶ Κρατερόν κτλ. The three commanders may have arrived almost simultaneously (as happened later in 325: cf. 6. 27. 3), but that does not imply that they had a common mission (as argued by Schachermeyr² 349 n. 416). Craterus had operated in Bactria throughout the campaign of 328 (see above, 17. 1 n.), while Phrataphernes and Stasanor had been fully occupied in their respective satrapies (see above, 7. 1 n.). There is a hint of this in Curtius, who refers erroneously to 'Arsaces' as satrap of Media immediately after his report of the extension of Stasanor's command; presumably his source had something to say about the prior deposition of Arsaces from the satrapy of Arcia (see above, 3. 25. 7 n., with *JHS* 101 (1981) 23).

2. Ταπ<ο>ύρους <Αὐτο>φραδάτην The spelling is interesting.

Earlier Arrian referred to the Caspian people as *Tapouroi* (3. 23. 7, 24. 3; cf. 7. 23. 1) and in the Persian line at Gaugamela they are listed as *Topeiroi* (3. 8. 4, 11. 4). *Tápυροι* (as here) seems an authentic variant (Ctesias, *ap.* Diod. 2. 2. 3; Baeton, *FGrH* 119 F 1; Curtius' manuscripts have *Taphiri*). Similarly 'Phradates' is the form of the satrap's name which is consistently found in Curtius, and it appears to be an acceptable alternative to Autophradates (3. 23. 7 n.). The manuscript spellings should therefore be retained, on the assumption that Arrian failed to reconcile discrepancies which he found in his sources (for other instances see vol. i 17).

Curtius enlarges on the instructions given to Phrataphernes; he was to take over Hyrcania and the territory of the Mardi and Tapuri and to refer the satrap to Alexander under close arrest. That suggests that Autophradates had now become satrap of Hyrcania, whereas at the time of his appointment Hyrcania was linked with Parthyaëa under the control of Amminapes (see above, 3. 22. 1 n.). But Amminapes did not last long in office. He was replaced by Phrataphernes in Parthyaëa before 329 (3. 28. 2); and Hyrcania could then have been annexed and associated as a separate satrapy with the Elburz peoples, all under Autophradates. Now, Phrataphernes was given the entire double satrapy, as it had originally existed. That is corroborated by the terminology in Arrian. Under Darius, Phrataphernes was satrap of Parthyaëa and Hyrcania (3. 23. 4). In 329 and 328 he is satrap of Parthyaëa alone, but after his visit to Nautaca he is invariably satrap of Parthyaëa *and* Hyrcania (5. 20. 7; 6. 27. 3; 7. 6. 4). It looks as though the satrapy was divided in 330/29, much as Drangiana had been separated from Arachosia (see above, 3. 25. 1 n.). At that time Alexander favoured smaller satrapies which their rulers could control more easily under the threat from Bessus and the insurgent Satibarzanes. Now that the disorders were contained, the satrapies could be amalgamated once more under officials who had proved their worth.

Autophradates had refused successive summonses to court, a refusal which Alexander saw as gross insubordination (cf. 5. 20. 6, 29. 4). Presumably he had withheld co-operation during the troubles in Parthyaëa (see above, 7. 1 n.) and had acted as a despot in Hyrcania (*avare ac superbe*, Curtius). How long he was able to hold out against Phrataphernes we cannot say. He is not mentioned in the context of Phrataphernes' visit to India in 326 (5. 20. 7) and his capture may have been long delayed. Possibly he was the Phradates whom Alexander executed in late 325 for having aimed at kingship (Curt. 10. 1. 39; cf. Berve ii 97, no. 189). In that case he was sent to Persia to await Alexander's judgement. But this latter Phradates may have been a pretender in Persia itself, quite unrelated to the delinquent satrap.

3. **Στασάνορα δὲ ἐς Δράγγας** Curt. 8. 3. 17 adds that he was to replace the incumbent satrap, Arsames, who had been appointed late in 330 (see above, 3. 28. 1 n., with *JHS* 101 (1981) 22–3). Stasanor now had his satrapy enlarged southwards, and he retained the two provinces down to and beyond Alexander's death. For the form of the ethnic name, attributable to Aristobulus, see above 3. 25. 8 with note.

Ἀτροπάτην ἐπὶ σατραπείᾳ Atropates (Berve no. 150) had been satrap of Media under Darius (cf. 3. 8. 4). Presumably he fled with Darius and surrendered to Alexander in Hyrcania at the same time as Phrataphernes (cf. 3. 23. 4). Now he was reinstated after his predecessor, Oxydates (3. 20. 3 with note), had been found wanting. He served Alexander with distinction and remained in high favour (see below 6. 29. 3; 7. 13. 2).

ἐθελοκακεῖν αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο Cf. 3. 29. 5 (Arsaces in Arcia). The terminology, which is Herodotean, suggests that Oxydates had been half-hearted in the field (see above, loc. cit.), which is not as extreme as revolt (cf. Seibert, *Eroberung* 141: 'einen Aufstand vorbereitete'). It is most likely that he had been unsuccessful in repelling raids by Bessus' men or containing local insurgency. The depleted garrison of Media seems have been of little help.

Σταμένης (Berve no. 718) Stamenes is usually identified as a Persian (Berve; Schachermeyr² 352; Badian, *Greece and Rome* 12 (1965) 177), but that is sheer guesswork. His successor in Babylonia (after 326) was Archon of Pella (cf. *Ind.* 18. 3), and there seems no reason why Stamenes (Curtius has 'Ditamenes', an obvious corruption) should not also have been Macedonian. The name is apparently unique, but it could be related to the *Σταδμέας* who appears as witness in the fifth-century treaty between Athens and Perdiccas II (*SEG* x 86 = *IG* i³ 89, line 64). On the other hand the *strategos* of Babylonia, Apollodorus, remained in office until 325, when he met Alexander on his return from India (see below, 7. 18. 1 with note) and was retained at court; and there is no reference to a *strategos* in the troubles that followed Alexander's death (*Arr. Succ.* F 24. 3–5). Perhaps Stamenes was replaced after Alexander reached Carmania, and his successor, Archon, was considered sufficiently reliable for the king to dispense with a separate military commander in Babylonia. In that case Stamenes might have been an oriental after all.

ὑπαρχος Simple variation for *σατράπης*; see above 4. 7. 2 n.

Σώπολιν . . . Μεν(ν)ίδαν Of the three commanders Epocillus and Men(n)idas had brought mercenary forces from the Syrian coast (see above, 4. 7. 2 n.) and Sopolis was a long-standing cavalry commander (see above, vol. i 58).

τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἐκ Μακεδονίας A remarkably precise designation, 'the army from Macedonia', which contrasts with the more

general reference at 4. 7. 2 (στρατιὰν ἄγοντες). As at 7. 24. 1 (καταλοχίζειν . . . τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν σὺν Πευκέστῃ τε ἐκ Περσῶν κτλ.) Arrian refers to an existing force which is to be brought up to court; it is not a general allusion to reinforcements. That could be a force of non-Macedonians levied in Macedon (as would be required by Hammond's model, *JHS* 109 (1989) 62–8) or the Macedonian home army itself. The former is most unlikely. Antipater had sent mercenaries of his own volition and in large quantities as recently as 329 (see above 7. 2 n.), and Alexander hardly needed to send three senior officers all the way back to Macedonia to provide an escort. Macedonian troops were a different matter. The last recorded convoy to reach Asia was that of Amyntas, late in 331 (see above, 3. 16. 10 n.). No body of Macedonians is subsequently described arriving at court. That cannot be mere coincidence, for there is a continuous record of mercenary convoys from 334 to 323. Until 331 they are interlaced with reports of Macedonian arrivals, but from 330 onwards the tradition records only non-Macedonians (cf. Berve i 147, 179–82; Bosworth, *JHS* 106 (1986) 7). Antipater in all probability had withheld native Macedonians from the levies he sent to Asia, and Alexander insisted on replacement troops. In 328/7 he sent his three officers for the home army currently in service (Antipater would be required to recruit and train new forces). They never apparently returned. The Menidas who brought a contingent of cavalry (nationality unspecified) to Babylon in 323 is most likely to be the Median garrison commander (see below 7. 23. 1 n.), not the officer sent to Macedon in 328/7. That clear fact tells against Hammond's assumption (*JHS* 109 (1989) 65) that Alexander had made a policy decision to recruit no further troops from Macedon. On the contrary, he intended to withdraw the standing army, and, when Antipater apparently failed to co-operate, he sent Craterus, in part to ensure that the regiment did bring replacement troops to Asia (see below, 7. 12. 4 n.).

18. 4–19. 4. *Capture of the Sogdian Rock*

This passage and its sequel (20. 4–21. 10) present one of the most intractable problems of source criticism in Arrian. Here Arrian seems totally at loggerheads with the rest of the tradition, which is reasonably coherent. He mentions two sieges of rock fortresses in Sogdiana, both of which he dates to the beginning of spring 327. The defenders of the first rock, which is merely termed 'the rock in Sogdiana', are not identified, but the second rock is specifically located in Pareitacene and is described as the stronghold of Chorienes (21. 1, 6–10). The rest of the tradition is more complicated

and conflicts with Arrian both in chronology and in the nomenclature of the Sogdian commanders. There are three episodes:

(i) The siege of the rock of Ariamazes, which is located north of the Oxus and which Alexander captured in the summer of 328 by the stratagem of the 'winged men' (Curt. 7. 11. 1-19; *Metz Epit.* 15-18; Polyæn. 4. 3. 29; Diod. 17 index κε; Strabo 11. 11. 4 (517)).

(ii) The siege of the rock of Sisimithres, which took place close to Alexander's winter headquarters at Nautaca (Curt. 8. 2. 19-33; Plut. *Al.* 58. 3; Strabo loc. cit.).

(iii) The surrender of Choriēnes, who entertained Alexander's men after a premature and almost disastrous march from their winter quarters (*Metz Epit.* 24-31; Curt. 8. 4. 1-22 (on which see below, 21. 1 n.); cf. Diod. 17 index κθ).

The sources are self-consistent, except for Strabo, who is somewhat confused and contracted, and reports variants. But even Strabo explicitly names Ariamazes and Sisimithres as defenders of the rock citadels and locates the former close to the Oxus. Indeed some of his material parallels details in Curtius: he claims that Sisimithres' fortress, 15 stades high and 80 in circuit, was only half the height of the Sogdian rock, which coheres exactly with the 30 stades of height and 150 of circumference which Curtius (7. 11. 2) gives for the stronghold of Ariamazes (cf. 21. 2 n.)

The chronology of this alternative tradition is derived from Curtius, but it is consistent with all sources but Arrian; the narrative outline recurs in the *Metz Epitome* and the index to Diodorus. There are no grounds for suspecting contamination (as argued by Hammond, *Three Historians* 144-6). Strabo and Plutarch derived their material from different sources, but the details are compatible with the vulgate account of Curtius rather than Arrian. This tradition is not only coherent but credible. The siege of the rock of Ariamazes fits neatly into the campaign of 328, which is very imperfectly covered by Arrian, whereas it is hard to accommodate it in the densely packed spring of 327 (cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 30-3; Holt 61, 66). If that is true, Arrian's account is doubly distorted. The investment of the 'rock in Sogdiana' is presented six months too late in the campaign, and Sisimithres is displaced by Choriēnes (it is not a simple question of variant names as assumed by Berve ii 354 (no. 708) and many others). How that distortion came about is a nasty conundrum. Arrian's habit of grouping events in neat compartments (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 59-60) probably contributed. It was tempting to deal with two similar sieges in a single narrative section. But Arrian's sources will have been primarily responsible for the confusion. The narrative dislocations are best explained by the hypothesis that two variant accounts are contaminated.

I suspect that the fatal variant was the report of the capture of

Rhoxane, which (as we know from Strabo, loc. cit.) some authorities at least placed at the rock of Sisimithres. Now Arrian notes that Rhoxane was captured at the 'Sogdian rock' and makes her presence there the setting for the entire episode (see below, 18. 4, 19. 5). It is possible that Aristobulus (whom Strabo may have used) assigned Rhoxane to the rock of Sisimithres, whose capture was the first major event after taking to winter quarters at Nautaca. Ptolemy may also have mentioned Rhoxane about this point but digressed to explain how she had come into Alexander's hands at the earlier siege, when the episode of the 'winged men' took place. He was not personally present on that occasion (see above, 16. 2 n.) and chose to deal with the siege in a retrospective note. In that case it is not surprising that Arrian assumed that the rock taken by the winged men was the rock on which Rhoxane had taken refuge and superimposed Ptolemy's retrospective notice upon Aristobulus' report of the capture of the rock of Sisimithres. That was easier to do if Aristobulus gave comparatively few details of the siege, stressing the fact that it was surrendered (note Strabo's muddled statement that both rocks were taken 'by surrender' (ἐκ προδοσίας)).

The second contamination is more complicated. I presume that Aristobulus (like Curtius) dealt with the advance from the area of Nautaca to the territory of Chorienes and mentioned Chorienes' surrender of his citadel with its accumulated supplies (cf. 21. 10). Ptolemy, however, followed his note on Rhoxane and her capture with a detailed account of the siege of the rock of Sisimithres (whom he presumably did not name), giving due attention to his own role (21. 4). Arrian would then have assumed that this siege, which in Ptolemy immediately followed the capture of Rhoxane, was directed against the citadel of Chorienes. A conjectural reconstruction may be given:

Aristobulus	Ptolemy
(i) Al. leaves Nautaca to invest the rock of Sisimithres, where he captures and marries Rhoxane (18. 4, 19. 5-6)	In early spring 327 Al. married Rhoxane, whom he had captured on the 'rock in Sogdiana' (18. 4-19. 4)
(ii) Al. moves from winter quarters to Pareitacene, where he receives Chorienes' surrender and supplies his army (21. 1, 9-10).	Al. moves from Nautaca to lay siege to an insurgent rock fortress, whose commander surrenders after overtures by Oxyartes (21. 2-9).
(iii) Al. returns to Bactra	Al. returns to Bactra

If this reconstruction is near the mark, Ptolemy's account of the winter and spring of 327 was very schematic, focusing on the marriage to Rhoxane and the heroic siege of the citadel of Sisimithres. The march on the territory of Chorienes, which was a mistake and nearly a disaster (cf. Strasburger, *Studien* i 465; Holt 72), he

seems to have ignored altogether. That made it easier for Arrian to construct a composite narrative, combining reports of different episodes which had a superficial similarity. For a similar complex contamination compare the report of Alexander's last days, which flits backwards and forwards from Ptolemy to Aristobulus (7. 25; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 158-67).

4. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἡρὶ ὑποφαίνονται Cf. 3. 6. 1; 7. 21. 2. The expression is a borrowing from Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 3. 1; cf. 3. 4. 16) and presumably Arrian's own usage. The reference to the spring sits somewhat uneasily in the campaign narrative which stresses omnipresent snow (18. 5, 19. 1-2, 21. 10). Admittedly Alexander was misled by an early break in the winter weather (Curt. 8. 4. 2; *Metz Epit.* 24), and his historians may have anticipated the advent of spring in their accounts (Holt 66 n. 64; cf. Tarn i 72-3 n. 1). But the point of reference may be the marriage to Rhoxane (see above), which did take place in the early spring (Curt. 8. 4. 22-30; *Metz Epit.* 28-31). The chronological introduction in that case singles out the major event of the season, not the campaigning which preceded it.

τὴν ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ πέτρᾳ This is usually termed the rock of Ariamazes (Curt. 7. 11. 1; *Metz Epit.* 18; Polyaeus 4. 3. 29; cf. Berve no. 112; Briant, *L'Asie centrale* 81-2, 87); Strabo (11. 11. 4 (517)) has the alternative nomenclature 'rock of the Oxus'. Its location is a matter for conjecture, depending on the site of Alexander's crossing of the Oxus in 328 (see above, 15. 7 n.). The rock of Sisimithres, which Aristobulus presumably mentioned at this juncture, was in the vicinity of Nautaca, where Sisimithres was the local dynast (Curt. 8. 2. 19). Given the identification of Nautaca with the modern Shakhriyabz (see Map 2), one should look for a site in the mountains to the east, towards the head of the Kashka Darya (cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 36, with von Schwarz 74-5; P. Bernard, *Studia Iranica* 19 (1990) 25-7).

ἡ Ὀξύαρτου δὲ γυνή κτλ. Oxyartes (Berve no. 587) had been one of Bessus' last adherents (3. 28. 10) and presumably joined in the general revolt of 329 (cf. 4. 1. 5 n.). He was obviously an influential local magnate, but he seems to have had no higher connections; he became important when his daughter married Alexander. The name is derived from the great local river (F. Grenet, *BCH* 107 (1983) 376-8) and might have been relatively frequent; Ctesias (*FGH* 688 F 1 = Diod. 2. 6. 2) gave the name to the legendary King of Bactria in Semiramis' day (pace S. K. Eddy, *The King is Dead* (Lincoln, Nebr. 1961) 122-3, Briant, *L'Asie Centrale* 31, and Holt 36, there is no reason to posit a Macedonian interpolation). If Arrian is correct about the ethnic (see also 6. 15. 3; 7. 4. 4), he was Bactrian,

rather than Sogdian. *Σογδιανός* is used very rarely as an ethnic designation (Ariamazes in Curt. 7. 11. 1 seems the only instance), whereas *Βάκτριος* has a wider application, sometimes defining individuals who were more properly Sogdian (cf. Arr. 7. 4. 6 on Spitamenes: *contra* Bernard, *Studia Iranica* 19 (1990) 26).

Of the daughters of Oxyartes only Rhoxane is mentioned by name and only she is mentioned as a bride of the Macedonians. There was also at least one son, Itanes, who later secured admission to the élite *agema* (see below, 7. 6. 5).

ὥς ἐξ ἀνάλωτον δῆθεν 'on the (mistaken) assumption that it was impregnable'. *ὥς* ... *δῆθεν* is a Herodotean idiom. Originally the heavily ironical particle *δῆθεν* implied deception or pretence by the agent (cf. Hdt. 1. 73. 5; 3. 156. 1; 6. 39. 1; 9. 80. 3, 99. 3), but in Arrian the meaning (foreshadowed in Hdt. 3. 74. 4) tends to be that the agent is deceived or misled (6. 13. 2; 7. 8. 2, 14. 5, 23. 2; *Ind.* 27. 10 retains the Herodotean sense). Cf. Fredricksmeier, *AJAH* 4 (1979) 3-5; *contra* Badian, in *Edson Studies* 56-8.

5. ὥς ἐξ χρόνιον πολιορκίαν Cf. Curtius 7. 11. 1: Ariamazes had laid in supplies for a two-year siege.

χιών πολλή The snow is an integral part of Arrian's narrative (see particularly 19. 2), but it has no place in the tradition of the siege of the rock of Ariamazes, which took place in the summer of 328. Curtius (7. 11. 3) mentions only the run-off from the springs which watered the summit (so Polyaen. 4. 3. 29: *πηγὰς ὑδάτων ἔχων ἔνδον*). Holt (66 n. 64) suggested that Ariamazes' fortress was a different location from Arrian's 'rock of Sogdiana', but that involves the unpalatable conclusion that Alexander used the same stratagem on two different occasions (cf. Holt 61 n. 45, conceding that 'one author has attributed features of this assault to the wrong "rock"'). But how did the unseasonable weather conditions come to be superimposed? Possibly Ptolemy, who was not present at the siege (see above, 16. 2 n.), injected an element of fantasy (his original informants could have mentioned residual snow on the mountain tops: cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 35). Alternatively (and perhaps preferably) Arrian may have taken the factor of snow from Aristobulus' account of the siege of Sisimithres' citadel and superimposed it on Ptolemy's narrative of the Sogdian rock.

6. καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ὑπέρογκον The taunt and its effect on Alexander is also recorded by Curtius (7. 11. 5-7; cf. Polyaen. 4. 3. 29), who claims plausibly that the king's emissary was Artabazus' son, Cophen (see above, 2. 15. 1 n.).

βαρβαρίζοντες 'using their native language' (cf. Hdt. 2. 57. 2 with Arr. 7. 6. 3), rather than 'acting like barbarians', the usual rendering.

7. δώδεκα τάλαντα Curtius (8. 5. 12) has a similar story, with a

sliding scale of rewards from ten talents to one for the tenth man to the top. Arrian's account suggests the same principle but does not make it explicit that the rewards only applied to the first group of twelve to scale the cliff. Alexander's liberality far eclipsed that of Dionysius I who gave a mere 100 *minae* (1 $\frac{2}{3}$ talents) to the first man to mount the walls of Motya in 397 (Diod. 14. 53. 4; cf. de Ste Croix, *Class Struggle* 119).

τριακοσίους Δαρεικούς At first sight the figure of darics is startling and suggests that Alexander was using Persian coinage captured from the royal treasures *en route* (cf. Diod. 17. 66. 2). But 'daric' can be used in a loose sense, to denote any gold stater (cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 846A: the 1,000 'darics' which Harpalus gave Demosthenes can only have been gold staters of Alexander). The terminology may well be Arrian's own, designed to vary his expression. Instead of repeating the bald figure of one talent (which Curtius agrees was the lowest reward given) he gives a literary conversion, perhaps echoing Xenophon (*Anab.* 1. 7. 18), who represents the sum paid to the seer Silanus alternately as 3,000 darics and ten talents. For a similar superimposition of a literary equivalence see 1. 4. 4 n.

19. 1. πετροβατεῖν ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις Curtius (7. 11. 7) states that the men selected were herdsmen from the Macedonian uplands. No doubt they also had specialist training in rock climbing during the extended warfare in Bactria and Sogdiana (see above, 3. 30. 10), but the fact that they needed to improvise pitons from their tent pegs suggests that they had little experience of climbing sheer rock faces under siege conditions.

ἐς τριακοσίους The number is repeated in all sources (Curt. 7. 11. 7; *Metz Epit.* 16; Polyae. 4. 3. 29).

κατὰ τὸ ἀποτομώτατον This is unique to Arrian. Curtius (7. 11. 14) claims that the least precipitous route was chosen. It is unlikely that the climbers were operating on a sheer face all night (cf. Curt. 7. 11. 15), and we may assume that they chose the easiest route that was consistent with secrecy.

2. ἐς τριάκοντα Curtius (7. 11. 19) confirms that 32 lives were lost during the ascent. The picturesque detail of the bodies lost in the snow seems an elaboration by Arrian (see above, 18. 5 n.); Ptolemy may simply have noted that the bodies of the fallen could not be retrieved.

3. ὑπὸ τὴν ἑω ... καταλαβόντες Curtius (7. 11. 14-15, 20) describes a climb lasting two nights and a day. His account is highly rhetorical (with an echo of Virg. *Aen.* 8. 67 at § 17) and may be an elaboration of the original vulgate account of a single night's climb (*Metz Epit.* 17; Polyae. 4. 3. 29). The vulgate sources are, however, agreed that the climbers came out above the enemy encampment,

which was sited on a plateau almost encircled by higher ground (Curt. 7. 11. 3, 18-19, 22-4; *Metz Epil.* 15, 17).

σίνδονας Cf. Curt. 7. 11. 11, 21 (*candida vela*); *Metz Epil.* 16 (*lintheis candidis*); Polyaeus (4. 3. 29) claims that the climbers waved their girdles.

4. πλείονάς τε ὑποτοπήσαντες This is generally agreed (Curt. 7. 11. 25; Polyaeus. 4. 3. 29: ὡς πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀναβαινούσης).

ἐνέδοσαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς All sources agree on the surrender. Arrian says nothing about the fate of the defenders, whereas Curtius (7. 5. 28-9) states that Ariamazes and his fellow nobles were scourged and crucified. That is not 'entirely at variance with Arrian' (*pace* Hammond, *Three Historians* 145). If true, the story is omitted by Arrian (or by his sources) exactly as was the equally dark episode of the crucifixion of the survivors of the siege of Tyre (see above, 2. 24. 5 n.). Indeed the atrocity, if it took place, was in keeping with the bloody repression that Alexander exercised during the Sogdian revolt (see above, 4. 2. 4 with note); the fate of Ariamazes would encourage other defenders to surrender without resistance—or insolence. The only problem is the variant tradition in the *Metz Epitome* (18), alleging that Ariamazes was killed by his own men, who were then pardoned by Alexander. That may well be garbled, perhaps reflecting a tradition that Ariamazes was forced to surrender by his troops. However, the sequel in Curtius (7. 11. 29) is perfectly credible. The mass of the defenders were distributed around the newly settled cities as a non-free work force. That coheres with Alexander's policy elsewhere (cf. 4. 4. 1 n., with Briant, *RPT* 242-7), and the settlement of the populace is indirectly attested in Arrian (see above, 16. 3 n.). In that case the surrender prevented a general massacre of the male population, but the defenders were reduced to a condition of servitude and transplanted *en masse* (Holt 61, 62-5). The rock itself was placed under the control of 'Artabazes' (Curtius loc. cit.), who is probably not identical with the satrap Artabazus (for whose activities see above, 16. 3 n.).

19. 5-20. 4. *Alexander's Marriage to Roxane*

Arrian moves directly from the capture of Oxyartes' family to the espousal of Roxane which Aristobulus appears to have located in the citadel of Sisimithres (see above, p. 126). The formula λέγουσιν ('they say') will refer generally to the narrative of his principal sources (see above, vol. i 21). Arrian is shedding responsibility for the tradition of Alexander's infatuation and names his sources in the most general terms, expressing their content in *oratio obliqua*.

5. Πρωξάνη ὀνόματι (Berve no. 688) Arrian deals with the

marriage as a timeless excursus. He mentions Rhoxane's capture at the 'Sogdian rock' and adds that Alexander subsequently married her. There may have been an interval of months. According to Curtius (8. 4. 23; cf. Plut. *Al.* 47. 7; *Metz Epit.* 28-9) Alexander only saw and was smitten by Rhoxane when she appeared dancing with other noble ladies at a banquet given by Chorienes (see below, 21. 1 n.). That was in the early spring of 327, whereas the rock of Ariamazes fell in the summer of 328. She may have been in Alexander's entourage for several months before the king noticed and married her.

καλλίστην τῶν Ἀσιανῶν γυναικῶν This is generally agreed (cf. *Metz Epit.* 29; Curt. 8. 4. 23; Plut. *Al.* 47. 7).

οἱ ἔξῃν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ στρατεύσαντες A deliberately vague periphrasis for Ptolemy and Aristobulus (cf. *Ind.* 2. 4 with 3. 28. 5 n.).

ἐρασθέντα . . . οὐκ ἀπαξιώσαι There is general agreement that Alexander married Rhoxane out of passion, and Plutarch, like Arrian, dwells on the fact that he legalized the liaison (Plut. *Al.* 47. 7-8; *Mor.* 332 E: οὐχ ὕβρισεν ἀλλ' ἐγγημε φιλοσόφως). According to Curtius (8. 4. 27) the marriage was celebrated in Macedonian style by dividing a round of bread, which both parties tasted. This has usually been taken as a mistaken reference to *Iranian* nuptials (Berve ii 347, following von Schwarz 82; Schachermeyr² 354), but it is now argued, on largely *a priori* grounds, that the marriage was indeed conducted in Macedonian style (M. Renard and J. Servais, *AC* 24 (1955) 29-50). If so, Alexander was imposing the customs of the conquerors; he was marrying a member of the local aristocracy but he made it plain that the wedding marked the consummation of the conquest. In the same way Amyntas and the Macedonian garrison commanders also took Bactrian or Sogdian wives (Diod. 17 index λ; *Metz Epit.* 31), underlining their claims to be rulers of the great satrapy (cf. *JHS* 100 (1980) 10-11; Holt 75-6). Whether the marriage was as popular with the locals as Plutarch (*Al.* 47. 8) claims is dubious. It was probably seen as the ultimate sign of subservience to the new power. The king might have a son by his Bactrian wife, but there was no guarantee and little prospect that he would not be displaced by some later offspring of another marriage (cf. Justin 13. 2. 10).

6. ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον τι ἢ μέφομαι Alexander's marriage was clearly a *topos* of rhetoric and popular philosophy. At the base of it was the historical controversy over Rhoxane, which erupted after Alexander's death. *Est cur Persas vicerimus, ut stirpi eorum serviamus?* The rhetorical flourish which Curtius (10. 6. 14) places in Ptolemy's mouth might well represent contemporary feeling (for the same sentiment and similar rhetoric compare Justin 13. 2. 9). According to Curtius (8. 4. 25-30) there was resentment even at the time of the

wedding. Symbol of conquest or not, an Iranian lady was associated with Alexander in formal marriage, as no Macedonian woman had ever been. Later the dissension over the episode was enshrined in philosophical debate. Critics who focused upon Alexander's immoderation could adduce the marriage as yet one more example: the king followed his sexual passion and contracted an undesirable marriage with an alien woman, his inferior in personal qualities and in birth (*virguncula* . . . *ignobilis*: Curt. 8. 4. 25). Arrian may be influenced by Stoic views of sex and marriage. Marriage itself was regarded as a duty of the patriot and citizen (cf. Antipater of Tarsus F 63 (*SVF* iii 254-5); Chrysippus F 686 (*SVF* iii 172)), but the marriage should be to an appropriate partner. *ἔργος* was indifferent, neither good nor bad in itself (cf. Chrysippus F 717 (*SVF* iii 180, lines 32-3)). The proper object was 'another self' (cf. Antipater F 63 (*SVF* iii 256, line 31)); that choice might be accompanied by *ἔργος*, as it was in the case of (say) Crates and Hipparchia (Epict. *Diss.* 3. 22. 76), but *ἔργος* was not essential or even desirable (cf. D. Babut, *REG* 76 (1963) 55-63, esp. 62). On the other hand to be motivated by passion was a sign of moral weakness, a poor excuse for undesirable conduct (Epict. *Diss.* 2. 21. 7).

To this criticism there were two counters. First we have the claim that the marriage was an act of policy rather than passion, to reconcile the victors and vanquished by a symbolic union (Plut. *Al.* 47. 7-8 (but compare *Mor.* 338 D); Curt. 8. 4. 25). That is not Arrian's chosen theme. Instead he concentrates upon the purely moral aspect. Far from being an example of incontinence the marriage was an act of practical virtue. Rather than violate Rhoxane, as he might have done, given his absolute power, Alexander chose to marry her. That is the interpretation we find in Plutarch (*Mor.* 332 E; cf. *Al.* 47. 8), and in Plutarch also the Rhoxane episode is associated with the greater example of self-control, the waiving of his conqueror's rights over Darius' wife (*Mor.* 338 D-E). The connection of the two incidents may well have been a familiar theme of rhetoric and inspired Arrian's excursus. Unlike the famous *exempla* of Cleitus' death and the introduction of *proskynesis* the marriage to Rhoxane needed no mitigation. It could be solidly enlisted in the category of moral virtues as one, and not the most striking, example of Alexander's self-discipline, contrasting with and palliating the acts of immoderation criticized in the 'great digression' (see above, pp. 46-7).

τῆς γε Δαρείου γυναῖκός On the capture of Stateira at Issus and her subsequent treatment see above, 2. 11. 9, 12. 5 with notes. Alexander's continence is generally noted and was a favourite *topos*; there is a tradition that he did not set eyes on Darius' wife (Plut. *Al.* 22. 5; *Mor.* 522 A; Apion, *FGrH* 616 F 22). On the other hand the

report of his display of grief at her funeral presupposes some intimacy (Plut. *Mor.* 338 E; Curt. 4. 10. 23). The two traditions perhaps are at the basis of Arrian's wording: either Alexander did not see his captive (and so was not tempted) or he did see her and overcame his sexual desire.

νέος τε ὢν Here Alexander's youth is used to heighten the encomium: he was self-restrained when one would have least expected it (compare Plut. *Mor.* 338 E). At 7. 29. 1 his youth and good fortune is addressed in mitigation of the criticism of his sins of passion (cf. Curt. 10. 5. 26, 32, 34).

20. 1. λόγος κατέχει The story is common, recurring at greater length in Plutarch (*Al.* 30; *Mor.* 338 E-F) and Curtius (4. 10. 25-34), and alluded to in passing by Athenaeus (13. 603 C) and Justin (11. 12. 6-8). Arrian's version is relatively untheatrical and placed at an earlier point than we find in the other sources. The interview between Darius and his eunuch takes place shortly after Issus, not on the eve of Gaugamela, and his wife is still alive (see above, 2. 12. 5 n.). These variants suggest that Arrian drew his material from a different source, which used the story we find in Plutarch and Curtius (for a list of similarities see Atkinson 395) but placed it at an earlier juncture, possibly to avoid difficulties of interpretation arising from Stateira's death in childbirth almost a year after her capture (cf. Plut. *Al.* 30. 1; Justin 11. 12. 6). Curtius or his source may have glossed over the cause of death (4. 10. 19; travel fatigue not miscarriage) for the same reason (cf. Atkinson 392). The ultimate source could even be Callisthenes, who had an obvious interest in portraying Alexander as Darius' rightful successor (see above 2. 14. 9 n.) Subsequent writers would have varied the details to suit their propagandist or rhetorical purposes. Arrian's version may come from the vulgate, as is often assumed, but the λόγος κατέχει formulation certainly does not exclude his major sources (see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 62-4). The sustained eulogy of the passage is compatible with what we know of Aristobulus.

τὸν εὐνοῦχον τὸν φύλακα Other sources are more explicit; the escapee was only one of the eunuchs of the bedchamber and his name is given as Tiroos (Plut. *Al.* 30. 2) or Tyriotes (Curt. 4. 10. 25, 28, 30-2).

αἱ παῖδες [καὶ οἱ υἱοί] The bracketed words have been regarded with suspicion since Gronovius, who observed that they are missing in the quotation of the passage preserved in the 'Suda' (s.v. Ἀλέξανδρος), which reads simply καὶ οἱ παῖδες ('Darius' progeny', as at 2. 12. 4 and 20. 4 below). But that is true of only one branch of the tradition: the Parisian MSS of the 'Suda' read οἱ παῖδες καὶ οἱ υἱοί (sic!). The reading is certain, but καὶ οἱ υἱοί is still best treated as an

interpolation, to explain an original reading *οἱ παῖδες*. The language of the passage is modelled on the earlier exposition at 2. 12. 4-5, where *οἱ παῖδες* refers primarily to the female members of the royal household, and in this episode Darius' concerns are patently concentrated upon his womenfolk.

2. ἡ θεραπεία κτλ. See above, 2. 12. 5 n., and for the terminology see above, 4. 16. 6 n.

εἰ σωφρονεῖ . . . ἔτι 'whether his wife still preserved her virtue'. For a good example of *σωφρονεῖν* in this sense of marital purity compare Dio 58. 2. 4. Darius is worried about his wife voluntarily accepting her captor's favours. Once assured on this score, he addresses a darker topic—rape. In the other tradition Darius' suspicions are excited by Alexander's over-exuberant grief at Stateira's funeral (Plut. *Al.* 30. 7-10; Curt. 4. 10. 30-3).

3. ἀλλ' ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ The prayer of Darius is reported in very similar language in all sources and there is unanimity over its content: Darius prays for the continuity of his empire in the form he first received it, but, failing that, for Alexander to ascend the throne of Cyrus (Plut. *Al.* 30. 12-13; *Mor.* 338 f; Curt. 4. 10. 34; Athen. 13. 603 c). Other sources claim that a plurality of gods was invoked. In Arrian it is simply Ahura Mazda, whom he, like Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 2. 4. 19; 3. 3. 21; 7. 5. 57) identifies with Zeus Basileus, head of the Greek pantheon. For other examples of the Greek terminology applied to foreign deities, see above, 2. 3. 6; 3. 5. 2 (on which see *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 54-5). Arrian may preserve an authentic echo of the claim of the Achaemenid kings that they received power at the hands of Ahura Mazda and ruled at his behest.

4. θαρσύνσας ἀφίκετο See below 21. 6 n. Oxyartes joined Alexander at the news of his family's capture and was present at his daughter's marriage (Curt. 8. 4. 27; *Metz Epit.* 29). Arrian here seems to anticipate Alexander's attraction to Rhoxane which was apparently first revealed at the banquet of Chorienes, *after* Oxyartes came to court (Curt. and *Metz Epit.* locc. cit.; Plut. *Al.* 47. 7; *Mor.* 332 E).

21. 1-22. 2. *The End of Campaigning in Sogdiana*

21. 1. ἐς Παρειτάκας προῦχώρει The tribe is named only here and at 22. 1, where they are termed 'inhabitants of Pareitacene'. It can be located only by inference from Arrian's narrative, which is complicated by internal confusion (see above, 18. 4 n.). If one accepts that Alexander started from his winter quarters at Nautaca, there is some possibility that he went southwards to the vicinity of Derbend (see Map 2) and from there eastwards to the valley of the Surkhan, which may as yet have been relatively unaffected by the

war (cf. Holt 30). The more traditional location is east of the Vakhsh near Baldzhuan (von Schwarz 82; Tarn i 76; Engels 106; Seibert, *Eroberung* 144). That rests on the assumption that Pareitacene lay outside Sogdiana and ought to be a border province. But Arrian's wording should not be taken too literally; Pareitacene could have been an unpacified province within Sogdiana, which Alexander approached only after crushing revolt elsewhere. According to the vulgate tradition (Curt. 4. 4. 1-20; *Metz Epit.* 24-8) Alexander was making for an area called Gazaba (Gazabes, *Metz Epit.*), which could well be the actual name of Chorienes' fortress.

αὐτὸς ὁ Χοριήνης It is usually argued that Chorienes is a simple variant for Sisimithres (Berve no. 708, following von Schwarz 83; Holt 66; Heckel, *Athenaeum* 64 (1986) 223-6). The *Metz Epitome* (19, 28) clearly distinguishes the two names, placing Sisimithres near Nautaca and Chorienes near 'Gazabes'; and Chorienes is described as the host at the symposium where Alexander married Rhoxane. That is the tradition followed by Curtius (8. 4. 21), who describes the aid given by Sisimithres after a calamitous winter storm and then notes Alexander's arrival in the region *cui Cohortandus satrapes nobilis praeerat*. The corrupt name was traditionally restored as Oxyartes, since Curtius later implies that the satrap was the father of Rhoxane (8. 4. 23). But it is evident from the fuller, parallel account of the *Metz Epitome* that Chorienes and Oxyartes were quite distinct personages and both were present at the symposium (*Metz Epit.* 28-9); Curtius' narrative is clumsily conflated. Chorienes must therefore be restored in place of *Cohortandus* (so Schachermeyr² 353 n. 423; cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 31). In that case the vulgate tradition clearly distinguished Sisimithres, the local ruler near Nautaca, and Chorienes, who held sway in Pareitacene. The only alternative is to assume (with Heckel 224-5) a desperately convoluted confusion in the common source of Curtius and the *Metz Epitome*: that source conflated variant reports in *its* sources. It is surely easier to separate two individuals, Sisimithres and Chorienes.

2. τὸ μὲν ὕψος . . . ἑξήκοντα The dimensions are consistent with neither of the fortresses described in the vulgate (rock of Sisimithres, 15 stades high and 80 in circuit; rock of Ariamazes, 30 stades high and 150 in circuit; cf. 18. 4 n.). The rock of Chorienes appears to be a third citadel, whose description in Aristobulus Arrian has conflated with the details Ptolemy gave of the citadel of Sisimithres.

μία καὶ αὐτὴ 'single and, what is more, narrow and barely passable'. For this use of αὐτός compare 5. 13. 2 (ἐς νῆσον γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν μὲν μεγάλην κτλ.).

παρὰ τὴν φύσιν . . . πεποιημένη 'constructed in defiance of the nature of the place' (Brunt). Cf. *Cyneget.* 2. 2 (quoting Xen. *Cyneget.* 5. 29). The sense must be that the access road ignored the easiest

approach to the summit and was deliberately taken up the hardest inclines.

φάραγξ τε κύκλω Curtius' description (8. 2. 20-4) of the stronghold of Sisimithres also focuses upon a ravine. The rock itself lay at the head of a defile (*fauces*) into which ran the spillage from the plateau above. Accordingly any attacker needed to cross a raging torrent, sunk in a broad ravine (*vastam voraginem*), before laying siege to the citadel proper. There is no suggestion that the ravine encircled the rock, as it does in Arrian; and, if the ravine was a river bed, it can hardly have done so. Either Arrian is imposing a stock description (cf. 6. 12. 2: *περιειργόντων σφᾶς ἐν κύκλω*) or he is conflating two accounts, one which described an isolated rock fortress surrounded by a ditch, and the other (from Ptolemy) which dealt with the bridging of the ravine.

3. οὐτως πάντα . . . ἐξαιρετέα εἶναι Plutarch (*Al.* 58. 2) makes a similar general comment to introduce an anecdote about the surrender of Sisimithres ('nothing is impregnable for those with daring, nothing safe for those without it'). Arrian may be recalling the same anecdote, but it is more likely to be his own comment (cf. 2. 26. 3; 4. 28. 3). Curtius (7. 11. 4) makes a similar observation about the capture of the rock of Ariamazes, and it was probably a rhetorical commonplace.

τέμωνων δὴ τὰς ἐλάτας Silver fir (*Abies cephalonica*) appears to have been abundant in Sogdiana in Alexander's day and stands of it were observed north of the Iaxartes (Polycleitus, *FGrH* 128 F 7). The casual reference to its luxuriant growth here tends to confirm the hypothesis that the area was comparatively well wooded (see above, 4. 2 n.).

ὥς καθοδὸν εἶναι Arrian's description is not easy to follow. It presupposes a watercourse in the bed of the ravine, flowing too strongly to be dammed. It therefore had to be bridged, so that there would be a stable foundation for the fill. To that end men and materials needed to be conveyed to the bed of the ravine, and the serious business of filling the ravine could only proceed once the engineers had constructed the foundation. Arrian begins by describing the initial construction of ladders; he then moves to the fill (21. 4) and last of all explains how the foundation was created (21. 5).

4. Περδίκκας τε . . . καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου The routine detail probably comes from Ptolemy himself (Strasburger, *Studien* i 127; Kornemann 67; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 18). The army was probably divided both day and night, with each group assigned a particular area to strip for the fill. Alexander supervised the whole operation during the day, as he did at Aornus (4. 29. 7), and left the three Bodyguards to work in collaboration overnight.

οὐ πλέον ἥπερ εἴκοσι πῆχεις Contrast the siege operations at

Aornus, where the army constructed a stade-long stretch of the assault mound in a single day (4. 30. 1). Here there was limited access. The fill was dropped (ἄνωθεν ἐπεφόρου) over a narrow frontage on top of the bridge framework already prepared. Only a fraction of the workers could operate at the mound head at any given time, and that would of necessity slow the construction.

5. πασσάλους κατεπήγνυνον ἐς τὸ δξύτατον τῆς φάραγγος This is the most opaque part of Arrian's narrative. Most editors and commentators have been influenced by the description of the ascent of the 'Sogdian rock' (4. 19. 2) and assumed that the Macedonians drove 'pegs' (usually interpreted as long stakes) into the sides of the ravine so as to create the framework for a bridge. The torrent would then flow underneath the siege mound without disturbing the fill (cf. Schachermeyr² 354; Lane Fox 316; Hammond *KCS*² 199). But it is hard to see how such a construction could have been wide enough to span the ravine, which Arrian suggests was measured in scores of cubits, and how it could have sustained the weight of earth heaped upon it without some sort of support from beneath. The terminology should perhaps be examined more closely:

(i) πασσάλους: this term usually denotes a small peg, used for hanging larger objects or for climbing (4. 19. 2; 6. 10. 3). But πάσσαλοι can also be piles, timbers driven vertically into the sea (or river) bed (*Ind.* 41. 2: πασσάλοις δὲ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν πεπηγόσιν: cf. Apollod. *Poliorc.* 140. 7). That is surely the sense here. The Macedonians drove piles into the ravine bed (for the technique compare Caes. *BG* 4. 17. 3-7) and raised a bridge-like superstructure on top.

(ii) ἐς τὸ δξύτατον: this phrase caused difficulties to the early commentators, who rendered it *quam firmissime* ('as strongly as possible'). Gronovius rightly insisted that it should be taken with the following words 'into the sharpest (i.e. narrowest) part of the ravine, and he has been followed by all successive editors in his interpretation. It is, however, hard to find a parallel for δξύς used in the sense of narrow. The closest parallel is in Arrian's tactical monograph (*Tact.* 16. 7-8) where it refers to the sharp apex of the wedge formation, but there is no instance of its being used synonymously with narrow. On the other hand Arrian repeatedly uses δξύς to denote rapidity of water flow (cf. 1. 3. 4; 4. 25. 7; 6. 4. 4, etc.), and the passage here might be most conveniently rendered 'into the most rapidly flowing section of the ravine'. Given this interpretation the bridge would still be located at the narrowest part of the ravine, but the piles would be driven vertically into the stream bed.

πλέγματα . . . ἰδεάν 'plaited constructions of twigs in the form of a bridge'. These were presumably rectangular frames of wickerwork arranged over the timber infrastructure so as to afford a solid foundation for the fill of earth and wood (cf. Curt. 8. 2. 24).

Compare 5. 7. 3, where the wickerwork constructions are pyramidal in shape.

6. προκαλύμματα For the terminology compare 2. 18. 6. A screen of hides was erected across the lip of the causeway as it advanced across the ravine. It protected the convoys actually tipping in the fill. The bridge workers in the stream bed were protected by the slopes of the ravine.

δεόμενος Ὀξυάρτην Oxyartes figures in Plutarch's anecdote (*Al.* 58. 3-4) about the capture of Sisimithres' fortress. Curtius (8. 2. 25, 27, 31) mentions an Oxartes as intermediary, and it has been argued that this man was distinct from Rhoxane's father, on the grounds that Oxyartes is first introduced at a significantly later date (e.g. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 160; Brunt, *Arrian* i 411). But *Oxyartes* at Curt. 8. 4. 21 is an unjustified emendation (see above, 21. 1 n.), and there is no problem accepting Oxyartes' presence at court from the late summer of 328 (see above, 20. 4 n.). 'Oxartes' is found in other contexts where the identity of Rhoxane's father is not in doubt (cf. Curt. 9. 8. 10).

According to Curtius (8. 2. 25 ff.) Alexander first sent Oxyartes to negotiate a surrender. His overtures were first rejected, but he was recalled after the Sogdian leader had second thoughts. A genuine nucleus surely underlies the two versions.

7. βίη μὲν . . . ἐς πίστιν δέ An elaboration of the simple theme we find in Curtius: *hortari ut fidem quam vim Macedonum vellet experiri* (8. 2. 27). Arrian's formulation consciously recalls his introductory observations (21. 3, above). The phrasing is somewhat clumsy, with a harsh anacoluthon: 'he said that with respect to force there was nothing that could not be captured by Alexander and his army, but, if Chorienees tried trust and friendship, he could give the king's trust and justice the highest praise.' There is no need to posit a lacuna after *φιλίαν* (with Krüger and Brunt).

8. αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχει Curtius (8. 2. 32) alleges that Sisimithres and his family were commanded to return to the fortress and await the king's presence.

9. αὐτὸ τὸ χωρίον . . . ἔδωκεν Curtius agrees that Sisimithres was confirmed in his domains, as later was Chorienees (8. 2. 32, 4. 21); Alexander kept their sons in his entourage as guarantees of their good behaviour. In both cases his action was far milder than his drastic reprisals at the rock of Ariamazes (see above, 19. 4 n.), even though Sisimithres had given Alexander more trouble. Briant's explanation (*L'Asie Centrale* 87) that Ariamazes had in effect established his own court and exceeded his rightful position in the satrapal hierarchy strikes me as excessively legalistic. Nor am I attracted by Holt's theory (68) that Alexander deliberately renounced a policy of suppressing the local magnates and reverted to

the Achaemenid pattern. It seems more likely that the action against Ariamazes was deliberate terrorism, of a piece with his operations against other pockets of insurgency during the bitter summer of 328 (cf. Curt. 8. 1. 2). By the winter of 328/7 the rebellion was largely contained, and, now that he had proclaimed the consequences of resistance, he could encourage the remaining malcontents to surrender by correspondingly generous rewards. Both Sisimithres and Chorienes remained regional overlords under the loose control of the satrap (cf. 1. 5 n.).

10. πολλῆς χιόνης ἐπιπεσοῦσης The snowfall is not mentioned in the description of the siege proper (though it is not inconsistent with the winter setting and may be referred to in Diod. 17 index κθ). Curtius and the *Metz Epitome*, however, describe a winter storm which mauled the army while it was in transit between winter quarters and the territory of Chorienes (Curt. 8. 4. 1-17; *Metz Epit.* 24-8; cf. Holt 72). According to Curtius (8. 4. 19) the emergency was relieved by a convoy of provisions from Sisimithres. That is in itself perfectly credible, and Arrian may preserve a reference to the same event (so Strasburger, *Studien* i 465). Aristobulus perhaps remarked that Chorienes relieved the hardships suffered in the storm, so that Arrian inferred that the snow fell during the siege he had just excerpted from Ptolemy. In that case there were two influxes of provisions, one from the convoy of Sisimithres and the other from the citadel of Chorienes.

οὐδὲ τὴν δεκάτην μοῖραν Compare Ariamazes in Curtius (7. 11. 1) who allegedly lays in provisions to feed 30,000 men for two years. That is almost exactly comparable to Chorienes' huge reserves.

οὐ πρὸς βίαν μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ γνώμην This does not cohere well with the siege description in Arrian (and Curtius). Arrian's Chorienes and Curtius' Sisimithres did not open negotiations until the ravine was bridged (or nearly so) and the Macedonian artillery barrage was within range of the citadel. That was a surrender encompassed by βία rather than consideration. On the other hand Curtius' Chorienes surrendered by his own volition before siege operations even began, which fits Arrian's observation admirably. That is further corroboration of the hypothesis of conflation; Chorienes' peaceful surrender was confused with the capture of Sisimithres' fortress, which required a siege.

22. 1. Κράτερον δέ κτλ. So Curtius 8. 5. 2, agreeing that Craterus was given the command against Austanes and Catanes and adding that Polyperchon was given a separate command of his own in an area named Bubacene (not identifiable, but possibly in the north of the Surkhan valley: see above, 21. 1 n.). This latter tradition is supported by Plutarch (*Al.* 55. 6) who mentions a letter sent by

Alexander to the Sogdian commanders, reporting the Pages' Conspiracy. Craterus, Alcetas, and Attalus are named as addressees, but not Polyperchon, who had perhaps been detached from his regular phalanx command when he was sent on his mission to Bubacene (see above, 12. 2 n.; Berve ii 325, no. 654; J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* 5 (1955) 219-21; *Plut. Al.* 155).

τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν This is the last explicit reference to Craterus' battalion, and by 326 he is explicitly attested at the head of a hipparchy (5. 12. 3). When the transfer came we are not told. Tarn (ii 145) assumed on *a priori* grounds that his battalion had already come under the command of Gorgias, while Berve (ii 223, no. 446) erroneously inferred from Arr. 4. 23. 5 (see note below) that Craterus still had his battalion during the march on India. It seems to me most plausible that he lost his infantry command at the great division of forces that took place at the borders of Gandhara (see below, 22. 7). The battalion formerly commanded by Craterus did not belong to the *asthetairoi* who were attached to Alexander (cf. 23. 1 n.) and Cleitus the White first emerges as battalion commander at that point (22. 7; cf. 5. 12. 2), attached to the command of Hephaestion and Perdiccas. Then Craterus could have been separated from his former battalion to serve as second-in-command to Alexander during the march on India.

τὴν Ἀλκέτα This is the first explicit mention of Alcetas as phalanx commander. He was brother of Perdiccas (Berve ii 22-3, no. 45) and presumably had assumed command of Perdiccas' battalion after his brother became a Bodyguard (cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 275). That could have been as early as 330 (cf. Curt. 6. 8. 17); Perdiccas was a Bodyguard of some seniority by 328/7 (21. 4).

ἐπὶ Κατάνην τε καὶ Αὐστάνην The names recur in Curtius (8. 5. 2). Of the two Austanes (Berve no. 186) is not mentioned elsewhere. Catanes may be, as is generally assumed (cf. Berve no. 415), identical with the Sogdian noble who helped surrender Bessus and engineered revolt in 329 (cf. 3. 30. 5 n., 4. 1. 5 n.). The *Metz Epitome* (23) has a very circumstantial note, not paralleled elsewhere, to the effect that Catanes was arrested along with the other insurgent leader, Dataphernes (who was also an associate of Spitamenes) and brought alive to Alexander by their Dahan associates during the winter of 328/7 (see above, 17. 7 n.). That might be sheer error (Berve ii 415 n. 3), but there is nothing against the hypothesis that there were two Sogdian nobles named Catanes, one Spitamenes' partner in rebellion and the other a local magnate in Pareitacene.

2. ἀμφὶ τοὺς χιλίους πεντακοσίους These are very significant casualties in comparison with the 800 cavalry who fell in battle against Coenus (17. 6) or the 150 killed by Craterus himself on the borders of Bactria (17. 2). The men of Pareitacene, unlike the

nomadic forces of Spitamenes, came from established agricultural communities, and the disproportionate ratio of infantry losses to cavalry shows the tenacity with which these peasants defended their land.

καὶ ἐν Βάκτροις . . . ξυνηνέχθη The Pages' Conspiracy is reasonably located at the Bactrian capital, where some of the boys had spent the summer of 328 (cf. 16. 6 n.). Strabo 11. 11. 4 (517) claims that the city in which Callisthenes was arrested and imprisoned was Cariatae, a name otherwise unattested. But the context in Strabo is garbled; as it stands the passage implies that Alexander destroyed Cariatae and *Maracanda* as well as Cyropolis (above, 2. 1-4 with notes) and there may be a lacuna. It is certainly not impossible that the city name has been corrupted and what underlies *Cariatae* in the MSS is some form of Zariaspa, the alternative name of the Bactrian capital (cf. Schachermeyr² 339 n. 398, 392 n. 478).

22. 3-30. 9. *The Advance to India (Summer 327 to Spring 326)*

For this section of the campaigns Arrian's narrative is by far the fullest. The vulgate sources are scantier than usual. Much of Diodorus' account is lost in the central lacuna, and what survives (from the fall of Massaga) is patchy and somewhat incoherent (84-86. 3). The fullest representative of the vulgate is, as usual, Curtius (8. 10. 1-12. 4), but the original has been sadly mangled by drastic abbreviation and rhetorical elaboration of minor details; and there is much incompetent contamination of sources (see below, 26. 1, 29. 1 nn.). In some episodes the *Metz Epitome* (32-48), corrupt though its text may be, is closer to the presumed common source. Arrian's account is therefore even more central than usual. It is worked up from his principal sources with no detectable insertion from the secondary tradition, and there is only one passage (28. 2) where Arrian comments in his own person. Otherwise the primary source is undoubtedly Ptolemy, who was particularly active during this campaign and recorded his activity *in extenso* (see below, 23. 3, 24. 3-25. 4, 29. 1-2). But Ptolemy was not used exclusively, as some scholars maintain (Strasburger 41-2; Kornemann 67-70). Arrian certainly combined his narrative with other material, which is sometimes detectable (30. 2-3 (Aristobulus); 26. 5-7 (Nearchus?)). As always, his narrative is likely to have been a mosaic of different reports rather than an extended extract from a single source.

For a survey of modern scholarship see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 145-53; *Eroberung* 143-54. For German scholarship the pioneer work was Christian Lassen's great *Indische Altertumskunde* ii² (Leipzig and London 1874) esp. 124-52, which heavily influenced Droysen and was largely incorporated in A. E. Anspach's important (and still

useful) work *De Alexandri Magni Expeditione Indica* (Programm Duisberg 1901-3; Leipzig 1903). The Afghan campaigns of the nineteenth century stimulated intense speculation about the route of Alexander and gave rise to various identifications, all of which were rendered obsolete by the topographical researches of Sir Aurel Stein (*On Alexander's Track to the Indus* (London 1929), incorporating two earlier essays in the *Geographical Journal* 70 (1927) 417-39, 515-40). These are still fundamental for the physical background and their results were until recently canonical. They have, however, been modified and partly challenged in two large articles by P. H. L. Eggermont (*OLP* 1 (1970) 63-123; 15 (1984) 191-233), and Eggermont himself has received the same treatment at the hands of E. Badian (*CQ* 37 (1987) 117-28).

3. ἐξήκοντος ἤδη τοῦ ἡρος 'now that spring was over'. It is clear that, contrary to received opinion, Alexander left Bactra *after spring had passed*, not simply at the end of spring (as I assumed at *JHS* 101 (1981) 30, following the consensus). The parallels are unambiguous. Arrian himself (7. 12. 1) uses the phrase again to refer to payment of wages 'for the time which had already elapsed' (τοῦ ἐξήκοντος ἤδη χρόνου), and that is the invariable sense in his stylistic models, Herodotus and Xenophon (Hdt. 2. 111. 2; 6. 69; Xen. *Anab.* 6. 3. 26; *Hell.* 7. 1. 28, 5. 18; cf. Pollux 1. 56). Alexander would have left Bactra in the early *summer* of 327 BC.


This is the last chronological pointer supplied by Arrian until the campaign on the Hydaspes (5. 9. 4, 19. 3). Strabo (15. 1. 17 (691)) records some invaluable observations by Aristobulus (*FGrH* 139 F 35). Snow fell during the campaign in the mountains, after the setting of the Pleiades (November 327), and at the beginning of spring Alexander reached the plains and the city of Taxila (for reading and interpretation see *JHS* 101 (1981) 37-8). There are accordingly some nine months to be filled between Alexander's departure from Bactra (c. June 327) and his arrival in Taxila (spring 326). The campaign in Swat and Buner would have taken several months—the winter of 327/6 and perhaps much of the previous autumn; but the summer remains to be accounted for. The stay in Parapamisadae may well have been more protracted than the brief notes of Arrian suggest. The diplomatic negotiations in the Indus valley (and no doubt in Gandhara also) will have taken time (cf. 22. 6 with note); and, if there was to be a campaign in the Cophen valley, it would have been prudent to wait until the rivers had declined from their summer spate (*Ind.* 6. 4). The dearth of information may reflect an uneventful rather than a short sojourn in Parapamisadae.

Ἀμύνταν . . . μυρίους For Amyntas' appointment to the satrapy

see above, 4. 17. 3 n. Nothing is recorded of his subsequent activities, and at Alexander's death the satrap of Bactria/Sogdiana, confirmed in office at Babylon (Diod. 18. 3. 7; Dexippus, *FGH* 100 F 8. 6), was a certain Philippus (Berve no. 785). Amyntas, it seems, took no significant role in the Bactrian revolt late in 325, when the citadel of Bactra itself fell to Athenodorus and his disgruntled colonists (Curt. 9. 7. 2; cf. Schober 30-1; Holt 84). It is possible that he was killed during the revolt (so Berve no. 60 and most commentators) or deposed as a result of his failure. He may even have died *before* the unrest began, in which case the instability caused by the absence of a satrap (and bickering over the command) encouraged Athenodorus and his associates to leave their unwelcome domicile in Bactria.

The forces under Amyntas' command are the largest attested in any satrapy, and the cavalry in particular is extremely strong, half as large as the total that fought at Gaugamela (3. 12. 5). Some of these troops (no doubt most of the infantry) were mercenaries (Berve i 268), but the size of the cavalry force suggests that a large proportion came from local levies, which were already prominent in the satrapal army during the last stages of Spitamenes' insurrection (see above, 17. 3 n.). They would contain any nomad invasion from the steppes as enthusiastically and effectively as they had done over the winter of 328/7. The satrapal forces were buttressed by the Graeco-Macedonian population of the new settlements (cf. Holt 81-2), and there was a formidable deterrent against native insurrection within the satrapy and incursions by the Saca peoples from without. It is hardly surprising that the troubles subsequently attested relate to the new settlers, not the native population which (*pace* Holt 68-70) appears to have been effectively suppressed.

4. ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις The outward journey had required some sixteen days (Diod. 83. 1; Curt. 7. 3. 19; fifteen at Strabo 15. 2. 10 (725)). The return journey, which Strabo (15. 1. 26 (697)) agrees took a different, shorter route, almost certainly followed the ancient highway from Bactra to the passes of Kara-Kotal (2,840 m.) and Ak-Robat (3,125 m.) to the valley of Bamian and then over the Shibar pass to Begram (Foucher i 24-7; Schachermeyr² 676-9; and see Map 3). Engels (95, 107) argues that the route by the Shibar pass is longer than that by the Khawak (the route taken by Alexander in 329) and that the Macedonian army took a more direct route by the Salang pass (Foucher i 22-4). But Alexander was in no hurry in the summer of 327 and there was no reason to take any other than the easiest, best-trodden route which led directly south from the Bactrian capital. It was an easier season than the earlier transit and the gentler route via Bamian no doubt *seemed* shorter in both time and distance.



Map 3. Parapamisadae and the approach to India

τὴν κτισθεῖσαν ἐν Παραπαμισάδαις For the original foundation of *Alexandria in Caucaso* see above, 3. 28. 4n. Arrian here uses the alternative nomenclature, based on the native name for the area, Parapamisadae (his invariable spelling; see also *Ind.* 5. 11; *Succ.* F 1. 36). That is an approximation to the Akkadian 'Paruparaesanna', which appears on Darius' Bistun inscription as an alternative to Gandhāra (cf. E. N. von Voigtlander, *The Bistun Inscription of Darius the Great: Babylonian Version* (*Corp. Inscr. Iranicarum* I. ii: London 1978) 12, 54; Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 336–7).

τὸν μὲν ὑπαρχόν . . . τῆς ἀρχῆς This official is not named, and Berve (no. 545) identifies him as the Neiloxenus whom Alexander had left as supervisor for the Iranian satrap, Proexes (3. 28. 4). But Neiloxenus seems to have been the regional military commander, whereas Arrian suggests that the deposed 'hyparch' had his responsibilities confined to the new foundation. He was the counterpart of the 'satraps' of the newly founded cities who were responsible for the recruitment of the *Epigoni* (7. 6. 1; cf. *JHS* 100 (1980) 17–18; and for the equivalence of satrap and hyparch in Arrian see above, vol. i 112). As we should expect in an enterprise as solemn as a city foundation, the establishment of the new community was entrusted to an official, independent of and comparable in status to the regional satrap. At Aī Khanum the founding father, Cinēas, was honoured with a heroon in the centre of the civic area and clearly received the same honours as the oecist of a traditional *apoikia* (cf. L. Robert, in P. Bernard, *Fouilles d'Aī Khanoum* i (Paris 1973) 217–22). Alexander's 'hyparch' had the same functions and the same distinction, and like his successor, Nicanor (Berve no. 556), he was probably a Macedonian of high status.

5. προσκατοικίσας . . . ἀπόμαχοι ἦσαν At 3. 28. 4 Arrian gave no information about the population of *Alexandria in Caucaso*. What he states here coheres with the vulgate account (Diod. 83. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 23), which describes a mixed population of 7,000 natives and 3,000 camp followers and mercenaries (the latter, according to Diodorus, were volunteers, according to Curtius, supernumeraries). There is no mention of Macedonians (nor is there at 24. 7 below), some of whom were allotted to the first foundation (sq Curtius). That may be simply omission, but quite probably after the foundations in Bactria and Sogdiana (see above, 4. 1 n.) there were no Macedonian troops who could be discarded to swell the resident population.

σατράπην δὲ Τυρίεσπιν (Berve no. 758) Curtius (9. 8; 9) gives his name as Terioltes. Apart from his (presumably) Persian origins nothing is known of his background. Nor is it known how he came to succeed Proexes (see above, 3. 28. 4). Proexes may have died (so Berve no. 658) or been deposed for unsatisfactory performance. For Tyriespis' own unscintillating career see below 5. 20. 7; 6. 15: 3.

της χώρας . . . Κωφήνα ποταμόν For Arrian Parapamisadae proper refers to the inhabitants of the Hindu Kush, locally named Mt. Parapamisus (5. 3. 2-4 with notes; cf. Diod. 83. 1). The satrapy extended to the valley of Kabul below, to the triangle formed by the rivers Ghorband and Kabul. From Arrian's description it looks as though his source understood the river Cophen to begin at the confluence proper, as appears to have been the usage of Alexander's bematists (Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a), who made the Cophen a point of reference between *Alexandria in Caucaso* and *Peucelaotis* (Charsada). The satrap of Parapamisadae, then, controlled the passes of the Hindu Kush and the crucially important area below. That was the crossroads of central Asia, the *triodos* where the road from Bactra to the Indus met that from Arachosia and the Helmand valley (see above, vol. i 368), and it was the nodal point for communications between the Iranian and Indian lands.

6. ἐς Νίκαιαν πόλιν This is the only reference to Nicaea, and its status and geographical position are unknown (for early speculative identifications see Anspach 12; O. Stein, *RE* xvii 243). The favourite localization is that of Foucher (*CRAI* 1939. 435-47, esp. 446; so Goukowsky ii 151 n. 1), who places Nicaea by the old village of Mandrawar, on the lower Alingar a little distance west-north-west of modern Jalalabad (see Map 3). On this reconstruction Nicaea was hardly 3 km. from the Cophen; and Alexander subsequently marched *away* from the river and did not cross it (Strabo 15. 1. 26 (697) explicitly states the contrary). What is more Arrian makes it clear that Nicaea was some distance from the Cophen: Alexander arrived there and then 'advanced in the direction of the Cophen'. The site must be much further west, in the triangle of lower Parapamisadae. It could be, as Droysen (iii² 2. 228; so Tarn, *GBI* 99; Brunt, *Arrian* i 321 n. 6) suggested, the settlement which Diodorus claims was established a day's march from *Alexandria in Caucaso* (Diod. 83. 2—which Goukowsky (*Diodore* xvii 236-8; *Mélanges P. Lévêque* ii (Paris 1989) 245-66) would have us relate to a foundation north of the Hindu Kush). In that case one should look in the rough vicinity of Begram. On the other hand Tscherikower (104) revived Wilson's suggestion that the name is a simple translation or a Greek approximation to a similar sounding native name. If so, the possibilities are open and identification is elusive.

ὡς Ταξιλήν The ruler of the area around the city of Taxila, the first principality east of the Indus (see below, 5. 3. 6 n.). 'Taxiles' was in fact a regnal name, assumed by each prince at his accession. The vulgate tradition supplies valuable information on this and on the history of the ruling house. Alexander had received representations from the ruler of Taxila while he was still in Sogdiana (Diod. 86. 4; Curt. 8. 12. 5; *Metz Epil.* 49). Curtius states (as does *Metz*

Epit.) that the instigator of these overtures was the crown prince Omphis (Mophis in Diodorus and *Metz Epit.*), who persuaded his father to offer submission and subsequently, when his father died, refused to take the throne until he received it in person as the gift of Alexander. It was only then, in spring 326, that he assumed the regnal name (Diod. 86. 6; Curt. 8. 12. 14; *Metz Epit.* 52). If the story is correct (as assumed by Anspach 34 n. 99 and summarily rejected by Berve ii 370), the Taxiles who answered Alexander's summons to Parapamisadae was the old prince, who died a few months later, while Alexander was still west of the Indus.

προπέμψας κήρυκα A retrospective note: the participle must be understood in the pluperfect ('since he had sent ahead a herald'). Arrian refers to the Cophen as the rendezvous point and explains how the meeting had been arranged. The negotiations would have required time. Given that Alexander's messenger had to travel at least 300 km. from Parapamisadae to Taxila, making frequent detours to local dynasts on the way, and Taxiles needed to cover the same distance with a cumbersome entourage, we must allow for an interval of two months or longer between the summons and the arrival of the Indian princes. Alexander may even have sent his instructions before he left Bactra.

τοὺς ἐπὶ τᾷδε τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ The princes 'west of the Indus' (cf. 28. 6) must comprise the rulers of the Cophen valley in the vicinity of the main route to Taxila. The most important was Astis of Peucelao-tis (below, 22. 8), and the others included Cophaeus and Assagetes, who had principdoms close to the Indus (28. 4). Arrian refers to these dynasts as *ὑπαρχοι*, the terminology he uses for the baronial nobility of Bactria and Sogdiana (see above, 1. 5 n.). For the Bactrian barons the usage is natural enough; they were rulers under the sway of the Great King, and *ὑπαρχος* always has the connotation of subordination ('Suda' s.v.). But, as is clear from other sources, these Indian dynasts were rulers in their own right. Curtius terms them *reguli* (8. 10. 1), and the second Porus, whom Arrian (5. 20. 6) introduces as a *ὑπαρχος* is described by Diodorus (91. 1) as a king. It will not do to argue that the term is used because these princes had (like Taxiles) offered their submission to Alexander and now ruled under his writ (compare the case of Moeris, ruler of Patala, who is termed *ὑπαρχος* after his surrender and *ἄρχων* before: 6. 17. 5, cf. 17. 2). The terminology is used of the ruler of the Aspasi, who never submitted and died before his principdom came under Alexander's control (see below, 24. 2, 5). Compliant or recalcitrant, the local princes are termed *ὑπαρχοι*. That also excludes the hypothesis of J.-M. Bertrand, in *Mélanges d'histoire ancienne offerts à William Seston* (Paris 1974) 27-8, that the term applies to people who had not yet received their position officially from Alexander.

There can be only one explanation. Alexander, or rather, Arrian's source, regarded all the Indian princes as *de facto* subjects of the Great King, whether or not they regarded themselves as autonomous, and there *was* intended to be an analogy with the Bactrian and Sogdian nobility. As is well known, under Darius I the Indian lands were occupied and there were satrapies established: Gandhara, Sattagydia (*Ḫatagus*) and Hinduš (cf. D. Fleming, *JRAS* 1982. 102–12; A. D. H. Bivar, in *CAH* iv² 199–210). After the fifth century there is no suggestion that direct Persian control was maintained. Badian (in *CHIran* ii 462–3) has argued strongly for at least some vestige of Achaemenid rule in Gandhara. Certainly Indians had fought at Gaugamela under Bessus' command (see above, 3. 8. 3), and some may have been recruited from the Cophen valley, but Arrian's description ('bordering on the Bactrians') suggests rather the inhabitants of Parapamisadae, who provided good cavalry (cf. 5. 11. 3) and are not otherwise attested at Gaugamela. But whatever the status of Gandhara in fact, it is likely enough that the Persians had never renounced suzerainty. The frieze of throne-bearers (the subject nations of the Achaemenids) recurs in identical sequence and composition in all six royal Achaemenid tombs, from Darius I to Artaxerxes III (cf. Erich Schmidt, *Persepolis* iii (Chicago 1970) 108 ff.). Sattagydians, Gandharians, and Indians duly appear, as do Egyptians, Libyans, and Ethiopians. The Achaemenids may have lost their hold temporarily or permanently, but the fact is never acknowledged or implied by omission of any of the throne-bearers. In the same way Alexander considered the Indian rulers to be by right his subjects. That gave a pretext at least for invasion: Alexander was reaffirming control over his proper vassals, a motive that had more respectability than sheer imperial expansion or emulation of Heracles and Dionysus (cf. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 119). The pretext was echoed in the terminology used for the Indian rulers: not kings but hyparchs, rulers *under* the Great King. Nearchus later was to repeat the official propaganda, arguing that the Indians of the Cophen had been tributary to Persia since the time of Darius (*Ind.* 1. 3).

As always, Arrian's usage is not consistent. The variation of *σατράπης* and *ὑπαρχος* which is such a feature of his general narrative is paralleled at 5. 8. 2–3, where Taxiles is first defined as *ὑπαρχος* of his city, but then Abisares appears as *king* (*βασιλεύς*) of the mountain Indians. Alexander viewed Abisares in exactly the same light as the other dynasts, insisting on his submission (5. 20. 5–6) and ultimately confirming him as *satrap* in his own lands (5. 29. 4). It is clear that Abisares enjoyed the same status as Taxiles, a local ruler independent before the advent of Alexander, and the variation of terminology cannot be pressed. With Porus (see below, 5. 8. 4 n.) the situation is more complex. Arrian never terms him hyparch and twice implies


that his title was king. That is his regular designation (cf. Berve ii 344 n. 4), and is invariably used in the sources derived from Hieronymus of Cardia. But Hieronymus evidently placed Porus on the same level as Taxiles: both to him were kings (Diod. 18. 39. 6; cf. Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 36). The fullest and apparently most accurate statement comes from Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 15): Alexander allowed Porus 'to rule over the land of which he was king with the title of satrap'. That is exactly the position of Abisares: king to his subjects and satrap under Alexander, with regal powers but *de facto* subordinate to a greater king. It looks as though Ptolemy stressed the latter relationship; the usage of *ὑπαρχος* to denote an independent prince can be directly ascribed to him (4. 24. 1, 5 = *FGrH* 138 F 18). He emphasized the relationship of subordination to Alexander. Other sources, particularly when dealing with Porus, simply wrote of kings (5. 19. 1-3 probably derives from Aristobulus and 6. 2. 1 from Nearchus).

ἐς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν The number seems a little small. Taxiles in fact supplied thirty elephants in his own right when Alexander reached the Indus (5. 3. 5). The twenty-five elephants here may have been those promised by the dynasts of the Cophen valley, who had elephant stables of their own (cf. 4. 25. 5, 30. 5-8).

7. ἐνθα δὴ A resumptive reference to the last named destination, the river Cophen (see above). Arrian gives no indication where the division of forces took place. It was clearly below the confluence of the modern day Kabul and Ghorband rivers and equally clearly above the confluence of the Kabul and Alingar (see below, 23. 2 n.). All that can be said for certain is that the most commonly suggested location, near modern Jalalabad (cf. Foucher, *CRAI* 1939. 446), is too far east.

ἐς τὴν Πευκελαώτιν χώραν This is clearly identical with 'Peuce-laitis' in the Cophen valley mentioned in the *Indike* (4. 11); and the Indian town 'Peucolatis' which the bematists (according to Pliny) placed on the Cophen, 237 Roman miles distant from *Alexandria in Caucaso* (Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a), was the eponymous capital of the district. That in turn must be the Sanskrit Pushkala-vati, one of the capitals of Gandhara, which is now identified with the mound of Bala Hisar near the modern town of Charsada, 5 km. from the present confluence of the rivers Kabul and Swat (Wheeler, *Chārsada*, esp. 1-5, *Flames over Persepolis* (New York 1968) 97-102) and a nodal point on the ancient highway to the Indus (Foucher 41-3, 206) (see Map 4). It must be distinguished from the city Πευκελιώτις which Arrian later locates in the vicinity of the Indus (see below, 28. 6 n.).

Arrian does not supply enough detail to enable us to reconstruct the exact route of Hephaestion and Perdikkas. They must in general



MAP 4. The campaigns in Swat

have followed the line of the Cophen and the main road down to the Indus crossing, which was near the town of Und (Foucher 40, 206; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 70-1). Seibert (*Eroberung* 149) has recently revived Sir Thomas Holdich's view (*The Gates of India* (London 1910) 94-5) that Perdikkas and Hephaestion used the southern route via the Khyber pass and the south side of the Cophen. His argument is based on scepticism about the identification of Arrian's Peucelaotis with Charsada—which is surely beyond reasonable doubt; but even so there may be some truth in it. Presumably the forces with Hephaestion and Perdikkas would not travel in a single column. The very fact that there were two commanders suggests that there would be simultaneous operations in different sectors, as the surrenders of the local rulers were acquired by persuasion or coercion. It is possible, and indeed likely, that Hephaestion and Perdikkas moved separately and by different routes to the north and south of the Cophen (Berve ii 171, 314 somewhat implausibly suggests that Hephaestion commanded the cavalry and Perdikkas the infantry). They need not have joined forces much before they reached the prearranged crossing point at the Indus (see below, 28. 5 n.).

τὴν τε Γοργίου . . . ἰππέας ξύμπαντας This appears to be roughly half the army. Hephaestion and Perdikkas have three phalanx battalions as opposed to Alexander with four battalions and the hypaspists (see below, 23. 1 n.). The Companions are explicitly divided half and half; and Alexander has the lighter equipped *hippakontistai* (see above, 3. 24. 1; 4. 4. 6, 17. 3), while his lieutenants take the mercenary cavalry. The Agrianians and archers go with the king, naturally enough, given that the campaigning was to be in the mountains. But the list is defective. It is confined to Greek and Macedonian forces. There is no mention of the Bactrian and Sacan cavalry who served at the Hydaspes (5. 11. 3, 12. 3) or even of the Dahan horse archers (*hippoloxotai*) who are attested with Alexander himself during his invasion of Aspasian territory (4. 24. 1). Either Arrian's source has excluded the oriental cavalry, which is unlikely, given the later appearance of the *hippoloxotai*, or Arrian himself has been deliberately selective in his report of the contingents.

Κλείτου (Berve no. 428) This is the first appearance of Cleitus, who was dubbed 'the White' to distinguish him from his famous homonym (Athen. 12. 539c). Nothing is known of his background or previous career, but he may well have been close to Craterus. He seems to have taken over Craterus' battalion (last attested under Craterus at 22. 1), now that Craterus was detached to serve with Alexander in the main invasion column. Later he was transferred to a cavalry hipparchy (5. 22. 6 n.; 6. 6. 4), before being demobilized at Opis with Craterus (Justin 12. 12. 8) and commanding Craterus'

fleet during the Lamian War (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 198-9). There is no need to posit two separate individuals (so Hammond, *CQ* 30 (1980) 466-7, following Beloch iii² 2. 330); the battalion commander and the hipparch were one and the same.

παρασκευάζειν . . . ξύμφορα So Curt. 8. 10. 2-3. The mission is reported retrospectively in several later passages (28. 5, 30. 9; 5. 3. 5, 7. 1), and it is clear that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus gave precise information about the bridging of the river (cf. 5. 7. 1, 8. 1). Curtius on the other hand is explicit that a bridge of boats was intended. The chronology too is uncertain. When Alexander came down to the plain of the Indus at the beginning of spring the bridge had been long complete (30. 9). Perdikkas and Hephaestion evidently completed their journey to the Indus relatively quickly and based themselves at the crossing-point over the winter months, dealing with troubles in the hinterland (see below) and supporting Alexander's operations in Assacenia.

8. Ἄστις . . . νεωτερίσας Astis (Berve no. 174) was evidently one of the hyparchs who brought gifts to Alexander at the Cophen. He returned to his principedom with one at least of the generals and subsequently revolted from Macedonian rule. Arrian places the revolt after the Macedonians had begun (*ἐπρασσον*) their work at the Indus (Anspach 13; Badian, *CQ* 37 (1987) 118), and there is no explanation why Astis changed his attitude or what, if any, correlation existed with events elsewhere. Certainly he had no love for Taxiles and his son, who were obviously favoured by the new overlord, and there may even have been some collaboration with the Assaceni immediately to the north.

τὴν πόλιν προσαπώλεσεν The city is not identified in any way. It could possibly be the capital, Peucelaotis (Pushkalavati), as has been recently suggested (Badian, *CQ* 37 (1987) 124-5). The favourite location, Orobatis (cf. 28. 5), accepted by Droysen (i² 2. 114), Anspach (14), and Berve (ii 90), is impossible: no source locates Orobatis in Peucelaotis, and the city was fortified and garrisoned *before* Hephaestion and Perdikkas reached the Indus. On the other hand the city into which Astis fled with his army was important enough to be placed under a commandant and strong enough to stand siege for a month. Although it is not named, the city could well be the capital. Arrian perhaps implies it, for here he uses the name Peucelaotis to designate the region and he suggests that the city under siege was its chief settlement. Astis would have naturally chosen the capital for his defence, unless (a possibility which cannot be excluded) he was cut off by Hephaestion's invasion and forced to seek refuge elsewhere.

ἑυμπεφεύγει Elsewhere Arrian invariably uses the compound verb in a collective sense, not of a single individual (cf. 1. 2. 3; 4. 3. 1, 21.

1). But emendation (Enthoven's *πεφεύγει*: cf. 5. 21. 2) is unjustified; the compound implies that Astis took flight with his entourage (cf. Diod. 20. 3. 1, 45. 3).

Σαγγαῖος (Berve no. 691) Nothing more is known of Sangaeus. He is not the successor of Astis; his authority is apparently limited to the capital, like that of Sisicottus to Aornus (see below, 30. 4). Perhaps one of Astis' family was placed over the principedom, counterbalanced by the supervisor of the chief city, who was predisposed to be hostile to the dynasty.

23. 1. καὶ τῶν πεζεταίων The MSS read *δοθεταίων* (cf. *CQ* 23 (1973) 245-52 and above, 2. 23. 2 n.), and the reading now properly appears in Brunt's Loeb text and the Artemis edition by Wirth and von Hinüber. The *taxis* named under Alexander's command are those of Polyperchon (25. 6), Coenus (24. 1, 25. 6), Alcetas (27. 1), and Attalus (24. 1, 10). Of these the battalions of Polyperchon, Coenus, and Alcetas are known to have been recruited from Upper Macedonia, and this passage is the main clue that *asthetairoi* is the term applied to the men from the mountain cantons, those best suited for the campaign in the hill country north of the Cophen.

G. T. Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia* ii 711-12, argues that the number of battalions of *asthetairoi* had increased since 332, when the unit of Coenus alone is glossed as 'the so-called *asthetairoi*' (2. 23. 2; cf. 6. 6. 1, where Peithon's *taxis* belongs to the *asthetairoi*), and suggests that the term was an honorific title, conferred on Coenus' men after Issus and gradually extended to other units as they distinguished themselves. This, I think, places too much reliance on Arrian's *akribeia*; if his source referred to the battalion of Coenus as *asthetairoi*, he might easily infer that they were the only *asthetairoi*. Secondly Griffith seems to assume that the position of Coenus' troops in the battle line reflects their distinction. In fact the position of the units rotated from day to day (cf. 1. 28. 3; 5. 13. 4 with notes) and Coenus' location next to the hypaspists at Issus and Gaugamela may have been fortuitous. I prefer to conclude that the title singles out a specific section of the phalanx and that its application remained unchanged.

A more subversive hypothesis has been advanced by P. Goukowsky (*REG* 100 (1987) 240-55, esp. 243-8). For him the *asthetairoi* were not entire *taxis* but a subsection, a *corps d'élite* within each phalanx battalion. I am not convinced. At 2. 23. 2 the force of the text is that Coenus' entire *taxis* had the title; it cannot mean, as Goukowsky would have it, that Coenus chose from his *taxis* the group known as *asthetairoi*. Admittedly the context describes the storming of the walls of Tyre from assault bridges mounted on ships. A single boarding-craft could not take the entire battalion of Coenus, but for that

matter (as Goukowsky 244 admits) neither could Alexander's vessel accommodate the entire body of the hypaspists. Both Alexander and Coenus took as many men from their units as could be crammed on to the ships and the boarding-bridges, but nothing suggests that they were accompanied by a permanent élite. The discussion of the present passage (244-5) is vitiated by the assumption that all units described as *taxeis* in Arrian's narrative of the campaigns in Bajaur and Swat are subdivisions of the phalanx (i.e. four full battalions and the *asthetairoi* from the three battalions with Perdiccas and Hephaestion (see above, 22. 7 with note)). In some cases this is demonstrably not so: the *taxis* of Balacrus must be the well-known corps of javelin men (see below, 24. 10 n.). The phalanx *taxeis* with Alexander were complete battalions, and they are best defined as *asthetairoi*. There are similar objections to Goukowsky's interpretation of the dispositions at Sangala (see below, 5. 22. 7 with note), and in general his theory seems to place undue force upon the evidence.

It is certainly a problem how far we can take the text of Arrian. As we have observed (above, 22. 7 n.), Arrian does not give a complete list of the units with Alexander. Apart from the *hippotoxotai* there are light-armed detachments of Balacrus, Philippus, and Philotas (24. 10 n.). The count of the phalanx *taxeis* therefore may not be complete. Attalus' unit (not apparently recruited from Upper Macedonia) may have been listed apart from the *asthetairoi* proper and omitted by Arrian (or Arrian's source); in south India it seems not to be included among the *taxeis* of the *asthetairoi* (6. 17. 3; cf. 21. 3). But in 327 and in 325 there was certainly a pool of units which could be termed *asthetairoi* and on both occasions the *taxeis* of Polyperchon, Coenus/Peithon, and Alcetas are included in the pool. The connection with Upper Macedonia seems assured.

ἐς τὴν Ἀσπ(ας)ίων τε καὶ Γουραίων The passage is corrupt, but was restored with near certainty by Gronovius. Arrian's Ἀσπ(ας)ίοι are mentioned again at 24. 1, and they correspond to the Aspasi in whose territory Plutarch claims Alexander received his shoulder wound (*Mor.* 327 B: the MS reading is ἄπασιν οἷς). That is the incident reported by the river Choes (23. 3), and it supports the natural inference that the Aspasi were the first people attacked by Alexander. In that case the source here cannot be Aristobulus, who referred to them as Ὑπάσιοι (Strabo 15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35; the same spelling at 15. 1. 27 (698)), and we have welcome corroboration of the working hypothesis that Ptolemy is the principal source for this whole section. For the Guraei see below, 25. 6-7.

2. παρὰ τὸν Χόην This is a primary and controversial detail for fixing Alexander's route. According to Arrian's account the Macedonians crossed three rivers of significance before impinging on the principedom of Assacenus on the upper Swat. The Guraeus (25. 7) is

clearly identical with the Panjkora (see Map 4); before that the Macedonians crossed a river whose name is lost in transmission (24. 1) but which clearly had an extensive course. If (which seems certain) Arrian's Choes was a separate river, there were two major river systems to be crossed before Alexander reached the Panjkora. Those can only be the valleys of the Kunar and the Alingar, the latter of which must be Arrian's Choes. This simple view was advocated by G. F. Hertzberg (*Die asiatischen Feldzüge Alexanders des Großen* ii^a (Halle 1875) 212), who noted that the Alingar was locally named Kho or Khao, and it was developed by G. Radet (*JS* 1930. 214-16; so also Caroe, *Pathans* 51; Goukowsky ii 23-4). But Christian Lassen (ii^a 136-7) argued that the Kunar fits the topographical detail in Arrian rather better than the relatively broad valley of the Alingar (cf. Foucher, pl. xxxi) and that Arrian's Choes is the same as the *Kōas* reported by Ptolemy and the Choaspes (mentioned by Aristotle, Strabo, and Curtius). His discussion was accepted by Anspach (15-16 n. 39), and in virtually all German scholarship from Droysen (i^a 2. 103-5) onwards (see, most recently, Seibert, *Eroberung* 150). The chief English proponent of the identification with the Kunar was Sir Aurel Stein (*Serindica* i (Oxford 1921) 3-4; *Alexander's Track* 41-2), who brought no new arguments to bear but almost irresistible *auctoritas*.

One line of argument is a red herring: the identification of the rivers Choes, Coas, and Choaspes. The truth was clearly and cogently expounded by J. Marquardt (*Philologus* Suppl. 20 (1905) 243-5; accepted by Stein, *Serindica* i 2 n. 3). Ptolemy's *Kōas* can only be the Cophen or Kabul river; it forms a confluence with both the Indus and the Swat (*Geogr.* 7. 1. 27) and that is only consistent with the Cophen, which is not named by Ptolemy. As for the Choaspes, Curtius (8. 10. 22) mentions it in his campaign narrative after the joint operations of Ptolemy and Alexander described by Arrian (4. 24. 1b-25. 4) just before the crossing of the Guraeus. Arrian's Guraeus is most probably the Choaspes of Curtius, quite distinct from and east of Arrian's Choes. Strabo's description is consistent (15. 1. 26 (697)). For him the Choaspes joins the Cophen after passing a city named Gorys (reminiscent of Arrian's Guraeus) before traversing Baidobene and Gandaritis. It looks as though the modern Panjkora was locally named Guraeus and renamed Choaspes by Alexander's men, who were familiar with Aristotle's geography. According to Aristotle (*Metabr.* 1. 350^a24), one of the great rivers flowing from the Hindu Kush was the Choaspes, and the Panjkora, later swelled by the Swat, proved to be one of the most formidable affluents of the Cophen, and caused most difficulty in its crossing (Arr. 25. 7). It was readily identified with the Choaspes of earlier report.

One can only decide between the Alingar and Kunar on practical grounds. Lassen's argument that the lower reaches of the Alingar are broad and level does not hold. We do not know precisely where Alexander's line of march took him, and the valley of the Alingar above the confluence with the Alishang (see Map 3) is particularly steep and difficult on its west bank (for a recent report see W. Thesiger, *GJ* 123 (1957) 464 with the map provided). On the other hand, if the Kunar was Arrian's Choes, then one is hard put to find a location for the river mentioned at Arr. 24. 1 (Lassen 138 n. 3 suggested an eastern tributary of the Kunar); and Radet (*JS* 1930. 216) observed pertinently that there is a good deal of marching and campaigning to be fitted into the river system of the Kunar. It is best to conclude that the Choes was in fact the Alingar. The expeditionary force of Hephaestion and Perdikkas will have parted company by the main road, which passed over the Alingar near modern Mandrawar. It was an important point, distinguished by a rock-cut Aramaic inscription of the Indian king, Aśoka (c. 250 BC), which points the direction to distant Tadmor, Palmyra (A. Dupont-Sommer, *CRAI* 1970. 158-73). Alexander took the more difficult route along the east bank to subjugate the Aspasi in the hill country.

τῶν πεζῶν . . . ὀκτακοσίους Compare 3. 21. 7, where Alexander dismounts 500 of his cavalry and uses the horses for the pick of his infantry. Here the cavalry proceeds with Alexander in its entirety, but he has additional horses to accommodate 800 of the infantry. He will have used his stay in Parapamisadae to procure an ample number of remounts (cf. 3. 30. 6). Curtius (8. 10. 4) adds that the light infantry marched with the cavalry (which is likely enough) and that Craterus led the phalanx (so *Metz Epit.* 35)

ἀσπίσι ταῖς πεζικαῖς So in the pursuit of Darius (3. 21. 7; Curt. 5. 13. 8) the mounted infantrymen had taken their heavy armour. It would be essential if, as proved to be the case, there was siege work to be done or if the enemy were inaccessible to cavalry. This was not an isolated expedient. Alexander appears to have done the same in the next sector of operations (24. 5). He needed to transport his infantry quickly enough to prevent the populations he attacked from vanishing into the hills, but at the same time the infantry had to operate as infantry. Hence the supply of adequate horses for transport only.

ὑποπεφυγέναι It is apparent from the narrative that Alexander was determined to acquire the lasting submission of the peoples he conquered. He would not simply march unopposed through a deserted countryside, leaving the inhabitants to rebel after his passage, as had happened in Sogdiana. Flight was even more undesirable than resistance, and the savagery with which the Macedonians

harried any refugees they overhauled (23. 5, 24. 2; cf. 5. 24. 7; 6. 6. 6, 8. 3) is understandable, as is Alexander's determination to take the 'impregnable' fortress of Aornus (28. 1 n.). No refuge, however impenetrable, was to be secure, and Alexander embarked on a deliberate campaign of terror to ensure ready submission (see below, 23. 5 with note).

3. **κατέκλεισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν** So Curt. 8. 10. 5, who adds that Craterus caught up at this point, bringing the infantry column and no doubt the heavy scaling-ladders (cf. 25. 5). The wound supervened as Alexander inspected the fortifications (Curt. 8. 10. 6; Plut. *Mor.* 327 B). Ptolemy will have added the additional detail of his own wound and that of Leonnatus; it was clearly not serious enough to discommodate him.

5. **οὐ ἐτρώθη . . . ὀργιζόμενοι** Compare the utter savagery at the Malli town (6. 11. 1 n.). The blood-lust of the Macedonians may well have been sharpened by the injury inflicted on their king, but there was policy behind the massacre (see above, 23. 2 n.). According to Curtius (8. 10. 5) Alexander himself had instructed his troops, even before the siege began, to take no prisoners, and the sack was a premeditated act of terror (so Diod. 17 index λβ). *Pace* Anspach (16 n. 44, so Hammond, *Three Historians* 148), there is no formal conflict with Arrian; the troops merely carried out their instructions (cf. 2. 4 n.) with especial dedication. The only direct conflict in the vulgate is the exaggerated note that all the defenders were killed (Curt. 8. 10. 6; *Metz Epit.* 35; Diod. index), not merely those overhauled in flight.

ἐς Ἀνδακα The city is not named elsewhere and cannot be identified. It is the 'fortified town' whose garrisoning and submission of hostages is recorded in the *Metz Epitome* (35).

ξὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι τῶν πεζῶν 'with the other commanders of the infantry'. The passage cannot be pressed to prove that Craterus still retained his infantry *taxis*, which had most probably been transferred to Cleitus and sent ahead with Hephaestion and Perdiccas (cf. 22. 1, 7 nn.). The contrast in Arrian (admittedly implicit) is with the infantry commanders (Coenus and Attalus) who went ahead with Alexander (24. 1); Craterus was left with the rest (Polyperchon and Alcetas). He was intended to proceed exactly as Alexander had and to reduce as much of the Alingar valley as possible to subjection. The king moved on to the central portion of Aspasian territory, hoping to attack before the inhabitants had time to strengthen their defences or evacuate their villages.

24. 1. ἐς τέσσαρας μάλιστα ἵππαρχίας The phrase should denote an approximation ('up to four hipparchies'). That is the normal meaning in Arrian when ἐς and μάλιστα qualify a numeral (cf. 2. 10. 7; 3. 8.

6; 5. 18. 3). It never represents a fraction (as assumed here by Berve i 108 n. 5), and it cannot imply that the *agema* was included in the four hipparchies (so Tarn ii 164; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 486). The sense is 'the *agema* and something like four hipparchies of the other Companions'. Superficially the qualification suggests that there was some doubt about the numeral, and Anspach (17 n. 4) inferred intelligently that Ptolemy (better Arrian) was aware of differences in his sources. But the qualification also occurs when Arrian has no doubt about his figures. The key reference is *Ind.* 11.1 where Arrian notes (following Megasthenes, *FGrH* 715 F 19) that the Indians were divided into 'something like seven groups' (ἐς ἑπτὰ μάλιστα γένεα); he then lists the seven groups in order with no hint that there is any doubt about the figure, as do Strabo (15. 1. 29 (703)) and Diodorus (2. 40. 1); and both Strabo and Diodorus repeat the division into seven without qualification (εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη διηρῆσθαι/διήρηται). The qualification is most certainly a stylistic device in Arrian, which had no counterpart in his original source.

Ptolemy, I assume, recorded that Alexander took with him the *agema* in addition to four hipparchies of Companions. Why does he specify the number? It seems most likely that Craterus was left with some at least of the Companions. He would need cavalry for rapid movement as much as Alexander, and indeed the *hippakontistai*, who are mentioned at 23. 1 as part of Alexander's contingent, were not apparently taken in his advance force. It would be reasonable that at least one of the hipparchies of Companions also remained with Craterus. In that case, given that Hephaestion had half the Companions with him in the Cophen valley, we have a surprisingly large number of hipparchies during this portion of the campaign—a minimum of ten in addition to the *agema*, not seven or eight, as is commonly supposed (see above, 3. 29. 7 n.). If so, there is virtual confirmation that the Companions had been augmented by the incorporation of the *prodromoi* (see above, 4. 6 n.). Hammond (*CQ* 30 (1980) 467) has argued that the Companions were swelled by other non-Macedonian cavalry in Sogdiana, who were detached into separate units after Alexander reached the Indus. That is most implausible. Arrian (see above, 17. 3 n.) suggests strongly that the native cavalry of Bactria and Sogdiana was (as we should expect) organized in separate units, distinct from the Companions, and there is no indication until the last years that the Companions included any troops other than native Macedonians. Nor was there any reduction of hipparchies in India. The Malli campaign (cf. 6. 6. 1, 4, 7. 2) provides evidence of at least eight hipparchies in addition to the *agema*.

τὸν †Εὔασ ... πόλεως προὔχωρει *A locus conclamatus*. Since Vulcanius editors tended to print *Εὐάσπλα προὔχωρει*, following a

unique reading in one of the *deteriores*. There has also been a tendency to emend the name to that of a known affluent of the Cophen: Gronovius suggested Σουαστόν (the Swat—which is plainly impossible) and Kiepert Χοάσσην — the most popular candidate (cf. Radet, *JS* 1930. 218). But the manuscript reading is guaranteed by the derivative *Itinerarium Alexandri*, which reports at this juncture the crossing of a river 'Euas' (*Euique amni transmisso quisquis obuius sternitur*).¹ That virtually confirms Roos's hypothesis of a lacuna (see also Castiglioni, *SIFC* 17 (1909) 313, with a very weak conjectural supplement). Between the river-name (Εὐας) and the following word (πόλεως) there is a gap of indeterminate length, containing information about the city attacked by Alexander after his two-day march. A considerable segment of text may have fallen out. The *Itinerarium* reports a crossing and some opposition, whereas Arrian (24. 2) reports a massacre of refugees who offered no resistance.

The other sources give some slight help in filling the lacuna. Curtius (8. 10. 7–19; so *Metz Epil.* 36) places the surrender of Nysa (see below, 5. 1. 1 n.) shortly after the campaign on the Choes, and claims that Alexander moved from Nysa to an area named Daedala (*montes Daedalos* in Justin 12. 7. 9). From Daedala he crossed to Acadira (Arrian's Ἀριγαῖον: see below, 24. 6 n.). Daedala, deserted by its inhabitants according to Curtius, corresponds to the land of the Aspasian hyparch in Arrian, also evacuated by the locals. That gives us an equation and a working hypothesis. Now, there is no reference in Curtius to a river, but the crossing of the 'Euas' may be included in his brief note (8. 10. 7) of the subjugation of an *ignobilis gens* immediately after the sack of the first city on the Choes. Then came the surrender of Nysa. As it stands, Arrian's text has no reference in the campaign narrative to Nysa, but it was reported by his narrative sources (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 69) and its location was presumably mentioned. Arrian may have reserved all his discussion of the episode for his later excursus (5. 1–2), as he demonstrably did with Cleitus' killing (see above, 16. 3 n.). But it is more likely that he reported the visit to Nysa extremely briefly at the appropriate point in his campaign narrative, just as he noted the occurrence of the Pages' Conspiracy at Bactra (see above, 22. 2). In that case the reference to Nysa will have come between the crossing of the 'Euas' and the attack on the Aspasian capital, squarely inside

¹ *Itin.* 105. The correct reading is given in the apparatus by D. Volkmann (above, vol. i. 37 n. 23). Unfortunately Volkmann accepted the 'correction' by the author of the *editio princeps*, Angelo Mai, and read *Choeque amni*. That is unacceptable. The *Itinerarium* places the river crossing after Alexander's shoulder wound (Arr. 23. 3) and before the occupation of Arigacum (Arr. 24. 6), exactly where Arrian mentions the mysterious Εὐας. It cannot have been the Choes, which Alexander crossed at a significantly earlier stage (Arr. 23. 2).

the lacuna. Arrian reported the advance to the 'Euas' and fighting there. Then came the visit to Nysa, where perhaps news came that the Aspasians were evacuating their capital. With that the lacuna ends: 'learning that the barbarians were moving from their city, he advanced to the territory of the Aspasian hyparch'. This reconstruction is of course based on conjecture, but it does not, I think, do violence to any of the evidence.

The river which in Arrian's text appears as *Εὐας* must be the Kunar, the largest of the tributaries of the Cophen (see above, 23. 2 n.). Alexander moved from the Alingar valley into the next river system to the east. How he did so is wholly uncertain. Goukowsky (ii 22, 153 n. 15) suggests that he went from the upper Alingar over the Donda pass (3,280 m.) and down to the valley of the Pech (a western tributary of the Kunar). This is a consequence of his localization of Nysa in the upper Pech valley, which seems excessively precise, and involves an extremely rough transit by a column so amply endowed with cavalry. It is more probable (but hardly provable) that Alexander withdrew south to the plain of Laghman and cut across to the lower reaches of the Kunar, perhaps—if the *Itinerarium* may be trusted – crossing to the east bank. The city of the Aspasian hyparch would have been located some distance upstream in the central valley (for an idyllic description see Sir Thomas Holdich, *The Gates of India* (London 1910) 101–2), and Radet (*JS* 1930. 219) was justified in locating Nysa in one of the affluents to the east of the Kunar.

2. *ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν* The Aspasians gave Alexander every inducement to vacate their territory, as did the inhabitants of Arigaeum (24. 6). The devastation no doubt encouraged him to apply his policy of terror (above, 23. 2 n.) for exemplary effect. The carnage among the refugees must have been appalling (expressed with Thucydidean detachment by Arrian's *φόνος πολὺς . . . τῶν βαρβάρων*) and was hardly confined to the combatant males.

3. *τὸν δὲ ἡγεμόνα κτλ.* The details undoubtedly come from Ptolemy, who deliberately worked up his *aristeia* in Homeric colours (*FGrH* 138 F 18; cf. Strasburger 41; Kornemann 146; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 19–20; Tonnet i 190–1). Ptolemy himself takes the centre stage, relegating the king to a support role (24. 5). Whether he deliberately suppressed the rest of the engagement is questionable: Arrian himself may have contracted and concentrated the original report. But the emphasis was surely upon Ptolemy's feat. It was not simply 'Freude an einer privaten Rauferei' (Strasburger). The exposure to personal danger, following the example of Alexander himself, was a duty, and Ptolemy later engaged in a very similar bout of single combat for the purpose of galvanizing his own officers (Diod. 18. 34. 2; cf. Arr. 6. 7. 5–6, 9. 3). To emphasize an earlier *aristeia*

under the eyes of Alexander himself was to propagate his inspirational qualities of leadership and attract support from the many who were impressed by such pretentious displays of bravery (for the political aspect see *Entretiens Hardt* 22 (1975) 28-9). Such episodes, involving individuals other than Alexander, are not exactly frequent in the literature of the reign, although they must have been relatively frequent in fact. The closest parallel to Ptolemy's achievement is Erigyus' impressive killing of Satibarzanes in hand-to-hand combat (see above, 3. 28. 3 with Diod. 17. 83. 5 and—a memorable passage—Curt. 7. 4. 36-7). That was indeed retailed by Arrian in somewhat sober style and his account may even derive from Ptolemy. But Erigyus was dead by the spring of 327 (Curt. 8. 3. 40) and no competitor for power in the age of the Successors.

τινι τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν This does not entail that Ptolemy had an infantry command (so Tonnet i 190). The standard translation 'to one of his hypaspists' (so e.g. Brunt, Savinel) is misleading. Arrian's narrative suggests that Alexander was some distance behind the van of the pursuit with the mounted infantry. Ptolemy was clearly at the head of one of a number of cavalry detachments pressing on the heels of the Aspasian fugitives, and he was hardly slowed by infantry—even mounted hypaspists, who were unlikely to have been accomplished riders. 'Hypaspist' is here used in a non-technical sense (see above, 1. 11. 8 with note), to mean 'armour-bearers' or 'attendants'. The senior marshals, like their king, were presumably attended by servants, who bore their weapons or (as here) carried out menial duties. This usage is found in Xenophon (*Hell.* 4. 5. 14; *Anab.* 4. 2. 20) and may be a borrowing by Arrian himself; Ptolemy's attendants become hypaspists to match the hypaspists of the Aspasian prince (cf. 1. 5. 2 for the hypaspists of the Agrianian monarch Langarus).

4. δια τοῦ θώρακος . . . ὁ θώραξ ἔσχε The diversionary effect of the breastplate is a commonplace in Homeric *aristeiai* (*Il.* 3. 358, 4. 136, 7. 252, 11. 436), 'a standard part of near-miss descriptions' (B. Fenik, *Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad* (*Hermes Einzelschr.* 21: 1988) 196-7). But the single combat may well have progressed in the manner described; the breastplates of the Macedonian staff appear to have been well made and effective (see above, 23. 3).

τὸν μηρὸν διάμπαξ βαλὼν The description is incomplete. A thigh wound would not be immediately fatal (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 23, where the same vocabulary is used), and we must assume that Ptolemy administered the *coup de grâce* before despoiling his adversary. The omission is probably deliberate, designed to echo *Il.* 16. 306-11, one of the earliest episodes in the *aristeia* of Patroclus. There the hero transfixes his adversary's thigh, and the victim immediately collapses and dies (compare *Il.* 5. 305-9, 660-2, 694-6, where the

thigh wounds, though serious, do not bring instant death). It looks as though Ptolemy was aware of the parallel and cast himself in Hephaestion's role as the royal favourite, Patroclus to Alexander's Achilles. Arrian consciously accentuates the epic flavour, continuing with four consecutive dactylic feet (ὡς δὲ τὸν ἡγεμόνα σφῶν κείμενον).

6. ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὰ ὄρη There is general agreement that these mountains formed the divide between the Kunar valley and the region now known as Bajaur, an area of some 13,000 square kilometres, tilting gradually down from the Kunar watershed to the river Panjkora, Arrian's Guraeus (Holdich, *Gates of India* 103; Caroe, *Pathans* 51; Goukowsky ii 24). Holdich (in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* s.v. 'Bajaur') wrote of 'a continuous line of rugged frontier hills, forming a barrier easily passable at one or two points'; he took Alexander across by the Spinasuka pass, Caroe by the Nawa pass to the north.

Ἀριγαῖον *Argacum* in *Ilin.* 105; Curtius (8. 10. 19) reads *Acadira*, clearly the same place. Holdich and Caroe (see note above) are both inclined to identify it with the modern town of Nawagai (so Foucher 206), in a salient position commanding the Bajaur valleys and a short distance west of the foothills of Kohimor (see Map 4).

οἱ ἀμφὶ Κρατερὸν See above 23. 5 with note. Craterus was now left to carry out similar work of consolidation in Bajaur, and later he performed a vital logistical role during the siege of Aornus (see below, 28. 7). He was assuming the role of Parmenion, indispensable in support but rarely present at court. Given his predilection for Macedonian tradition (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 3; cf. *JHS* 100 (1980) 7) the separation may have been equally pleasing to him and to Alexander.

7. τοὺς προσχώρους ὅσοι ἐθέλονται See above, 4. 4. 1 on the founding of Alexandria Eschate. The voluntary nature of the settlement is as suspect here as in the earlier foundation (see the note ad loc.). It is not impossible that some of the neighbours of Arigaeum were willing to take advantage of generous allocations of land and settled on privileged terms, but the tradition of Alexander's conquest suggests that there was a general flight from the path of the invasion and few who threw in their lot willingly with the new order. The majority of the local settlers (like the Hellenic population) were pressed men, prisoners of war assigned to the rural work-force of the new foundation (cf. Tscherikower 192-3; Briant, *RTP* 245-6, 251-2).

πρὸς τι ὄρος Usually identified as the Kohimor, the triple peak which towers over Bajaur to the east of Nawagai, rising to a height of 2,480 m. (see the map in Caroe, *Pathans* 44).

8. Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου As the direct citation at 25. 4 amply proves, this whole passage is based directly upon Ptolemy, who

recorded his achievements at length. He was responsible for sighting the largest concentration of enemy and played a major part in crushing the resistance. It may not be true (as claimed by Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 22 (*contra* Tonnet i 191-2)) that Ptolemy placed himself in the leading role that one expects of Alexander. The king commanded the larger contingent and attacked the biggest group of defenders (24. 10); and his victory was effortless (25. 1). Ptolemy had a subsidiary command but he made the most of it in his description, stressing the comparative difficulty of the terrain (25. 2) and the exceptionally warlike character of the defenders (25. 2-3). The laconic description of Leonnatus' success stands in sharp contrast. Ptolemy certainly implied that he was the architect of the victory. It could not have happened without his reconnaissance and he was successful in the hardest fighting. The nucleus of the story recurs in Curtius (8. 10. 21) but in so contracted a form that it is impossible to use.

9. ἡπίστησεν Alexander's incredulity proved unfounded (for a similar case see 2. 7. 2). He did not discount Ptolemy's report completely and verify it independently (so Tonnet i 192). Rather he realized that there *was* a concentration of refugees (so Brunt) but considered that Ptolemy was wrong about the sheer number of camp-fires. The note of scepticism does not undermine Ptolemy's credit. Rather it underscores the enormous number of defenders whose refuge he had discovered.

τρίχα διανέμει The division of forces is only partially analysed. Leonnatus' contingent is described fully, as is Ptolemy's, but there is no hint of the composition of Alexander's own force or the group left to protect the camp. We also have to reckon with Craterus' force at Arigaeum which comprised heavy infantry (25. 5)—presumably the phalanx battalions of Alcetas and Polyperchon (see above, 23. 5 n.). It will not do to proceed by elimination, for the list of contingents which fell to Alexander's command at the great division is demonstrably defective (see above, 22. 7, 23. 1 with notes). Presumably Alexander reserved for himself the majority of the hypaspists and a substantial force of cavalry. He will also have needed light troops for skirmishing, to provide the cover that Balacrus gave to Leonnatus and the archers to Ptolemy; presumably he retained the remainder of the archers and any additional companies of light infantry. The *hippakontistai* (above, 23. 1) will also have accompanied his army group. One phalanx *taxis* (perhaps that of Coenus) may have remained in camp. But all is speculation. Ptolemy clearly concentrated upon the units under his own command, and Arrian felt no obligation to give a full tally even of what he found in his original.

10. τὴν Βαλάκρου Balacrus (Berve no. 202) was a specialist commander of javelin men. He is attested in that role at Gaugamela (3.

12. 3, 13. 5) and at the Iaxartes (4. 4. 6), and at Aornus he led a light reconnaissance company (Curt. 8. 11. 22). It was perverse of Berve (ii 101, after Kaerst, *RE* ii 2816) to deny that Balacrus here is the same individual and list him as a phalanx commander (so now Goukowsky, *REG* 100 (1987) 245). That would leave Leonnatus in command of phalanx troops only, with no missile support. *τάξις*, as Tarn (ii 144) observed, is an all-purpose word and can denote any unit of troops (see also *CQ* 23 (1973) 252).

τὴν Φιλίππου καὶ Φιλώτα τάξιν On Philotas' *taxis* (a unit of light-armed troops) see above, 3. 29. 7 n. Nothing is reported elsewhere about Philippus (Berve no. 784) or his *taxis*, but it is likely enough that it was also light-armed (so Tarn ii 144). His command should have belonged to the same category as Philotas'. Wherever Arrian uses the idiom *τὴν x καὶ y τάξιν*, it invariably denotes two (or more) commands of the same larger body of troops, which could be regarded as a single entity (1. 6. 10, 20. 5; 3. 24. 1, 25. 6; 4. 22. 1, 7, 24. 1, 25. 6; 5. 12. 2).

δύο χιλιαρχίας τῶν τοξοτῶν This is our only clue about the organization and numbers of the archers. Berve (i 133) notes correctly that it implies a total of at least three chiliarchies (they are described as *taxeis* at 5. 23. 7), but the upper limit is indefinite and there is no indication of what was the effective complement in each chiliarchy. Archers are a frequent component of Ptolemy's commands and are elsewhere associated with the entire body of Agrianians (3. 29. 7; 5. 23. 7). Given that he was attacking an entrenched position on the mountain, it was a logical combination.

25.2. *ὀρθίους ποιήσαντες τοὺς λόχους* 'arranging their companies in depth' (cf. 4. 4. 7: *ὀρθίαις ταῖς ἵλαις*). The Aspasians seem to have occupied the mountain side on a narrow front, so that they were massed in considerable depth. Their fighting units are appropriately described as *λόχοι* (cf. 1. 28. 5 on the Pisidians). The expression is borrowed from Xenophon who uses it of the Ten Thousand (*Anab.* 4. 2. 11, 3. 17, 8. 12-13; 5. 4. 22); and there has been a tendency to emend Arrian's text (*ποιήσας* Pflugk; *ποιήσαντας* Reiske) so that the phrase refers to Ptolemy's force. The Macedonians advanced in depth, exactly as the Ten Thousand did in similar circumstances (cf. 1. 28. 5 n.). But emendation is unnecessary. Even Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 5. 12. 2) uses the expression to describe manœuvres by non-Hellenic troops, and Arrian is emphasizing the strength of the enemy position: they occupied the high ground and occupied it in depth. At *λόχους* the explanation ends, and Arrian resumes his exposition emphatically with an asyndeton, implying rapid and immediate action by Ptolemy.

The text can be interpreted in a more cumbersome way, with the

manœuvre being referred to the Macedonians. Punctuate as follows: ἀλλά (γῆλοφον γὰρ εἶχον οἱ βάρβαροι) κτλ. This produces an anacoluthon; the sentence begins in the plural and reverts to the singular. As Grundmann (51) observed, there is an exact parallel in Herodotus (8. 83. 3); and, one may add, there are parallels for the explanatory γὰρ clause beginning immediately after the adversative conjunction (Hdt. 1. 191. 6; 6. 135. 3). This would give us a highly elaborate Herodotean pastiche, which is not unlikely in itself. But Arrian does not elsewhere provide an explanatory clause immediately after ἀλλά (the closest instance is at 5. 19. 5). Instead on literally dozens of occasions he uses ἀλλά . . . γὰρ as a strong adversative (Denniston 100 ff.), and so it can readily be understood here. I therefore incline to the first explanation, which has the result of emphasizing the difficulties of the assault.

3. ἀλκιμώτατοι τῶν προσχώρων 'by far the most warlike of the local population'. For πρόσχωροι in this sense (not 'neighbours') see 2. 3. 2; 3. 21. 7; 4. 29. 1; 6. 18. 1. These Aspasiens are contrasted with those encountered previously on the Alingar and the Kunar. But they are presumably the same people who were defeated by Alexander without effort (οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ). Ptolemy must have suffered casualties in his frontal assault, unlike Alexander, whose men escaped unscathed after an equally sharp battle. Accordingly he stressed the difference in the terrain and laid emphasis on the warlike qualities of the enemy.

4. ἀνθρώπους . . . μυριάδας These figures are usually accepted without comment as evidence of Ptolemy's documentary reliability (cf. Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 21 and Tonnet i 192, both accepting the figures for different reasons). But Arrian himself injects an element of scepticism; he does not give the figure on his own authority and names his source (cf. 1. 2. 7, 2. 11. 8 with notes). He was prudent to do so, for the numbers defy belief. Modern estimates of the total population of the 13,000 square kilometres of Bajaur hover around 100,000 (*Imperial Gazetteer of India* vi (Oxford 1908) 219-20), and a general massacre in the capital of Bajaur ordered by the emperor Babur (in January 1519) claimed only 3,000 victims. The 40,000 souls captured in this one action must be a gross exaggeration, so too the 230,000 cattle (where would the fodder be found in this single mountain refuge?). Ptolemy implied that his prudent reconnaissance and skilled leadership resulted in a quite extraordinary haul of booty. It was propaganda well suited to the contemporary world, where the king's duty was to increase the prosperity of his subjects by the spoils of war (cf. M. M. Austin, *CQ* 36 (1986) 459-65).

πέμψαι ἐθέλειν ἐς Μακεδονίαν Alexander followed good precedent in exploiting the best of the local livestock to improve agriculture at home (*Hell. Ox.* 17. 4-5; *Xen. Hell.* 3. 2. 26; cf. P. Ducrey, *Le*

Traitements des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique (Paris 1968) 87–92). He had consigned the mercenaries captured at the Granicus to forced labour upon the land (1. 16. 6 with note), and he intended the same for the Indian cattle. There is no suggestion that (as is sometimes supposed) he sent the animals home as breeding-stock. The cattle of Epirus were already celebrated (Arist. *HA* 3. 522^b16–21; see below, 2. 16. 6 n.), and the purity of the breed was carefully preserved in the 400-strong royal herd (Arist. *HA* 9. 595^b18–21). The Indian cattle, as Arrian states, were intended for agricultural work. Whether they were actually sent off or reached Macedonia we cannot say. At all events they made an impression upon Ptolemy, who may have procured some for Egypt. At the grand procession of his son, Philadelphus, there were twenty-six pure white oxen from India (Athen. 5. 201 c = *FGrH* 627 F 2 (32)). They were paraded as exotica, but they may have been the pick of a larger herd (for the Ptolemies' importation of livestock see Rostovtzeff, *SEHWW* i 387–9).

5. τῶν Ἀσσακηνῶν The Assaceni (so Arrian spells the name here, at 5. 20. 7, and at *Ind.* 1. 1, 8) are more usually termed Assacani (at 4. 30. 5; so Strabo 15. 1. 17 (698)), and their homonymous king always appears as Assacanus (Arr. 4. 27. 4, 30. 5; Curt. 8. 20. 22; Strabo loc. cit.). Whatever the true spelling (if there is one), it is a Greek approximation to the Sanskrit *Aśvaka* (Lassen ii* 137–8, universally accepted). The people were certainly located in the valley of the Swat, above its confluence with the Panjkora (see Map 4), their territory extending eastwards as far as the Indus (cf. 4. 28. 6 n.).

We are not informed how Alexander obtained his information about the intentions of the Assaceni. He may have sent scouts ahead, but the detailed figures given for the military resources of the enemy suggest that there were local informants. Possibly the Guraei, who did not apparently offer any resistance (see below), were willing to collaborate against their neighbours and advance what knowledge they had of the intentions and forces of the Assaceni.

τριάκοντα δὲ ἐλέφαντας See below 4. 27. 9, 30. 5. The elephants were never used. Once the decision had been made to avoid a pitched battle (25. 7), they were removed to secure havens in the rear.

6. αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος ... Ἀσσακηνοῦς Something is missing, either fallen from the extant text or omitted by Arrian himself. Alexander's force must be contrasted with some other contingent or contingents. As the text stands, the antithesis is between Alexander and Craterus; the latter brought up the heavy infantry and siege engines, while Alexander himself moved against the Assaceni. Nothing is stated about a division of the army, yet a division there must

have been. As the text stands, Alexander does not have the hypaspists with him (they re-emerge under his command at 26. 6). Nor is anything said about the battalions of Alcetas (cf. 27. 1) and Attalus (24. 1, 10), the units of light infantry mentioned at 24. 10, or the horse archers (24. 10). It looks as though Alexander once again detached Craterus to command a second column. The battalions of Coenus and Polyperchon, which had served under Craterus on the Alingar and Kunar (see above, 23. 5 n., 24. 6), now went ahead with Alexander. After the hard marching and hill fighting of the previous campaign, with much of the infantry mounted for greater speed (23. 2, 24. 5), it was prudent to reverse the commands. The hypaspists and the two phalanx battalions which had served with Alexander now went into the slower supporting contingent, while the battalions of Coenus and Polyperchon had their turn in the forward column. There was a (partial) reunion at Massaga, where Alexander was reinforced by the hypaspists and the battalion of Alcetas and (after the first assault) could call upon the services of his siege train (26. 5). Either Arrian or his source is avoiding any reference to the support column in order to place the focus squarely on Alexander. Arrian's technique of selective narrative might be at fault, but the misunderstanding at 26. 5 (τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ) is easier to explain if Ptolemy (or Aristobulus) said little or nothing about the movements of the second column and brought in the siege engines without any indication of how they had arrived.

τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς χιλίους The text as it stands implies that the Agrianians numbered 1,000 in all. That is possible in itself: 1,000 Agrianians are attested under Tauron's command late in 331 (Curt. 5. 3. 6), and the corps may have been expanded since the Hellespont crossing, when, according to Diodorus' suspect testimony (17. 17. 4; see above, 1. 6. 6 n.), archers and Agrianians together had numbered only 1,000. By 327 there were at least three chiliarchies of archers (24. 10), and it is reasonable enough that Agrianian numbers were also increased as Alexander's army was massively reinforced between 333 and 331. There are not sufficient grounds for emendation. Tarn's conviction (ii 193 n. 1) that the expression is impossible has been widely shared, but it has been adequately refuted by Roös, who adduced an exact parallel (1. 14. 1: τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς). Krüger suggested emending to τοὺς ψιλούς (as at 30. 6; see also 4. 4. 6, 29. 1), but there is no obvious reason for corruption (Roös was wrong to change his mind in his *editio minor*). No emendation yet suggested is any improvement on the received text.

διὰ τῆς Γουραίων χώρας The homonymous river Guræus (25. 7) has traditionally (and rightly) been identified as the modern Panjkora, Gauri in the *Mahabharata*, which associates it with the Suvastu, or Swat (*Mahab.* 6. 91. 333 (§574) cf. Lassen ii² 140-1, n. 6). The

Guraei would have occupied the territory between Bajaur and the Katgala pass, which probably divided their territory from that of the Assaceni in the Swāt (see Map 4); their domains would have corresponded roughly to the modern province of Dir (*Imperial Gazetteer of India* xi (Oxford 1908) 360-1), an alluvial plain joined by numerous rich lateral valleys scarcely less fertile than neighbouring Swat. Alexander probably followed the northern fringes of the Kohimor and continued down the Jandul valley to the Panjkora (Caroe, *Pathans* 51).

7. χαλεπῶς διέβη Cf. 3. 7. 5 (Tigris), 29. 3-4 (Oxus); 5. 20. 8-9 (Acesines). The latter passage is explicitly taken from Ptolemy (*FGrH* 138 F 22), who apparently had a professional interest in river crossings. It is interesting that the Panjkora caused so much difficulty. In modern times the rivers lose their summer spate by September and the Swat is 'fordable almost everywhere by midwinter' (*Imperial Gazetteer of India* xxiii 187). The Macedonians probably chose an excessively narrow part of the river for their crossing and were unpleasantly surprised by the strength of the current and the slippery conditions underfoot.

ἄθροοι μὲν . . . ἐτόλμησαν For Arrian the news of Alexander's approach is sufficient to disperse the enemy forces. Curtius (8. 10. 22; so *Metz Epit.* 39) very plausibly adds that the local ruler had recently died. There is nothing in Arrian to controvert this. The local leader killed during the siege (27. 2 n.) was clearly the army commander at Massaga, not the ruler of the territory (as assumed by Droysen i² 2. 111 and Anspach 25 n. 73). Nor can the prince of the Assaceni readily be identified with the hyparch of the Aspasii who was killed by Ptolemy (24. 3; so Lassen ii² 145; Berve ii 89, no. 202). He probably died in his capital shortly before Alexander's invasion, and with his passing disappeared any semblance of unity among the Assaceni.

26. 1. ἐπὶ Μάσσαγα There are variant spellings of the name (see Roos's apparatus), but general agreement that Massaga was the capital of the Assaceni (*Arr. Ind.* 1. 8; Strabo 15. 1. 27 (698); cf. *Metz Epit.* 39). The precise site is difficult to establish. Stein (*Alexander's Track* 44) was right to go no further than the general area of the lower Swat. Caroe (*Pathans* 52-3) essayed a precise identification immediately east of the Katgala pass, on the grounds that there is nothing in Arrian to suggest a campaign near the river Swat. Where Caroe located Massaga, the Wuch Khwar (see Map 4) makes a natural moat to the east, as described by Curtius (8. 10. 23), and the terrain is intersected by deep ravines. There are ruins, but not apparently traces of the formidable defensive system, which is also described by Curtius (8. 10. 25-6); and it is questionable

whether the modest Wuch Khwar may be identified with the Maśakavati, known from Sanskrit sources as the river of Massaga (Lassen i² 502 n. 5; V. S. Agrawala, *India as Known to Pāṇini* (Lucknow 1953) 42). Caroe's hypothesis has been cautiously accepted (Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 66; G. Tucci, *East & West* 27 (1977) 41-2), but it is best to leave it as a somewhat dubious possibility.

τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πρόσω Ἰνδῶν 'mercenaries from the Indians who lived beyond'. The expression is deliberately vague (Krüger's *πρὸς ἔω* adds unnecessary precision). Arrian's sources had no idea of the origins of these mercenaries. We may think of the principality of Abisares (27. 7, 30. 7 n.) or even the peoples of the mountains to the north, but there is no proof. They are most unlikely to have come from the country under Taxiles or the parts of the Cophen valley overrun by Hephaestion and Perdiccas. According to the *Metz Epitome* (39) they had been recruited by the deceased king's brother and numbered 9,000—a figure not incompatible with Arrian's 7,000. Most sources agree that they were responsible for the tenacity of the defence (cf. 27. 3 n.). Curtius, however, does not mention them at all, but lays the emphasis upon the romantic figure of Queen Cleophis. She becomes the chief agent in the defence (so, more briefly, Justin 12. 7. 9), and the role of the mercenaries, which the vulgate tradition dealt with fully (see particularly *Metz Epit.* 42-5; Diod. 17. 84), is omitted. The romantic meeting of Alexander and Cleophis, already a feature of the early vulgate (see below, 27. 4 n.), was developed and concentrated in the later tradition (thanks to Timagenes?), and other elements of the story, even the massacre of the mercenaries, disappeared.

2. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος κτλ. This stratagem and its successful outcome is only found in Arrian. Other sources concentrate upon the more spectacular episodes of the later siege, where Alexander was less dramatically successful. It is clear that this was a relatively brief skirmish, fought by Alexander with the relatively small advance force he had brought with him from the Panjkora (see above, 25. 6 n.). The defenders of Massaga were heartened by the paucity of the attacking army (cf. 27. 8) as much as by the absence of an immediate attack. Alexander's first plan must have been to pin the population in their capital until the rest of the column and the siege engines arrived. The sudden sortie was an unexpected bonus, and he exploited the defenders' error to the full. Arrian's source related the incident at some length, emphasizing the cost to the attacking force. It helped mitigate the subsequent grim siege work with its frequent set-backs and not inconsiderable losses; the action had begun with a brilliant success won by a small force with practically no casualties.

ἐγίνωνσκεν γὰρ ἔσομένην Arrian immediately negates any sug-

gestion that the rout might not have taken place. The hypothetical force of the conditional clause is cancelled at the outset.

πρὸς γήλοφόν τινα This was the hill on which the mercenaries made their last, fatal stand (27. 3). For an attempt at an identification see Caroe, *Pathans* 53.

4. τῷ τε παραλόγῳ For the very similar reaction of the mercenaries at the Granicus compare 1. 16. 2 (*ἐκπλήξει . . . τοῦ παραλόγου*).

προσῆγε τῷ τείχει At this point begins the siege narrative of the vulgate tradition (Curt. 8. 10. 27; cf. *Metz Epit.* 40) which has Alexander make a careful reconnaissance of the walls before attacking. If Curtius is right in his description (and the difficulties described by Arrian offer some corroboration), the walls of Massaga were a formidable complex of mud brick reinforced by a wooden superstructure and supported on a foundation of stone (Curt. 8. 10. 25-6; *Metz Epit.* 40), and there was also a defensive moat (8. 10. 24). Alexander cannot have contemplated an immediate attack. He needed time for his heavy column to arrive with its siege equipment and also time to prepare the ground for the assault. In Arrian there is no intermission. The day after Alexander's wound the attack on the walls begins. A siege tower appears from nowhere on the second day of the bombardment and by the third the hypaspists are present in force (26. 6: see above, 25. 6 n.).

By contrast Curtius (8. 10. 30-1) records a nine-day interlude during which the buildings outside the city walls were demolished to fill the moat and siege towers were constructed. That is what is required if we are to make sense of Arrian's siege description. There must have been several days' delay while the towers were built (cf. 26. 6 n.), in the course of which Craterus brought up the main army and the specialist siege engineers (cf. 25. 4). In that case Arrian is misleading. I can only assume that he changed sources at the end of 26. 5, reverting to an account which dealt with the preparations for the siege and then began the action the following day (*τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ*). Arrian chose it because of its highly coloured description of the siege which was presumably described in less detail (and with less emphasis on Macedonian set-backs) in his other sources. This second source could even be Nearchus, who may have witnessed the event and had no qualms about recording Macedonian casualties.

τοξεύεται . . . ἐς τὸ σφυρόν The wound is also reported by Curtius (8. 10. 28-9) and in the *Metz Epitome* (40), both claiming that it bled profusely and was acutely painful. On this occasion (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 341 B) the injury was compared with Aphrodite's superficial but painful wrist wound at the hands of Diomedes (*Il.* 5. 339-40). In Plutarch and his derivatives the analogy is drawn by Alexander himself and is directed sarcastically against his flatterers: 'this is human blood, not "ichor" such as flows in the veins of the

blessed gods' (Plut. *Mor.* 180 E, 341 B; *Al.* 28. 2; cf. Dio Chrys. 64. 21; Zonaras 4. 10). Other versions make Alexander the butt of the sarcasm, which is placed in the mouth of Anaxarchus (Diog. Laert. 9. 60) or even Callisthenes (Sen. *Suas.* 1. 5). Aristobulus (*FGrH* 139 F 47), however, represented the quotation itself as flattery and attributed it to the Athenian pancratiast, Dioxippus. Now, Dioxippus (Berve no. 284) is a relatively obscure individual, unlikely to have been adduced as the author of the quotation if the story is fiction (so Brown, in *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 86-7; Badian, in *Edson Studies* 64). Tarn (ii 358 n. 5; so Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 74) accordingly argued that the immediate source, Athenaeus, only gave half of Aristobulus' story: Dioxippus made the flattering analogy but Alexander immediately snubbed him—'it's blood, not ichor'. That, as Brown (*loc. cit.*) has observed, is to pervert the clear sense of Athenaeus, who (as the preceding anecdote (6. 250 F-251 A) shows) was ready to cite an apposite retort by the king.

The context of the quotation in the *Iliad* suggests flattery very strongly, not a sarcastic antithesis of blood and ichor. Homer describes the shedding of the goddess's immortal blood (αἷμα) and remarks that what flowed in her veins was ichor. In fact ichor *was* the immortals' blood. The most probable occasion for Dioxippus' quotation is Alexander's complaint about the very human pain of his wound at Massaga (Curt. 8. 10. 29). Dioxippus then suggested that the blood was ichor, a mark of immortality, and invoked Homer's description of the wounding of Aphrodite: even an Olympian could experience intolerable pain. In the later transmission of the story Dioxippus was forgotten, and the quotation was grafted on to Alexander's (temporary) admission of his human frailty or turned into a moral admonition. Whatever interpretation one accepts, the anecdote is colourful evidence of the adulatory atmosphere which pervaded Alexander's court at this period (see above, 8. 3, 9. 7-9, 10. 6 with notes).

In Arrian the bare fact of the wound is reported with a note that it was not serious. There is no hint of the analogy with Aphrodite, and it is more than likely that he did not draw upon Aristobulus at all.

5. οὐκ ἀτόλμως . . . ἡμύνοντο The resistance is less determined in Curtius (8. 10. 31-3; so Metz *Epil.* 41-2), who emphasizes the psychological effect of the siege engines upon the defenders. But his account is contracted. The siege towers are used at once, whereas in Arrian they make their appearance on the second day of the siege proper. Nor is there any mention of the assault bridges that play so vital a role in Arrian's account, which is far preferable to the rhetorically condensed version of Curtius.

πύργος . . . ξύλινος This was an assault tower, mounted on wheels

and powered by a large capstan worked from the interior. It was clearly one of the *helepoleis* which Poseidonius (Berve no. 656) is said to have built for Alexander (Biton, in Marsden, *Technical Treatises* 70-3 = pp. 52-6 (Wescher)). Poseidonius' tower was built on a rectangular base, 50 feet by 60 and rose to a height of 50 feet. It was crammed with archers and anti-personnel catapults (τόξοται καὶ βέλη), apparently discharging both javelins and stones. The latter are only attested in *Metz Epitome* 42 (*saxa nervis missa scorpionis*), but the report is not intrinsically implausible; M. Pöhlmann (*Untersuchungen zur älteren Geschichte des antiken Belagerungsgeschützes* (Diss. Erlangen 1912) 38-9), had inferred their use on *a priori* grounds (*contra* Y. Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris 1974) 215 n. 3). Alexander's towers were probably a prototype of the *helepolis* used at Salamis by Demetrius, which had heavy stone-throwers mounted on the lower levels and lighter catapults in the upper storeys (Diod. 20. 48. 3; cf. Garlan 229). At Massaga the stone-throwers will have extended the damage inflicted on the walls by the rams during the previous day, while the archers and javelin-throwers stripped the battlements of defenders in preparation for the lowering of the assault bridges.

6. ἀπὸ μηχανῆς γέφυραν The assault bridges (technically termed ἐπιβάθραι, as at 27. 1, below) were designed to be lowered at the level of the wall. They were kept within the body of the tower while it was propelled to its position and then let drop on to the battlements (Biton, pp. 55. 8-56. 8 (Wescher); see the illustration in Marsden, *Technical Treatises* 87). The troops in the assault group were fed up the tower to the level of the bridge (Vitruv. 10. 13. 2, quoting Diades), protected from defensive fire by the fabric of the building; and the bridge itself was wide enough to permit a number of troops to attack abreast (see below). The disadvantage was that each tower had to be custom made. According to Poseidonius the height of the walls should be carefully calculated and the assault bridge designed to be lowered at precisely that point (Biton pp. 52. 5-7, 55. 9-11). Diades' ἐπιβάθραι were presumably more sophisticated than Poseidonius' drawbridges (cf. Athen. Mech. pp. 10. 12, 15. 5-7; Vitruv. 10. 13. 8), but even they could not be conjured to appear overnight.

Τύρον ὡσαύτως ἐξεῖλον Cf. 2. 23. 4, 22. 7 with notes ad loc.

ἄχθος λαβοῦσα μείζον The construction of the bridge was too flimsy for the press of attackers. Its collapse was a sign of extreme haste but was hardly unique. For a similar episode in the triumphal period compare Appian, *Ill.* 19-20, 55-8. That passage is heavily overlaid with imaginative embroidery (cf. *HSCP* 81 (1977) 253-4), but it presupposes that the collapsing assault bridge was a regular phenomenon in warfare.

7. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι Arrian's account is vivid and rhetorical, emphas-

izing the intensity of the hail of variegated missiles and the many directions of the Indian attack. His source implied a large number of Macedonian casualties and underscored Alexander's need to send an entire phalanx battalion to retrieve the wounded and halt the attack (27. 1). This contrasts sharply with earlier passages in which Macedonian losses are omitted or palliated (see above, 1. 21. 3; 2. 23. 6; 3. 18. 3 nn.); here the tendency is to highlight the carnage suffered by the Macedonians.

27. 2. ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ χωρίου This was clearly the commander of the forces at Massaga, not a member of the ruling dynasty (see above, 25. 7 n.). It is not unlikely that his death weakened the morale of the defenders, so that the mercenaries opened negotiations with Alexander. What follows in Arrian is clearly not the surrender of the city, which in his version never took place (27. 4 n.), but an armistice covering the Indian mercenaries only. Faced with hopeless odds, they made their peace with the victor independently of their employers. In the vulgate tradition it is the queen who negotiates (Curt. 8. 10. 33; Diod. 17. 84. 1), apparently against the wishes of the mercenaries (*Metz Epil.* 42-3); and the mercenaries are included in the general capitulation.

3. ἀσμένῳ γίνεται Diodorus (84. 2) claims that Alexander's hostility to the mercenaries was unchanged by the capitulation. Given the sequel, that is only too likely. Even on Arrian's account Alexander acted upon a report of the mercenaries' desertion; he gave them no time for second thoughts but cut them down in the night. His eagerness to preserve them evaporated once they were out of the walls of Massaga. That casts doubt upon the nature of the agreement. Other sources agree that it allowed the mercenaries to leave the city under arms (Polyaen. 4. 3. 20; *Metz Epil.* 43; cf. Diod. 84. 2), but there is no suggestion that they agreed to serve in Alexander's army. If Arrian is right, the Indians violated the terms of the agreement (which they possibly misunderstood: so Tarn i 89), and Alexander adjudged it null and void. On the other hand the vulgate tradition has some plausibility. The defence of Massaga, thanks to the mercenaries' resistance, had been the most stubborn yet encountered by Alexander in India and it had caused him personal injury. An object-lesson would be in keeping with his actions elsewhere (see above, 23. 5, 24. 2 nn.). He would negotiate to allow the mercenaries out of the city, but then he massacred them ruthlessly in violation of the truce. That is the verdict of Plutarch (*Al.* 59. 6-7), who remarks that the episode is a blemish (κηλὶς) upon Alexander's military reputation. The blemish was not the massacre *per se* but the apparent breach of a formal truce. That is mitigated in Arrian's account, where the mercenaries themselves plan to disregard the compact

(as—significantly—do the defenders of Aornus (see below, 30. 2 with note)); the bad faith originates with them, not with the king, who wished to save them. It is most likely that this version is tainted by apologetic, the same tendency which omits the attempt of another group of mercenaries to surrender at the Granicus (cf. 1. 16. 2 n.) and makes Alexander bend heaven and earth to save the Thebans from themselves (1. 7. 10 n.). In both cases the source is probably Ptolemy, and Arrian's account of the fate of the Indian mercenaries may well also derive from him.

ξὺν αὐτῷ στρατεύεσθαι Cf. 1. 19. 6, where Alexander takes pity on the mercenaries at Miletus and enrolls them in his army as a tribute to their bravery. If this passage is apologetic, it was perhaps inspired by the events at Miletus. See also 3. 25. 4, where Alexander enlists some of the mercenaries who surrendered in Hyrcania but discharges those whose service under Persian command had begun before 337 (which refutes Hammond's strange contention (*KCS* 205) 'that any commander dealing with mercenaries of any race has only two courses, absorption or elimination').

κατεστρατοπέδευσαν . . . ἐπὶ γηλόφῳ So Polyæn. 4. 3. 20. This is presumably the hill seven stades from the Macedonian camp, which is mentioned at 26. 2. Diodorus (86. 1) places the encampment eighty stades from Massaga, presumably an error of his own or his copyists, not taken from his source (*contra* Hammond, *Three Historians* 53); *Metz Epitome* 43 locates it 'at no great distance' from the city. According to the vulgate the mercenaries brought with them their wives, children, and camp followers, who were placed in the middle of the encampment and escaped the general massacre (Diod. 84. 3, 5-6; *Metz Epit.* 45).

4. κατακόπτει τοὺς Ἰνδοῦς The massacre is attested in all sources but Curtius and Justin, and (Arrian excepted) they give prominence to the protests of the mercenaries at Alexander's violation of the oaths (Diod. 84. 3; Polyæn. 4. 3. 20; *Metz Epit.* 44). The king's reply is reported with slight variants but the general sense is clear: he had given them the right to leave the city but not to depart altogether (Polyæn. and *Metz Epit.*: Diodorus claims 'not to be friends of the Macedonians for ever'). In any case it was a quibble. Alexander cites the letter of the agreement which probably *was* safe conduct out of the city and maintains that the agreement ends at the city walls (compare his solution of the Gordian knot: 2. 3. 7 with note).

αἶρεῖ κατὰ κράτος This is unique to Arrian. Other sources (Diod. 84. 1; *Metz Epit.* 42-4; Curt. 8. 10. 33-4) state that the city was surrendered and never taken by storm. Instead of capturing the city Alexander was received by the queen regent and the local dignitaries, who formally welcomed him (*Metz Epit.* 45; Curt. 8. 10. 34). If

Arrian is correct, the mercenaries deserted the city, leaving it defenceless against the Macedonian army. On the other hand, if the vulgate tradition is accepted, the apologetic element in Arrian deepens. The city was formally surrendered and the mercenaries were included in that general surrender. Their subsequent massacre was a violation of the spirit of the agreement and a breach of faith. Arrian's source therefore had the mercenaries desert the city and threaten to violate the compact with their new employer. Their massacre had some—inadequate—justification, and their desertion left Massaga defenceless against the final assault.

τὴν μητέρα . . . καὶ τὴν παῖδα The queen's name is given as Cleophis (Curt. 8. 10. 22; *Metz Epit.* 39, 41–2; Justin 12. 7. 9–11; cf. Berve no. 435). Diodorus (84. 1) stresses her admiration of Alexander's magnanimity, Curtius (8. 10. 35) Alexander's admiration of her beauty; and Justin alleges that the city's surrender was consummated in a sexual union. Her daughter is not mentioned elsewhere: Curtius (8. 10. 35) reports a son and *Metz Epitome* (45) a grandson.

ἐς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν Sir Aurel Stein (*Alexander's Track* 45–6) emphasizes the minimal number of casualties 'in spite of the valour shown by the defenders': rightly so. Arrian mentions three successive days of attack on the walls of Massaga and notes the casualties resulting from the collapsed assault bridge (26. 7 n.); nor can the massacre of the mercenaries have been achieved without losses (cf. Diod. 84. 3–5; *Metz Epit.* 45). The twenty-five deaths in the entire siege recall the 400 allegedly suffered in the seven months of the siege of Tyre (cf. 2. 24. 4 with note). The figure is clearly minimized and may well derive from Ptolemy, who seems to have glossed over the hardships of the siege (cf. 26. 2 n.).

5. ὡς ἐπὶ Βάζιρα Bazira (Beira in Curt. 8. 10. 22) was identified by Stein (*Alexander's Track* 46–8) as the ancient stronghold of Birkot, immediately south of the river Swat, some 20 km. upstream from Chakdarra (see Map 4). The identification, philologically convincing, was confirmed by a late (tenth-century AD) inscription referring to the site as 'Vajirasthana', i.e. the place Vajira (G. Tucci, *East & West* 9 (1958) 327 n. 28; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 67).

According to Arrian Coenus was sent out after the siege of Massaga. Curtius (8. 10. 22) maintains that Alexander 'left him' (*reliquit*) in charge of the siege of Beira (Bazira) before he began to attack Massaga. Radet (*JSt* 1930. 255) differed from Stein (48) and most scholars in opting for Curtius' version; Coenus' mission, he argued, would have prevented any diversion from the upper Swat valley—and also kept the population of Bazira from escaping into the mountains (cf. 28. 1). Alexander's movements at this stage are not clear. There is an apparent hiatus before he leads his army to

the siege of Ora. *Metz Epitome* 45 may be correct that he stayed in Massaga for several days after its surrender, but it makes more sense if the attacks on Bazira and Ora had begun before Massaga itself fell and Alexander then chose which site would suffer his presence (and his siege train) first. It is possible that the reference to Coenus was retrospective; Arrian's source (Ptolemy?) stated that Coenus had been sent to Bazira and Alexander hoped that the news of Massaga's fall would bring its submission.

Ἄτταλον . . . ἐπὶ Ὄρα στέλλει Ora (*Horā* at *Itin.* 107, *Nora* or *nra* at Curt. 8. 11. 1) was located by Stein (*Alexander's Track* 53-61) at Ude-gram, a little distance up the Swat valley from Bazira. There is as yet no corroboration of the hypothesis, but the general position must be correct. Ora lay in the Swat valley and was accessible from Massaga (Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 67). Caroc's alternative location (*Pathans* 54-5) in Buner is much too distant.

Attalus, Alcetas, and Demetrius were certainly despatched to Ora after the siege of Massaga, at which Alcetas was active (27. 1). But they may not have begun the operations. Curtius (8. 11. 1) alleges that Polyperchon was sent against 'Nora', that he defeated the inhabitants (cf. Arr. 27. 6), and took the city by storm (Arr. 27.9). Stein (*Alexander's Track* 59) was clearly wrong to cast doubt on the identification with Ora. Curtius' report is contracted and possibly garbled, but it coheres in outline with Arrian except that all operations are attributed to Polyperchon. This may well contain a nucleus of truth. Polyperchon and Coenus were the phalanx commanders with Alexander in his push from the Guræus (25. 6 n.); both could have been sent to begin operations at other centres of resistance while the main body of the army was engaged in the siege of Massaga. In that case, after the fall of the capital Polyperchon was reinforced by two further battalions and a force of cavalry while Alexander moved on Bazira with the main army.

6. ὑπερύψηλον The superlative is justified. The hill of Bir-kot towers above the river Swat to a height of over 900 m., with 'precipitous rocky slopes' on the north side and 'unscalable crags' to the south (see Stein, *Alexander's Track* 36-7 with figs. 17-19 for a description of the ancient fortifications).

7. πρὸς Ἀβισάρου Abisares (Berve no. 2) was ruler of the people known as Abhisara (*Ἀβισσαρεῖς* at *Ind.* 4. 12), located in the mountain country above the territory of Taxiles (Onesicritus, *FGrH* 134 F 16a; cf. 5. 8. 3 n.). His realm is located in modern Hazara (see Map 4), its western frontier defined by the Indus (cf. Stein, *Alexander's Track* 122-3; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 113-14). Allied with Porus (cf. 5. 22. 2; Diod. 87. 2), he was a natural enemy of Taxiles and his Macedonian overlord, and he later gave sanctuary to refugees from Buner (see below, 30. 7 n.). The mercenaries at Massaga may even

have come from his domains (26. 1 n.); and, if so, it is understandable that Alexander took prompt action at the news that another contingent was on its way to reinforce the Assaceni. These forces were actually dispatched (ἐσταλμένοι) by Abisares, not merely 'instigated' as Stein would interpret the passage (45, 58-9; so Eggermont, *OLP* 15 (1984) 200), and, if truly reported, the action was a severe provocation. But there is no hint that Abisares' troops reached Ora and the ease of its capture strongly suggests that there was no reinforcement.

ὥς μὴ ἄδεια εἶη The siege of Bazira is in fact abandoned. Alexander leaves a small force to deny the inhabitants use of their land and (as Stein, *Alexander's Track* 46, inferred) to prevent any interruption to operations at Ora. Their turn would come later.

8. ἐς πεντακοσίους This was a major victory, eclipsing Alexander's first success at Massaga (26. 4) and rivalling Coenus' own defeat of Spitamenes (17. 6); and it was achieved by a handful of troops. It is unfortunate that their commander is not named.

28. 1. ἔφυγον δὲ ἐς τὴν πέτρην Gronovius excised these words as a gloss, anticipating the fuller statement in the next sentence, and he was followed by all editors until Roos restored the manuscript reading in his *editio maior*. The words may well be spurious. As the text stands, it implies that the rock which the people of Bazira chose as their refuge was something other than the rock of Aornus. Otherwise one would expect some reference to the identity of the two rocks—and also to have the name Aornus given at the outset (as at 18. 4 and 21. 1). The implication is that the people of Bazira fled to *their* rock, while the rest of the population of the upper Swat fled to the rock named Aornus. In that case the rock which served the refugees from Bazira can only have been Mt. Ilam (so Stein, *GJ* 70 (1927) 432), immediately to the south and immediately accessible from Bir-kot. The other rock, Aornus, was something different (see below), chosen by the natives of the upper valley who did not have such direct access to Mt. Ilam. But the received text remains very clumsy and one would expect some further specification of the place of refuge. There could be a lacuna after πέτρην, into which some defining phrase has disappeared, but it is probably best to hypothesize a gloss. In that case Arrian gave no indication of the destination of the refugees from Bazira; they merely evacuated their city, as did the other natives of the area, who converged on Aornus. Whichever alternative one accepts, the location of Bazira cannot be used as a pointer to the identification of Aornus.

τὴν Ἀορνὸν καλουμένην In a classic piece of topographical investigation Sir Aurel Stein argued that Arrian's Aornus must be identified with the spur of Pir-sar overlooking the Indus due east of

the upper reaches of the Swat (*GJ* 70 (1927) 417-39, 515-40; *Alexander's Track* 113-54). His results were immediately accepted as conclusive (cf. Radet, *JS* 1929. 69-73), and have only recently been challenged. G. Tucci (*East & West* 27 (1977) 52-5) and P. H. L. Eggermont (*OLP* 15 (1984) 191-200, tentatively endorsed by E. Badian, *CQ* 37 (1987) 117 n. 1) have argued for Mt. Ilam, immediately to the south of Bazira and Ora and, at 3,000 m., the most prominent peak of the region (described by Stein, *Alexander's Track* 168-71). The following considerations seem to me decisive:

(i) The Indus flowed at the foot of Aornus. That is attested in the vulgate tradition, which alleges that the river washes its southern side (Diod. 85. 3; Curt. 8. 11. 7). The statement could be dismissed as imaginative fabrication (so Eggermont, *OLP* 15 (1984) 191), were there not independent corroboration from Strabo (15. 1. 8 (688)), who is here reporting Eratosthenes' criticisms of the Alexander historians (see below, 28. 2; 5. 3. 2-4 with notes): 'a rock named Aornus under whose roots flows the Indus near its sources' (*radices eius Indus amnis subit*—Curtius). This description fully fits the site of Pir-sar, which lies on a bend of the Indus and 'the portion of this bend which a force coming up the Indus valley would first reach lies due south of Pir-sar' (Stein, *Alexander's Track* 143). Arrian's report of the siege, it is true, does not mention the river, but his narrative of the preliminaries has Alexander move towards the Indus and subjugate a number of small settlements before turning to the assault upon Aornus (28. 6 with notes). Such operations are consistent with a push northwards along the Indus to Pir-sar but cannot be reconciled with an attack on Mt. Ilam, some 40 km. west as the crow flies from the Indus.

(ii) Mt. Ilam is too close to the Macedonian operations in Swat. It may have provided a temporary refuge for the fugitives from Bazira (see above), but it is most unlikely to have been chosen as a permanent haven. It was sandwiched between Alexander's forces in the Swat valley and the armies of Hephaestion and Perdiccas which now controlled the main road down the Cophen valley (28. 5 n.). Fugitives there could expect attack from at least two directions. On the other hand Pir-sar is remote from Alexander's chosen crossing-point, his ultimate destination in Gandhara, and is accessible to refugees from the upper Swat, who would have crossed the watershed into the Ghorband valley and found their way down the river systems to the Indus (Stein, *Alexander's Track* 122). There they might have hoped to weather the storm of the invasion. But the very inaccessibility of the fortress proved a challenge to Alexander. He would give an object-lesson that no refuge would be proof against his sovereignty (see above, 23. 2 n.).

Pir-sar, then, has the advantages of proximity to the Indus and

geographical remoteness which no other candidate for Aornus can boast to an equal degree (for a review of earlier identifications see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 152-3), and it fits the descriptions of Aornus to be found in the historical sources (see below, 28. 3 nn.). It would be utopian to claim certainty, but Stein's location is far more convincing than any other as yet suggested.

The Greek *Ἀορνός* (*Ἀορνός* in the vulgate) is clearly an approximation to a native name. The most favoured candidate is the Sanskrit *avarana* (Lassen ii² 148 n. 3; Tomaschek, *RE* i 2359; Radet, *JS* 1930. 225 n. 6; Charpentier, *JRAS* 1931. 940), meaning 'stronghold', which Stein (*Alexander's Track* 152) argued was contracted into the local name Una, 'applied to the peak rising immediately above Pirsar'. Whatever the original, the Greek version had a whimsical attraction, suggesting that the fortress was too high for birds to surmount (cf. Philostr. *VA* 2. 10 for further embroidery of the theme). There was a parallel, perhaps familiar to Alexander's men, in the Iranian name for the Hindu Kush: *Uparisena*, 'too high for the eagle' (Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 336). See also 3. 29. 1 for Aornus, the second city of Bactria; the Iranian name must have had a similar ring to that of the Indian mountain fortress.

μέγα . . . χρήμα πέτρας The Herodotean tone of the narrative is reinforced by one of Herodotus' most characteristic idioms; cf. Hdt. 1. 36. 1 (*ὅς χρήμα γίνεται μέγα*) with Stein's note ad loc.

οὐδὲ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Διὸς ἄλωτόν The local stories that Aornus had proved impregnable for Heracles were clearly reported in Arrian's source. The theme is resumed a few sentences later (28. 4) and at the end of the section (30. 4), and it is most unlikely that it was grafted into the narrative by Arrian himself, inspired by the criticisms of Eratosthenes (see below). The example of Heracles must have been a familiar *topos*. It is reported in similar terms throughout the vulgate tradition (Diod. 85. 2; Curt. 8. 11. 2; Justin 12. 7. 12-13; *Metz Epit.* 46-7) and should have been retailed by Arrian's sources, not least Nearchus who emphasized Alexander's susceptibility to Greek interpretations of local legends (see below, 6. 24. 2-3 with notes). There can be no doubt that there were local myths celebrating the impregnability of Aornus, perhaps exaggerated in, the mistaken hope of deterring Alexander from attacking, and that the local deity associated with the rock was identified as Heracles in Alexander's entourage. Whether that deity was Krishna (most probably the model for Megasthenes' Heracles) must remain an open question (Karttunen 211-12). Dahlquist's attempt (120-30) to prove that it was the sky-god Indra must be adjudged a failure, not least because in his story the god is ultimately victorious (cf. S. S. Hartman, *Temenos* 1 (1965) 55-64). It is perfectly possible that legends relating to different deities in different areas were integrated

in the person of the Greek Heracles. Once Alexander's men had inferred the presence of the king's ancestor they would be alert for traces of his passage. The worship of Śiva in lower India (see below, 5. 3. 4 n.) will have reinforced the conviction that Heracles had visited the far east, and as a result the Theban Heracles was assimilated to yet another deity. He was a generous host and could accommodate himself to any number of local manifestations.

2. ἐς οὐδέτερα ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι Arrian here inserts a piece of Eratosthenes' criticism, which he gives in context at *Ind.* 5. 10 (more of the critique recurs at 5. 3. 1-4). Eratosthenes' arguments (also retailed by Strabo 15. 1. 7-9 (687-8)) centred on the contradictions in the primary histories and the omission of the themes in some of the more authoritative writers (Strabo 15. 1. 9). He also noted the absence of record in Greek authors before Alexander's time (15. 1. 7). That is an adequate refutation of the myths, which clearly were fabricated or adapted to enhance Alexander's reputation, and Arrian clearly accepts the argumentation as far as the stories of Heracles are concerned (he is more credulous about Dionysus at Nysa (see below, 5. 1. 2; *Ind.* 5. 9)). None of the known manifestations of Heracles (see above, 2. 16. 1 n.) are likely to have reached India, and the story is probably an invention. At *Ind.* 5. 13 Arrian modifies his total rejection, and argues that the deity of Aornus might be yet another Heracles unknown in Greek myth, or some mighty monarch living close to the Indian lands. That rationalization comes from his reading of Megasthenes who reported Indian claims that *their* Heracles was born locally and so cannot have originated from Thebes, Tyre, or Egypt (*Ind.* 8. 4; cf. Diod. 2. 39. 1 = *FGrH* 715 F 13). In this earlier passage he leaves his scepticism unmodified. There is no digression on Heracles to follow, as there is in the *Indike*, and he does not need to soften his preferred position—rejection of the myth.

τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἂν ἄπορα The classic example was the slaying of the Hydra, which was transformed into a failure of Heracles to provide a model of impossibility (cf. Hor. *Odes* 4. 4. 61-2; Zenobius 6. 26).

3. τὸν μὲν δὴ κύκλον κτλ. The description in Diodorus (85. 3; cf. Curt. 8. 11. 6) is not dissimilar, giving a circuit of 100 stades and a height of 16. In fact the spur which terminates at Pir-sar sweeps round in a great arc several miles long (see Stein's end-map and the diagram and air photographs in Fuller 248-51) and reaches a height of 8,721 feet (2,670 m.) at Una-sar. The identification of the spring is slightly problematic. Stein (*Alexander's Track* 131) noted several small springs on the plateau of Pir-sar and two large reservoirs to store the runoff from rain or melting snow, but the closest approximation to Arrian's impressive spring of clear water was the 'very fine spring gushing forth from the side of the Acharo-sar peak' (117), some two miles from Pir-sar itself. However, the timber and

agricultural land was noted in abundance by Stein (131): 'Pir-sar . . . presents itself as a plateau, occupied along practically its whole length by fields of wheat. The width of the cultivated ground on the top varies from about 100 to 200 yards.' This plateau could certainly support a large temporary population of refugees, though the dimensions are probably not as vast as Arrian's description would indicate. The 'single man-made approach' to the rock is presumably the route across the massif of Mt. Una and the Burimar ravine (see below, 29. 7), which may have been eased by the occasional bridge or artificial causeway. Any such engineering work would have been demolished in advance of Alexander's attack.

4. **πόθος λάμβανει ἐξελεῖν** Cf. Justin 12. 7. 13: *captus itaque cupidine Hercules acta superare*. Arrian's οὐχ ἤκιστα similarly singles out emulation of Heracles as the principal component of Alexander's desire (cf. 6. 19. 5, 24. 5), as does Diodorus' description (85. 2: 'on hearing this Alexander was still more aroused to lay siege to the stronghold and contend with the glory of the god'). What is at issue (and stressed by all sources) is not 'the craving towards the unknown' (Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 55) but the burning desire to emulate and surpass. The use of πόθος here is at best morally neutral. The emulation almost has a hint of the undesirable, and πόθος can have a hint of perversity, like Sulla's desire to surpass all mankind in the variety of his murders (Dio F 105. 12; cf. H. Montgomery, *Gedanke und Tat* (Lund 1965) 211-12).

5. **καὶ οἱ ἀμφὶ Ἡφαιστίωνα** See above, 22. 7-8 with notes. This additional material is retrospective. Arrian's source apparently mentioned it for the sake of completeness after describing Alexander's three fortifications in the Swat. His strengthening of the defences of Ora is paralleled by similar actions by his lieutenants, carried out in the past, while they were on their way to the Indus. As Arrian subsequently notes (30. 6), they had long since (πάλαι) completed their commission to bridge the Indus (cf. Badian, *CQ* 37 (1987) 122-3). There is no explanation given for their fortifications at Orobatis. There may have been local resistance, but (*pace* Badian) the army corps did not necessarily go out of its way to Orobatis. The main road apparently described an arc from Charsada and Orobatis lay on the route (Foucher 42; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 20-1). It is possible that Hephaestion and Perdikkas had received early warning of the Assacanian king's intentions to resist (see above, 25. 5) and fortified a bastion to the south of his territory which would deter attack and contain the area if its inhabitants proved disposed to revolt.

Ὀροβάτις ὄνομα Eggermont (*OLP* 1 (1970) 72-4) argued that Orobatis is the same as the city *po-lu-sha*, known from Chinese sources as associated with the emperor Aśoka and identified with the

modern town of Shahbazgarhi, where a set of rock edicts was discovered. The identification is hypothetical but plausible.

6. **Νικάνορα τῶν ἑταίρων** (Berve no. 556) Nicanor had been placed in charge of *Alexandria in Caucaso* (see above, 22. 5). Now he was given the newly acquired territory of Gandhara and presumably the conquered lands of the Assaceni and Aspasiens to the north. The appointment marks the formal conquest of the area. The fugitives at Aornus remained to be crushed, but that was a mopping-up exercise.

ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰνδόν According to Arrian Alexander left the last scene of operations in the Swat valley and moved eastwards towards the Indus—a necessary preliminary to the attack on Aornus. We have no indication of the precise route he took (see below). The most direct route would have taken him by the side of Mt. Ilam southwards to the region of Daggar in modern Buner and then down the Barandu river to the Indus. But the Barandu may have been undesirably difficult for a field army (cf. Stein, *Alexander's Track* 158) and Alexander could have reached the Indus somewhat further to the south, as Strabo (15. 1. 27 (698)) seems to indicate.

πόλιν τε Πευκελαώτιν . . . παρεστήσατο This is an unnecessarily vexed passage. The problem lies in its relation to Arrian's earlier report (22. 8) of the revolt of Astis in Peucelaotis and the destruction of his capital. That Peucelaotis must be identified with the mound of Bala Hisar, near Charsada; it came under the control of Sangaeus and lay at a considerable distance from the Indus. Arrian's city of 'Peucelaotis' is sited 'not far from the Indus', surrenders to Alexander, and its garrison commander is Philippus. How can these considerable contradictions be reconciled? Various solutions have been proposed, all involving some violence to the evidence:

(i) Arrian's Peucelaotis, here and at 22. 8, is Pushkalavati, the ancient capital of Gandhara (so Stein, *Alexander's Track* 124; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 74; Badian *CQ* 37 (1987) 123–6). This solution involves Alexander taking a detour south to Pushkalavati, not to conquer the city but to receive its formal surrender. This was a 'ceremonial entrance into the capital' (Badian 127), to mark the installation of the satrap and the final pacification of the area, after which Alexander moved east to deal with the pressing business at Aornus. The hypothesis is vulnerable on several counts. In the first place there is nothing in Arrian's narrative to suggest a ceremonial act at Peucelaotis. His terminology (*ὁμολογία παρεστήσατο*) indicates a negotiated surrender, as opposed to capture by storm (cf. 2. 5. 6, 20. 5; 4. 22. 7), not confirmation of a surrender already achieved. Nor is there any explanation of what happened to Sangaeus, Alexander's original choice as commandant of Peucelaotis. That can be

dismissed as unimportant (Badian 127) but it is a negative point none the less.

(ii) These objections would be surmounted if (with Droysen, Anspach, and Berve) one distinguishes between the city occupied by Astis and the capital, Pushkalavati (see below, 22. 8 with note). But one would still need to explain why the major city of Gandhara was allowed to hold out until Alexander coerced it into submission. There is a further fatal objection to both solutions. Peucelaotis is here defined as 'not far from the Indus'. Pushkalavati is some 65 km. from Alexander's crossing point, and the diversion from Assacenia would have taken Alexander *away* from the Indus. If, then, 'Peucelaotis' is the capital of Gandhara, Arrian must be adjudged doubly confused, about the direction of the route and the location of the city (so Badian 125-6). But Arrian refers to the location of Peucelaotis again in the opening of the *Indike* (1. 8), where he again states that it was 'not far' from the Indus. This cannot be a repetition of the error (as Badian argues), for the same information, clearly from the same source, recurs in Strabo (15. 1. 27. (698)), who locates the city near the Indus, in the vicinity of Alexander's bridge. That seems conclusive. At 4. 28. 6 Arrian took from Ptolemy or Aristobulus the information that Peucelaotis was near the Indus, and the same information occurred in the source for his *Indike*, which he shared with Strabo.

(iii) It follows almost axiomatically that two cities of the same name must be distinguished, first the capital of Gandhara, the Pushkalavati of the Indian sources (O. Stein, *RE* xix 1394), and secondly a city near the Indus, to the north of Alexander's crossing-point at Und. This latter city is apparently placed in the territory of the Assaceni (*Ind.* 1. 8; Strabo) and listed alongside Massaga as the second city of the realm. Both authors use the same terminology, referring to it as ἄλλη πόλις Πευκελαῖτις. Unfortunately this must be taken grammatically with the preceding reference to Massaga; Peucelaotis is another city of Assacia, not another city of the same name. Even so the common description is adequate to distinguish it from the capital of Astis in central Gandhara. This city was attributed to the Assaceni and located near the Indus. If the name means 'city of lotuses' (Wheeler, *Chārsada* 3), there would be nothing surprising in its being given to two different cities, even cities in the same general vicinity. In that case Arrian's report is unproblematic. Alexander went from his triangle of fortresses in the Swat directly towards the Indus, and close to the great river he received the surrender of Peucelaotis, the largest city in the area. There is no possibility of an identification without a thorough archaeological survey of the area. All one can assume is that it lay somewhere between the Swat and the Indus and relatively close to the latter.

Φίλιππον (Berve no. 183) The name is too frequent for one to be confident of an identification, but it is tempting (the doubts of Anspach 29 n. 83 and Berve notwithstanding) to see him as Philip, son of Machatas, who was later appointed satrap of northern India (5. 8. 3). There would be a striking parallel in the case of Nicanor (see above) who was first placed over a city (albeit a prestigious Alexandria, not a native capital) and then transferred to Gandhara, immediately to the east.

Κωφαῖός τε καὶ Ἀσσαγέτης (Berve nos. 458, 171) These were dynasts close to the Indus who had submitted to Macedonian rule, probably before Alexander left Parapamisadae (see above, 22. 6 n.). If Cophaeus derived his name from the river Cophen (Lassen ii² 147-8; Berve), one should locate his territories near the confluence with the Indus, east of the former realm of Astis. Assagetes is no more than a name.

7. ἐς Ἐμβόλιμα πόλιν Curtius (8. 12. 1) uses the form *Ecbolima* and agrees that it was close to Aornus; Alexander returned there after its capture. It is presumably the same as the Ambulima named in Buddhist texts (Stein, *Alexander's Track* 124; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 93-4; 15 (1984) 198), and Eggermont suggested the village of Ambela, immediately south of Daggar, in central Buner. But despite the similarity of name, Ambela is too far inland and some fifty miles from Pir-sar, much too distant to serve as a provisioning centre. It would admittedly be better placed if Aornus were equated with Mt. Ilam (see above, 28. 1 n.), but that would entail contradicting the consensus of ancient evidence, that the campaign was fought near the Indus. In that case Embolima should be located near the river within easy reach of Pir-sar. Of Stein's preferred identifications (*An Archaeological Tour in Upper Swāt and Adjacent Hill Tracts* (Calcutta 1930) 71) Amb is too far south (about the same distance as Ambela), but Kabulgram, between the Indus and Puran rivers, is much closer and the more attractive.

ἐς χρόνιον τριβήν An interesting indication that Alexander was not confident of success in his direct assault. If he failed to surpass Heracles, the rock would still need to be neutralized by the more prosaic means of slow starvation. A garrison would be left at Embolima and maintain pressure upon the refugees. Given the food resources of Pir-sar and the possibilities of provisioning it from the north, that would have been at best a protracted exercise and ultimately perhaps hopeless.

8. τοὺς τοξότας . . . ἐς ἑκατόν Arrian's list of units seems incomplete (see also 22. 7, 23. 1, 24. 9, 25. 5 with notes). There is no reference to the hypaspists who were clearly present in force (29. 1, 30. 3) and not likely to be included under the select phalanx troops. Similarly there seem to have been light troops other than the

Agrianians (29. 1; cf. 24. 1 and 10). On the other hand it is more than likely that Alexander took only the vestigial numbers of cavalry noted here. The Companions would have formed a headquarters staff and, once the mountains were reached, the *hippotoxotai* could be dismounted and used to swell the number of foot archers.

κουφοτάτους . . . εὐοπλοτάτους 'the most agile and at the same time the best armed'. The phalanx may have been uniformly armed but there was apparently wide variety in the quality of its weapons, many of which may have begun to deteriorate. Late in 326 there arrived a vast consignment of 25,000 infantry panoplies (Diod. 95. 4; cf. Curt. 9. 3. 21: *quis distributis vetera cremari iussit*). These clearly took time to amass and dispatch from the central satrapies into India, and Alexander probably commissioned them before he began his march from Parapamisadae. By the time of the attack on Aornus he may have needed to ensure that his assault troops were not only physically fit (cf. 3. 21. 2 n.) but had weapons which were dependable.

29. 1. τῶν προσχώρων τινές See the romantic embellishment in Diodorus 85. 4-5 and Curtius 8. 11. 3, reminiscent of the turning of the Persian Gates (cf. 3. 18. 4 with note). The vulgate gives its informants colourful backgrounds.

οὐ χαλεπὸν . . . εἶναι The report proved optimistic. The capture of the rock required the laborious construction of a siege mound from this forward position (29. 6-7). But, once Ptolemy's force was in place, the defenders were irrevocably isolated on the plateau and assured of capture (Diod. 85. 6).

Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Λάγου There has never been any doubt that this passage (at least down to 29. 6) derives from Ptolemy himself, who (as usual) gave prominence to his successes (Strasburger 42; Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 21-3; Tonnet i 192-3). His capture and retention of the forward position was the most important single act in the capture of the rock. That is confirmed by Diodorus (85. 6), who states that the defenders were condemned to a hopeless siege, once the approach route was occupied. But Diodorus does not mention Ptolemy, nor does Curtius, whose report, although heavily contaminated and rhetorically garbled, contains much circumstantial detail. In particular the light infantry which occupied the forward position was led by a certain *Mullinas, scriba regis* (Curt. 8. 11. 5). That can only be the Myllenas, son of Asander, who was honoured at Eretria along with Tauron, son of Machatas (*IG* xii 9. 197). If he was a royal secretary, it did not prevent his having the occasional military command (cf. 5. 24. 6 n.). Curtius apparently records the ascent a second time from a second source (cf. Schwartz, *RE* iv 1877). After the construction of the mound he reverts to an earlier stage of

operations, and has the archers, Agrianians and thirty of the royal guard sent up to the heights (*iubel per ardua nili*: 8. 11. 9, 14), and two of the guard, Alexander and Charus, give their lives when Alexander makes his unsuccessful move to the rock (8. 11. 14-18; cf. Arr. 28. 2). In neither of these episodes is there any mention of Ptolemy. Now, Ptolemy certainly commanded the advance force; it was too crucially important to be led by anyone other than a Bodyguard. But his subordinates clearly distinguished themselves. Myllenas may have been the first to the forward position, and the heroic deaths of Charus and Alexander were widely commemorated (cf. Plut. *Al.* 58. 5). In the vulgate tradition their achievements were emphasized and the role of the commander slurred over. By contrast Ptolemy annexed the credit for himself and did not name his subordinates; the only acts of heroism to be recorded under his command were his own (see above, 24. 4 with notes).


καὶ τοὺς ψιλοὺς τοὺς ἄλλους The light infantry other than the Agrianians (cf. 30. 6) presumably included archers (as Curt. 8. 11. 9 implies); but there were other contingents which can be considered, notably Balacrus' javelin men, who served against the Aspasii (cf. 24. 10) and were present at Aornus (Curt. 8. 11. 22), and the companies of Philippus and Philotas (cf. 24. 10 n.). The latter could have been placed under the (temporary) command of the royal secretary, Myllenas.

τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ἐπιλέκτους Cf. 5. 20. 3. On this occasion, if we may believe Curtius (8. 11. 9), the select troops came from the royal *agema*.

2. ὁδὸν τραχεῖαν κτλ. For a reconstruction of the route see Stein, *Alexander's Track* 144-5 and Fuller 252. The ultimate goal, according to Stein, was the Little Una plateau, some two miles west of the plateau of Pir-sar (see Map 5). Reaching it from the Indus involved a climb of over 1,200 m. across the Danda-Nurdai spur (see the maps of Stein and Fuller) a not inconsiderable feat by night.

ἐπήγε τῇ ὕστεραίᾳ For a romanticized version of this advance compare Curtius 8. 11. 11-18. There were clearly losses as the Indians attacked from above (Curt. 8. 11. 13) and Alexander was forced to call off the assault. It was a small-scale re-enactment of his first disastrous attempt to storm the Persian Gates (see above, 3. 18. 3 with note), less costly because of the comparatively small number of troops involved. The result was that Alexander abandoned the more direct approach, whichever that was, and followed the route previously taken by Ptolemy.

4. μὴδὲ ἀγαπᾶν . . . τὸ χωρίον Seibert (*Ptolemaios* 122) suggests that this was a reproof: Alexander considered Ptolemy to have failed in his duty by not attacking the Indians the previous day. That, as Tonnet objects, is most implausible. If Ptolemy were glossing over



MAP 5. Operations at Mt. Aornus

the fact that he had received a rocket, then he would have omitted the letter altogether or simply reported the instruction to give supporting action. Instead he portrayed himself conscientiously obeying orders, even orders which imperilled his advance position and risked entrapping his small force irretrievably. Alexander was willing to make the sacrifice and Ptolemy acted accordingly. The following day's success was then largely due to him.

ἀμφοτέρωθεν βαλλομένους . . . ἀμφιβόλους Cf. 2. 23. 3. Both passages are modelled upon Thuc. 4. 36. 3 (cf. 32. 3), but whereas in Thucydides ἀμφίβολος is resumptive and has its literal sense, in Arrian it is used metaphorically. The juxtaposition of similar words and phrases in different senses is one of his stylistic traits (cf. 22. 6 προὔχῳρει . . . προχωρῇ), which may again owe its inspiration to Thucydides (C. W. Macleod, *Collected Essays* (Oxford 1983) 90 n. 8, 137 n. 30). If so, he presents us with an interesting and original combination of Thucydidean style and vocabulary.

6. ξυνείστηκε καρτερὰ μάχη The battle was obviously at close quarters; and, if Stein is correct (*Alexander's Track* 145), the Indians left the plateau of Pir-sar and occupied the heights adjoining the Danda-Nurdai spur. That would certainly have impeded the Macedonian advance, but one wonders why Alexander, who by now had had several days to survey the terrain and was briefed by local informants, did not block access. He could at least have sent troops to occupy the pass of Pezal-Kandao before he approached the spur.

ἔτι ἄπορος ἦν Arrian gives no indication why the assault proved impossible, and his narrative moves without explanation to the construction work on the mound. The gap is filled by Diodorus (85. 6), who refers briefly to a ravine at the base of the rock (so Curtius 8. 11. 7-8), a ravine which Stein (*Alexander's Track* 118-9, 146-8) identified as that of Burimar. This ravine plunges 180 m. down from the eastern spur of Una-sar on the Burimar plateau, which it divides effectively from the main plateau of Pir-sar. According to Stein (146) the gulf to be spanned was 'not less than 500 yards'. Given Arrian's description the distance can hardly be less. The effective range of torsion catapults in Alexander's day was well over 300 m. (cf. Marsden, *Artillery* 86-91) and, since the mound was designed primarily for their use, the gap must have been at least the width of the Burimar ravine. That is one of the strongest points in favour of Stein's location, but one must note that he was able to find no trace of Alexander's construction work. If he is correct, one must assume that the mound was partly demolished when the rock came under permanent military occupation (30. 6) and that centuries of erosion eventually removed any remnants of the hastily built causeway.

The omission of the ravine is certainly a defect in Arrian's

narrative, and Tarn (i 90 n. 5) may have been right in assuming that a description of the terrain has fallen out of the text (perhaps one should posit a lacuna after *προσβολή*). Alternatively one might posit a switch in sources: Arrian moved from Ptolemy to Aristobulus and plunged directly into the building of the mound without explaining why it was necessary.

7. χάρακας ἑκατὸν κατ' ἄνδρα This would clearly have taken some time. Alexander did not begin filling the mound immediately. There was a lapse of perhaps several days, while the material was being prepared and the specialist engineers were summoned (from Embolima?) to direct the work.

Arrian does not explain why the stakes were necessary (nor, for that matter, does Curt. 8. 11. 8). Presumably they were used as a framework for the sides of the mound (cf. Thuc. 2. 75. 2), rather like the wooden support scaffolding which may still be seen protruding from the siege mound at Masada (Y. Yadin, *Masada* (New York 1966) 226). According to Chares (*FGrH* 125 F 16) the timber was also used to preserve snow, which was kept in pits (excavated for the fill?) covered with oak branches. Spring was approaching (cf. Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 35), and the snow needed to be kept from melting to conserve drinking water for the large working force.

θεατῆς καὶ ἐπαινέτης Cf. 2. 23. 4; 4. 21. 4; *frag. inc.* F 12 (Roos). The careful emphasis here is surely Arrian's own. He repeatedly insists that the conscientious commander must inspect his troops consistently and give what praise or censure is appropriate to the occasion (*Tact.* 38. 5, 41. 3, 42. 5; *Ecl.* 10, based on Xen. *Cyrop.* 5. 3. 55).

30. 1. ὥς ἐπὶ στάδιον A suspiciously long distance for a single day's work. Compare the dramatically slower progress at the 'rock of Chorienes', where the difficulties may have been greater but not out of all proportion (see above, 21. 4 n.). Stein (*Alexander's Track* 147) observes that the slope of the ravine becomes gradually steeper as the bottom is approached; but we have no idea where the Macedonians began their construction work. They can hardly have filled the entire ravine to a depth of 180 m., as Stein apparently assumes, and they presumably began the mound only when the terrain became too steep for the catapults to be advanced. The mound would have the function of levelling out the roughest and steepest parts of the ravine, allowing a smoother and more gentle ascent.

τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ Curtius (8. 11. 9) claims that the gap was bridged *intra septimum diem*, and Diodorus also mentions seven days (85. 6), though he confusedly implies that there were seven days of assaults on the rock *after* the completion of the mound, whereas the fighting

in relays took place *during* its construction. The seven (or six plus) days may be correct. Arrian makes it clear that the construction work continued after the fourth day, when the hill was occupied. The advance group there would have held the defenders at bay while the work on the mound continued free from harassment.

γῆλοφον ισόπεδον τῇ πέτρῳ Stein (*Alexander's Track* 133, 147–8) identified this small hill with the shoulder of Mashlun, 100 m. or so long and about 100 m. again below the summit of Bar-sar (see his fig. 79). That, as he admits, is not at the same level as the rock—and the position looks hideously exposed to attack from above. Alexander may have needed to climb to take the rock (30. 3), but it was hardly the prolonged and fatiguing ascent posited by Stein (118–19, 148).

2. ἀδιήγητον Cf. *Ecl.* 26. A lexical borrowing from Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 8. 7. 22: the first attested usage).

πέμπαντες δὲ κήρυκας The negotiated surrender is recorded only by Arrian. According to Diodorus (85. 7–86. 1) the Indians withdrew by night of their own accord, though Alexander predicted the action and relaxed his blockade. Part of this story recurs in Curtius (8. 11. 20–21), where it is contaminated with a version closely related to Arrian's (22–4). Neither source reports any attempt at negotiation. Arrian's story is not wholly flattering to Alexander and is reminiscent of the massacre of the mercenaries at Massaga (cf. 27. 3 n.). The king's response to the Indian overtures is not given, but the implication is that he agreed in principle to a truce. The Indians then delayed ratifying it and attempted to escape under cover of night. Their bad faith justified the harrying of their retreat. Much of this story is presumably correct. There must have been some indication of the defenders' flagging resolution, to excite Alexander's suspicion that they would withdraw, and it is possible that there was an attempt to surrender the rock. Alexander, then, as is agreed (see below), deliberately encouraged them to take flight and attacked them on their withdrawal. He would capture the rock by force, not simply accept its surrender. Accordingly the Indians were induced to believe that they were being *allowed* to leave the rock. That emerges clearly from Arrian's narrative, which is slanted to obscure the deception on the Macedonian side. The slight deformation perhaps inspired the more blatant exculpation of the atrocity at Massaga.

ἐν τῷ . . . διαγαγόντες 'spending the day in further postponement of the truce'. The phrase is doubly Thucydidean, in vocabulary (cf. Thuc. 5. 99: τὴν διαμέλλησιν τῆς . . . φυλακῆς) and in the striking combination of neuter article and participle in place of an abstract noun (cf. Thuc. 3. 10. 1: ἐν τῷ διαλλάσσοντι τῆς γνώμης; cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* 36–7; Tonnet i 395–6). The literary elaboration is achieved at some cost to clarity. Arrian implies that the truce was

not ratified by the Indian ambassadors and that it remained unrati-
fied for the rest of the day—a sure sign of bad faith.

3. τὴν κύκλωσιν . . . ἀφελεῖν Diodorus (85. 7) claims that Alexander withdrew the guard which he had left 'in the pass' (ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ). If Stein's identification of the site is correct, this can only refer to the country south of Pir-sar, in particular the pass of Pezal-Kandao which blocked the only escape route (see above, 28. 6 n.). Once the siege began, the pass must have been occupied by a holding force. Its withdrawal, clearly visible from Pir-sar, would have been an encouragement to evacuate the rock, a signal that retreat would not be opposed. The retreat took place southwards, the area closest to the siege mound being the first to be evacuated (κατὰ τὸ ἐκλειμμένον . . . ἀνέρχεται).

τῶν σωματοφυλάκων Clearly the *agema* of the hypaspists (as at 3. 17. 2; 4. 3. 2), which supplied troops for Ptolemy's advance force (29. 1 with note). The variant terminology (and the overlay of apologetic) suggests that Arrian's immediate source here was Aristobulus. The figure is a random one: it is the merest guess (Berve i 127 n. 2; Atkinson, in *Συ Alexander d. Gr.* i 422-3) that a pentakosiarchy of hypaspists was supplemented by 200 men from the *agema*. Alexander took the fittest men available, and there is no means of fixing the relative proportions.

4. κατὰ τῶν κρημῶν So Curtius 8. 11. 23. The sudden attack created panic and a greater press of fugitives than could be accommodated on the narrow path to the Maju crest (Stein, *Alexander's Track* 132). Many would inevitably have been forced over the surrounding crags.

ἔθυσεν ἐπ' αὐτῇ He apparently sacrificed to Athene and to Nike as he had done after the capture of the rock of Sisimithres (Curt. 8. 11. 24, cf. 2. 33). The two deities are celebrated on the obverse and reverse of his imperial gold staters (Bellinger 4-6; O. H. Zervos, *NC* 1982. 172-3; Price, *Coinage* i 29-30), and it is not surprising to find concrete expressions of veneration for them. Curtius can hardly be exhaustive. It would be strange under the circumstances if Alexander offered no honours to Heracles (cf. 6. 3. 2; *Ind.* 36. 3), who (along with Zeus) graced his silver coinage.

Σισικότις (Berve no. 707) Sisicottus (his name is alleged to be a Greek rendering of Sasigupta) is an obscure figure. He may have been of princely status (so Berve), but there is no evidence. His career, as reported by Arrian, is a valuable pointer to the political uncertainty which prevailed in Gandhara before Alexander's intervention. Like Sangaeus (see above, 22. 8 n.) he was a refugee from factional struggle at home but he had gone further afield and found a haven with Bessus, the Achaemenid satrap of Bactria (Badian, *CHI* Iran ii 462-3 n. 1, alleges that he had been *summoned*, 'as a vassal

by his king': that is contradicted by Arrian's *ἡγετομολήκει*). He was a natural adherent of Alexander and no doubt encouraged him to take the field against the rulers responsible for his exile. Their identity cannot be proved, but, given Sisicottus' key appointment, it must be a fair probability that he was an Assaceni and was trusted because of his enmity with the governing family. Curtius (8. 11. 25) confirms the appointment and alleges that it extended to the district around the rock. If he is correct, it helps explain Arrian's later reference to him as satrap (cf. 5. 20. 7 with note); he was a garrison commander with authority over the surrounding area, an Indian counterpart to Philippus at 'Peucelaotis' (see above, 28. 6). Philippus' garrison, however, had comprised Macedonians. There is no suggestion of that here. Sisicottus' men may have been Indians (recruited from the loyal princedoms of Cophaeus and Assagetes (?)) with at most a stiffening of European mercenaries. Thracian troops were used as garrison forces in India (6. 15. 2; Curt. 10. 1. 21) and could be placed under oriental commanders (5. 20. 7).

5. ἐξ τὴν Ἀσσακηνῶν χώραν The direction of march is difficult to establish. From Arrian it would seem that Alexander headed towards mountain country and away from the Indus (note *ἡδὴ ἦγε* at 30. 7). That suggests that his objective was the mountain region of central Buner, which lay between the eastern and western capitals of the Assaceni (see above, 28. 5 n. and Map 4) and could well have formed a dependent principality governed by a brother of the paramount monarch. This was the general area advocated by Stein (*Alexander's Track* 158) and more recently approved by Eggermont (*OLP* 1 (1970) 99-100, modified not too successfully in his later essay, *OLP* 15 (1984) 201-2), and it must be correct. Alexander first withdrew to Embolima (Curt. 8. 12. 1; see above, 28. 7 n.) and then moved away from the Indus. The route via Chakesar and the Puran valley (described by Stein 164) and then across the Nawe-ghake pass into central Buner (Stein 166 with fig. 93) is the simplest and most likely.

ἀδελφὸν τὸν Ἀσσακάνου Diodorus (86. 2) mentions a local ruler, Aphrices (*Ἀφρίκης τις Ἰνδός*: named Erices in Curtius), who planned resistance with 20,000 troops and fifteen elephants but was murdered by his own men. Berve (no. 191) resisted the general tendency to identify the king's brother with Aphrices, on the strength of *Metz Epitome* 39, which reports the brother's name as Amminais. But that report comes in a different and earlier context, the introduction of the mercenaries into Massaga (see above, 26. 1 n.), and we have no record of the subsequent activities of Amminais; he may have died or been captured at Massaga. Nothing excludes the Assaceni king having had several brothers, one of whom ruled the western frontier area of Buner.

ἐς Δύρτα πόλιν The city cannot be identified, but Eggermont is probably near the mark when he locates it near Daggar, the strategic centre of Buner (*Al. in Sind* 182; *OLP* 15 (1984) 201). Curtius (8. 12. 1-2) reports a minor action en route: Alexander had to clear some defiles of troops placed there by 'Erices'. This he did with little trouble and Erices was subsequently assassinated. Neither event is mentioned by Arrian and there is no way of reconciling his account as a variant (as attempted by Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 97-9; 15 (1984) 195-6). Rather he and Curtius have reported different episodes in the short campaign. Curtius mentioned forcing the pass, but Arrian concentrated upon the evacuation of the territory. *Pace* Eggermont, the episode in Curtius probably precedes that in Arrian. The clearing of the defiles (which may well be the Nawe-ghake pass) left the area below vulnerable to Alexander's advance and the inhabitants fled in terror, as had their compatriots elsewhere (the situation in Bajaur (above 24. 6-7) is the closest parallel). This time they had the object-lesson of the capture of Aornus, and put the river Indus between themselves and the invaders (see below, 30. 7). The evacuation was complete, and Alexander entered a deserted land, as (under similar circumstances) he did at Patala (6. 17. 5-6). **Νέαρχον καὶ Ἀντίοχον** On the hypaspist chiliarchies see above, vol. i 148-9. Neither Nearchus nor Antiochus are mentioned elsewhere in command of hypaspists, not even in Curtius' list of promotions to 'chiliarchies' late in 331 (Curt. 5. 2. 5, on which see now J. E. Atkinson, in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* i 413-35). That tends to reinforce the supposition that the promotions in Sittacene were to pentakosiarchies, not chiliarchies, and that Curtius has confused the two, mistakenly inferring that the new formation was the chiliarchy. Atkinson's alternative suggestion (432-5), that the chiliarchies were indeed new formations, but formations within the phalanx infantry, creates unnecessary difficulties. There is no proven reference to chiliarchies within the phalanx *taxeis*, let alone pentakosiarchies, which on this theory would have been the older subdivision; and Alexander's promotions in Sittacene only account for a fraction of the positions available (Atkinson 434 argues that some appointments were made on a non-competitive basis). Confusion in an author celebrated for his muddles seems a preferable hypothesis.

Antiochus (Berve no. 90) is an obscure individual who does not impinge elsewhere in the record of the reign. That is the case with the other attested hypaspist chiliarch (1. 22. 4 n.), and it comes as a surprise to find Nearchus, an ex-satrap and long-standing friend of Alexander (and of non-Macedonian origins) in that relatively humble position. We may perhaps dismiss the record as confused (so Badian, *YCS* 24 (1975) 150-1) and suppose that Nearchus was not a regular hypaspist commander but on this occasion had temporary

charge of light infantry (compare Eumenes' commission at 5. 24. 6). However, it is far simpler to accept (with Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 191) that this Nearchus is distinct from the satrap and admiral. Berve (ii 269 n. 3) scouted the idea, arguing that Arrian would have noted the fact. Hardly so. One need only compare the two mysterious officers named Πτολεμαῖος who crop up without any indication that they are distinct from the son of Lagus (1. 23. 6; 4. 7. 2), or the light infantry commander Philotas (3. 29. 7; 4. 24. 10), who is not distinguished from any other bearer of that common name. Nor is Nearchus a rare name. It is frequent enough at Athens and for that matter in Arcadia (*SIG*³ 490 = *SEG* xi 1102; *IG* v 2. 323, lines 42, 58, 82; 368, line 127), and it is widely attested in the Greek world. Macedonia itself is the provenance of two sling bullets inscribed with the name of Nearchus (W. Vischer, *Kleine Schriften* ii (Leipzig 1878) 275 no. 76; M.-C. Hellmann, *BCH* 106 (1982) 84 no. 37), hardly Alexander's admiral. There is no reason whatsoever why there should not have been a Macedonian Nearchus, a relatively insignificant chiliarch of hypaspists, who must be distinguished from the son of Androtimus.

6. τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας τοὺς ψιλούς Since Gronovius there has been a tendency to emend the text by the insertion of a καὶ. The effect is to distinguish the Agrianians from the light infantry proper (as at 4. 4. 6, 19. 1). Linguistically there is no reason for emendation, and the parallels show conclusively that the Agrianians were regarded as light armed (see above, 25. 6 n.). The only objection of substance is that the Agrianians are never again (in some fifty references) used in isolation; they always act in conjunction with some other unit, usually light armed. But the object of the exercise was reconnaissance, not fighting, and the Agrianians may have been deployed in isolation.

καὶ δύο ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἄλλας The text suggests that the hypaspist corps comprised more than three chiliarchies; so does 5. 23. 7, where Ptolemy at Sangala has three chiliarchies of hypaspists along with the Agrianians and a unit of archers. It is most unlikely that (as argued by Tarn ii 150 and R. D. Milns, *Historia* 20 (1971) 191; *contra* Atkinson, in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* i 421-3) Arrian is expressing himself misleadingly and that there were only three chiliarchies; no one other than the king himself is attested with the entire body of hypaspists. The simplest interpretation of the promotions in Sittacene (Curt. 5. 2. 5) would have eight pentakosiarchs appointed, hence four chiliarchies. (Atkinson's difficulties with the manuscript reading *novem* (Curt. 5. 2. 2-3) are unnecessary; he himself (416) gives the most reasonable explanation 'that VIII was misread as VIIII'. For a similar case see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 197.) The *agema* will have formed a separate body outside the chiliarchies. In all

probability there were four chiliarchies in 331, but the number may not have been static. Given the demands of the fighting in Sogdiana and Gandhara, where the army was constantly divided into small units, the hypaspists may have been expanded by troops from the phalanx, so that the chiliarchies (whose actual strength was not necessarily their paper strength) were increased—possibly to as many as six. As Milns (191) observes, the survivors of Alexander's hypaspists numbered 3,000 as late as 318, after the mass discharge at Opis and the losses of the first coalition war. At the height of the campaign in Asia their numbers must have been significantly greater. We can only be certain of a number *above* three chiliarchies. The actual total evades our grasp.

τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ . . . ἔμελεν A favourite anacoluthon (3. 6. 2; 6. 23. 1), conceived as imitation of Thucydides but never exactly paralleled in Thucydides (cf. Thuc. 3. 104. 2; 7. 60. 2).

7. ὁδοποιεῖ For earlier road making (by the Thracians) see 1. 26. 2. This was clearly one of the regular fatigues of campaigning, and Alexander apparently envisaged his army constructing a major road across North Africa (Diod. 18. 4. 4; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 202). It must have been a frequent necessity but the work it entailed was doubtless unpopular (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 5. 1. 13–14).

παρὰ Ἀβισάρη See above, 27. 7 n. Abisares was known to be unsympathetic to Alexander and provided a relatively accessible haven for the refugees from Buner. There is no indication that he intended to intervene more actively and send troops into Buner (as argued by Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 101), as he was reported to have done at Ora.

8. κυνηγέται τῶν ἐλεφάντων For Indian methods of hunting wild elephants see *Ind.* 13–14 (Megasthenes, *FGrH* 715 F 20; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 43–5). The objects of Alexander's hunt were domesticated and needed no breaking in; it was sufficient to entrap them and round them up. That appealed to Alexander, the inveterate huntsman; and his participation no doubt increased the excitement of the occasion and contributed to the headlong panic in which two of the beasts were lost.

9. ναὺς ἐποιήθησαν See below, 5. 3. 5, 8. 4–5. The bridge built by Hephaestion and Perdiccas also comprised collapsible boats, constructed sectionally for ease of transport (cf. 5. 7. 1 n.). The fact that Alexander needed to build more suggests not only that he intended to make several more river crossings (Curt. 8. 10. 3) but also that the hostility of Porus was well known. Alexander already realized that he would need to force a crossing of the Hydaspes and began amassing transport ships well in advance.

BOOK V

1. 1-2. 7. *The Submission of Nysa and the Legend of its Foundation*

Book V begins with a deliberate and contrived interruption of the campaign narrative. Arrian does not return to the events in hand until 3. 5-6, when he briefly records Alexander's arrival at the Indus. That in turn gives rise to a lengthier interruption, a digression on the rivers of India, set in the geographical framework of Eratosthenes, with an appendix on contemporary Roman methods of bridge building. The narrative proper resumes only at 8. 2. Arrian's second digression has a more obvious structural justification. It provides background information on the river system of India, which will dominate the historical record of the next two books. At the same time it introduces the companion monograph, the *Indike*, and explains its relationship to the larger history of Alexander (4. 3-5. 1). The earlier digression on Nysa has no such thematic relationship with its sequel. Arrian moves abruptly to the Indus and never resumes the subject of the digression. Nor is there a direct relationship with the preceding narrative, as there is in other cases where Arrian takes material from its chronological setting (e.g. 4. 8. 1 ff., 20. 1-3; 5. 19. 6; 7. 1. 5-2. 4). The connection is more tenuous and subtle. At 4. 28. 1-2 Arrian comments on the tradition of Heracles' attack on Aornus and accepts Eratosthenes' view that the entire story was a Macedonian fabrication. He does not interrupt the campaign record to comment more fully, but the theme is reserved to make an emphatic opening for Book V. Eratosthenes' strictures are expounded and for the most part accepted. But events at Nysa are an exception. They allow Arrian to express Herodotean neutrality to the myth of Dionysus' presence (1. 2) and soften Eratosthenes' criticism (3. 1). The myth is also reported fully in its historical context, and Arrian directs his focus upon Alexander's emulation of Dionysus—a theme adumbrated in the previous book (cf. 4. 8. 1, 10. 6 with notes) but never expanded. Now, Alexander's emulation of his divine ancestor is explicitly correlated with his aspirations to world empire (2. 1), aspirations which are to be thwarted by the close of the book. The digression accordingly looks both forward and backward. It has its connections with the surrounding narrative, but its primary function may be more dramatic than structural. It makes a colourful and exotic opening to a section of the campaign history celebrated for its exotica (cf. 4. 3-4) and whets the reader's appetite for what is to follow (cf. Stadter 84-5).

Arrian does not name his sources for the visit to Nysa. Much of the exposition is in *oratio recta* (1. 3, 2. 1-2, 3. 5), which suggests that the material comes from at least one of his principal authorities. Where he slides into indirect speech, it implies that he has reservations about the material he records (see above, vol. i 21-2; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 61-5). That is clear enough at the beginning of the digression, where his source(s) reported that Nysa was a foundation of Dionysus, a very questionable piece of myth. But when he resumes after his critical comment (1. 3), he expresses himself in direct speech. That may reflect a shared tradition, the subsequent reversion to accusative and infinitive (1. 4) indicating material less well attested, perhaps reported in one source only. There is no suggestion that the story is in any way affected by the late secondary tradition (*pace* Tarn ii 45; Pearson, *LHA* 217 n. 20; Stadter 84; Hammond, *Sources* 249-50), except perhaps for the final sentence (2. 7). It is likely enough that all of Arrian's major authorities gave some account of the incident, so that he was able to select or combine their reports at will. Single sources cannot easily be detected (cf. Badian, *CQ* 37 (1987) 121 n. 13, *contra* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 439-40), but Arrian's use of the same material elsewhere provides some guidance. It has long been noted (Schwartz, *RE* ii 1241; Strasburger 42-3) that there is a later reference to the horsemen of Nysa (2. 4) buried in the general campaign narrative (6. 2. 3), a context which is derived from Nearchus and Ptolemy; and the casual retrospective note suggests that events at Nysa had been fully reported. Less frequently observed is the fact that Acuphis' little speech (1. 5-6) is a reworking of material in the *Indike* (1. 4-6, 5. 9). Once more that suggests Nearchus as the source (if he mentioned Nysa at all, Megasthenes gave a different account of it (Diod. 2. 39. 4 = *FGrH* 715 F 4)); Arrian excerpted his account in its general geographical context at the beginning of the *Indike* and reused it for Acuphis' speech and probably for the wider story of events at Nysa. Nearchus could well be the major source for the first two chapters of Book V (so Goukowsky ii 158 n. 80), but his version of events was certainly supplemented from other authorities: Ptolemy (see below), Aristobulus, or even both.

Other sources for the episode are relatively abundant. The visit was reported by Theophrastus (*HP* 4. 4. 1) in a passage which is in part corrupt (see the Budé apparatus) but describes the absence of ivy east of Syria and unambiguously states that it was found in Mt. Meros in India, the alleged birth place of Dionysus. The same phenomenon was noted by Cleitarchus (*FGrH* 137 F 17) who gave the local name of the ivy (*σκινδαψός*) and mentioned the association with Dionysus. But the source for Cleitarchus' statement, the Scholiast to Apollonius Rhodius (2. 904), is too brief to permit any

reconstruction of the original, and on this occasion the later sources (Curt. 8. 10. 7-17; Justin 12. 7. 6-7; *Metz Epit.* 36-8; Plut. *Al.* 58. 6-9) are too diverse in their reports to be grouped together as a vulgate. The visit to Nysa was clearly a standard item in the history of Alexander and reported in variant forms throughout the tradition. It follows that the main lines of the story (the allegations that Nysa was founded by Dionysus, and the privileges accorded to the inhabitants) can hardly be fiction (as argued by Niese i³ 129 n. 3, Kaerst i 456 n. 1). The visit must be historical, and Alexander did believe (or purported to believe) that the city was a foundation of Dionysus. This is the consensus of modern scholarship (e.g. Lassen ii² 141-5; Droysen i² 1. 109; Anspach 20-2; Tarn i 89-90; Schachermeyr² 410-12; most fully argued by Goukowsky ii 21-33) and is surely correct.

1.1. μεταξὺ τοῦ Κωφίηνος καὶ τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ Cf. *Ind.* 1. 1, where the Indian tribes are described from the Indus west to the Cophen, following Alexander's line of march, rather than the actual course of the Cophen, which flows into the Indus. For the details of the march and the general localization of Nysa see above, 4. 24. 1 n., where it is argued (with Radet) that the city lay somewhere to the east of the river Kunar.

τὸ δὲ κτίσμα εἶναι Διονύσου In the *Indike* (1. 5) Arrian has Dionysus found Nysa and settle there veterans of his campaigns. The second detail is reserved for the speech of Acuphis (1. 5-6). Here he mentions only the foundation of Nysa after the conquest of India. That seems to have been the version of Cleitarchus also. Diodorus (2. 38. 4; cf. 1. 19. 6-8) describes how Dionysus retired to the hills to escape the heat of the Indian campaign and named the district Meros, inspiring Greeks in later days to invent the legend of his concealment in Zeus' thigh (contrast Arrian 1. 6). The last statement recurs in Curtius (8. 10. 13) and may be a portion of Cleitarchus' version of the legend, which Diodorus grafted on to the surrounding extract from Megasthenes (*FGrH* 715 F 4; see Jacoby's apparatus at p. 608), as he did a few chapters earlier with Cleitarchus' description of the walls of Babylon (2. 7. 3-4 = *FGrH* 137 F 10). In the first generation after Alexander, then, the tradition had Dionysus invade India and leave Nysa as a permanent memorial of his conquest. Megasthenes had a different approach. He did not apparently mention Nysa itself but described the unique flora of the mountains (Strabo 15. 1. 58 (711) = *FGrH* 715 F 33), which like Alexander's men he attributed to the passing of the god. Dionysus, however, he turned not merely into a colonizer but a civilizer, who introduced urban life to India (*Ind.* 7. 3-5; Diod. 3. 38. 5; cf. A. Zambrini, *ASNP* 15 (1985) 787-91). The myth was inevitably snowballing.

Before the time of Alexander no extant source connects Dionysus with India. Goukowsky's attempt (ii 11-13) to prove that the legend existed earlier in the century must be adjudged a failure. Diodorus' reference to the return from India at 3. 65. 8 need not be, and probably is not, derived from Antimachus of Colophon (c.400 BC), who is mentioned in the previous sentence as an authority for the much more familiar location of Nysa in Arabia (cf. A. Dihle, in *India and the Ancient World* 52-3). And it takes considerable faith to identify the subject of a fourth-century Athenian aryballos (British Museum E 695 = H. Metzger, *Les Représentations dans la céramique attique du iv^e siècle* (Paris 1951) 168 no.79)—a bearded man mounted on a Bactrian camel—as Dionysus, still more to recognize the scene as the return from India. But, if there had been no connection with India before Alexander, Dionysus' wanderings had long since been extended into the far east, notably by Euripides (*Bacch.* 15), who had him visit Bactria. There was every reason for Alexander's entourage to look for traces of the god's passage, more than there was for Heracles who was not apparently associated with the far east before Alexander (cf. 4. 28. 3). The initiative for the identification, as at Aornus, probably came from the local inhabitants, who emphasized the sanctity of their city and its connection with the local god (see below, 1. 3). The identification may even have been theirs. There had been several months of diplomatic contact between Alexander and the dynasts of Gandhara (cf. 4. 22. 6 with notes), and Alexander's aspirations must have been well known. If the vulgate tradition is correct, Taxiles and his fellow rulers hailed him as son of Zeus when they came to Parapamisadae, and recounted the earlier presence of Dionysus and Heracles (Curt. 8. 10. 1; *Metz Epit.* 34; cf. Goukowsky ii 35 ff.). They were prudent enough to accommodate Alexander's ambitions in their mythology, and the inhabitants of Nysa will have followed their examples, as later did the Oxydracae (6. 14. 2). For the Macedonians, who required little convincing, the appearance of ivy there, uniquely in Asia (see below, 1. 6 n.), was sufficient proof of Dionysus' fertilizing influence. They had recognized him before in Sogdiana (Curt. 7. 9. 15; see above, 4. 4. 8 n.) and were ready to find further evidence of his passage.

There is little prospect of identifying the Indian deity of Nysa. In the nineteenth century, before the inhabitants were forcibly converted to Islam, the cult of Indra was strong and closely associated with the flourishing vineyards of what is now Nuristan (see particularly L. Edelberg, *Kuml* 1965. 176-80; Goukowsky ii 27-8). But it is ivy, not the vine, which was the unique feature of Nysa, and no source mentions wine or the consumption of wine, which was so prominent in the lives of the nineteenth-century Kafirs (the only

potations described are those of the Macedonians (Curt. 8. 10. 18)). Indeed the vines which the Macedonians found in the area were wild, their grapes blighted by the constant rains (Strabo 15. 1. 8 (687)). A more popular (cf. Karttunen 212-16) and promising candidate is Śiva (for a review of attributes see Dahlquist 184-9). But from the Greek perspective the crucial evidence was the flora of the region, not any similarity of cult attributes, and we can have no inkling of what induced the people of Nysa to represent their god as Dionysus. Maybe there was no simple equation. The Macedonians were predisposed to look for evidence of Dionysus' presence, and different cults in different areas could have been subsumed under the general portmanteau of the Greek deity (see below, 3. 4 n.). They may have been as diverse as the Tyrian Melqart and the Indian god of Aornus, both regarded as local manifestations of Heracles.

After (and perhaps before) the visit to Nysa Alexander saw Dionysus as his precursor, the conqueror and colonizer of India, and the more impressive the god's performance the greater the glory of his progeny. The god's progress became a catalogue of victory, his return to the west marked by a bacchanalian celebration which Alexander in his turn strove to emulate (see below, 6. 27. 1 n.). The tradition was fostered by the Ptolemies who in their turn claimed descent from Dionysus and named the demes of Alexandria after agnates of the god (Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* i 44-5, 202-4). Philadelphus seems to have been most attracted by the legend of Dionysus in India, which he made a central theme of his grand procession (Athen. 5. 200 c-201 c; cf. Rice 67-8, 85-6); but Soter himself presumably encouraged the cult of Dionysus (J. Tondra, *CE* 25 (1950) 283-5), and the genealogy linking the god with the dynasty will have originated in his reign, if not with Alexander. If so, it is likely enough that Ptolemy referred to the tradition of Dionysus in India when he wrote his history and in particular reported the colonization of Nysa (as was argued by Kornemann 147; Schachermeyr² 411 n. 502).

2. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω συμβαλεῖν The phrasing is modelled on Herodotus' digression on the origins of Heracles and Dionysus and the relationship between the Greek and Egyptian pantheons. He, like Arrian, declares his perplexity and leaves his readers to form their own opinions (Hdt. 2. 146. 1, cf. 123. 1). This was recommended practice in Arrian's day (Luc. *hist. conscr.* 60; cf. Avenarius 163-4) when dealing with myth, and Arrian is conventional. He lists rational objections to the tradition, but leaves the door open for miraculous intervention (see below). The criticism is certainly that of Eratosthenes, which is also retailed by Strabo (15. 1. 8 (687)) and was part of a thorough-going refutation of the Indian exploits of

Heracles and Dionysus. Arrian reserves most of the material for a critical digression (3. 1-4) and concentrates upon the issue of Nysa and Dionysus' mythical association with India. Within that episode he focuses upon a single argument, the improbability of the conquest leaving no tradition of Dionysus' passage between the Aegean and India. That was clearly the gravamen of Eratosthenes' critique (it is repeated by Strabo 15. 1. 9 (688)) and Arrian focuses upon it exclusively, ignoring Strabo's observation that the vines of the region were very disappointing specimens, not what one would expect of Dionysiac plantings.

ἐκ Θηβῶν ἢ ἐκ Τμώλου Attempts to emend this passage (as Grundmann 242 n. 1) presuppose that Arrian is contrasting a Theban Dionysus with some other (cf. 2. 16. 3). That is unnecessary. It is clear from Strabo (15. 1. 7, cf. 1. 2. 20) that Eratosthenes made much of the prologue to Euripides' *Bacchae*, in which Dionysus is born at Thebes, snatched into the thigh of Zeus, and then grows to maturity in Lydia. From Mt. Tmolus he traverses Asia and ultimately returns to his birthplace, Thebes (*Bacch.* 13-23, 64-5, 461-2). There were two points at which the god might have invaded India: on his outward journey from Tmolus to Thebes or after his return to his homeland. In either case it was the Theban Dionysus who was at issue. Eratosthenes was writing at a time when the Theban origins of the god were of considerable genealogical significance. Deianeira, the wife of Heracles and mother of Hyllus, was alleged to have been the daughter of the god (see above, 4. 10. 6 n.). Hence the Theban Dionysus was the ultimate ancestor of Alexander and of the Ptolemies. No other manifestation of the god would fulfil the same role.

ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεῖον . . . προσθή Arrian's observations at 2. 16. 6 provide a good commentary: it is implausible that Eurystheus could have had knowledge of the far west—unless one assumes that Hera gave him the information. The myth conceals the deficiencies exposed by rational argument. Here Arrian makes the more general point that miracles are to be expected of a god. It is clear from the *Indike* (5. 9) that he considered the very existence of the city of Nysa and the presence there of ivy as strong evidence of Dionysus' visit, strong enough to override the rationalizing criticisms of Eratosthenes. With Heracles the external evidence was more suspect, and the criticism is allowed to stand. Given good reason to accept a myth, one may disregard implausibilities in the tradition and accept that the gods may achieve what is inherently improbable. But there must be *some* positive evidence. Compare Arrian's verdict on the stories of Achilles' island (*Periplus* 23. 3-4), which he considers credible (οὐκ ἄπιστα) because of the moral qualities of Achilles: it was inherently likely that the gods had granted him heroic status.

3. ὥς δὲ ἐπέβη τῇ Νύσῃ Arrian has no record of the prelude to the embassy. According to Plutarch (who has a very similar description of the interview with Acuphis) there was resistance: the Macedonians had to cross a deep river, and the Nysaeans only sent the embassy when they were under siege (ἀπὸ τῶν πολιορκουμένων: Plut. *Al.* 58. 7). Curtius (8. 10. 7-10) had Alexander make a surprise attack on the city (*Metz Epit.* 36: *imprudenter Nysaeis*) and begin a regular investment. The two versions are not incompatible (*pace* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 441). The Nysaeans for instance might have relied on the river as an adequate defence and been surprised by the unexpected crossing. As for the beginnings of the siege, Plutarch's description is lost in a lacuna and may not have contradicted Curtius, whose account is circumstantial. One peculiar detail, the burning of the cedar-wood tombs near Nysa (Curt. 8. 10. 8-9), is unlikely to be fiction. The mountains of Nuristan abound in Himalayan cedar (deodar) and the wooden tombs have their modern counterparts (see particularly Edelberg, *Kuml* 1965. 180-1; further bibliography at Goukowsky ii 154 n. 29). It may be assumed that his account is broadly correct. The inhabitants of Nysa did contemplate resistance, but the prompt arrival of the enemy and the beginning of siege operations brought them to their senses. Arrian is not concerned with the military details and concentrates upon the origins and social organization of the city. But his source probably did mention the attack. Arrian's expression ἐπέβη τῇ Νύσῃ is usually translated 'approached Nysa'. But ἐπιβαίνειν is used in a unique sense here (elsewhere in Arrian it always has the meaning 'mount'). The closest parallel is Xen. *Cyrop.* 5. 2. 26 (a passage Arrian knew well: cf. *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 265-6), where ἐπιβῆναι τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ can only mean 'to attack the Assyrian' (see also Plut. *Cim.* 15. 1). As Stephanus (*TGL* iii 1522 D) long ago saw, the force of Arrian's wording is that Alexander *was attacking* Nysa. The context given in his source may not have differed greatly from that in Curtius.

Ἄκουφίς (Berve no. 36) Cf. Plut. *Al.* 58. 7; *Metz Epit.* 37. Acuphis is usually presented as in some sense the governor of Nysa ('Vorsteher' Berve; 'man of greatest power' Brunt). Nothing in the sources supports the inference (rather Nysa is described at 2. 2 as an aristocracy). In Plutarch, Acuphis is the oldest (or most distinguished) of the envoys, and Arrian gives the same impression: τὸν κρατιστεύοντα σφῶν simply means 'the man of greatest excellence among them' (cf. 3. 21. 7; 6. 14. 3; Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 5. 1; 2. 1. 23; 8. 4. 4-5). Acuphis was clearly the envoy who had superior *auctoritas* but he had no *potestas* until he received Alexander's mandate.

ἀφείναι τῷ θεῷ 'to release the city into the charge of the god'. The wording implies that the city, now a prisoner of war, might be released to its rightful owner, the god (cf. 1. 29. 5; 2. 14. 1). The

Nysaeans represent themselves as the subjects of the god who should be allowed to resume his rule. A few lines later Acuphis repeats the request in a more standard form: liberty and autonomy (1. 5, 2. 2). It is clear that what was intended was independence in the full sense, as was spelled out later by the Oxydracae (6. 14. 3): they had wished to preserve their independence, but would accept a satrap appointed by Alexander, pay whatever tribute he chose to impose, and surrender as many hostages as were demanded. When defined by its negative (its only meaningful) sense, autonomy meant the absence of direct rule, tribute, and hostages. That was clearly what the Nysaeans intended by their request, but for Alexander autonomy and freedom had very different connotations (see below, 2. 2 n.).

4. *παρελθεῖν τε δὴ κτλ.* There is exactly the same setting in Plutarch (*Al.* 58. 7), who concentrates on the terror inspired by Alexander's appearance and his unexpected courtesy. There is probably a common source: Aristobulus (so Strasburger 42; Kornemann 147) or even Nearchus. The transition to *oratio obliqua* may suggest that the material occurred in one source only (see above).

κεκοιμῆμενον ἔτι ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ 'with the dust from the road still on him'. There is (*contra* Goukowsky ii 26) no contradiction of Plutarch, who has Alexander return from the *siege*. It is clear from Curtius (8. 10. 10) that little or no fighting took place, and Alexander himself was not involved. He retained the dust accumulated on the approach to Nysa and, as Arrian makes clear, he was fully armed for battle, helmet and all, not in travelling attire (when his weapons at least would be carried for him). His appearance and the terror it inspired in the envoys are entirely credible, if (as Plutarch and Curtius state) a full-blooded assault had just been called off.

5. *ὦ βασιλεῦ κτλ.* Acuphis' speech is reported only by Arrian, and the subject-matter is recapitulated from the exordium of the *Indike*, where the claims made here are stated as fact. It is theoretically possible that Arrian repeated the rhetoric of his speech in the *Indike*, but there is no reason why he should have included a piece of free composition in an otherwise derivative passage. The overwhelming probability is that *Ind.* 1. 4-5, which is marginally fuller in detail, provided the material for Acuphis' speech. The explanation of Dionysus' founding is held in reserve and placed in the mouth of the spokesman for the city. It enlivens the exposition and gives a positive content to Acuphis' pleading.

ἐκ τῶν ἀπομάχων At *Ind.* 1. 5 Arrian adds that the foundation probably included volunteers from neighbouring communities. That makes Dionysus' practice correspond to Alexander's own (see above, 4. 4. 1, 22. 5, 24. 7 with notes), but it does not wholly suit Acuphis' case that Nysa was founded by Dionysus' non-Indian followers and should be treated differently from its neighbours. The tradition of

Indian colonists is an embarrassment in this context and tacitly omitted.

πλείονα Διονύσου ἔργα This is probably Arrian's own embellishment, resuming and developing the sentiments of Anaxarchus (see above, 4. 10. 6 n.). The motif recurs, again in a speech, at 5. 26. 5.

6. Νύσαν τε οὖν Cf. *Ind.* 1. 5, where the onomastic material is repeated in slightly varied form. There is also rough agreement in the rest of the tradition. The city named Nysa is consistently distinguished from the neighbouring mountain, which is called Meros (cf. Strabo 15. 1. 8 (687); Curt. 8. 10. 7, 12; *Metz Epit.* 36; Pliny, *NH* 6. 79; Mela 3. 66). Cleitarchus (*FGrH* 137 F 17; so Philostr. *VA* 2. 7-9) allegedly referred to the mountain as Nysa; but the source (Schol. Ap. Rhod. 2. 904) is highly contracted and can hardly be considered an accurate excerpt. All the existing branches of the vulgate (see above, and also Diod. 17 index λγ; Justin 12. 7. 6; Plut. *Al.* 58. 6) use the name Nysa for the city alone. That is a departure from the Homeric tradition in which Nysa is the *mountain* where Dionysus was reared by a plurality of anonymous nurses (*Il.* 6. 133; *Hymn.* 26. 3-5; cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 556; Hdt. 2. 146). One must assume that the Indian toponyms precluded the simple naming of the mountain after the Nysa of myth. It was the city-name which recalled the Greek Nysa, whereas the local name of the mountain was more akin to Meros. That involved the god in some inconsistency. The city he founded commemorated the mountain where he was reared; the neighbouring mountain was named after the circumstances of his birth.

There remains an echo of the Homeric tradition in Arrian. Here he states that Dionysus named Nysa in memory of his nurse, but in the parallel passage at *Ind.* 1. 5 the manuscript tradition has it that the city was named after the mountain. The text has been amended (*τῆς τροφῆς* for *τοῦ ὄρους*; Fränkel and Roos) to impose consistency, but the emendation is not palaeographically compelling (Chantraine and Brunt retain the preserved reading). One must therefore assume that Arrian's source represented the mountain figuratively as the nurse of Dionysus. This metaphorical interpretation may have preceded Alexander; Terpander of Lesbos allegedly described Ny(s)sa as having nursed Dionysus (*Νύσσαν λέγει τετιθηνηκέναι τὸν Διόνυσον*; Lyd. *de mens.* 4. 51, p. 106. 20 (Wünsch)), and he may well have been referring figuratively to the mountain. If the metaphor was popular, it will have encouraged the personification of Nysa. That was certainly the case in the grand procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in which Nysa was represented as a human figure, crowned with grapes and ivy leaves (as was the mountain) and pouring the libation of milk which was appropriate for a nurse (Athen. 5. 198 f; cf. Rice 66-8). In due course the person of Nysa the nymph

emerged, the daughter, so it was said, of Aristaeus (Diod. 3. 70. 1, cf. 64. 5, 68. 4). By Arrian's time the city of Scythopolis in Samaria claimed to have received its alternative name, Nysa, after the god's nurse, who was buried there (Pliny, *NH* 5. 74), and the local coinage depicted the infant god in her arms (Head, *HN*² 803; *BMC Palestine*, p. xxxvi, 76-7; Schürer ii² 38, 143; B. Lifschitz, *ANRW* ii 8 (1978) 263, 275-6).

πλησίον . . . τῆς πόλεως So *Ind.* 1. 6. Other sources place Nysa explicitly at the foot of the mountain (Curt. 8. 10. 12; Strabo 15. 1. 8 places the mountain above the city). The *Metz Epitome*'s statement that the Nysaeans 'showed Alexander the mountain from afar' (*montemque procul ostenderunt* (36)) certainly does not justify Goukowsky's conclusion (ii 28-30), based on Cleitarchus (see note above), that there were *two* separate mountains, Nysa and Meros, both visited by Alexander. No source mentions two mountains; only Cleitarchus (in compressed extract) refers to a Mt. Nysa, and all others, deriving from different authorities, locate a single mountain (Meros) in the immediate vicinity of the city (Nysa). That must be correct.

Μηρὸν ἐπωνόμασε Διόνυσος The myth of Dionysus' second birth from the thigh (or knee) of Zeus is early and apparently popular. It figured in Pindar (F 85 Maehler), is dramatically invoked in Euripides' *Bacchae* (523-7), and is charmingly portrayed on a volute crater from Apulia of about 500 BC (A. D. Trendall, *JHS* 54 (1934) 175-9; *LIMC* iii 479, no. 667). In Alexander's time it was common currency. According to Arrian, the god himself gave the name to the mountain in commemoration of his early vicissitudes. The explanation is found elsewhere (*Metz Epit.* 36: *quem ille ex progenie sua Meron appellasset*) and was clearly already in Arrian's source. But other traditions claim that the myth itself was a fabrication: Meros was an Indian name, and it was the ingenuity of Greek rationalists which excogitated the story of the thigh of Zeus (Curt. 8. 10. 12; Pliny, *NH*, 6. 79; Mela 3. 66). This version was in circulation at an early date and was accepted by Theophrastus (*HP* 4. 4. 1: ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον εἶναι μυθολογοῦσι). Clearly there were two explanations. Both accepted that Nysa was a Dionysiac foundation and that the neighbouring mountain was locally named Meros. For one school of interpreters the names themselves give rise to the stories of Dionysus' concealment and second birth, and for another the stories were true, and inspired the god to name his new foundation after the scenes of his childhood. If Nearchus is Arrian's source here (see above), the credulous explanation was the earlier. It was subsequently modified by sceptical rationalization in the style of Hecataeus (cf. 2. 16. 5-6).
κιττὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλη This is the crux. At *Ind.* 5. 9 Arrian accepts the occurrence of ivy, along with the survival of the place names, as

evidence of the god's influence, and rejects Eratosthenes' criticism (recorded by Strabo 15. 1. 8). The phenomenon was widely discussed, notably by Theophrastus (*HP* 4. 4. 1), who noted the dearth of ivy elsewhere in Asia. Cleitarchus also must have devoted some attention to the ivy of Nysa, for he recorded its local name (*σκινδαψός*) and implied that it differed from the European ivy (*FGrH* 137 F 17). Modern reports give some factual corroboration. Himalayan ivy (*Hedera nepalensis*) with distinctive yellow berries is relatively common in the 'alpine' districts of Pakistan but, once one is past the Afghan frontier, it is found mainly in Nuristan, in the side valleys of the Kunar and the Alingar (L. Edelberg, *Kuml* 1965. 180-4 with the end map). The plant cannot have been unique to Mt. Meros, as Arrian claims (see below, 2. 6 n.), but it was peculiar to the mountain districts and may not have been frequently sighted after the army left Nysa. Once the plains were reached, ivy was a thing of the past.

The absence of ivy in the rest of Asia was a matter of much interest. Theophrastus is categorical that it petered out in Upper Syria five days' march from the coast, a statement which must be based on autopsy, perhaps by one of the bematists interested in local flora (cf. *FGrH* 122 F 4). Harpalus, Theophrastus adds, was sufficiently intrigued to experiment with growing it in Babylon. He failed. There was a famous exception to the rule. According to Theophrastus ivy was sighted in Media, no doubt *Hedera colchica*, which is still found between the Caucasus and northern Iran (cf. S. Amigues' note at p. 219 of her Budé edition). Theophrastus explained the phenomenon by the proximity of Media to Europe, and it was clearly thought that ivy was a European plant which could not travel beyond the continental boundary without divine assistance. That explains Alexander's lack of surprise when he and his staff passed a complex of stone cairns and ivy-covered trees in his pursuit of the Saca horsemen north of the Syr-Darya (Curt. 7. 9. 15; see above, 4. 4. 8 n.). The ivy there was Himalayan ivy, which extends northwards from the Hindu Kush into Uzbekistan (S. Kitamura, *Flora of Afghanistan* (Kyoto 1960) 281), but Alexander's men considered that they were in Europe once they were north of Syr-Darya (above, 3. 30. 9; 4. 1. 1, 15. 4 with notes) and saw the ivy as European ivy. It was seen as proof of the god's presence, and predisposed the Macedonians to look for the same phenomenon elsewhere.

2. 1. *ἤθελε πιστὰ εἶναι* The note of scepticism is interesting. Arrian implies that Alexander's eagerness to believe the myth overrode its intrinsic implausibility. Strasburger 42 (cf. Kornemann 147) compared the exposition of the motives for the visit to Siwah (3. 3. 1-2, 4. 5), where there is also a tinge of ironic realism, and he

ascribed both passages to Ptolemy. But there is also (as Strasburger observed) a parallel with what Nearchus reports about Alexander's motives for the desert crossing. Emulation of Semiramis and Cyrus is coupled with the more rational aim of provisioning the fleet (6. 24. 2-3 with notes). A similar combination occurs in the present passage: Alexander's emulation of Dionysus is followed by concern for his troops' morale. The report, in direct speech, could in theory derive from any (or a combination) of Arrian's major sources. Its general flavour, however, seems most characteristic of Nearchus.

ἐπέκεινα <ἄν> **ἐλθεῖν** Krüger's supplement seems necessary (and restores consistency with 5. 26. 5). Otherwise the text is nonsense: Alexander had already gone beyond Dionysus when he reached Nysa. That could only be a reference to his conquests in the north-east (cf. Curt. 7. 9. 15), and it would require positing a rather long lacuna to restore coherency (e.g. *καὶ* <πρότερον ἐν τῇ Σογδιανῇ καὶ> **ἐπέκεινα** **ἐλθεῖν** **Διονύσου**). On the other hand Krüger's addition of **ἄν** is neater and gives good sense but it is somewhat surprising sense: Alexander already intended that he would go beyond Dionysus. The ambitions he harboured were clearly unlimited. There are hints as early as 328 that he planned the conquest of Asia in its entirety (see above, 4. 15. 6 with note) and his aims had not become any the less grandiose when he actually entered India.

οὐδ' ἄν Μακεδόνας This is the first hint in Arrian of discontent among the Macedonian rank-and-file. The earlier difficulties, when the troops required all Alexander's powers of persuasion to move east from Hecatompylus (Diod. 17. 74. 3; Curt. 6. 2. 15-4. 1; Justin 12. 3. 2-4; Plut. *Al.* 47. 1-2) are not mentioned at all; and the war-weariness of the Thessalians discharged at the Oxus is only alluded to much later, in Coenus' speech at the Hyphasis (5. 27. 5). It does not appear at the appropriate point in the campaign narrative (cf. 3. 29. 5 with note) and was not apparently included by his source at that time. The dismissal of the Thessalians was presumably mentioned in the tradition of the Hyphasis mutiny, adduced as an antecedent of the troubles of 326, but in the campaign narrative of 329 it was described in anodyne terms as a simple administrative measure. Nor is there any word of the colourful episode in which Alexander burned his baggage train to reactivate his troops' appetites for plunder (whether at the gates of India (as in Plut. *Al.* 57. 1-2; *Aem.* 12. 11; Polyæn. 4. 3. 10) or three years earlier, in Parthyaëa (as in Curt. 6. 6. 14-17), is immaterial here). Now the theme emerges for the first time. That may be to introduce the discontent which was shortly to come to a head at the Hyphasis (5. 25. 2), but it is also possible that there is a fresh element in Arrian's source material. That can only have been Nearchus, who had no hesitation in mentioning (admittedly in his own interests) the Macedonians'

yearning for home (*Ind.* 20. 4, 8) and even emphasized Alexander's difficulties in maintaining discipline (cf. 6. 25. 2 with note). The king, who feigned ignorance when he lost control, might have welcomed the inspirational example of the conquering Dionysus.

2. καὶ δίδωσιν ἐλευθέρους . . . αὐτονόμους This was the grant made previously to the Lydians (1. 17. 4) and to the Ariasprians, who could also boast of an excellent internal government (3. 27. 5). In both cases Alexander made the grant as a regal benefaction, but in both cases there was direct rule imposed and rule by a foreigner. If one combines Curt. 7. 3. 4 and Diod. 81. 2 it would appear that the Ariasprians were directly administered by 'Amedines', an ex-secretary of Darius III, who was in turn subordinate to Tiridates, the satrap of northern Gedrosia. In the same way the people of Nysa were presented with a hyparch, but a hyparch of their own stock who had found especial favour with the king (see below, 5. 21. 5 n.). He would presumably be controlled in due course by the satrap of Gandhara, Nilcanor (see above, 4. 28. 6 with note). No doubt the satrap would keep his distance and show due deference, but, if there were unrest or signs of unrest, then the Nysaeans would rapidly become aware of the limits of liberty. Nothing is said of tribute and it may well have been excused: Alexander was not in need of the financial contribution of so small a community. But the demand for cavalry and hostages, only partly relaxed, was a demonstration of the realities of the new regime. Alexander's will was absolute and the only appeal was to himself. From the outset liberty was shown to be liberty to act as he wished, and autonomy was the absence (for the moment at least) of any direct intervention in the internal affairs of Nysa—other than the appointment of Acuphis as hyparch. But the Nysaeans will have reflected on the fate of their neighbours and rightly considered themselves fortunate.

ὅτι πρὸς τῶν ἀρίστων . . . ἔχεται The government of Nysa was aristocratic. The 300 members of the ruling class correspond to the group of counsellors which Megasthenes later observed alongside the Maurya king and, in autonomous cities, the local authorities (*Ind.* 12. 6–7; cf. *FGrH* 715 F 19; Diod. 2. 41. 4: see, however, Zambrini, *ASNP* 15 (1985) 823–7). The same phenomenon was also described by Nearchus, who claimed that the Brahmans handled the government and advised the local rulers (Strabo 15. 1. 66 (716) = *FGrH* 133 F 23). Whatever the Nysaeans' claims (or Alexander's belief) about their non-Indian origins (see above, 1. 5 n.), their institutions were presumably Indian, brought by the volunteers who joined Dionysus' settlement (*Ind.* 1. 5). The governing élite of Brahmans appealed to Alexander's conservative views of good government, and his appetite was whetted to discover more about that curious social group which was both politically active and devoted

to religious asceticism (cf. 7. 2. 2-4). It was some time before he discovered an undesirable aspect to the Brahmans, their encouragement of nationalist resistance in southern India (see below, 6. 16. 5 with note).

ξυμπέμψαι ἑς τριακοσίους This is a surprisingly large number, comparable to the 1,000 picked troops demanded of the Oxydracae the following year (cf. 6. 14. 3): and the Oxydracae were a populous nation with a multitude of cities (6. 14. 1). For all his expressed admiration of the Nysaeen polity Alexander had not forgotten their original intention to resist him (see above, 1. 3 n.). He took a body of soldiers large enough to be an effective pool of hostages and retained them until his return from the Hyphasis (see below, 6. 2. 3).

ἑκατὸν τοὺς ἀρίστους So Plut. *Al.* 58. 8-9 and *Metz Epil.* 37-8, both agreeing with Arrian on the content of Alexander's demand and the substance of Acuphis' riposte. The anecdote was clearly famous and reported in similar terms throughout the tradition. Beneath the superficial banter lies a deep concern. The 100 members of the governing class were a matter of far greater importance than the dispatch of troops, which was not questioned. There may be an echo here of the controversy over Calanus, who was criticized for renouncing his philosophical self-sufficiency and following a master other than god (see below, 7. 2. 4 = Megasthenes, *FGrH* 715 F 34; cf. Karttunen 159-60, 229-30). And in Indian doctrine to be servant to a king and, more importantly, to entertain relations with outcasts meant forfeiture of one's Brahman status (Manu 3. 157: 'He who forsakes his mother, his father, or a teacher without a (sufficient) reason, he who has contracted alliance with outcasts either through the Veda or through a marriage. . .'; cf. F. F. Schwarz, *Grazer Beitr.* 9 (1980) 101). There probably lay the crux of the matter. Acuphis would not compromise and Alexander refrained from enforcing his will.

4. ἐκέλευσε . . . αἰτῆσαι A sharp transition from indirect to direct speech and then back into *oratio obliqua*. The idiom is strongly Herodotean (cf. Hdt. 2. 162. 3-4: ἐκέλευε . . . ἀξιοῦν, on which see Guy L. Cooper, *TAPA* 104 (1974) 74), but there may be more at issue than literary imitation. The demand for the cavalry may well have been more strongly attested than the debate over the 100 members of the ruling class, and Arrian's brief excursion into direct speech underlines the fact.

5. πόθος ἔλαβεν ἰδεῖν Reminiscent, in all probability deliberately so, of the account of the journey to Siwah (see above, 3. 3. 1). In both cases the earlier presence of familiar mythical figures inspires Alexander to visit the scene. The motivation is surely a fact, but the method of expression Arrian's own (see above, 1. 3. 5; 4. 28. 4 with

notes), yet another Herodotean idiom in a passage strongly influenced by the master.

ξὺν τοῖς ἑταίροις . . . ἀγῆματι Curtius (8. 10. 13) less accurately claims that Alexander went with his entire army but he seems correct in stating that provisions were sent ahead. Otherwise the festivities described by Arrian (2. 6) would not have transpired.

κισσοῦ τε ἀνάπλεων καὶ δάφνης The flora of Mt. Meros is variously described. For Arrian there was an abundance of ivy and bay and groves of different varieties of trees. What he does not mention (and indeed he implies its absence) is the vine. In that he differs from the rest of the tradition. Curtius (8. 10. 13, 15) mentions the vine along with ivy, bay, and wild olive (so Justin 12. 7. 7), while Megasthenes (Strabo 15. 1. 58 (711) = *FGrH* 715 F 33) claimed that the wild vine grew uniquely in the mountains where Dionysus was worshipped, alongside ivy, bay, myrtle, boxwood, and many other trees which could only be cultivated east of the Euphrates in specialized gardens (Theophrastus, *HP* 4. 4. 1, makes the same point in relation to boxwood and the lime). The presence of the vine was clearly an essential part of the tradition by Eratosthenes' time, for he observed that the local grapes never ripened and so, by implication, were unlikely to be the gift of the god (Strabo 15. 1. 8 (681)). The absence of the vine in Arrian is notable and indicates an early stage in the development of the tradition. Vines are pre-eminently what one would expect of Dionysus, and it is not surprising that they are provided in the vulgate tradition, to fall foul of the scepticism of Eratosthenes. Perhaps Cleitarchus, or his informants knew of the wild vines which (as Megasthenes confirms) grew abundantly on the Himalayan foothills, and still do in Nuristan in association with the evergreen oak (L. Edelberg, *Kuml* 1965. 180), and transferred them incorrectly to Nysa. Arrian's source on the contrary emphasized the growths of ivy alone as the conclusive evidence of the god's presence. That is undoubtedly an accurate account of what the Macedonians experienced and may well rest on autopsy. The bay trees also seem an authentic recollection; *Daphne angustifolia* is still found in Nuristan (Edelberg 161, 180).

καὶ ἰδεῖν σύσκιον This produces a repetitive and bathetic effect which most commentators have found offensive. Roos's apparatus lists the various emendations hitherto attempted, none of which is particularly compelling. Krüger's ἄλσει παντοίῳ σύσκιον is the most economical; it creates a balanced sentence and is consistent with Arrian's usage elsewhere (*Ind.* 22. 7: ὕλη παντοίῃ σύσκιος).

6. οὐδὲ ἵναπερ . . . ἄμπελοι Arrian (or rather his source) is thinking of the Sydracae (or Oxydracae) of the Punjab, who claimed to be related to Dionysus because of their cultivation of the vine. In that, Eratosthenes implies (Strabo 15. 1. 8 (687-8)), they were

unique. Certainly there could be no question of the ivy growing in the heat of the plains, and Arrian's source presumably contrasted the two regionally distinct gifts of Dionysus: ivy in the mountains and vines in the plain.

τὰς ἐπωνυμίας . . . ἀνακαλοῦντας The Macedonians sang the dithyramb in honour of the god and invoked him under his manifold cult titles (cf. Soph. *Antig.* 1115). Little enough is known of the original dithyramb, but it is clear enough that the genre contained invocations of the god, as do Euripides' Bacchic choruses (*Bacch.* 65-9, 412-13, 526, 566). The phenomenon occurs in Pindar (F 75. 9-10, 248 (Maehler)) and with striking effect in Pratinas' poem to the god, in all probability a dithyramb (Athen. 14. 617 B-F = Page, *PMG* 708), where Dionysus is addressed as Bromios and in a climactic cadenza the chorus cries out to him as *θριαμβοδιθύραμβε κισσύχαιτ' ἀναξ* (cf. T. B. L. Webster, in A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy* (Oxford 1962) 20). The dithyramb was notoriously passionate and Aeschylus apparently described it as *μυξοβόας*, 'with cries intermingled' (Plut. *Mor.* 389 A = Aesch. F 355 (Radt)). The shouting of the cult epithets went eminently well with the dithyramb and intensified the religious excitement of the moment. It was a short step from invoking the god's presence to sensing his arrival. Bacchic possession probably did not occur (see below), but it would have been a natural sequel.

καὶ ἐδώχθηθῆναι According to Curtius (8. 10. 17) the celebrations in Dionysus' honour took place over ten days. If so, it was a very thorough-going affair, and it would be remarkable if there were not *some* Dionysiac excesses.

7. οἱ δὲ καὶ τότε ἀνέγραψαν The closest parallel is at 6. 28. 1, where Arrian again retails Dionysiac material, using sources (which he discounts) other than Ptolemy and Aristobulus. This passage may be taken from the same tradition, which is demonstrably late (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 68-9) and clearly stressed the more sensational aspects of Alexander's imitation of Dionysus. Arrian included the detail for interest's sake, in Herodotean mode (Hdt. 7. 214. 1; 8. 119), and also to inject a note of scepticism, preparing the way for the more comprehensive discussion of Eratosthenes' rationalism (3. 1-4).

What is dismissed is the tradition that Alexander's staff put on an exhibition of Bacchic possession. In Curtius (8. 10. 16) and Justin (12. 7. 8) the invocation of the god, attested by Arrian, is represented as a sign of divine possession, and what in Arrian's main tradition is an ordered, if frenetic, celebration becomes a spontaneous outbreak of orgiastic behaviour. The line of demarcation is thin but significant. Calling upon the god by his cult title *Euios* was not far removed from raising the Bacchic cry 'Euhoi' (*ἀνεύσαι τὸν θεόν*) and being

psychologically transported by the god. Given the tradition of Bacchic worship in Macedonia (see particularly Plut. *Al.* 2. 9), such possession is not intrinsically incredible; but it seems to have been characteristic of women rather than men and it was certainly not attested in Arrian's primary source for the events on Mt. Meros.

3. 1-4. *Eratosthenes and the Creation of Myth*

3. 1. καὶ ταῦτα . . . πιστευέτω This refers back directly to the questionable story of Bacchic possession (2. 7) but also recalls the earlier discussion of Dionysus' presence in India (1. 1-2), where the general issue of the credibility of myth was raised. Now the question is explored more fully, in an atmosphere of agnosticism (ἐν μέσῳ κείσθων: 3. 4). True to his principle that one cannot be rigorous in applying arguments of probability to the divine (1. 2 with note) Arrian refuses to express an opinion. For that we must turn to the *Indike*, where he accepts the tradition as it relates to Dionysus but is negative towards the myths of Heracles (*Ind.* 5. 9-13; see above, 4. 28. 4 with note). The formulation is different but the mental attitude consistent.

Ἐρατοσθένης τῷ Κυρηναίῳ For the biographical tradition on Eratosthenes see the 'Suda' *Life* (*FGrH* 241 T 1) with the discussion by P. M. Fraser, *PBA* 56 (1970) 175-207. Born in Cyrene in the first part of the third century BC, Eratosthenes studied and wrote at Athens until summoned by Ptolemy III Euergetes shortly after 245 BC to take charge of the Library at Alexandria. There he remained until the end of the century. Of his multitudinous works, which encompassed philosophy, poetry, and history, it is his *Geography* which concerns us here, and in particular the third book in which he propounded his map of the world, based upon the geometrical shapes of the land masses and explicitly designed to incorporate the geographical knowledge accruing through Alexander's expedition (Strabo 1. 2. 1 (14); 1. 3. 3 (48) = iB. 10-11 Berger). This was Arrian's primary source (along with Megasthenes) for the geography of India. Eratosthenes, he claims (*Ind.* 3. 1), is more reliable than any other source, and he reviews his geographical framework in similar terms in both the *Indike* (2. 1-4. 1) and the Alexander history (5. 4. 1-3, 5. 2-6. 2). Within that framework came Eratosthenes' famous strictures on the creation of myth at Alexander's court. Both Arrian (5. 3. 1-4; *Ind.* 5. 8-13) and Strabo (11. 5. 5 (505); 15. 1. 7-9 (687-8)) refer to them on two occasions out of their immediate context, but it is reasonably clear that the starting-point was the misplacing of the Caucasus. Arrian (5. 5. 3) supplies the linkage when he gives Eratosthenes' (correct) name for the Hindu Kush (Parapamisus) and briefly digresses to mention the

Macedonians' transposition of the Caucasus for the greater glory of Alexander. There is a similar note at *Ind.* 2. 3-4, which corresponds in turn to Strabo's digest of the third book of Eratosthenes' *Geographica* (15. 1. 11 (68g)). What incensed Eratosthenes particularly was the geographical incompatibility. In his map of the world the Hindu Kush was an extension of the Taurus range, dividing Asia from the Aegean to the eastern Ocean, and there could be no question of the Caucasus as traditionally defined forming a common range with it (as is naïvely suggested by Arrian). He therefore laid stress on the 30,000 stades which (on his reckoning) separated India from the Caucasus (Strabo 11. 5. 5) and dismissed the entire tradition as fabrication.

It was the geographical misconception that was of paramount importance for Eratosthenes, but he felt obliged to explain how the misconception arose and the result was a digression on encomiastic fabrication, beginning with the deliberate misnaming of the Hindu Kush and continuing with a running critique of the various efforts to trace the passage of Heracles and Dionysus. The effect is cumulative. Every connection of the Greek divinities with the Indian lands was a deliberate fraud; and so the overwhelming probability was that the traces of Heracles' presence in the Hindu Kush were bogus and the identification with the Caucasus was inadmissible. The geographical consequences were important and explain the vigour of Eratosthenes' attack. It is also evident that he is trying to eradicate a fixed misconception. The popular, and indeed the scholarly, tradition of the campaigns of Alexander had created a conviction that the Hindu Kush visited by Alexander was the mountain range where Prometheus had been pinioned. Aristobulus casually referred to the range as the Caucasus (see above, 3. 28. 5 n.), as later did Megasthenes (Strabo 15. 1. 12 (690) = *FGrH* 715 F 6c) and even the venerable Patrocles (Strabo 2. 1. 2 (68) = *FGrH* 712 F 2). But the main culprit must have been Cleitarchus. The vulgate tradition is consistent in reporting that the range was named Caucasus and the cave of Prometheus was discovered there (see below); and every one of Eratosthenes' alleged mythological fabrications has its counterpart in the vulgate. It had clearly been influential in forming popular opinion, and Eratosthenes felt obliged to demolish the entire construction. That meant *inter alia* the demolition of the myth of Dionysus' conquest of India, which had been proudly commemorated in Ptolemy Philadelphus' grand procession half a century before (see above, 1. 1 n.). In doing thus Eratosthenes hardly risked official disapproval (as suggested by Fraser, *PBA* 56 (1970) 197-8; see also A. Dihle, in *India and the Ancient World* 48-9). He was writing under Euergetes, who may not have taken the Dionysiac cult to the same excesses as his predecessor (J. Tondriau,

CE 25 (1950) 291-3), and was certainly not attacking the *fable convenue* that Dionysus was the ultimate ancestor of the Ptolemaic house (see above, 4. 10. 6n.). It was the manufacture of myth which he sought to expose and the exposure had a scholarly, not a political function, to eradicate a popular misconception and underpin the framework of his own geography.

πάντα . . . ἐπιφημισθῆναι 'Everything which was ascribed to the divine by the Macedonians was so attributed for the favour of Alexander and to add solemnity.' Here ἐπιφημισθῆναι denotes the attribution of an object to a divinity (cf. LSJ⁹ II 2, esp. Dio 44. 37. 5). Elsewhere (4. 28. 2) Arrian uses the verb in the reverse sense with the divinity as the subject (so Plut., *Publ.* 23. 1). That is conscious variation, parallel to his use below of the simple verb φημίσαι in a different sense ('alleged', as at *Peripl.* 6. 4). It is a feature of Arrian's style to repeat the same word (or cognate words) with quite distinct meanings (see above, 4. 22. 6: προῦχώρει . . . προχωρή).

Arrian does not here expound the detailed arguments of Eratosthenes, which are summarized by Strabo (15. 1. 9 (688)). (i) The episodes in question are not universally reported: indeed they are omitted by the most reliable authorities, and the details vary from source to source. (ii) It is incredible that the passage of Heracles and Dionysus left no traces between India and the Aegean. (iii) Heracles' club and lion-skin are a late accretion to the mythological tradition. Of these criticisms (ii) is adduced earlier, at 5. 1. 2 (see note) and (iii) is hinted at in the *Indike* (5. 13). They do not suit the present passage, where Arrian is leaving the matter in doubt. Unless answered, Eratosthenes' criticism would tip the balance towards scepticism, and his point about the sources would need elaborate discussion, since the tradition of Dionysus at Nysa was found in writers whom Arrian considered reliable, as indeed was that of Heracles at Aornus. Accordingly Arrian concentrates his discussion upon two of Eratosthenes' examples, both relating to Heracles and not apparently attested in his primary sources. He presents them neutrally, with no statement of his personal preferences. The reader needs to remember that he has roundly scouted the tradition of Heracles at Aornus and will retain his scepticism in the *Indike* (5. 8). The immediate context, however, is the passage of Dionysus, which Arrian explicitly accepts, and he mentions the myths of Heracles as further examples of physical evidence for the presence in India of a Greek divinity (at Aornus there was only a verbal tradition). The ivy at Nysa was paralleled by the cave in the Caucasus and the Indian cattle, and Arrian simply gives the parallels without undermining them by rationalist criticism. However, the exposition retains much of Eratosthenes' animus, particularly at 1. 3, and the implication of the

language he uses is that the location of Prometheus in the Caucasus is a deliberate fiction.

2. **μῦθον ἐπιχῶριον** This was apparently the version of Cleitarchus. The natives of Parapamisadae pointed out the mountain which contained Prometheus' cave, with the eagle's nest and the traces of his chains (Diod. 83. 1; Curt. 7. 3. 22). Eratosthenes implied strongly that the identification was a fabrication (the alternative of the local myth is not mentioned in the other reports of his criticism: *Ind.* 5. 11; Strabo 11. 5. 5, 15. 1. 8), but there was certainly some local tradition which induced the Macedonians to locate Prometheus' cave there, apparently within sight of *Alexandria in Caucaso*. The very toponym, Parapamisus, once translated, would have suggested the connection with the eagle (see above, 4. 22. 4 n.); and it would not be surprising if there were some native legend relating to the Iranian hero, Vereθragna, who was later identified with the Greek Heracles (E. Benveniste, *Paideuma* 7 (1959) 193-9; Goukowsky, *Diodore xvii* p. 237). The association with Prometheus was presumably made by Alexander's men, who conflated Iranian with Greek tradition and had Alexander follow in the footsteps of Heracles, his Argead ancestor. It could even be that the fabrication was one of Callisthenes' last services for Alexander. In his campaign history he had represented Heracles and Perseus extending their travels in Africa as far as Siwah (*FGrH* 124 F 14a; see above, 3. 3. 1 n.), and he may well have concocted a similar myth during the early summer of 329. That was followed later in the year by the discovery of the 'boundaries of Dionysus' north of the Syr-Darya (see above, 4. 4. 8; 5. 1. 6 nn.), which supplied the precedent for detecting the passage of the divine wanderers everywhere in the eastern world.

τοῦτο ἄρα ἦν κτλ. Prometheus' punishment, the chaining and the torture inflicted by the eagle, was a familiar theme from the time of Hesiod (*Theog.* 523-3), who already depicts Heracles killing the eagle—but not necessarily releasing Prometheus (so Pherecydes, *FGrH* 3 F 17); and the scene appears on Attic vases (but not apparently elsewhere) from the end of the seventh century (L. Eckhart, *RE* xxiii 707-11). As yet there is no localization; in Pherecydes, Heracles meets the Titan on his quest for the apples of the Hesperides. However, in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Unbound* the setting of Heracles' meeting with and release of Prometheus was the Caucasus (cf. Aesch. F 193, 199 (Radt), *contra* M. L. West, *JHS* 99, (1979) 134-5). By Alexander's time that had clearly become the canonical location of Prometheus' torment, and the identification of Prometheus' cave in the Hindu Kush had the necessary corollary that the Hindu Kush was actually the Caucasus.

For Eratosthenes the geographical distortion was deliberate and

malicious; the Macedonians transferred the Caucasus from the Pontic shore to the far east (so Arrian (3. 3) and Strabo). That involved a distance of 30,000 stades (Strabo 11. 5. 5), Eratosthenes' summation of the distance by road from the Caspian to India (Strabo 11. 8. 9 = *FGrH* 119 F 26). The estimate was certainly based on the figures provided by Alexander's bematists, who seem to have referred to the Hindu Kush as the Caucasus (Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a), but they need not have imagined their progress as rectilinear. It was possible to conceive the route as describing a curve and finishing not too far removed from the starting-point. The Hindu Kush was therefore the eastern extension of the Caucasus proper and the Black Sea was not impossibly distant. It was the same geographical distortion which led to the conviction that Colchis and the Black Sea were relatively close to the northern borders of Sogdiana (see above, 4. 1. 1, 15. 4 with notes). One fraudulent or erroneous inference was piled upon another, so that the theory became dogma. The discovery of Prometheus' cave will have helped to form opinion but there was probably already a tendency to see the Hindu Kush as part of the Caucasus. It would have encouraged the adaptation of the local legend to the Greek model, and subsequent generations associated Prometheus' punishment axiomatically with the Caucasus.

It is interesting that Arrian makes no comment of his own, either here or in the *Indike*. Eratosthenes speculated that the motive behind the invention was to have Alexander eclipse the Argonauts, who had reached Colchis but had not penetrated as far as Prometheus' place of punishment (Strabo 11. 5. 5 (505-6)). Now, by the Roman period the alleged place of Prometheus' punishment was firmly fixed by the Black Sea and was even a tourist attraction (App. *Mithr.* 103. 478; cf. David Braund, in P. Freeman and D. L. Kennedy, *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East* (Oxford 1986) 38-45). Arrian himself took a considerable interest in the area while governor of Cappadocia, and in his voyage of inspection of 131 he was shown the anchor of the *Argo* (*Peripl.* 9. 2) and caught sight of the Caucasian peak named Strobilus where Prometheus was alleged to have been chained (ibid. 11. 5; cf. *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 252). That was clearly relevant and corroborated Eratosthenes' critique. It is understandable that Arrian ignored the information in the Alexander history, where he leaves the issue deliberately open. But in the *Indike* he is openly sceptical and his autopsy would support his case. What is more he is far from reticent in drawing on his experience in that work (cf. *Ind.* 4. 15-16, 14. 5-6, 15. 9, 41. 2) and would not withhold knowledge deliberately. This is a strong negative argument that the works on Alexander were written before the governorship of Cappadocia (see above, vol. i 8-11; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 29-37).

4. **βοῦς ἰδόντας ἐγκεκαυμένους** At *Ind.* 5. 12 Arrian is more expansive. The Indian tribe is named (Sibae: elsewhere Sibi), and the brand of the club is only one proof of Heracles' presence (the tribe was clothed in skins like Heracles and carried cudgels). Strabo (15. 1. 8) has exactly the same material, which must be the substance of the claims criticized by Eratosthenes. Once again Arrian is uninterested in the detail of the argument and omits Eratosthenes' observation that the club and lion-skin were an anachronism dating to the time of the Epic Cycle (Strabo 15. 1. 9 (688)). That would have tilted the scales too decisively towards rejection of the myth.

The Sibi are located in the Punjab, close to the confluence of the Acesines and the Hydaspes (Diod. 96. 2; Curt. 9. 4. 1-3; Justin 12. 9. 2). All the sources of the vulgate allege that the Sibi purported to be the descendants of Heracles (the claim made at Nysa with respect to Dionysus); and Curtius mentions the skin clothing and the use of clubs in warfare—though *not* the cattle brands. There is no reference to the Sibi in Arrian's later campaign narrative, but the beginning of Book VI is overshadowed by the river journey. The peoples who surrendered or resisted are a lesser concern and are not mentioned by name (see below, 6. 4. 2 with note). The Sibi are certainly historical (A. H. Dani, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan* 9 (1964) 13-17). Their domicile has been strikingly confirmed by Indian evidence. The mound of Shorkot (to the east of the Chenab (Acesines) below its modern confluence with the Jhelum (Hydaspes), see Map 9 below) has yielded an inscription naming the site Śibipura (J. P. Vogel, *Epigraphica Indica* 16 (1921) 16). That is probably the Sivapura mentioned by the scholiast on Panini as a place in the northern country (Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 88-9). The name suggests the deity Śiva, whose attributes included a club and animal skins (cf. Dahlquist 73-5 (hypercritical); M. Mariottini Spagnoli, *East & West* 17 (1967) 257-60), and it is highly probable that the local worship of Śiva (and the adoption of the god's attributes by his devotees) encouraged Alexander's staff to make the equation with Heracles and extend the myth of Heracles' exploits in India. The events at Nysa provided the model, and the Sibi were recognized like the Nysaeans as descendants of the god's superannuated followers; their relationship with Alexander was acknowledged in a formal grant of freedom (Diod. 96. 3; see above, 5. 2. 2 with note).

ῥομια δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ Διονύσου See above, 5. 1. 2 with notes. Nysa was the prime instance, but Eratosthenes also drew attention to the Sydracae (Oxydracae in Arrian), who cultivated the vine, set out to battle to the accompaniment of drums and cymbals, and wore a fragrant, dappled costume reminiscent of Dionysus (Strabo 15. 1. 8 (cf. 33); *Ind.* 5. 9). There is no counterpart to this in the vulgate tradition, but Arrian (6. 14. 2) reports that the Oxydracae made

explicit reference to Dionysus when they surrendered. No doubt they also made claim to a direct connection with Dionysus, adducing proofs of their descent from the god (cf. Goukowsky ii 42-3), which Alexander may or may not have believed. Eratosthenes noted that the customs cited were widespread among the Indians (Strabo 15. 1. 8; Arr. *Ind.* 5. 9 does not even mention the Oxydracae specifically), and his knowledge may derive from the Alexander historians who will have been aware that the Oxydracae were not unique. Megasthenes (Strabo 15. 1. 58 (712) = *FGrH* 715 F 33) observed that the use of perfume and cymbals on campaign was characteristic of the northern devotees of Dionysus (cf. *Ind.* 7. 9), while Indian sources associate the Punjab with wine drinking to excess, even among Brahmans (O. Stein, *RE* xviii 2031; Karttunen 216-18, 226-7). The Oxydracae might not have been successful in pressing their claims, but they did draw attention to the characteristics of Indian society which suggested Dionysiac influence and, as with Heracles, the myth of the god's conquests gained additional momentum.

3. 5-4. 2 *The Crossing of the Indus*

Arrian momentarily resumes his campaign narrative, taking the story from 4. 30. 9. This allows him to introduce the Indus and its tributaries, which are to play so dominant a role in the events of the next two years; and the crossing of the Indus in its turn leads to the formal introduction to Indian geography. The material in the main comes from Eratosthenes, but it is juxtaposed with short extracts from his historical sources. Ptolemy is the usual choice (cf. Straburger 43; Kornemann 148; Schwartz, *RE* ii 913, suggested Aristobulus). That is probably correct. There is no indication of the season, which may be a simple oversight by Arrian. But Aristobulus explicitly recorded that Alexander reached the plains and the city of Taxila at the beginning of spring (Strabo 15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35), and, if Arrian were following his account, we should expect a statement to that effect (cf. 4. 18. 4 with note). But Arrian did consult Aristobulus' account of the crossing (see below, 7. 1), and some details may be added from it.

5. γέφυράν τε . . . τριακοντόρους See above, 4. 22. 7, 28. 5, 30. 9 with notes. The crossing-point is nowhere located for us, and it is usually assumed that the bridge was constructed at the main ford of the Indus, at the old city of Udabhandā, modern Ohind (cf. Foucher 40; Eggermont, *OLP* 1 (1970) 70-1). There the present river bed extends over three or four km., broken by small islands and sandbanks. But Hephaestion's bridge, supported by boats (see below, 7. 1 n.), can hardly have had such a colossal span. Foucher 206-7 was

probably right to locate the bridge some distance upstream, where the river runs in a single channel. The shipbuilding was supplemented by Alexander's own activity further up the Indus (cf. 4. 30. 9), and it continued apace after he moved on to Taxila. By the time of the Hydaspes crossing Hephaestion's two triaconters (cf. Diod. 86. 3) had multiplied; there were enough for the entire hypaspist corps (see below, 13. 1). These vessels were exclusively for transport, and it is unlikely that any were provided with a second bank of oars, as were some vessels in the Indus fleet of 325 (see below, 6. 1. 1, 5. 2 with notes; Clason, *Ships and Seamanship* 125). They were collapsible for ease of transport (see below, 8. 5) and clearly had the biggest draught that was compatible with lightness and river-worthiness.

παρὰ Ταξίλου . . . δῶρα ἤκοντα For Taxiles the elder and his submission to Alexander in the summer of 327 see above, 4. 22. 6 with note. The fact that there is a second submission corroborates the vulgate story that there had been a change of regime; the old ruler died and his son Omphis was confirmed on the throne by Alexander. Omphis had been careful not to arrogate the kingship, and the size of his gifts to Alexander indicate that he intended to leave his overlord in no doubt of his good will. The vulgate tradition states that the gifts were conferred at the formal meeting, after Alexander had crossed the Indus (Diod. 86. 5-6; Curt. 8. 12. 11; *Metz Epil.* 50-2). That probably is a conflation. It is likely enough that Omphis wished to sweeten the temper of his new master and be sure of his benevolence before he risked a personal encounter. The horrific reports of massacre emanating from Swat cannot have been reassuring to him, however impeccable his credentials may have been.

ἀργυρίου . . . διακόσια The vulgate tradition records two donations: 600 talents of silver at the meeting (*Metz Epil.* 52) and 80 talents of coin (*signati argenti*) after Alexander reached Taxila (Curt. 8. 12. 15). The latter is a subsidiary gift, stamped pieces of bullion to accompany the gold crowns conferred upon Alexander and friends when they were feasted at Taxila (M. J. Price, in *Studia Naster* i 84, has tentatively argued that this may have been the celebrated 'Porus' coinage; see more fully W. Hollstein, *SNR* 68 (1989) 8-14). It is distinct from the more substantial donation of silver which Alexander found at the Indus. The amounts are large, but the Indian prince was buying favour and did so to good effect. His largess was eclipsed by that of Alexander, never one to be outdone in magnanimity, who responded with 1,000 talents from his own booty, much to the chagrin of his own friends (Curt. 8. 13. 16-17; Plut. *Al.* 59. 5; Strabo 15. 1. 28 (698)). Plutarch claims that the entire 1,000 talents was paid in coin, which is clearly an exaggeration (cf. Price 84 n. 31); but Alexander certainly had large reserves of

coined money (cf. 4. 18. 7 with note) and could have conferred a considerable sum upon his Indian ally.

ἑρεῖα . . . μύρια Curtius (8. 12. 11) agrees on the 3,000 cattle (which he alleges were bulls). The Indian prince would have received notice of Alexander's intention to sacrifice at the crossing (cf. 1. 4. 5; 4. 4. 3; 5. 27. 4 with notes), and provided a sumptuous offering for the ceremony. It would have been an occasion for general feasting, with the sacrificial beasts shared out to the troops by companies (cf. 7. 24. 4; *Ind.* 18. 12). It may be an exaggeration when Diodorus 86. 3 states that the ceremonies lasted for thirty days (Brunt, *Arrian* ii 455-6), but, if we take into account the time required to funnel the army over the bridge, it might well have been a matter of weeks rather than days before the last contingents of the army were on their way from the Indus to Taxila.

ἐλέφαντας . . . τριάκοντα Cf. 4. 22. 6. The vulgate (Curt. 8. 12. 11; *Metz Epit.* 52) gives a precise figure of fifty-six (fifty-eight, *Metz Epit.*). These elephants of Taxila were renowned for their size (Ael. *NA* 13. 8).

6. ἱππεῖς δὲ ἑπτακόσιοι This can only be a *corps d'élite*, intended to convey the best possible impression of Taxiles' military potential. His total contribution to Alexander's army was considerably greater (see below, 8. 5). These cavalrymen (or their leaders) also acted as spokesmen for their ruler. Arrian's text as it stands is defective, continuing with a statement 'that Taxiles was surrendering Taxila' (καὶ τὴν πόλιν . . . ὅτι αὐτῷ Ταξίλης ἐνδίδωσιν). The indirect speech comes out of nowhere and can hardly be explained by Abicht's assumption that ὅτι refers to καταλαμβάνει (3. 5). If so, the construction is violently broken by the intervening sentence (καὶ ἱππεῖς . . . ἦκον), which destroys any link with what precedes. There is surely a lacuna into which an introductory clause has disappeared: the most economical assumption is that Taxiles' men reported their master's loyalty and that he was opening his city to Alexander (McGrindle's translation, 'and that prince sent word that he would surrender', also presupposes a lacuna).

Τάξιλα See below, 8. 2, where the description is repeated. Taxila is the standard Greek approximation to the Sanskrit Takshaśila, the capital of the lands immediately east of the Indus. It is some 65 km. from the river, to the north-west of modern Rawalpindi (cf. A. H. Dani, *The Historic City of Taxila* (Paris and Tokyo, 1986) 8-17). Other sources, including Aristobulus (Strabo 15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35; cf. 15. 1. 28 (698)), also comment on its size. Until recently modern excavators were more disparaging. The Bhir mound, which was thought to be the oldest part of the ruins and contemporaneous with Alexander, was a haphazard collection of undistinguished buildings of limestone or mud-brick (for a lively

description see Sir Mortimer Wheeler, *Flames over Persepolis* (New York 1968) 103–6), all huddled together in an area no more than 1,000 m. in length. But the oldest portion of the city lay elsewhere, on the Hathial mound, where pottery has recently been found ranging in date from the second millennium BC to the Mauryan period (cf. F. R. Allchin, *Antiquity* 56 (1982) 8–14) and fragments of a city wall have been unearthed which may well belong to the Achaemenid period (Dani 41). This area could have contained the royal palaces and been more monumental in character than the residential area on the Bhir mound. Only further excavation will tell. The site as Alexander found it was certainly spacious, but its material splendour perhaps left something to be desired.

4. 1. ποταμὸς ὅτι μέγιστος The size of the Indian rivers was a standard *topos*, and from the time of Alexander the Ganges was acknowledged as the greatest, in depth at least (Diod. 93. 2; cf. Curt. 9. 2. 3). Megasthenes, who visited Chandragupta's capital Pataliputra (see below, 6. 2 n.), was struck by the dimensions of the Ganges, which he claimed surpassed any river in the world: the Indus was second, followed by the Danube and Nile (*Ind.* 4. 2–5. 1; Strabo 15. 1. 35 (702) = *FGrH* 715 F 9). Eratosthenes agreed that the Ganges was the greatest of the Indian rivers (Strabo 15. 1. 13 (698)), and Arrian followed the consensus. He was to tackle the subject at greater length in the *Indike*, where he reported Megasthenes' observations in detail. Here he presents the main features which are, he alleges, uncontested: the size of the Indus, its course, and its delta. The precise figures, whether the inflated estimates of Ctesias (see below) or the more moderate dimensions adduced at 5. 20. 10, are superfluous. The known facts of the flow of its tributaries prove that the Indus eclipses all rivers outside India. Accordingly Arrian contents himself with a general statement which is confirmed by the detailed figures he presents in the course of the campaign narrative (5. 20. 10; 6. 4. 2, 14. 5, 18. 5).

The first observers were able to study the Indus closely. Alexander's men spent over a year, from spring 326 to midsummer 325, in close proximity to the great river and were able to observe it at all seasons. Its relatively fast flow, particularly at monsoon time and around the great confluences (see below, 6. 4. 4–5. 3), contrasted with the slow current of the Nile, which the Macedonians had experienced at low water in winter. The Danube, on the contrary, had been flowing rapidly when Alexander reached its banks in spring 335 (see above, 1. 3. 4), but he was operating in a relatively limited area where the river was narrow, and its crossing presented no problems. In retrospect it would have suffered in comparison with the Indus, especially when the Indian river was in its summer

spate. The Alexander historians accordingly commemorated the Indus as the greatest of all rivers except possibly the Ganges, and Megasthenes confirmed the superiority of the Ganges from his personal observations. He was correct. Though slightly less in length, the Ganges far outstrips the Indus in its mean discharge, which is estimated at 38,000 cubic metres per second, the third in magnitude (after the Amazon and Congo) of the world's great rivers. The Indus' mean discharge is some 5,000 cubic metres per second, but, even so, it is twice the volume produced by the Nile, which for all its vast length suffers from low precipitation and high evaporation losses. By contrast the Danube produces a higher volume of water than the Indus (7,000 cubic metres per second) and has an almost identical length (2,850 km.) and only a slightly smaller drainage area. A more intimate experience of that river might have put it on the same level as the Indus in the minds of Alexander's staff.

ἐπὶ τᾷδε τοῦ ὄρους This can only mean 'on this side (i.e. the western side) of the range'. The alternative, that *ἐπὶ τᾷδε* refers to the perspective of the Macedonians in India, and so alludes to the eastern (or southern) side, could only be sustained by pressing the dubious reading at 5. 11. 3 (see below ad loc.). The other parallels (e.g. 2. 17. 4; 3. 6. 4, 8. 6, 28. 8; 4. 22. 6, 28. 6; 5. 9. 3) are conclusive that *ἐπὶ τᾷδε* reflects the perspective of Arrian and his readers. 'This side of the Parapamisus' is the side which faces Europe. In other words Arrian states that the sources of the Indus lie not in but beyond Parapamisus. He gives a different view in the *Indike*, when he summarizes Eratosthenes: the sources are actually in the Taurus (*Ind.* 3. 2: ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ Ταύρου ἵνα τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ αἰπῆγαί; so Strabo 15. 1. 13 (690); Curt. 8. 9. 3). The different orientation here (and the use of Caucasus as a geographical gloss) suggests that the information is taken from Megasthenes, the source for the rate of flow of the Punjab rivers. In that case Megasthenes probably took an eccentric view of the sources of the Indus. Seeing it as the second river of the world, he gave it an exceptionally long course, circumventing the Caucasus/Hindu Kush and rising in mountains yet further removed from the Ocean (but in Megasthenes' cosmography closer to Europe). His 'knowledge' may have come from Indian informants who referred to the Himalayas as a separate range, distinct from the Hindu Kush and more remote. This is admittedly speculation. Diodorus' digest of Megasthenes has both the Ganges and the Indus rising in the north (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτῶν: Diod. 2. 37. 4 = *FGrH* 715 F 4), which is too imprecise to control Arrian's statement. But Arrian's wording surely is meant to convey something more than the Indus rising in the Hindu Kush/Caucasus, and the geographical framework it presupposes is not that of Eratosthenes.

δίστομος ... *Ἰστρον* Here Arrian reverts to Eratosthenes. The

information he provides is repeated exactly in Strabo's summary of Book III of the *Geographica* (Strabo 15. 1. 13 (690)). The Alexandrian geographer compared the Ganges with its supposed single mouth with the two mouths and delta of the Indus, and he apparently listed and criticized the estimates given by the Alexander historians (Strabo 15. 1. 33 (701); cf. Arr. *Ind.* 2. 5-6). In his later account of events in the delta (6. 18. 2-20. 5) Arrian uses Nearchus and inevitably repeats many of Eratosthenes' details, particularly the description of the two major arms of the delta, which all sources (notably Aristobulus (F 58), Nearchus (F 21) and Onesicritus (F 26)) described. What is not taken up is the statement that there were shallows at the delta mouths (*τεναγώδεις* (cf. 5. 5): they were not 'marshy', as both Loeb editors translate). Arrian's later account describes the fleet going aground in a side-channel (6. 19. 1), but there are no difficulties with shallow water reported at the actual mouths (6. 19. 4-5, 20. 4). However he does concede (6. 14. 5) that the width of the Indus might exceed 100 stades at low water (*ἵνα λιμνάζει μᾶλλον*) and gives the greatest width (200 stades) precisely at the mouth (6. 18. 5).

The comparison with the five mouths of the Danube recurs at *Ind.* 2. 5 and may have been made by Eratosthenes. However, Strabo does not mention the Danube mouths in this context, and it is more probably an addition by Arrian, who seems to have had a predilection for this piece of wayward erudition (cf. 1. 3. 3 with note). The Indus had more mouths than two (as Nearchus perhaps realized when he mentioned the side-channel); in Roman times the author of the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* (38) reported seven mouths (so Ptol. 7. 1. 2), narrow and full of shallows. That presumably reflects the situation in the first century AD, when the configuration of the delta may have changed substantially from the time of Alexander (so Casson, *PME* 188). But the historians of Alexander concentrated upon the two main arms, which Alexander explored and which formed the two sides of the delta. These were the base of the estimates which Eratosthenes reported and criticized. Other mouths were either not discovered or considered too insignificant to be mentioned. As a result it became received knowledge that the Indus had two mouths, to be retailed as late as Nonnus (cf. Treidler, *RE* Suppl. x 490).

τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ Δέλτα παραπλήσιον In the *Indike* (2. 6) Arrian again makes the comparison, and at 6. 17. 2 he explicitly resumes his discussion, claiming that the Delta is even greater than that of the Nile. That echoes Eratosthenes (cf. Strabo 15. 1. 13 (690): *παραπλησίαν τῷ κατ' Αἴγυπτον*), who took issue with Onesicritus (*FGrH* 134 F 26). The latter had alleged that the Indus delta formed an equilateral triangle, each side 2,000 stades long, and claimed that it was

equal in area to its Egyptian counterpart. On the contrary, Eratosthenes maintained (*ap.* Strabo 15. 1. 33 (701)), Patalene as Onesicritus described it was twice the circumference of the Nile delta, which was isosceles, its sides considerably shorter than its base of 1,300 stades (so Diod. 1. 34. 1; Strabo 17. 1. 4 (788)). Arrian gives Eratosthenes' conclusion out of context and implicitly accepts Onesicritus' calculation of the delta size. On Aristobulus' estimate (*FGrH* 139 F 48) of 1,000 stades for the delta arms, the area would correspond much more closely to the Egyptian delta.

τοῦτο Πάταλα καλεῖται So *Ind.* 2. 6. In the historical narrative Patala refers both to the island/delta (6. 17. 2, 5, 18. 3) and to the capital city of the district (6. 18. 2, 20. 1, 5, 21. 3; cf. *Succ.* F 1. 36). Other sources are unanimous in describing the delta area as Patalene and the city alone as Patala (cf. Treidler, *RE* Suppl. x 489-91). That is especially true of Strabo, who invariably names the delta Patalene, even when excerpting Eratosthenes (15. 1. 13 (690)). He uses the toponym Patala once only, to designate the city, and claims that the city gave its name to the delta. That is probably the origin of what we find in Arrian, who may (for once) be reconciling Eratosthenes with the terminology of his own sources. There is no controversy that Patala was the Indian name for the city (and probably the district). Lassen (*i*² 125) argued that its meaning was 'ship-station' which, if correct, would vindicate Strabo's claim (from Eratosthenes) that the name originally applied to the city rather than the delta. For more venturesome etymologies see Karttunen 190-1.

2. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Ὑδάσπης κτλ. The size of the rivers of the Punjab is a recurrent *topos* in Arrian. Here he adduces the volume of the individual rivers as proof of the outstanding magnitude of the Indus and Ganges. In the *Indike* (3. 10) he goes further and claims that the Acesines itself was 30 stades wide at its confluence with the Indus, larger in itself than the Nile or Danube: that confirmed Megasthenes' claims about the greater rivers (see above, 4. 1). Arrian seems to be going a stage further than Megasthenes himself, who listed the tributaries of the Ganges and Indus, noting that the majority were navigable and that all affluents of the Ganges were larger than the Ionian Maeander in its lower reaches (*Ind.* 4. 6, 12 = *FGrH* 715 F 9a). It is doubtful whether Megasthenes actually stated that the Punjab rivers eclipsed all others in Asia, but he gave Arrian a model to develop. The Alexander historians gave impressive estimates for the widths of the individual rivers (see below 5. 20. 8, 6. 4. 2, 14. 5 with notes), and there was ample ground for the claim, which he presents here as axiomatic. The detailed figures are held in reserve to be expounded in the narrative.

Κτησίας μὲν δὴ The text as it stands is defective. There is no main

verb (λέγει was supplied by Ellendt) and no responsion to μὲν δὴ. Elsewhere when Arrian uses this phraseology it is to contrast one authority with another (3. 3. 5: Πτολεμαῖος μὲν δὴ . . . λέγει . . . Ἀριστόβουλος δέ; 7. 22. 5: Ἀριστόβουλος μὲν δὴ . . . λέγει . . . εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ Σέλευκον λέγουσι; *Praef.* 2: ἄλλοι μὲν δὴ ἄλλα . . . ἀνέγραψαν . . . ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ Πτολεμαῖος κτλ.). Indeed in all the dozens of instances where Arrian uses the combination μὲν δὴ it is hard to find a case where there is no responsion. This in itself would suggest that Arrian originally contrasted Ctesias' figures with other, more moderate estimates. But there is other evidence. Photius (*Bibl. cod.* 72: 45^b21 = *FGrH* 688 F 45) independently attests Ctesias' figures for the Indus. While he agrees about the 40 stades width at the narrowest point, he claims that the river was 200 stades at its widest (τὸ δὲ πλατύτατον καὶ διακοσίων). Photius may be in error (or Arrian, as suggested by J. M. Bigwood, *Phoenix* 43 (1989) 309), but it is more likely that there is a lacuna in Arrian's text. Arrian refers to the 100-stade width elsewhere (6. 14. 5) and does not consider it implausible (Strabo 15. 1. 32 (700) also mentions the 100-stade figure but thinks it exaggerated). Possibly it came from Nearchus who commented on the vast width of the Indus below its last confluence and alleged that it approached 200 stades close to the Ocean (see below, 6. 18. 5). Arrian also knows figures which gave the Indus a mean width of 40 stades and a minimum of 15 (5. 20. 10). In this later passage he gives evidence for his view that they are close to the truth, and it would make good sense if he had introduced them earlier, as more moderate estimates to set off the exaggerated figures of Ctesias: Ctesias gave a minimum of 40 stades (and a maximum of 200: more credible writers still gave a mean width of 40) and a maximum of 100. On this hypothesis the copyist slipped from the first figure of 40 to the second.

Arrian refers to the *Indica* of Ctesias of Cnidus, the most popular account of Indian antiquities before the period of Alexander. Ctesias, who was a court physician under Artaxerxes II Mnemon, was the author of a 23-book work on Persian antiquities, covering events down to his return to his native Cnidus in 398/7 (Phot. *Bibl.* 72: 44^b40-2 = *FGrH* 688 F 30 (75); cf. Jacoby, *RE* xi 2033-7). His *Indica* was a single-book supplement, criticized widely for its sensationalism but, perhaps for that reason, very widely read. Photius summarized it in great detail, far more so than any part of the *Persica* (*FGrH* 688 F 45), and it provided a mine of exotica to be exploited by zoological writers as diverse in taste and talents as Aristotle and Aelian (cf. J. M. Bigwood, *Phoenix* 43 (1989) 302-16). The citations concentrate on the bizarre and incredible and may well give a skewed impression of the original. Practically nothing is preserved of the account of Indian customs, which clearly took up a fair amount

of space (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (16, 30, 38); cf. 50); and it is clear that Ctesias reported first-hand information (F 45 (51)), his own experiences (F 45 (19, 47-8)), and material gleaned from Persian royalty (F 45 (9)). But, even so, incredible and fictitious details are quoted in abundance and cannot totally misrepresent the flavour of Ctesias' work. And his claim to have seen a specimen of the fabulous *martichora* in the flesh (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (d β)) does not inspire any faith in the quality of his autopsy. Lucian (*VH* 1. 3) was justified in denying point-blank Ctesias' claims to direct knowledge. On the *Indica* see in general Jacoby, *RE* xi 2037-9; Karttunen 80-5; Bigwood, *Phoenix* 43 (1989) 302 n. 1 (bibliography).

Ctesias was used and criticized by Eratosthenes, who referred to his exaggerated estimate of the size of India and set it alongside statements by Onesicritus, Nearchus, and Megasthenes. That critique is quoted by Arrian (*Ind.* 3. 6-7) and by Strabo (15. 1. 12 (689)), both adducing the same sources in the same order, and there is no doubt that both are directly derived from Eratosthenes (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 45-6). This passage may also stem from Eratosthenes, who could have included a critical survey of estimates of the Indus' width (cf. Strabo 15. 1. 32 (700)). But Arrian will not have been ignorant of Ctesias' *Indica*, which was popular in his day and excerpted in detail by Aelian and Pausanias.

4. 3-5. 1. *The Advertisement for the Indike*

In this passage, which may be imperfectly transmitted (see below, 4. 4 n.), Arrian announces the future publication of his *Indike* and does so against a background of implicit criticism of other authors. In place of the exaggerated or fictitious reports to be found in popular accounts of Indian antiquities he will compile the most reliable information from the most reliable sources. But before he introduces his own work he enlarges on the fallibility of the earlier tradition with its concentration on the sensational. The remoteness of India and the impossibility of any reader verifying the reports had encouraged the fabrication of romance. It was only the advent of Alexander which brought eye-witness information to explode the falsehoods of earlier days. In that case an authoritative account of India must be based on sources later than Alexander, those which Arrian actually chose for his *Indike*.

It is reasonably certain that Arrian was directing his criticism primarily against Ctesias' *Indica* (see above). That was the most widely read treatment of Indian affairs in Arrian's own day, and Lucian (perhaps echoing Arrian himself) denounced it as a tissue of falsehoods: Ctesias was a liar who used liars as informants (*VH* 1. 3 = *FGrH* 688 T 11 h). The details adduced can mostly be found in

Ctesias and to a lesser degree in Herodotus, whom Lucian classes with Ctesias as a source of fiction (*VH* 2. 31; *Philops.* 2). The two most sensational fabrications of the earlier age, the gold-digging ants of Herodotus and the griffin guardians of Ctesias, are pilloried as inventions, refuted by the Alexander historians with their reports of Indian frugality. Arrian is far from ingenuous here. Nearchus and Megasthenes *did* mention the ants (see below) but had no direct knowledge of them, as Arrian was to concede in his *Indike* (15. 4-7). It is their more general picture, the facts which *were* reported from autopsy, which suggest fabrication by earlier authors. But the gist of Arrian's remarks is clear. Previous accounts of India (the most popular reading) contain much that has been demonstrated to be falsehood and many exaggerations which, if not disproved, are not inherently probable. By contrast his own work, written in Ionic to emulate and outstrip Herodotus and Ctesias (see above), will replace rumour and fabrication with what can reasonably be accepted.

That is not the whole story. The *Indike* is more than a compilation of geographical and ethnographical details. The majority of it is devoted to Nearchus' voyage along the coast of Pakistan and southern Iran (*Ind.* 18-43), which Arrian himself describes as the main theme of the monograph: the rest is a digression (17. 7: ἐκβολὴ τοῦ λόγου). Nearchus and his voyage engrossed the bulk of the *Indike*. Arrian had reserved the episode for a separate monograph, so as not to interrupt the narrative flow of the major work, devoted to the person and achievements of Alexander (see below, 6. 28. 6). There was a string of precedents for such an expedient, which Cicero cites in his own interest in his notorious letter to Luceius: Callisthenes, Timaeus, and Polybius had all separated particular campaigns from their larger histories (*ad Fam.* 5. 12. 2). As Cicero remarks, it was possible to concentrate more exclusively on a single theme, so as to create a richer, more detailed work. One may add the example of Xenophon's *Agesilaus*, which Arrian knew and imitated (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 138-9); that too was a monograph devoted to a single person, which drew upon and supplemented material from a larger work, the *Hellenica*. But Arrian describes Nearchus' voyage only after a preliminary sketch of India and Indian antiquities. Again he had precedents. Tacitus' *Germania* is a good example of the ethnographical monograph, separate from and (in this case) unrelated to any larger work of history, and the *Agricola* devotes its central section to the exploits of Tacitus' father-in-law in Britain: a résumé of British geography and institutions leads to a narrative of Agricola's seven campaigns. But there is an essential difference. In Tacitus the ethnographical excursus introduces the military narrative, whereas the peculiarity of the *Indike* is its lack of internal co-

ordination. Nearchus' voyage, all but its very beginning (*Ind.* 18–22), took place *outside* India proper; the geography, customs, and fauna of northern India were totally irrelevant to it. Arrian admits that the two portions of his work have no logical connection (*Ind.* 17. 6–7), and that both refer back to the major work on Alexander (see below, 6. 28. 6: *ὡς καὶ τήνδε εἶναι ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου*; *Ind.* 43. 14). They comprise separate digressions, each of which might have been included in the main work. Curtius had in fact done this, with very limited success. His description of Nearchus' voyage (10. 1. 10–15) is so brief as to be virtually unintelligible, while his account of Indian exotica is deliberately contracted to prevent an intolerable disruption to the narrative (cf. 8. 9. 37: 'many other things are on record, but it did not seem worthwhile to retard my exposition by including them'). Arrian solved the problem by extracting the two digressions and combining them in a separate treatise, where they sit together most uneasily.

The *Indike* is intended to be read alongside the Alexander history and can only be understood with reference to it. The many cross-references in the *Indike* (19. 8, 21. 8, 23. 6, 26. 1, 32. 1, 40. 1, 43. 14) presuppose knowledge of the major work and there is an overlap of content. Eratosthenes' geography and Megasthenes' description of the Indian rivers is summarized in both works, but in the Alexander history the geographical details are correlated to Alexander's campaigns and focus on the Indus river system, whereas in the *Indike* Arrian extends the scope of his geography to the Ganges to include the experiences of Megasthenes.

The India of the *Indike* is therefore the India of the fourth century. There was no necessity to continue the history beyond Megasthenes or even to include anything beyond the time of Alexander. Arrian's notes of his own experiences are few (*Ind.* 4. 15–16, 8. 9, 14. 5–6, 15. 9) and entirely marginal, enlarging on the subject matter of his sources. He may have followed a fashion in ignoring events after Alexander (cf. A. Dihle, *Antike und Orient* (Heidelberg 1984) 91–3; J. J. Schwarz, *East & West* 25 (1975) 192–8; Stadter 117; A. Zambrini, *ASNP* 17 (1987) 141–3), but such events were formally irrelevant. His *Indike* was inseparable from his history of Alexander (see particularly Schwarz art. cit. 193–4) and had no business continuing the story beyond his time. Megasthenes was included as a near contemporary, an associate of Silyrtius and Chandragupta (see below, 5. 6. 2 n.), but even Daimachus of Plataea, who was criticized by Eratosthenes along with Megasthenes and the Alexander historians (Strabo 2. 1. 9 (70), 19 (72) = *FGrH* 716 T 1–2), is ignored. Daimachus visited the court of Chandragupta's son Amitrochates (Bindusara), a contemporary of Antiochus I (cf. Schwarz art. cit. 185), and provided information relating

to the generation after Alexander. Arrian probably excluded him as already irrelevant to his main theme.

4. 3. ἐξ τῶν Ἰνδῶν τὴν γῆν For Megasthenes (Diod. 2. 35. 1 = *FGrH* 715 F 4) and Eratosthenes (see below, 6. 3 n.) the Indus formed the western boundary of India, and the peoples to the west in the Cophen valley were not true Indians. But the earlier historians of Alexander seem to have believed that India began at the borders of Parapamisadae (cf. Strabo 15. 1. 26 (697), where the mountains north of the Cophen are described as part of India). That was certainly the vulgate tradition (Curt. 8. 9. 1, 10. 1; Diod. 17 index λβ; *Metz Epit.* 35); and it seems to have been the view of Arrian's principal sources, who described the Aspasii and Assaceni as Indians (cf. Ptolemy *ap.* 4. 24. 3-4 above). Here, however, Arrian grafts Eratosthenes' geographical scheme upon his source's report of the Indus crossing. That provides an anchor for the digression which follows: Alexander enters India proper and the geographical framework is a natural continuation.

οὐτε οἷσισι νόμοις κτλ. The phraseology anticipates the announcement of the *Indike* (see below, 5. 1: νόμιμα ἄττα . . . ἄτοπα ζῶα), but not entirely. Except for a brief comparison of the aquatic life of the Indus and the Nile (*Ind.* 6. 8; see below, 6. 1. 2 n.), there is no description of fishes and river monsters in the *Indike* (the only specific reference to fishes comes in the Alexander history: see below, 6. 20. 3). Arrian is directing his comments at another target, probably Ctesias' *Indica*, which went into some detail about Indian customs (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (16, 30)) and the fabulous animals of the subcontinent (the subject of the majority of the preserved fragments). Ctesias also devoted considerable attention to the amazing *skolex*, the monster which was unique to the Indus (F 45 (3, 46); *Ael. NA* 5. 3; cf. Karttunen 190-2) and probably described the exotic water life of its tributaries also. Arrian begins with generalities, stating merely that he will eschew the marvels of India in the present work, foreshadowing the announcement of the *Indike* at 5. 1 and implicitly criticizing Ctesias. He next moves on to more specific criticisms of reports of India before the Alexander period. That (*pace* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 14 n. 4) is unlikely to be derived from Eratosthenes, who condemned the historians of Alexander and reserved special contempt for their successors, Megasthenes and Daimachus (Strabo 2. 1. 9 (70) = *FGrH* 721 F 5). He may have indicted earlier writers as even worse (τούτων τυφλότερα: Strabo 15. 1. 5 (686)), but the main butt of his criticisms was the writers of the Alexander period, the very authors whom Arrian presents as most reliable. Arrian's argument is different: the writers before Alexander had no first-hand information and could safely indulge in fabrication. Historical knowl-

edge began with Alexander and the reports from autopsy could be accepted as reliable (*Ind.* 4. 1, 5. 3).

οὐδὲ τοὺς μύρμηκας The classic story of the gold-digging ants is first found in Herodotus (3. 102) and has fascinated readers ever since (for a repertoire of modern interpretations, many of them more bizarre than the original story, see Karttunen 171–6). Various versions were known in antiquity, perhaps even to Ctesias. Aelian (*NA* 3. 4) has details quite different from Herodotus, reported immediately after a direct quotation from the Cnidian doctor (*FGrH* 688 F 45 k). Herodotus had prudently attributed his information to Persian sources (3. 102. 2, 105. 2), which explained the origins of the Indian tribute of gold dust. None the less Alexander's men were eager to find evidence of the existence of the fabulous creatures. Nearchus claimed to have seen their hides, dappled like leopard-skins, while Megasthenes confirmed Herodotus' reports from his own informants. Both versions are given in the *Indike* (15. 4–7), and Arrian clearly had no objection to reporting the stories as hearsay. They were relevant to the zoological portion of his excursus but not to the history proper of Alexander.

τοὺς γρόπας τοὺς φυλάκας This is demonstrably a reference to Ctesias who gave a vivid description of the gold-guarding griffins—exactly as they were portrayed in paintings and sculpture (Ael. *NA* 4. 27 = *FGrH* 688 F 45 h). Ctesias had clearly adapted Herodotus' story, based on Aristes of Proconnesus, that in the far north beyond the Issedonians there were griffins who were guardians of gold (Hdt. 3. 116. 1; 4. 27; cf. J. D. P. Bolton, *Aristes of Proconnesus* (Oxford 1962) 80–93), and he located them in the northern mountains of India (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (26)). The griffins may have displaced Herodotus' ants in Ctesias (so Bolton 66–7), but it is perhaps more probable that he juxtaposed the two sets of fabulous custodians, making the griffins protect the gold of the mountains and the ants that of the desert plains (see above). Unlike the ants, the griffins made no impact upon the historians of Alexander. Nothing evidently was heard or seen which could be correlated with the report in Ctesias.

ὅσα ἄλλα ... ἐξελεγχθῆσόμενα πρὸς οὐδαμῶν Arrian expresses himself in conventional language, based on the contrast between entertainment and utility (*τέρψις* and *ὠφέλεια*), the twin poles of historiography. If the former is the only objective, then the supreme virtue of history, truth, is sacrificed (*Luc. hist. conscr.* 8–9; cf. Avenarius 16–21). But there is also a conscious echo of Thucydides' programmatic statement (1. 21. 1), where the historian distances himself from logographers whose criterion was attractiveness to the hearer rather than truth (cf. 22. 1), and whose material was unverifiable (*ἀνεξέλεγκτα*), lost in the mists of antiquity. For Arrian

it is distance rather than time which allowed the falsehoods on India to gain acceptance, but he clearly imitates Thucydides: he eschews the unverified fabrications of the past for the eye witness reports of Alexander's men, just as Thucydides had relied on precise arguments from evidence to unravel the mysteries of the past. A very similar statement may be found in Strabo (15. 1. 37 (702)) when he states that the country beyond the Hyphasis was so remote as to lend itself to exaggeration and romance, and he levels specific criticisms at Megasthenes, perhaps echoing Eratosthenes. That may have been the ultimate inspiration for Arrian, but he uses the criticism differently, to vindicate the autopsy of Alexander's generation, and its elaborate literary expression is entirely his own.

4. ἀχρῦσους τε εἶναι κτλ. The rest of the chapter is shaped as an implicit encomium of Alexander. The Indians were frugal in their habits, physically courageous, and in warlike qualities the equals of Cyrus' Persians. All this redounds to the glory of their conqueror. But the passage begins peculiarly: the Macedonians refuted the majority of the fictions in earlier accounts, proving that the Indians had no gold and were not addicted to luxury. That rebuts earlier claims, notably Herodotus' statement (3. 106. 2) that there was an abundance of gold in India, to be mined (cf. 105. 2) or panned from the rivers. Alexander's men, however, reported no gold. This refutation is followed by three further claims alleged to have been proved by experience: the exceptional stature, dark coloration, and bravery of the Indians. But these claims refute nothing in the older literature and contain at least one gross exaggeration which one cannot easily credit in an eyewitness (see below). Arrian appears to be crudely summarizing a digression in one of his sources (surely Nearchus) which contrasted earlier romantic exaggerations with what Alexander's generation had ascertained as fact; some reports were controverted, others to some degree *corroborated*, (see the detailed argument below). It is possible that the text is defective (a lacuna after δῖαιταν ἀλλά?) but more likely that Arrian misleadingly contracted his original, jumping from the refutation of error to the confirmation of the formidable physique and courage of the Indians.

The statement that the Indians had no gold is difficult. It contradicts the explicit evidence of Megasthenes, who reported their predilection for gold ornaments (Strabo 15. 1. 54 (709), 59 (712) = *FGrH* 715 F 32, 33) and repeated Herodotus' assertion that they obtained gold dust from the rivers (Strabo 15. 1. 57 (711), 69 (718) = *FGrH* 715 F 27b). Some at least of the Alexander historians also mentioned gold. Taxiles, for instance, is said to have provided gold crowns for Alexander's staff when he feasted them in his capital (Curt. 8. 12. 15; cf. 9. 21, 24, 26, 29), while Onesicritus alleged that there was

only one region, the Utopian kingdom of Musicanus, which eschewed the use of gold and silver and refused to exploit the local mines (Strabo 15. 1. 34 (701) = *FGrH* 134 F 24), as did Plato's primitive Athenians (*Ctes.* 112 c). By implication gold was used elsewhere. What Arrian preserves, then, is unlikely to be his own gleaned from the literature, rather a general statement of autopsy by a single informant. It was probably Nearchus who reported that he saw no gold in his travels through India, and Arrian accepted what he wrote. Nearchus may have mentioned Alexander's investigations of the veins of gold and silver in the mountains above the kingdom of Sopeithes (see below, 22. 1 n.). There the geological expert Gorgus (Berve no. 237) reported rich deposits, untouched by the Indians who were ignorant of mining and smelting and unaware of their wealth (Strabo 15. 1. 30 (700)). Nearchus probably claimed that the Indians as a whole had no use for gold, but it seems to have been his individual view and was in fact false.

ἀλλὰ μεγάλους . . . γενναιοτάτους The combination of qualities is repeated in the *Indike* (1. 2) where Arrian notes that the peoples of the Cophen basin are less tall, brave, and black than the Indians east of the Indus. That (*pace* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 306–7) is unlikely to be an addition by Arrian himself. The qualities he adduces were already stressed by his source, who is probably Nearchus (see above, p. 198); and it looks as though that same source devoted some attention to the appearance and warlike qualities of the Indians. If my argument is correct, Arrian's exposition at 4. 4 is derivative. His source (Nearchus) singled out various apparently exaggerated statements of the past and claimed that he could confirm them from autopsy.

πενταπηχεῖς τοὺς πολλοὺς This is outrageous. Arrian himself notes that Porus, who was a giant among Indians, stood a little over five cubits, or 2.3 m. (5. 19. 1: four cubits and a span in Plut. *Al.* 60. 10; cf. Diod. 88. 4; *Metz Epit.* 54), and it is hardly conceivable that any historian of Alexander claimed that the mass of Indians achieved such a stature. There were reports of the large size of the Indians in Nearchus (*Ind.* 17. 1) and Megasthenes (Diod. 2. 36. 1 = *FGrH* 715 F 4), but neither can have alleged that the mean height approached five cubits. I can only assume that Nearchus referred to exaggerated reports of the Indians' height from earlier authors such as Ctesias and alleged that the Indians were indeed the tallest race in the world. If so, Arrian has confused the earlier exaggeration with the later statement from autopsy and created an absurdity.

μελαντέρους . . . πλὴν Αἰθιοπῶν A well-worn *topos*. Herodotus had compared the Indians and Ethiopians and alleged that even their sperm was black—much to the displeasure of Aristotle (*Hdt.* 3. 101. 1–2; cf. *Arist. HA* 4. 523^a17–20; *GA* 2. 736^a10); and Ctesias had

repeatedly stressed their dark pigmentation (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (37, 44), 45 f). These statements on hearsay were now confirmed by autopsy. Eratosthenes later expanded the comparison, relating the northern Indians to the Egyptians, the southerners to the Ethiopians (*Ind.* 6. 9; Strabo 15. 1. 13 (690) = Eratosth. F iii B15). The information was presumably already found in the Alexander historians, who compared the natural phenomena of India and Ethiopia (see below, 6. 2–3 with notes) and are unlikely to have ignored the common pigmentation of the inhabitants.

γενναιοτάτους τῶν γε δὴ τότε The qualification refers the statement directly to the time of Alexander. The Indians of his time at least were the most valiant of Asia. That allows the comparison with Cyrus' Persians, who, it is implied, were similar in military excellence, and sets in high relief Alexander's achievement in conquering the Indus valley. We do not know whether the bravery of the Indians was a *topos*. Herodotus observed that the hunters of the ants' gold were the most warlike of the race (*Hdt.* 3. 102. 1), and Ctesias enlarged on the Indians' contempt of death (*FGrH* 688 F 45 (30)). That is at least consistent with Arrian's statement, and Ctesias may well have included military valour among the admirable qualities of the Indians.

5. πένητες . . . οἰκήτορες Brunt suggests that there is an echo of the epilogue of Herodotus (9. 122. 2) where the military success of the Persians is attributed to the harshness of their land (*γῆν γὰρ ἐκτήμεθα ὀλίγην καὶ ταύτην τρηχέαν*). That is likely enough, but the thought is conventional and easily paralleled. Xenophon makes the same point in a passage surely familiar to Arrian (*Cyrop.* 7. 5. 67: *διὰ πεινίαν . . . διὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας τραχύτητα*; cf. 3. 2. 17).

τῇ Λακωνικῇ παιδεύσει This is certainly a reference to the Persian institutions as expounded by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* (cf. P. Briant, in *Achaemenid History* ii: The Greek Sources (Leiden 1987) 4, 7–9). Xenophon does not explicitly make the connection, but the similarities are so great as to be unmistakable (cf. E. N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity* i (Stockholm 1965) 177–9; E. Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought* (Oxford 1969) 50–1); and Arrian was correct in drawing the parallel. The Alexander historians had also adduced the model of Sparta when referring to India. The idealized state of Musicanus as Onesicritus described it had common messes like those of Sparta and a serf class not unlike the helots (Strabo 15. 1. 34 (701) = *FGrH* 134 F 24, cf. Brown, *Onesicritus* 59–62). Arrian himself (*Ind.* 10. 8–9) was to compare the absence of chattel slavery in India and Sparta to the advantage of the Indians. The conventional parallel encouraged him to adduce another parallel: Cyrus' Persians, who are simultaneously the counterpart of the Indians and the Spartans.

τὸ δὲ τραῦμα Cf. 4. 11. 9. Arrian concedes that Cyrus' defeat at the hands of the Massagetae might prove that the Persians had their superiors in fighting quality, but he qualifies his judgement. Herodotus had been very uninformative (because uninformed) about Cyrus' defeat, alleging that it was the greatest battle ever to occur between barbarians and lasted for a considerable time (Hdt. 1. 214. 2). But he gives no explanation of the Massagetic victory. Arrian can therefore suggest that the terrain or Cyrus' strategy might have been at fault. The defeat did not necessarily discredit the Persian rank-and-file—any more than Alexander's victories proved his Indian adversaries inferior.

5. 1. *ἰδίᾳ μοι γεγράφεται* Here and at 6. 28. 6 Arrian refers to the *Indike* as a project for the future, and in the *Indike* itself he writes as though the Alexander history is complete (*Ind.* 19. 8, 23. 6, 26. 1, 32. 1, 40. 1, 6, 43. 14). That may be true. However, Arrian has a very clear idea of the plan of his monograph (see below) and he had already selected his sources. What remained was the actual composition, to ancient minds the most arduous task of historiography (cf. Avenarius 71 ff.; F. G. B. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford 1964) 32-44).

καὶ ὁ ἐκπεριπλεύσας Arrian writes as though Nearchus is only one (albeit the most important) of the Alexander historians whom he used as source material for the *Indike*. In effect Nearchus is the *only* historian of Alexander whom he used directly. Onesicritus he cites but only indirectly through Eratosthenes (*Ind.* 3. 6, 6. 8; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 45-6).

δοκίμῳ ἄνδρῳ 'men of repute'. This is strongly Herodotean phraseology, repeated in the *Indike* (17. 6), where Arrian explains his use of Nearchus and Megasthenes. In part it is the celebrity of the authorities which attracts him, but he is also impressed by the autopsy which both Nearchus and Megasthenes (see below, 6. 2; *Ind.* 5. 3) could claim. Eratosthenes is given special credence because of his specialist attention to the physical description of the world (*ὅτι γῆς περιόδου πέρι . . . ἐμελεν*: *Ind.* 3. 1; cf. *Meteor.* F 1, where Arrian gave Eratosthenes' figures for the circumference of the globe). There his influence ends. Arrian uses the famous exposition of world geography in Book III of Eratosthenes' *Geographica* to create his own topographical framework both in the *Indike* and the larger work (see above, 3. 1 n.). In the *Indike* Eratosthenes provides only the initial geographical sketch (*Ind.* 2. 1-3. 8). Arrian then turns to Megasthenes for the description of Indian rivers (*Ind.* 4. 1-12). Eratosthenes' criticisms of the Alexander historians are rehearsed again at *Ind.* 5. 8-6. 9 (see above, 3. 1-3 with notes), but after that the *Indike* is largely a digest of Megasthenes, supplemented by Nearchus, as Arrian himself admits (*Ind.* 17. 6).

It is interesting that Arrian continues to use Megasthenes as his primary source despite Eratosthenes' strictures. For Eratosthenes he was a model of unscrupulous fabrication, eclipsed only by his successor, Daimachus—and Nearchus was not much better (Strabo 2. 1. 9 (70) = *FGrH* 715 T 4). Arrian was well aware of Megasthenes' tendency to romance and does in fact retail some of Eratosthenes' critique (*Ind.* 6. 2–3; *FGrH* 715 F 10). However, Arrian's scepticism is directed at reports of territory beyond the Hyphasis, not sighted by Alexander's men (or by Megasthenes) and therefore vulnerable to exaggeration (*Ind.* 6. 1; cf. Strabo 15. 1. 37 (702)). What he accepts (apart from the mythological sketch of Indian prehistory) is what Megasthenes might be expected to have observed at first hand. Arrian notes explicitly that the story of the gold-digging ants was a hearsay report only (*ἀκοήν ἀπηγγέεται*: *Ind.* 15. 7) and duly discounts it. The grosser exaggerations he appears to have omitted. He did not simply ignore Eratosthenes' criticisms. He accepted the element of romantic distortion in Megasthenes and made some attempt to filter out what could reasonably be accepted.

νόμιμα ἅττα . . . θαλάσσης A very schematic outline of the *Indike*, to be supplemented at 6. 28. 6 by an equally sketchy analysis of the voyage of Nearchus. Chapters 10–12 and 16–17 of the *Indike* deal with local customs, chapters 13–15 describe the fauna of India, and two-thirds of the work (18–43) is devoted to the voyage of Nearchus.

5. 2–6. 3. *The Geography of India*

Arrian's sketch, as he implies at 6. 2, is taken from the vastly fuller description of Asia, which came at the beginning of Book III of Eratosthenes' *Geographica*. There is a parallel and more informative précis in Strabo 2. 1. 1 (68–9; Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* ii 763 n. 97), expanded with special relevance to India at 15. 1. 10–14 (688–90). Arrian by contrast does not aim to give an accurate or comprehensive account of Eratosthenes' geography. What concerns him is the general position of India relative to the great mountain system of Asia, its size, and the alluvial origins of the Indus plain. He accepts the general scheme of Eratosthenes' which seems to have been conventional in his day, the continuous mountain ridge of the Taurus dividing Asia into north and south; but he gives few details and none of the technical terminology, unlike Strabo, who is concerned to defend Eratosthenes against the attacks by his critic, Hipparchus. As a result Arrian's exposition is vague and impressionistic, in places contracted to the point of unintelligibility. There is also a naïve attempt (below, 5. 3) to correlate Eratosthenes' framework with the scheme of the Alexander historians, for whom the Hindu




FIG. 2. Eratosthenes' picture of the East

Kush was part of the Caucasus, not an extension of the Taurus. That does not aid the clarity of the exposition.

For a digest of Eratosthenes' geographical work see Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* i 531-9 (cf. *PBA* 56 (1970) 187-8) with the bibliographical *mise au point* (ii 756 n. 51).

2. τὸν Ταύρον . . . ἀπείργειν τὴν Ἀσίαν Eratosthenes had divided the known world into two from east to west, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the eastern Ocean. The Taurus was the physical line of division from the Gulf of Issus eastwards to and beyond India (see Fig. 2), while the line westwards went from Issus through the Mediterranean, via Rhodes, the southern tip of the Peloponnese, and the Straits of Messana (Strabo 2. 1. 1 (67); cf. Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* i 532). This division was not Eratosthenes' brainchild. The Peripatetic philosopher, Dicaearchus, had apparently been the first to divide the world by a continuous parallel, not unlike that of Eratosthenes, but his line diverged northwards, from the Peloponnese to Asia Minor via Caria, Lycia, Cilicia, and followed the Taurus as far as Mt. Imaus (Agathemerus, in Müller, *GGM* ii p. 472 = Dicaearchus F 110 (Wehrli); Fraser *Ptol. Al.* ii 763 n. 98). This division seems to have intersected the land mass of Asia Minor, and Dicaearchus, late and garbled though the report of his doctrine is, appears

to have made the Taurus range the line of demarcation. In this he was followed by Hieronymus of Cardia who apparently made the Taurus divide Asia, and began the division in the far west with Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. 18. 5. 2, 4; cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus* 80-1). Alexander's men may have been ultimately responsible for the development of the concept with their equation of the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush. Dicaearchus gave a more acceptable picture, based on an extended Taurus range, and that concept Eratosthenes incorporated into his own geography. The Taurus was only used as a line of latitude east of Issus, but Eratosthenes clearly took pains to describe the formation of the range and explained that its outliers began at the Aegean.

Arrian makes the Taurus begin at Mycale, immediately opposite Samos (Philostr. *VA* 2. 1, has the same general picture). It is clear from many references in Strabo that Eratosthenes devoted a good deal of space to the problem of the western extension of the Taurus, and Arrian's statement is a pathetic garbled echo. The Taurus was conventionally thought to have originated directly opposite the Chelidonian isles in southern Lycia, at the southern outlier of Tahtali Dağ (Strabo 14. 2. 1 (651), 3. 8 (666)), but Eratosthenes observed that the range could also be envisaged continuing more directly westwards, from Cibyra to the Rhodian Peraea, where it was dispersed into lower, less distinctive spurs (Strabo locc. cit.). But that was not the only possible extension of the Taurus. The mountains of Pisidia reached as far as Celaenae (Dinar) and from there the range of Messogis ran directly west, terminating at Mycale (see below, Map 7). That line of demarcation had been noted by Theopompus (Strabo 13. 4. 12 (628) = *FGrH* 115 F 391) and could easily have been incorporated by Eratosthenes into a detailed description of the western Taurus. *Pace* Honigmann, *RE* vA 43, Arrian must have used Eratosthenes here (and at *Ind.* 2. 3), but he reduced a complex discussion to a few words and recorded only one of several alternative terminations. Here he makes the range extend to Mycale on the Aegean coast, whereas in the *Indike* (2. 2) he has it begin on the *south* coast of Asia Minor, reflecting what Strabo gives as the majority version (cf. Pliny, *NH* 5. 97; Mela 1. 82), that the Chelidonian isles marked the terminus of the Taurus. Arrian is uninterested in the detail. It is the general concept of the Taurus as a geographical line of demarcation which concerns him and it is immaterial where the range is thought to originate, provided that it is taken to the west of Asia Minor. The inconsistency probably bothered him as little as it has his modern readers.

ἀποτεμνομένων . . . Χορασμίους 'cutting off the territory of the Pamphylians and Cilicians it extends from there (sc. Pamphylia and

Cilicia) towards Armenia and from Armenia to Media alongside the Parthyaean and Chorasmians.'

The passage raises several difficulties. First the transmission of the text. Arrian is tracing the Taurus range from west to east, describing its situation to the north of Pamphylia and Cilicia and its extension through Armenia into Media. That would take Arrian to the Caspian Gates and the Elburz range, but hardly via Parthyaean and Chorasmia. Those territories lay to the east again, to the north of the Kopet Dağ massif, the connecting link between the Elburz and the Hindu Kush. It is admittedly possible that Arrian has garbled his original and warped the geography in an impressionistic haze of exotic names. But the passage is carefully constructed with studied repetition (*ἐς Ἀρμενίαν . . . ἀπὸ δὲ Ἀρμενίων*), and each section is connected to what precedes. As the text stands, the Bactrians intrude very suddenly with no preparation; and it seems almost certain that a clause has been lost (the lacuna begins after *ἐπὶ Μηδίαν*). Arrian described the further extension of the Taurus from Media to Bactria along the line of the Kopet Dağ. In that context the Parthyaean and Chorasmians are no longer intrusive, and in a list of this nature a single clause could easily be lost.

The coupling of Parthyaean and Chorasmians is also problematic. Parthyaean is quite properly connected with the extended Taurus range; its main capital, Hecatompylus, lay immediately east of the Caspian Gates (see above, 3. 21. 3 n.) and it stretched eastwards to Susia (Tuš), the borders of Areia, and the foothills of the Kopet Dağ (3. 25. 1 n.). But Chorasmia lay some distance north of the Taurus, to the south of the Aral Sea and east of the Caspian (see above, 4. 15. 4 n.). It may have been associated with Hyrcania and Parthyaean in Achaemenid times (Hecataeus, *FGrH* 1 F 292-3—east of the Parthians; Hdt. 3. 93. 3, 117. 1; 7. 66. 1), but in Alexander's day (and Eratosthenes') Chorasmia lay far to the north. The territory adjacent to Parthyaean and immediately to the east was Margiana, and that is what one would expect to find here. It is most likely that Arrian is once again condensing an extended passage of Eratosthenes. The geographer may have given a long list of peoples north and south of the Taurus in the sector between Media and Bactria (cf. Strabo 11. 8. 8 (513-14)), beginning with Parthia, including Margiana, and ending with Chorasmia. Arrian selected the first and the last, which were associated with the history of Alexander and no doubt sounded well together (he uses the same combination in Alexander's Opis speech: see below, 7. 10. 6).

3. δ δὴ Καύκασον κτλ. See above, 3. 1-3 with notes. It is clear that Eratosthenes' critique of the Alexander historians came at this point in his *Geographica*, and Arrian pauses (as he does at *Ind.* 2. 4) to recapitulate the main item, the fraudulent transfer of the Caucasus.

τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ξυνεχές Arrian gives a more charitable explanation of the application of the name Caucasus (contrasting with *ὡς μὲν λέγεται*); it may not have been conscious fabrication, but a genuine belief that the Hindu Kush *was* a continuation of the Caucasus. Eratosthenes would not have contested the latter proposition (see below, 5. 4 n.). Strabo apparently digests his views when he describes how branches of the Caucasus proper join on to the Armenian section of the Taurus (Strabo 11. 2. 15 (497); cf. Pliny, *NH* 5. 98). Alexander's men, however, were not concerned to show that the Parapamisis was the distant eastward extension of the Caucasus. For them it *was* the same range, and crossing it made Alexander go beyond Heracles himself, not to mention the Argonauts (Strabo 11. 5. 5 (505-6)).

καὶ ἐμοὶ πρότερον See above, 3. 28. 5 n. Arrian's use of the name was conventional, common to Megasthenes and Patrocles as well as the Alexander historians (see above, 3. 1 n.); and Strabo, Eratosthenes' most devoted follower, does the same even when discussing Eratosthenes' map of the world (2. 1. 2 (68), 33 (85-6); 15. 1. 13 (690)).

4. τοὺς μὲν . . . τὴν Μαιώτιν This can only refer to the Tanais and its tributaries, which discharged into the Maeotis (Sea of Azov) and formed the conventional northern boundary between Europe and Asia (see above, 3. 30. 9 n.). The Tanais and Maeotis accordingly provided the north-west limit of Eratosthenes' map of Asia (Strabo 2. 5. 31 (129)). For Eratosthenes there was no question of equating the Asian Iaxartes with the European Tanais/Don, as had the historians of Alexander. The river was conceived of as rising not in the Hindu Kush, but in the Caucasus proper (Strabo 2. 4. 6 (107); 11. 2. 2 (493)), as indeed does one at least of the modern tributaries of the Don, the Manych (Herrmann, *RE* ivA, 2162-4). In antiquity it was reported as the main stream of the Tanais, and Theophanes of Mytilene (*FGrH* 188 F 3) followed the popular view. Eratosthenes may not have made the identification, but he was at least aware of the existence of major rivers discharging north of the Caucasus (see also Strabo 11. 5. 8 (506) on the river Achardeus) and clearly considered the Caucasus proper to be a component of the greater Taurus range.

καὶ αὐτὴν κόλπον For the general theory that the Caspian was a gulf of Ocean see above, 3. 29. 2 n. It was *communis opinio* after Alexander, endorsed by Eratosthenes and adopted unquestioningly by Arrian, who embodied it in Alexander's speech at the Hyphasis (5. 26. 2; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 130) However, Arrian's mode of expression is peculiar. The demonstrative in apposition implies that the Caspian is being contrasted with another gulf of Ocean ('this too being a gulf of the great sea'). Few idioms are

more frequent in Arrian (in the immediate context see below, 5. 15, where καὶ οὗτοι contrasts the rivers between the Ganges and the Punjab with other Indian rivers, and above, 4. 1-2: καὶ τοῦτου Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ οὗτοι Ἰνδοὶ ποταμοὶ ὄντες), and there is a very strong implication that he regarded the Maeotis as a gulf of Ocean. That, according to Pliny (*NH* 2. 168), was a relatively common theory and it is found in other texts of the Roman period (Lucan 3. 277-9; Anon. *Peripl. M. Eux.* 64 = Müller, *GGM* i 304). Arrian indicates that it was mentioned as early as Eratosthenes, probably to be dismissed contemptuously as a misconception (cf. Strabo 2. 5. 18 (121) for the classic theory of four major gulfs of Ocean). But he expresses himself carelessly; his language suggests that he actually thought that the Maeotis joined the outer Ocean in the same way as the Caspian.

5. ὅσοι ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Strabo 15. 1. 13 (690), where the same passage of Eratosthenes is reproduced. The Alexandrian geographer divided the Indian rivers into two groups, the tributaries of the Indus and Ganges and those which had their own course. All, however, rose in the northern mountains. This is one of the few indications that Eratosthenes had knowledge of India beyond the two great plains to the north and Taprobane (Ceylon) to the south (Strabo 15. 1. 14 (690)). He apparently knew of the existence of Cape Comorin, at the extreme south (cf. Dihle, *Antike und Orient* 110-11, 122-3), but conceived it to be at roughly the same latitude as the Indus delta. Nothing was known of the mountains of central India, where the vast majority of the rivers of the south have their sources, and as a result a middle ground of fictitious rivers was created between the Ganges and Indus. Arrian accepts and propagates the misconception and clearly has no interest in ascertaining the facts as they were known in his day (see below, 6. 3 n.). He will draw upon his personal knowledge to corroborate the statements of his sources (*Ind.* 4. 15-16) but pays no attention to literature after the time of Eratosthenes, which could provide a much more informed geography (cf. Dihle, *Antike und Orient* 93, 182-3).

6. 1. ὅτῳ δὴ κτλ. Arrian discusses Eratosthenes' geography again at *Ind.* 3. 2-8, where he reports the exact dimensions of the subcontinent. Here he is concerned with the general picture, giving the size of India relative to the other subdivisions of the southern tract of the known world. The two passages, general and particular, are digested from the same segment of Eratosthenes (also reported by Strabo 2. 1. 7 (69-70), 22 ff. (78 ff.); 15. 1. 11-12 (689-90)). They were evidently conceived together and probably composed at the same time.

The peculiarity of Eratosthenes' world-view was his division of

Asia into 'sphragides', quadrilateral land masses defined by natural boundaries (see Fig. 2). North and south were divided by the 'diaphragm' of the Taurus range, which ran in a straight line due east to due west (cf. Strabo 2. 1. 1 (67-8)). How the northern sector was subdivided remains uncertain (cf. Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* i 532), but the south of Asia was grouped in four unequal segments. The fourth and smallest (below, 6. 2) comprised the territory between the Euphrates and Mediterranean and extended south to Egypt and Arabia Felix. The third ran from the Euphrates to the Caspian Gates in the north, and in the east from the Caspian Gates in a very ill-defined line south to the Persian Gulf and the boundary between Persis and Carmania. The second, Ariana, comprised the intervening area between the Caspian Gates to the north and the line of the Indus, which defined the western boundary of India proper, Eratosthenes' first and largest 'sphragis'. Crude and schematic though it was, this geometric picture of the world was comparatively easy to grasp and gave some conception of relative size. It was also, as far as Eratosthenes could ascertain, compiled from factual reports of distances, whether from official records or eyewitness descriptions (*Ind.* 3. 4; cf. Strabo 2. 1. 23 (79); 15. 2. 8 (723); Fraser, *Ptol. Al.* i 535), and might be thought to have a rough general accuracy. For Arrian's purposes it is more than adequate.

2. **μεγίστην μὲν μοῖραν . . . Μεγασθένης** Fuller details at *Ind.* 3. 7-8, supplemented by Strabo 15. 1. 11; 2. 1. 7 (*FGrH* 715 F 6). Megasthenes had claimed that India was 16,000 stades from east to west and over 20,000 from north to south. Eratosthenes accepted the former figure as based on factual report and reasonable hearsay but reduced the measurement from north to south to a maximum of 16,000 stades (see below, 6. 3 n.). Although considerably smaller than Megasthenes had suggested, Eratosthenes' India was still the greatest single sector of Asia, as Arrian proceeds to prove.

ὅς ξυνην μὲν . . . Ἰνδῶν βασιλέα This information was probably already found in Eratosthenes, who scouted the works of Megasthenes and Daimachus as sensational and unreliable, despite the fact that both men had been sent on embassies to India, Megasthenes to the court of Chandragupta and Daimachus to his successor, Bindusara (Strabo 2. 1. 9 (70) = *FGrH* 715 F 2c). He also pointed out that Megasthenes had only traversed and experienced a relatively small portion of the Indian land mass (*Ind.* 5. 3, 7. 1). Arrian uses the information for a totally different purpose, to underwrite Megasthenes' credentials as a firsthand reporter, ignoring Eratosthenes' dispiriting observation that eyewitnesses can be economical with the truth and are prone to exaggeration.

This passage provides the fullest biographical information on Megasthenes. Otherwise we have only the statement of Clement of

Alexandria that he lived at the court of Seleucus Nicator (*Ström.* 1. 72. 3 = *FGrH* 715 F 3). It may be, as is generally assumed (cf. O. Stein, *RE* xv 231-3; J. J. Schwarz, in Altheim-Stiehl 283-4; but compare T. S. Brown, *AJP* 76 (1955) 18 n. 1: 'No one can be sure whether it was Seleucus or Sibyrtius who sent him to Sandrocottus'), that Megasthenes was Seleucus' ambassador to the Mauryan court and was involved in the negotiations which led to the transfer of the eastern satrapies to Chandragupta in 303. But there is no hint in any source that Megasthenes was a royal envoy. Arrian (though one cannot press his wording too far) certainly suggests that his contact with India came while he was in the entourage of Sibyrtius in Arachosia (e.g. Timmer 6) and there is nothing to controvert the clear implication of the text. Sibyrtius (Berve no. 703; Billows 432-3) was appointed satrap of Arachosia late in 325 (see below, 6. 27. 1 with note) and retained his office down to 316, when he was temporarily ousted by the machinations of Eumenes but honourably reinstated by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 14. 6, 23. 4, 27. 4, 48. 3). Thereafter he disappears from history, as indeed does his satrapy. But Sibyrtius was to all intents and purposes an independent despot in Arachosia, particularly in the period between Antigonus' return to the Mediterranean in November 316 and Seleucus' establishment of his authority in the upper satrapies, which was not complete until 305 (Diod. 20. 53. 4; cf. Schober 143-5). At that time the Mauryan dynasty had been established and Chandragupta's writ ran through the Indus valley (see below). Eudamus had despaired of affairs around Taxila as early as 317, when he moved to western Iran with his 120-strong elephant division (Diod. 19. 14. 8), and the following year Peithon left Gandhara to join Antigonus' entourage (Diod. 19. 56. 4; see Schober 90-3; P. Bernard, in *Orientalia Tucci* i 84-6). Sibyrtius was now painfully exposed to Indian expansionism and the Silver Shields he received after Gabiene would have had all the unpleasantness their employers desired for them in the border regions of the Kirthar range (Diod. 19. 48. 3; Polyæn. 4. 6. 15; Plut. *Eum.* 19. 3-4). It would not be surprising if he made diplomatic overtures in his own right, and we can well accept that Megasthenes was his envoy at the Mauryan court. In that case Megasthenes' journey to Pataliputra might be placed as early as 310. It may have been even earlier. If we accept the manuscript reading at *Ind.* 5. 4 (so T. S. Brown, *Phoenix* 11 (1957) 13-14), Megasthenes claimed to have visited Porus as well as Chandragupta. That would entail dating his diplomatic activity to the period 321-317, before Porus' death and the Mauryan conquest of the Indus valley. The rulers of the upper satrapies were then threatened by the expansionist ambitions of Peithon of Media (Diod. 19. 14. 1-2; cf. Schober 74-9), and Sibyrtius would have been well advised to request assistance from the rulers of

India. In that case Chandragupta was new on the throne when Megasthenes visited his court.

I assume that Megasthenes made a single journey to Chandragupta's court. Admittedly Arrian's language is ambiguous, and there has been a continuous debate as to whether he thought that Megasthenes made several trips to India (πολλάκις . . . ἀφικέσθαι) or had several audiences with Chandragupta during a single visit (cf. Lassen ii²219 n. 1; O. Stein, *RE* xv 231; Schwarz, in Altheim-Stiehl 284). Of these two alternatives the first is definitely preferable: elsewhere ἀφικέσθαι παρά τινα is used exclusively of individuals who arrive from a distance, not of people already at court (cf. 1. 28. 3; 3. 6. 2, 23. 7, 25. 3; 4. 1. 1, 5. 1, 20. 4). But, as Brunt (*Arrian* ii 19, 448) has observed, the adverb probably goes with the main verb which immediately follows: Megasthenes often said that he visited Chandragupta (cf. 5. 27. 1: πολλάκις μὲν ἐκέλευε λέγειν). In that case Megasthenes harped upon his personal experiences. So one would infer from the extant citations, where he repeatedly emphasizes his firsthand knowledge of Chandragupta's capital and camp (Strabo 15. 1. 36 (702) = F 18b; 15. 1. 53 (709) = F 32). Megasthenes obviously wished his readers to be in no doubt of his privileged position, and it is the repeated claim to firsthand knowledge that Arrian is concerned to record.

Ξανδράκοττον Cf. *Ind.* 5. 3. This is the usual Greek transliteration of the Indian Chandragupta (Ἀνδρόκοττος in Plut. *Al.* 62. 4, 9; App. *Syr.* 55. 282; for other minor variants see Roos's apparatus with K. Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.* 84 (1935) 383). One of the great conquerors of Indian history, Chandragupta led a successful revolt against the last of the Nanda kings and extended central control into the Indus valley, uniting northern India under his monarchy. The chronology is uncertain, bedevilled by a desperately fragmentary source tradition (from both the western and the Indian side). The one continuous account of his rise to power, Justin's epitome of Trogus, places his war of liberation against the governors of Alexander after his overthrow of the Nanda dynasty (Justin 15. 4. 18-19). That would indicate that he first seized power in the Ganges valley and then transferred his operations to the west. By 316 (see above) the Macedonian commanders in northern India and Gandhara had abandoned their satrapies, and Chandragupta's hold on the Indus valley must have been established by then. Some ten years later Seleucus fought an inconclusive campaign in India and concluded a treaty in 303, ceding territory between the Indus and the Hindu Kush (on the impossibly vague tradition see Schober 156-83) in return for 500 war elephants. Thereafter the two empires coexisted peacefully, and Chandragupta died after twenty-four years of rule around 300 BC. On his career see Lassen ii² 205-22; *CHI* i 470-3; R. K. Mookerji,

Chandragupta Maurya and his Times (Delhi etc. 1966); J. J. Schwarz in Altheim-Stiehl, 267-96.

ἐλαχίστην δέ The fourth 'sphragis' is the least clearly defined. Strabo (2. 1. 31-2 (84-5)) merely gives a garbled version of Hipparchus' criticism of it. The Euphrates formed its eastern boundary and the Mediterranean its western down to Pelusium and the Egyptian border. According to Hipparchus it was disproportionately small; if added to the third 'sphragis' it would not equal the area of Ariana, let alone India.

αἱ δύο ζυντεθεῖσαι . . . ζυμβαλεῖν This is a fair statement. The sides of the quadrilateral formed by Eratosthenes' third 'sphragis' measured 10,000 stades by 9,000 (Strabo 2. 1. 27 (81)) and Ariana was estimated to measure 14,000 stades by 12,000 or 13,000 (Strabo 15. 2. 8 (723)). Taken together they exceed the estimated area of India (see below) by no more than 15 per cent.

3. ἀπείργεσθαι τὴν Ἰνδῶν κτλ. Eratosthenes' map of India is described more fully at *Ind.* 3. 2-8 and somewhat more informatively by Strabo (15. 1. 11 (689); cf. 2. 1. 31 (84), 34 (87)). Eratosthenes described India as rhomboid ('guillotine-shaped' would be closer). The northern side, defined by the Taurus, was estimated at 16,000 stades from west to east, while the Indus defined the western side, its course measuring 13,000 stades from the Taurus to the southern Ocean (see Fig. 2). To the east and south the Ocean formed a natural boundary, but both sides extended an additional 3,000 stades, tapering into a cape (Cape Comorin) and veering somewhat to the south and east (Strabo 2. 1. 34 (87)). Eratosthenes clearly took what firsthand measurements he could: Megasthenes' report of the distances along the royal road to Pataliputra (*Ind.* 3. 4; Strabo 15. 1. 11) and estimates by Alexander's bematists of the distances along the Indus. The east, as Eratosthenes freely admitted, depended on guesswork: merchants' reports of the distance from the mouth of the Ganges to Pataliputra and vague information about the voyage to Taprobane (Strabo 15. 1. 14 (690)). The map accordingly preserves something of the southern extension of India, but only on the east coast.

Nothing was known in Eratosthenes' day about the west coast beyond the mouth of the Indus (cf. Dihle, *Antike und Orient* 122). Like Strabo, Arrian writes as though the monsoon trade route between Egypt and India had never developed, and seems totally unaware of contemporary descriptions of south-west India (*Peripl. M. Erythr.* 50, describing the southward turn of the coastline beyond Barygaza (Broach); cf. Casson, *PME* 294-9). Pliny by contrast does give information about the monsoon route but keeps this data quite distinct from the geography of northern India, which remains anchored in the world-view of Eratosthenes ('kein Versuch wird

erkennbar, Altes und Neues sinnvoll miteinander zu verknüpfen': Dihle 183). If Arrian knew of the contemporary trade routes (and it is hard to think he did not), he ignored them as irrelevant. Alexander's campaigns were documented by eyewitnesses whose measurements and estimates were critically evaluated by Eratosthenes. His work could therefore be accepted as canonical.

ὥς πρὸς . . . Ἰάπυγα This is not simply a synonym. According to the Aristotelian division of winds *Iapyx* (or ἀργέστης) was not a direct westerly (that was the *zephyros*) but came from the west of north-west (Arist. *Meteor.* 2. 363^b24-7; *Mund.* 394^b26). Arrian defines the course of the Indus by the west and west north-west. That is his sole reference in the Alexander history to the south-east cape which was the most striking feature of Eratosthenes' India. Viewed from the vicinity of the cape the Indus lay in a direction west of north west, whereas further north it became due west. Eratosthenes evidently used the Aristotelian system of the winds to give precise indications of direction (cf. Strabo 1. 2. 21 (691)), and Arrian has preserved the exotic nomenclature without its context. The full description which would make it intelligible he reserved for the *Indike* (3. 3).

6. 3-8. *The Formation of the Indus Plain*


Arrian closes his digression with an essay on the alluvial plain of the Indus. His argument proceeds by a series of parallels. The alluvial action of the rivers of Asia Minor leads to the more impressive and familiar example of the Nile, which then allows Arrian to make a direct comparison with the Indus, illustrating the unsurpassed magnitude of the Indian rivers. With that the digression comes to a full close, and the next section, the discussion of bridging methods, is a natural sequel. As Arrian moves away from Eratosthenes' geography of India, he changes sources. The discussion of the alluvial plains is also used by Strabo, who twice ascribes the material to Nearchus (Strabo 15. 1. 16 (691) = *FGrH* 133 F 17). All four rivers of Asia Minor are mentioned, and there is also the direct citation of Herodotus. This common material is most unlikely to come indirectly via Eratosthenes (as argued by Pearson, *LHA* 119-20; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 450-1). Arrian knew his Nearchus intimately and had no reason not to use him directly. There is nothing in the digression which suggests an intermediary and some details are unlikely to have been found in Eratosthenes (see below, 6. 4 with notes). Most probably Arrian selected Nearchus' discussion to make a compositional bridge. He leaves Eratosthenes' geography at 6. 3 with the Indus firmly defined as the western boundary of the country which bore its name. Next Nearchus is enlisted to provide the proof that the name of India^a and its very existence comes from the river. The enumeration of rivers

which follows permits another link, this time with Megasthenes, who compared the Maeander with the tributaries of the Ganges (see below, 6. 7 n.). The digression accordingly ends with material on the comparative size of the Indian rivers, adapted but not copied from Megasthenes. It is an elaborately contrived passage, and the source material is carefully selected to fit the scheme of the argument. Arrian is not merely rewriting a passage of Eratosthenes.

3. ὥς εἰκάζουσι This introduces the material from Nearchus, the inference that the Indus created the surrounding plains and gave its name to them. Arrian does not state in so many words that India was named after the Indus, but the whole gist of the argument suggests that Nearchus made the claim. If so, he was quite correct. The name Indus is derived from the Sanskrit *sindhu*, meaning 'river'. Under Persian rule the southern satrapy, Sind, was named Hinduš, a nomenclature which the Greeks adopted (via the unaspirated Akkadian form 'Indu') and extended to the entire valley of the Indus (cf. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 346).

4. τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῖς ποταμοῖς Nearchus' direct inspiration was Herodotus. In his discussion of the Nile, which Nearchus used and cited (see below), the older historian suggested that its alluvial plain was comparable to the plains formed by the rivers of Asia Minor, and he mentioned four: those of Ilium, Teuthrania, Ephesus, and Maeander (Hdt. 2. 10). Nearchus exploited this material, as later did Pliny (*NH* 2. 201). The last three plains, those of the Caicus, Cayster, and Maeander, he adduced as parallels for the effect of the Indus. For the plain of Troy he substituted the more impressive example of the Hermus (see Map 6), a very familiar illustration of the effect of silting (cf. Strabo 13. 3. 4 (621)). The theme was rhetorically embroidered by Aelius Aristides, the sophist of Smyrna, who exploited it in his refutation of Ephorus' theory of the flooding of the Nile; the plain of the Hermus, known to have been a sea in ancient times, was at Ephorus' very doorstep, and he ought to have drawn the appropriate inference (Aristid. 36. 76-7 = *FGrH* 70 F 65 f). The criticism is hackneyed (cf. Diod. 1. 39. 11), but its inspiration was clearly Herodotus. Nearchus was more original. He used Herodotus' examples, but in a different context, as parallels for the Indus. If the plains of Asia Minor and Egypt were the creation of their rivers and bore their names, then the same was likely to be true of the much more impressive river of India.

ἐξ ὄρους . . . παρὰ Σμύρνην The larger imitation of Herodotus contains a smaller one. The course of the Hermus had been described by Herodotus (1. 80. 1), who also located its sources (correctly) by the sacred mountain of Dindymene. It was a familiar passage, quoted by Strabo (13. 4. 5 (626)) with explicit reference to Herodotus.



MAP 6. The Hermus valley

Arrian's phraseology clearly echoes that of Herodotus, and given his predilection for Herodotean echoes (see above, vol. i 35) one might think that it was his own borrowing, superimposed upon Nearchus. But there is a significant alteration. Whereas Arrian claims that the Hermus issues into the sea near Smyrna, Herodotus placed the outlet near Phocaea (ἐκδιδοί . . . κατὰ Φώκαιαν πόλιν); and he is quoted to that effect by Strabo (see also [Scylax] 98). The alteration is conscious and somewhat paradoxical. Phocaea was relatively close to the mouth of the Hermus, which lay a few kilometres east of the city's site. Smyrna, however, was some distance away, in the plain of the Meles, separated from the Hermus plain by the massif of Yamanlar Dağ (T. J. Cadoux, *Ancient Smyrna* (Oxford 1938) 4-6). The point of reference has become more remote.


If the modification is Arrian's, one can only assume that he has replaced a relatively obscure place name with one of the great cities (and *conventus* centres) of Asia Minor. Smyrna was to some degree associated with the Hermus. The river figures on local coins and is associated with the emperor Pius on a second-century dedication (*BMC Ionia* 272-3; *Inscr. Smyrna* 767); and Pomponius Mela has the river discharge into the Gulf of Smyrna, not the Hermaic Gulf (Mela 1. 89; cf. Cadoux 18). But the Hermus was widely commemor-

ated on local coinages as far afield as Sardes (F. Imhoof-Blumer, *SNR* 23 (1923) 277, 296, 302-7, 321-2; D. A. O. Klose, *Die Münzprägung von Smyrna in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin 1987) 37), and it had no unique association with Smyrna. Apart from his criticism of Ephorus (see note above) Aelius Aristides only refers once to the Hermus (51. 2: the first halt on the journey from Smyrna), and it is the Meles not the Hermus which he commemorates in his various compositions in praise of Smyrna. If Arrian did make the alteration, it was not the most natural correction of a precise and accurate location, and elsewhere, when he refers to Herodotus, he tends to keep to the original (cf. 3. 30. 8 with note). On the other hand Nearchus, as we have seen, did modify the information he took from Herodotus and the substitution of Smyrna for Phocaea is likely to be his work.

If that is the case, we must assume that Smyrna had particular importance for Nearchus. That is highly likely. During the last third of the fourth century Smyrna was emerging from an age of obscurity. Destroyed by the Lydians around 600 BC, it survived as a nondescript cluster of villages without any civic unity (Strabo 14. 1. 37 (646)). Its fortunes changed abruptly when its population was transferred to the site of New Smyrna, some twenty stades across the bay to the south (Cadoux 60, 101). According to Strabo it was Antigonus who moved the population and Lysimachus who completed the new foundation, and his is the generally accepted version (cf. Billows 213, 295). However, there is also a tradition that the site was moved by Alexander. That tradition contains an element of unhistorical romance, with the king portrayed hunting on the site of the future city, which he can never have visited (Paus. 7. 5. 1; Aristid. 20. 7).

Nevertheless the local tradition claimed Alexander as the city's second founder (Aristid. 19. 4, 20. 20, 21. 4) and Pliny reports it as a fact (*NH* 5. 118). More substantial is the archaeological record at Old Smyrna, where settlement came to a sudden end 'no later than the third quarter of the fourth century' (R. M. Cook, *ABSA* 53/4 (1958/9) 31). That tips the balance in favour of Alexander rather than Antigonus (Cook 34; Hornblower, *Mausolus* 192). The city will certainly have been endowed with a substantial territory, later increased by Antigonus; and it could even have acquired lands on the southern side of the Hermus, which it later lost in the vicissitudes of the Hellenistic period (cf. Cadoux 183). Nearchus was active at Alexander's court in the last year of Alexander's reign, when the decision to refound Smyrna was probably made, and a prominent member of Antigonus' staff (Billows 406-8). He would have been well aware of developments at Smyrna and he seems to have modified Herodotus' exposition to publicize the new state of affairs.

πεδίον Λύδιον The Caystrian plain was the most visible feature of



MAP 7. The lower Maeander valley

the panorama from Mt. Tmolus (Strabo 13. 4. 5 (625)). For the dramatic effects of silting at the harbour of Ephesus see Strabo's description at 14. 1. 24 (641).

καὶ Μαϊάνδρου τὸ Καρικόν The plain of the Maeander (see Map 7) is fully described by Strabo (12. 8. 15 (577)) who states that it divided Caria from Lydia and finally (if the text is correctly restored) flowed though Caria itself, discharging into the Aegean a little north of Miletus. By the coast, it seems, the plain of the Maeander was wholly contained in Caria, as is stated by Arrian. That was not always the case. In the Achaemenid period the river formed the boundary. Tralles, immediately north of the Maeander, was reckoned part of Ionia, not Caria (Diod. 14. 36. 3); and one at least of Arrian's narrative sources conceived Caria as beginning south of Miletus itself (see above, 1. 20. 2: ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐστέλλετο). In the Roman period once again the local geographer, Artemidorus, placed the boundary of Caria at the Maeander, on the road north to Tralles (Strabo 14. 2. 29 (663)). When the river was a boundary, it was not reasonable to describe its entire plain as Carian—unless the appellation was traditional (Thuc. 3. 19. 2 treats the plain of the Maeander as fully Carian). However, in the early period of, the Successors Caria extended north to the mountain barrier of Messogis.

Both Miletus and Tralles are reckoned among the cities of Caria controlled by the satrap Asander and captured by Antigonus in 313 (Diod. 19. 75. 4-6). The boundaries may well have been redefined by Alexander himself when he confirmed Philoxenus in the satrapy after the death of Ada, the last local dynast (see above, 3. 6. 4 n.). At all events after his death the plain of the Maeander was no longer spliced uneasily between Ionia and Caria, and, if Arrian preserves the terminology of Nearchus, the wording once again reflects the contemporary realities.

The silting of the Maeander estuary is a common theme. Strabo once again gives details of the westward extension of the plain, which by his day had advanced forty stades seawards from Priene (12. 8. 7 (579); cf. Diod. 1. 39. 13).

5. Ἡρόδοτος τε καὶ Ἑκαταίος Strabo (15. 1. 16) also cites Herodotus after a second explicit citation of Nearchus' conclusions. It could not be more evident that the reference to the Nile also comes from Nearchus. He took Herodotus' examples out of context and used them for his own purposes (see above), and he also adapted his description of Egypt as the gift of the Nile, referring to him by name. That is hardly surprising. Herodotus' discussion of the origins of the Egyptian plain (2. 5, 10-13) was often used in antiquity, notably by Aristotle (*Meteor.* 1. 351^b28-352^a8), who describes the gradual silting effect of the Nile and states that the entire country was a deposit of the river (see also Strabo 11. 2. 4 (536); Diod. 3. 3. 2-3). He also repeats Herodotus' statement (2. 15. 3) that the old name of Egypt was Thebes and like Nearchus he draws on Homer for corroboration (*Meteor.* 351^b35). It is interesting to find Nearchus, the erstwhile associate of Alexander at Mieza, reproducing the method of Aristotle. It may be more than coincidence (see further *ΤΟΠΟΙ* 3 (1993) 420-1).

Nearchus certainly used and quoted Herodotus. Whether he did the same with Hecataeus is questionable. There is no reference to Hecataeus in Strabo's version of Nearchus' argument, nor is there in any of the other three passages (1. 2. 23 (30), 29 (35-6); 11. 2. 4 (536)) in which he mentions Herodotus' statement that Egypt was the gift of the Nile. On the other hand Arrian refers elsewhere to Hecataeus' *Genealogiae* (see above, 2. 16. 5 with note), and it is likely enough that he also knew the *Periegesis*. He knew his Herodotus well enough to be aware of the implicit criticism of Hecataeus' geography of Egypt (Hdt. 2. 15-16; cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* 1a 367-8), and he may have been curious enough to check the original. That of course is also true of Nearchus, but Hecataeus seems to have been comparatively little read in the fourth century, and his work apparently only existed in a single exemplar even in the Library at Alexandria (cf. Jacoby, *RE* vii 2700-1). He was more congenial to the archaizing

taste of the second century AD. Aelius Aristides also knew his Hecataeus and referred explicitly to his description of Upper Egypt (Aristid. 36. 109 = *FGrH* 1 F 308).

του ἄλλου ἢ Ἑκαταίου Hecataeus' *Periegesis* was divided into two books dealing respectively with Europe and Asia (cf. Jacoby, *RE* vii 2672-3; L. Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford 1939) 31-2). The second volume clearly contained no ascription of authorship, and Callimachus apparently denied that it was the work of Hecataeus (Athen. 2. 70 A = *FGrH* 1 T 15a: on the reading see G. Nenci, *PdP* 6 (1951) 356-60, hardly convincing). Eratosthenes, however, observed that the style was consistent with works of Hecataeus which were acknowledged as genuine, and had no doubts about its authenticity (Strabo 1. 1. 11 (7)). There are two consequences. Any reader of Eratosthenes would be aware that the authenticity of the *Asie* had been questioned, and Eratosthenes himself would not have expressed any doubts when referring to the text. That makes it almost certain (against Brunt, *Arrian* ii 450) that the qualification is Arrian's own, a piece of erudition perhaps culled from Eratosthenes but not copied directly.

ὥς καὶ τὴν γῆν . . . ἐπώνυμον This, as is evident from Strabo (15. 1. 16), is Nearchus' inference from Herodotus, who nowhere states that Egypt was named after the Nile. Nearchus probably referred to Herodotus' lengthy proof that Egypt was *created* by the Nile (Hdt. 2. 10-13; cf. 13. 1: μέγα τεκμήριον) and then presented as his own inference the hypothesis that the country was named after the river just like the plains of Asia Minor. The Homeric evidence which follows is necessary to complete the argument, and it was certainly added by Nearchus himself. That is virtually assured by Strabo, who responds to Eratosthenes' criticisms of Homer's ignorance of geography by repeating the evidence of Menelaus' anchorage: the poet knew that the Nile bore the same name as Egypt and he knew the reason for it. In both the relevant passages (Strabo 1. 2. 29 (35-6); cf. 23 (30)) Strabo combines Homer with Herodotus, and it seems certain that he is repeating the gist of Nearchus' arguments.

ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι A direct echo of Thuc. 1. 9. 3. See above, 4. 2 n. The passage alluded to here is *Od.* 4. 581 f. (ἂψ δ' εἰς Αἰγυπτοῖο διπετῆος ποταμοῖο | στήσα νέας), the most frequently cited of Homer's references to the river Aegyptus (cf. *Od.* 4. 477, 14. 258, 17. 437). The line was a familiar part of the famous argument that the Nile flooding was due to the summer rains in Ethiopia. The epithet *διπετῆς* was understood as 'rain fed' and presented as evidence of rain-induced flooding. According to Strabo (17. 1. 5 (790)) the theory of the summer rains went back from Callisthenes and Aristotle to Thersylaces of Thasos and ultimately to Homer (cf. A. Rehm, *RE*

xvii 572-5; D. Bonneau, *La Crue du Nil* (Paris 1964); S. M. Birstein, *GRBS* 17 (1976) 136-7). *Od.* 4. 581 is explicitly cited, and it is attested that the passage was used in the argument by both Aristotle and Eudoxus (Schol. *Hom. Od.* 4. 477 = F. Lasserre, *Die Fragmente des Eudoxos von Knidos* (Berlin 1968) 100, F 287). Aristotle had clearly exploited the Homeric evidence, and it is not out of the question that Nearchus had heard his views on the subject in his youth. If so, he remembered the quotation and reused it as evidence that Egypt was named after its river. Nearchus retained an interest in the specific problem of the Nile flood and claimed that it was solved by the Macedonians' experience of the Indian rivers, which demonstrably flooded with the summer rains (Strabo 15. 1. 25 (696) = *FGrH* 133 F 20; cf. *Ind.* 6. 6). Aristotle (*Meteor.* 1. 349^a5-9) had previously linked Ethiopia with Arabia, both areas prone to heavy summer rainfall. Nearchus observed the same phenomenon in India, and his conclusions were accepted by Theophrastus (*CP* 3. 3. 3), who brackets Ethiopia with India, not Arabia. It looks as though (*contra* Pearson, *LHA* 123-4) Nearchus was strongly influenced by Aristotle. The Homeric quotation was familiar, and he used it in a slightly different context, influenced by his master but not copied from him.

6. οὐ μεγάλοι οὗτοι This concludes Nearchus' argument. Herodotus had compared the rivers of Asia Minor unfavourably with the Nile: none could match in size any of the five mouths of the river of Egypt, still less its main stream (*Hdt.* 2. 10. 2). Nearchus applied the argument to the Indus, and Arrian expands his discussion by blending it with Megasthenes' reports of the huge dimensions of the Indian rivers. It leads to an impressive, if grandiloquent climax.

7. οὐδὲ σύμπαντας ξυντεθέντας See above, 4. 2 n. Arrian gives a very inflated estimate of the size of the rivers of the Punjab (which he could have shared with Nearchus). Megasthenes (cf. *Ind.* 4. 6) had merely noted that the tributaries of the Ganges tended to be wider than the Maeander at its widest, and claimed that the majority of the tributaries of the Indus were navigable (*Ind.* 4. 12). That hardly justifies Arrian's statement here, let alone his even more exaggerated claim that the Asian rivers even when combined with the Nile and Danube are less in volume than the Indus. The passage once again needs to be read alongside its counterpart in the *Indike* (4. 13-15). There Arrian summarizes Megasthenes' proof that the Indus and Ganges were larger than either the Nile or the Danube: the Nile had no tributaries and the Danube was modest in volume near its sources. Arrian expands this material, observing that the Indus was a substantial river from the beginnings of its course (cf. *Ind.* 4. 3: Megasthenes on the Ganges) and absorbed no less than fifteen mighty tributaries, each smaller than itself. That—in terms of rhetoric—justifies the emphatic climax, which gives the most

impressive possible claim for the volume of the Indus. Its hyperbole certainly eclipses anything Arrian may have found in Megasthenes, but it makes an effective conclusion for the geographical digression, resuming and amplifying its opening statement (4. 1).

8. πεντεκαίδεκα ποταμούς Megasthenes had given the names of fifteen tributaries of the Indus, and Arrian lists them in the *Indike* (4. 8–11; compare Strabo 15. 1. 32 (700): 'the most notable' of the tributaries of the Indus are fifteen in all). The majority according to Megasthenes were navigable. Arrian, however, goes much further and builds upon his earlier statement (4. 2) that the rivers of the Punjab eclipse all others in Asia, and now he extends the claim to every tributary of the Indus. It is good rhetoric but a perversion of his source.

7. 1–8. 1. *Excursus on Bridging Methods*

The emphatic conclusion of the previous digression immediately poses the question how a river of the vast dimensions of the Indus could be bridged. In consequence Arrian supplies another excursus, listing the various possibilities and describing contemporary techniques. It is reminiscent of Polybius, who often juxtaposes Greek and Roman institutions, particularly military institutions (cf. P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964) 420–5). But Polybius has a practical aim, to explain the superiority of Roman technology, whereas Arrian includes his description of bridging methods because of their intrinsic interest (*ὅτι λόγου ἄξια*). In spirit he comes closer to Thucydides, as Thucydides was appreciated in Arrian's day, as a purveyor of brief descriptions of military technology (e.g. Thuc. 4. 100. 1–4) and siege engineering (e.g. Thuc. 2. 75–6). Such descriptions were typically brief and closely related to the narrative (cf. Luc. *hist. conscr.* 57). Arrian follows the model in that his digression is vivid and succinct, but it is hardly relevant to the actual narrative. It is deliberately superimposed as a counterpart of Herodotus' classic description of Xerxes' bridging of the Hellespont. Given Arrian's figures for the breadth of the Indus (see above, 4. 2 n.), Hephaestion's bridge was a far more impressive achievement than Xerxes', which spanned a strait only seven stades wide (Hdt. 7. 34; see above, 1. 11. 6 n.), more impressive than Alexander's own crossing of the Euphrates on two pontoon bridges (Arr. 3. 7. 1–2). Arrian accordingly expounds how the Indus *might have* been bridged and sets the methods of his own day against Herodotus' description of Xerxes at the Hellespont, which he expects his readers to have in their minds. Unlike the earlier Herodotean pastiche at 1. 3. 1–2 the comparison of old and new is explicit. Arrian gives what is the quickest and most efficient bridging method he knows, and opines

that it is the most likely to have been used at the Indus (8. 1). But it is a hypothesis only.

Arrian claims that he is driven to speculation because there was no description of the bridge's construction in either Ptolemy or Aristobulus. Both authors clearly referred to the bridge in its finished state (see above, 4. 22. 7, 28. 5, 30. 9; 5. 3. 5) but they were not particularly informative. It was certainly implied that the bridge was carried on boats (see below, 5. 8. 4), as was stated explicitly in the vulgate tradition (Curt. 8. 10. 2-3; cf. Diod. 86. 3; *Metz Epit.* 48). What is more, Arrian's earlier description of the two bridges at the Euphrates (3. 7. 1-2) only makes sense if they were carried on boats—with a small flotilla held in reserve to complete the construction. Arrian, then, is somewhat disingenuous in claiming that he could not conjecture the bridging method at the Indus with certainty (*ἀτρεκῶς*). His sources hinted at the use of ships but did not provide him with the details necessary for a technical excursus. These he supplied from his own experience, and the result was a description to match that of Herodotus. It was in its turn used and modified by Arrian's countryman, Cassius Dio, when he described Avidius Cassius' crossing of the Euphrates in AD 164 (Dio 71. 2. 3 = 'Suda' s.v. *ζεῦγμα*). Arrian's description of an unopposed crossing was adapted to Cassius' bridging operation in the face of the enemy; and Dio clearly intended to emulate Arrian as much as Arrian himself aspired to match Herodotus (see below, 7. 3-4 with notes).

7. 1. καθάπερ οὖν . . . πρὸς Δαρείου The only full description is that of the Hellespont bridge (Hdt. 7. 36), which is clear and unambiguous. Darius' bridges over the Bosphorus and Danube were pontoon bridges, but there is no direct statement that they were ship-borne. That they were is an inference from Herodotus' description of them as *σχεδίαι* (4. 88. 1, 89. 3, 97. 1, 98. 3; cf. 7. 36. 4; 8. 97. 1) and his statement that the Danube bridge was constructed by the Ionian fleet (4. 89. 1-2). The inference is easy, but no less so than the inference Arrian could have drawn from his own sources about the Indus bridge.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέξασθαι Arrian is probably thinking of the celebrated bridge which Apollodorus built across the Danube. This was some 1,200 m. long (a little over six stades) carried on twenty vast piers of squared stone, 170 Roman feet apart (Dio 68. 13. 1-2; cf. Lepper and Frere 148-51). Dio also remarks that the construction was particularly difficult because of the depth of the river and the rapidity of its stream (13. 4; cf. Caes. *BG* 4. 17. 2). But even the Danube by the site of the bridge (opposite Turnu Severin) was a fraction of the dimensions of the Indus as Arrian conceived it, with a mean width of 40 stades, 15 at its narrowest and deepest point (see

above, 4. 1-2). The piers would need to have been sunk to an impossible depth, and there was no time available for Hephaestion to complete such a gigantic operation. Everything follows if one accepts the original premise of the vast size of the Indus.

2. **ξυντεθείσαι . . . ὀρμισθείσαι** Arrian gives the barest gist of Herodotus' description at 7. 36, which is obscure and difficult (cf. How and Wells ad loc.: Stein drew upon Arrian to elucidate Herodotus). Xerxes' ships were secured by cables of flax and papyrus, and moored in line, but the minutiae are impossible to understand. It looks as though there were two bridges, one with the vessels anchored athwart the stream and the other with them parallel (7. 36. 1). Arrian does not attempt to fathom these complexities but resumes the description in a single bland phrase. It is the cables which he emphasizes. Did Hephaestion consider them adequate (**ἀπήρκεσαν**) to sustain the much longer bridge over the Indus? Xerxes' first bridges, he will have noted, were immediately destroyed by a storm (Hdt. 7. 34), and his second attempt, despite the care lavished upon it, did not see out the year (Hdt. 8. 117. 1). Alexander's bridge, Arrian implies, is unlikely to have had such a fallible prototype, and the Roman model, in which the ships were far more widely separated, connected by timber not cables, and placed in position separately (cp. Hdt. 7. 36. 3: Xerxes' cables were tightened from the land after all the supporting boats had been anchored in place), was clearly preferable.

ὅτῳ τρόπῳ . . . ἐγεφύρῳσαν 'using the method by which the Romans have a bridge constructed over the Danube or the Celtic Rhine and by which they bridged the Euphrates and the Tigris whenever they were caught by the necessity to do so'.

This is a complex and carefully worded passage. The variation of tense is surely deliberate. It contrasts present procedure on the Rhine and Danube with past operations on the Euphrates and Tigris and implies that there will be no further bridges across the eastern rivers. Here (*pace* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 536-7) I think it unavoidable that there is an allusion to Trajan's campaigns. To our knowledge the Tigris had been bridged once, by Trajan in his campaign of 116 (F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian Campaign* (Oxford (1948) 10-11, 209-10). Lucullus had *crossed* the Tigris (Plut. *Luc.* 24. 7), but there is no suggestion that he built a bridge. Indeed Dio's account of Trajan's operations, based on Arrian's *Parthica* (Dio 68. 26. 1-3; cf. Arr. *Parth.* F 57), practically excludes any earlier bridging. Such was the shortage of timber by the Tigris that Trajan had vessels built in secret near Nisibis and transported in sections to the river; their unexpected appearance demoralized the enemy. It is most unlikely that any earlier age witnessed such a flotilla conjured up by the treeless Tigris, and it follows axiomatically that Arrian was writing

in the aftermath of Trajan's campaigns—probably in the immediate aftermath. Arrian could well reflect the atmosphere at the time of Hadrian's renunciation of the eastern conquests, when Roman forces were withdrawn west of the Euphrates (HA *Hadr.* 5. 3, 9. 1; Fronto, *Princ. hist.* 8, p. 195 VdH; Eutrop. 8. 6. 1–2; Festus *Brev.* 14. 4, 20. 3). There was to be no further aggression and, now that Parthia was humbled, no need for demonstrations of force such as had seen L. Vitellius and Corbulo bridge the Euphrates in the past (Tac. *Ann.* 6. 37. 3; 15. 9. 1). That optimism is unlikely to have lasted long. War with Parthia loomed threateningly in 123, and the crisis required Hadrian's personal intervention in the east (HA *Hadr.* 12. 8; cf. Syme, *Roman Papers* iii 1438, 1441). After that Arrian would not have written so blithely of past necessities. The situation fits better the beginning of the reign, when hostilities were not envisaged beyond the Euphrates but the Rhine and the Danube were more troublesome. Fear of barbarian raids, it is alleged, induced Hadrian to remove the wooden superstructure of Apollodorus' great bridge (Dio 68. 13. 6). Operations across the Danube were certainly seen as a future necessity, and in that case temporary pontoon bridges would be used. We have, then, a rare indication of the time of composition—after Trajan's wars but before Arrian's adlection to the senate (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 32–7). The work may well have been conceived in the fervour of Alexander imitation which accompanied Trajan's enterprises in the east (see, however, Stadter 139–40) and was completed at the beginning of the new reign.

3. ταχυστάτη γε ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Dio (68. 26. 2) comments on the speed with which Trajan bridged the Tigris, and Tacitus also mentions Corbulo's rapidity at the Euphrates (*Ann.* 15. 9. 2: *tanta celeritate et ostentatione virium*). Caesar also reports that his great bridge across the Rhine was completed within ten days (Caes. *BG.* 4. 18. 1), which gives an indication how rapid the construction could be when boats were used and there were no piles to be sunk in the river bed.

Arrian does not claim autopsy (compare *Ind.* 4. 15: ἰδὼν οἶδα) and may not have witnessed bridging operations either on the Danube (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 18–19) or on the eastern rivers. But there is no reason to think that he was following a literary account (so Brunt, *Arrian* ii 25; Tonnet ii 27 n. 152). Admittedly Dio (71. 2. 3) gives a very similar description of bridge building and his account has been used to correct Arrian's text (see below), but this is surely a case of direct imitation. Dio knew the work of his fellow countryman, Arrian, and used his *Parthica* as the base for his narrative of Trajan's wars (see above, vol. i 37). He must have been familiar with the excursus on bridge building and reused it with modifications appropriate to the immediate historical

context, the campaign of Avidius Cassius. It is a rewriting and imitation of an acknowledged classic, reminiscent of Arrian's own treatment of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.

κατὰ πόρου ἀφίενται If the text is correct, this can only mean 'the ships are released downstream'. Arrian elsewhere uses *πόρος* to denote the stream bed (5. 20. 10; 6. 3. 2) and there is an exact parallel to our passage at 7. 21. 4 (*φέρεισθαι τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ πόρου*; cf. Hesych. s.v. *πόρος* . . . τὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ρεῦμα). Emendation seems unnecessary, though Krüger's *κατὰ τοῦ ροῦ* (accepted by Abicht and Brunt) is a simple alteration, which he considered guaranteed by Dio (71. 2. 3: *ἀφιᾶσι . . . κατὰ ροῦν*). It is more likely that Dio himself simplified an obscure and perhaps inelegant expression in Arrian. **οὐκ ἐπ' εὐθύ . . . πρὸ μιν κρουόμεναι** 'not sailing head on, but, as it were, backing water'. The expressions are antithetical. The support vessels do not go bow first (cf. *Peripl.* 21. 1; *Cyneget.* 25. 8) but in reverse. Arrian rather curiously uses an analogy, which he repeats to good effect at 5. 17. 7: Porus' elephants retreated like warships backing water. But here too he is choosing his words carefully. The vessels used for the bridge were not oared ships and so could only *seem* to back water. The reliefs on Trajan's Column provide a good illustration. The two representations of pontoon bridges (Lepper and Frere pls. vii, xxxv) depict the support ships as ordinary river vessels, elsewhere shown plying their trade on the Danube. Arrian's vessels were clearly of this nature and needed guidance from an oared 'tug vessel' to manoeuvre into the correct position with bows facing into the current (*ἀντίπρωρος πρὸς τὸ ρεῦμα*). The manoeuvre underlies Tacitus' account of bridge building by the Vitellian troops on the Rhine (*Hist.* 2. 34. 2): the support vessels were steered into place against the flow of the stream (*adversum in flumen dirigebantur*), presumably stern foremost like the boats in Arrian.

4. ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν Dio also describes the process of gradual construction from the materials carried on board each ship. He apparently envisages a unilateral process, the first vessel supplying the timber for the superstructure from the river bank outwards and the next filling the gap between itself and the first. In Arrian the construction crews appear to work in both directions. From the reliefs on Trajan's Column it would seem that the structure of the roadway required three thicknesses of timber. In addition there was a vertical supporting pier in the centre of each ship and a pontoon of planks under the bridge between each pair of boats (I. A. Richmond, *Trajan's Army on Trajan's Column* (London 1982) 7). The latter seems a unique refinement, not found in the second bridge of boats (Lepper and Frere, pl. xxxv), which corresponds more closely to Arrian's description.

5. κλίμακες προβάλλονται The representations of bridges on

Trajan's Column have a continuous railing at either side of the superstructure, supported by diagonal cross spars. These clearly correspond to Arrian's ladders, which will have provided a similar low barrier (the railings on Trajan's bridges rise no higher than the shins of the marching legionaries). The precautions to safeguard the transport animals are paralleled in Herodotus' description of Xerxes' bridge (Hdt. 7. 36. 5).

ὥς σύνδεσμος εἶναι Cf. 2. 18. 3. Both passages are inspired by Thucydides (2. 75. 5) and both contain demonstrable imitations of the master. Here his influence is particularly marked in both vocabulary and construction:

- (i) τὸ τεταγμένον ἐν τῷ δρωμένῳ. Cf. Thuc. 5. 66. 4: τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου; 2. 63. 3: μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον.
- (ii) τὴν κατάκουσιν τῶν παραγγελμάτων. Cf. Thuc. 2. 84. 3: οὐδὲν κατήκουον . . . τῶν παραγγελλομένων. Arrian has taken his model (already used at 3. 9. 8) to excess, coining a Thucydidean abstract (κατάκουσις) which is *hapax legomenon*.
- (iii) τὴν δξύτητα . . . ἀφαιροῦνται. Cf. Thuc. 7. 13. 2: τὴν ἀκρίβειαν . . . ἀφῆρηνται.
- (iv) τοῦ ἐκλιποῦς. Cf. Thuc. 4. 55. 2. For Arrian's use of this typically Thucydidean expression see above, 1. 12. 2 with note.

All this amounts to a literary pastiche of Thucydides, as is appropriate in a digression inspired by his example.

8. 1. ἐκ παλαιοῦ The first specific reference to a bridge of boats is Caes. *BC* 1. 61. 5–6 (*navibus iunctis*). However, for this bridge (across the Ebro) local shipping was requisitioned for miles around; and it has been conjectured (Kromayer–Veith 450) that the technique was still primitive, the boats placed side by side without the intervening superstructure described by Arrian. Caesar never mentions having himself constructed such a bridge. By the Julio-Claudian period the method seems to have been well developed. In AD 62 Corbulo's bridge across the Euphrates was carried on a line of carefully spaced warships (Tac. *Ann.* 15. 9. 1: *naves . . . conexas trabibus*), and Tacitus' description is strongly reminiscent of Dio's account of the operations of Avidius Cassius.

8. 2–3. *Alexander at Taxila*

2. ἐνταῦθα αὖ θύει Arrian explicitly takes up the campaign narrative from 3. 6, where he described the ceremonies before Alexander's crossing of the Indus. The sacrifice (but not as yet the games) is repeated in acknowledgement of his safe transit (cf. 1. 4. 5 with note). That must have been his usual practice.

καὶ ἐδέχετο αὐτὸν Ταξίλης The meeting is vividly described in the vulgate tradition (Diod. 86. 5-6; Curt. 8. 12. 7-10; *Metz Epit.* 50-1), which has the Indian dynast go out at the head of his entire army, elephants included, and then ride ahead with his staff to greet his overlord. The story is given a dramatic twist, with Alexander in turn arranging his army in battle order. After the embassy of submission which he had received at the Indus (above, 3. 5-6 with notes) Alexander can hardly have suspected his vassal of treachery, as is implied in the vulgate. On the other hand it is only too likely that Taxiles mobilized his entire army to give the best possible impression of his value as an ally. As it turned out, he was successful beyond all expectation; his presents to Alexander were surpassed by the conqueror's largess (above, 3. 5 with notes), while he himself was confirmed as ruler of Taxila (above, 4. 22. 6 n.) and had his realm enlarged.

χώραν τῆς ὁμόρου There is no way of identifying this territory. Any of Taxiles' neighbours, less enthusiastic in submission than he, might have been forced to cede disputed land. It is even possible that Taxiles asked for and received the lands of the princeling 'Samaxus' who had given sanctuary to the Persian regicide, Barsaentes, and was arrested by his neighbours and surrendered to Alexander along with his protégé (Curt. 8. 13. 3-5). That apparently occurred while the king was still at Taxila (Curt. 8. 13. 5) and Taxiles might have benefited directly. In that case his realm was extended west of the Indus, where the lands of 'Samaxus' were apparently located (Arr. 3. 25. 8), and by the end of Alexander's reign there is a hint that Taxiles' dominions lay on both sides of the Indus (Diod. 18. 6. 2; cf. A. B. Bosworth, *Antichthon* 17 (1983) 41).

3. παρὰ Ἀβισάρου Curtius (8. 13. 1) states that the embassy delivered Abisares' unconditional surrender and acceptance of Alexander's sovereignty. If so, he was insincere. Porus was under the impression that his old alliance with Abisares (cf. 4. 27. 7 n.) remained in force and expected reinforcements from the north (Curt. 8. 14. 1; Diod. 87. 3; see below, 5. 20. 5). Abisares was backing both sides, intending to protest his undying loyalty to the ultimate victor, whoever that proved to be.

τῶν ὁρείων Ἰνδῶν βασιλέως On the terminology see above, 4. 22. 6 n. Abisares' realm cannot be precisely defined. It is agreed that it lay in the mountains north of the domains of Taxiles (Strabo 15. 1. 28 (698) = Onesicritus, *FGrH* 134 F 18a) and probably extended beyond the Hydaspes (Curt. 8. 12. 13). The Indus seems to have defined its western frontier (see above, 4. 27. 7 n.) and in the east it went at least as far as the head-waters of the Hydaspes in Indian Kohistan. Abisares could with equal facility intervene in the territory of the Assaceni, west of the Indus (cf. 4. 26. 1, 27. 7, 30. 7 with

notes), or send reinforcements to Porus along the east bank of the Hydaspes.

παρὰ Δοξάρεως νομάρχου Doxares (Berve no. 287) is not attested elsewhere. He was presumably one of the princes east of the Indus who offered submission with Taxiles and provided troops for the army. They are described as 'hyparchs' at 8. 5, but at 11. 3 they are termed 'nomarchs'. Elsewhere independent rulers are referred to as nomarchs (6. 14. 1, 16. 1), and the usage is not confined to Arrian (Strabo 15. 1. 30 (699) with reference to Sopeithes (see below, 6. 2. 2)). Most probably it is used as a neutral term for a local ruler, without the connotations of subjection that *ὑπαρχος* had (see above, 4. 22. 6 n.) but implying a more limited sway than *βασιλεύς*. Doxares was inferior in power and prestige to Abisares (and probably to Taxiles), but he was clearly an independent ruler. The change in terminology here may simply be due to Arrian's desire for variation, but it is perhaps more likely that it reflects a change of source. At 8. 2 he uses a source (Ptolemy?) which underscores Taxiles' vassal status; but when he comes to the embassies he turns to a source (Aristobulus or Nearchus) which uses more neutral terminology and distinguishes between greater and lesser rulers.

Φίλιππον τὸν Μαχάτα (Berve no. 780) Philip, as we would expect, was a Companion (Plut. *Al.* 60. 16). Whether or not he was brother of Harpalus the treasurer is a moot point. The patronymic, not admittedly the most common, is far from unique, certainly not in Macedon. As Berve noted, Machatas, son of Sabattaras, a Macedonian from Europus, was honoured at Delphi towards the end of the fourth century BC (*SIG*³ 269 I; J. Bousquet, *BCH* 82 (1958) 61, argued for 324/3), and Philip could have belonged to that family—or some other (for a list of Machatae in and out of Macedon see L. Robert, *BE* 1959. 194).

Philip's satrapy gradually evolved. After the acknowledgement of Porus east of the Hydaspes, that river became its eastern boundary; and by the summer of 325 it extended as far south as the confluence of the Indus and the Acesines (see below, 6. 15. 2) and as far west as the frontier of Parapamisadae (5. 20. 7 n.; 6. 2. 3). Taxila was clearly envisaged as the satrapal centre. With its garrison and its use as a convalescent centre for Alexander's troops it is strongly reminiscent of Bactra in 328 (see above, 4. 16. 4 with notes).

ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν Ὑδάσπην The Hydaspes (the Vitaṣṭa of the Vedas) is the modern Jhelum, which flows through Kashmir into the Punjab and after a course of some 750 km. joins its waters with the Chenab. It is apparently more dependent on the melting of the Himalayan snows than the other rivers of the Punjab and consequently its waters begin to rise somewhat earlier, in March. In the last century, before the water flow was restricted by major dams and irrigation

canals, its depth by the town of Jhelum (in the general area of the battle) was estimated at 4.5 m. in summer and 3 m. in winter, and its breadth varied from 600 m. to 1.6 km. By September the water-level subsided, and the riverain land could be sown with wheat for the spring crop. (For details see the various volumes of the *Punjab District Gazetteers*, esp. xxv.A: Gujrat (1921), xxx.A: Shahpur (1917), xxvii.A: Jhelum (1904)). When Alexander reached Taxila, at the beginning of spring (see below, 9. 4 n.), the Hydaspes had begun its rise and it was a formidable obstacle.

8. 4-18. 3 *The Campaign on the Hydaspes*

Arrian's account of the campaign is by far our fullest and most informative. Much of it is based on Ptolemy (see below, 13. 3, 14. 3 with notes), but it remains uncertain how much material is added from Aristobulus (see below, 9. 4 n.). Of other sources the most intriguing is a purported letter of Alexander which Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 1-11) excerpts at length, claiming it as the personal record of the architect of the victory. The letter is probably a fabrication (L. Pearson, *Historia* 3 (1955) 445-6; *contra* J. R. Hamilton, *PACA* 4 (1961) 16-18), but it seems to have been concocted from early sources, cognate to (and possibly including) Ptolemy. There is some agreement with Arrian on facts, figures, and even wording (cf. 10. 3, 13. 3 nn.), and a penchant to improve on the story is detectable in both (cf. 12. 3, 14. 1 nn.). Other sources are more divergent. Of the so-called vulgate tradition the closest to Arrian is the brief summary of the *Metz Epitome* (53-9), which suggests that there was a certain measure of unanimity about the facts (see below, 11. 2-3 nn.). Curtius' account (8. 13. 5-14. 46) is, as usual, rhetorically elaborated. There are points of similarity with Arrian, but his narrative is at best confused and perhaps contaminated (see below, 11. 3 n.). He can only be used with caution, as can the various *strategemata* in Polyaeus (4. 3. 9, 21-2) and Frontinus (*Strat.* 1. 4. 9), which are excerpted out of context from unknown sources. Of other accounts of the battle, Diodorus' (87. 1-89. 3) is contracted almost to vacuity, and what remains is for the most part flaccid rhetoric. Justin (12. 8. 3-8) adds nothing. The majority of our information therefore comes from Arrian. Despite obscurities and corruptions the text is comparatively lucid and provides the only basis for reconstructing the battle.

Full bibliography (to 1970) is given by Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 156-60. The most authoritative discussions of the campaign (apart from questions of topography, which are discussed below, 9. 1 n.) are Droysen i² 2. 126; A. Bauer, in *Festschrift zu Ehren Max Büdinger's* (Innsbruck 1898) 71-88; G. Veith, *Klio* 8 (1908) 131-53; B. Breloer, *Alexanders Kampf gegen Poros* (Stuttgart 1933); Tarn ii 190-8; J. R.

Hamilton, *JHS* 76 (1956) 26-31; Fuller 180-99; Schachermeyr² 422-8; Lane Fox 353-62; Green 389-401; Hammond, *KCS*² 208-18; A. M. Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 91-113.

4. Πόρος (Berve no. 683) The eponymous king of the Pauravas (Lassen ii² 154). His realm lay between the rivers Hydaspes and Acesines, and according to Strabo (15. 1. 29 (698)) it contained some 300 cities. This on the face of it is an exaggeration, comparable to the vast population given for the territory east of the Acesines (see below, 5. 20. 4; 6. 2. 1 nn.). Porus' lands covered roughly the area of the modern Jech Doab, and, if Strabo is correct, did not extend into the mountainous forest country to the north. This was a fairly modest dominion. The configuration of the rivers will have changed since antiquity but the area enclosed between the Jhelum and the Chenab is unlikely to have decreased exponentially. Now the land in the Jech Doab comprises some 15,000 square kilometres, and at the time of the 1901 census its population amounted to one and a half million. Overwhelmingly rural, it contained only five towns numbering over 10,000 souls, and of some 320 settlements with populations larger than one thousand 263 had less than 2,000 inhabitants.¹

It is unlikely that the population was denser in Porus' day or that it was grouped in larger urban agglomerates. The proper conclusion must be that the richness and population of Porus' kingdom was magnified by Alexander's historians in order to enhance the glory of the conquest. Porus may have been the richest and most powerful of the princes of the Punjab (certainly the possessor of the largest stable of elephants), but his resources and military potential were feeble in comparison to what was at Alexander's disposal. He also had unquiet or hostile neighbours, like his cousin across the Chenab (see below, 5. 21. 3), and had alienated potential allies by a grandiose but unsuccessful campaign of annexation which he had waged along with Abisares (see below, 5. 22. 2). That recent failure is an eloquent comment on Porus' military shortcomings. Against Alexander the Hydaspes was his most effective ally. If he could prevent the crossing indefinitely, Alexander might lose patience and take his forces elsewhere. However, if the Macedonians crossed in anything like full strength, his resistance was doomed.

Porus had evidently avoided all diplomatic contact with Alexander; and at Taxila the king had sent an emissary, Cleochares (Berve no. 436), to demand submission (Curt. 8. 13. 2; *Metz Epit.* 55-6).

¹ These statistics are compiled from the *Punjab District Gazetteers* xxv.B: Gujrat (1912), xxvi.B: Shahpur (1912), and xxxii.B: Jhang (1912). The figures for settlement size are: over 10,000: 5; 5,000-10,000: 9; 2,000-5,000: 57; 1,000-2,000: 263; 500-1,000: 540.

The arrogant rejection of that demand made hostilities inevitable. **Κοῖνον μὲν ... Ὑδάσπην ποταμόν** Arrian here emphasizes the crucial factor of the campaign. The Hydaspes and indeed all the rivers of the Punjab were impossible to ford once their waters began to rise, and a formidable accumulation of transport vessels was necessary. That had been foreseen long before, when Hephaestion and Perdiccas received their orders not only to bridge the Indus but to build ships which could be moved in sections to the other rivers (Curt. 8. 10. 2-3). The majority were used to support the bridge across the Indus (see above, 3. 5, 7. 1 with notes), and there were a few extra built by Hephaestion and by Alexander himself (see above, 4. 30. 9 n.). Once the army had moved on from the Indus to Taxila the bridge could be dismantled and the individual vessels broken into sections. This was a colossal and time-consuming task. The number of vessels may well have numbered hundreds (see below, 12. 4-13. 1) and all had to be painfully transported by ox-teams, the invariable means of haulage in antiquity for heavy loads by land. This was inevitably slow. Oxen have a top speed of three kilometres an hour and do not normally work longer than five hours in succession (for details see A. Burford, *EcHR* 13 (1960) 10-18, and for interesting comparative figures N. K. Sandars, *The Sea Peoples*² (London 1985) 121-4). Even if, as is likely, Coenus used relays of teams, it is hard to envisage the cumbersome loads covering more than sixteen km. a day (ox-teams took two to three days to complete the 35-kilometre haul from Mt. Pentelikon to Eleusis: Burford 14). Now along the main road (and there was no quicker route) it was some forty miles (65 km.) from the Indus to Taxila and another 120 (200 km.) from Taxila to the Hydaspes (Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a). The dismantling of the vessels, the transport, and reassembly must have taken close to a month and monopolized the draught animals and native labour force of Taxiles' dominions. What is more, the exercise was repeated later in the season at the Acesines and the Hydraotes (see below, 5. 20. 8), both of which had to be crossed twice. It is not surprising that there were delays, as the great wagon-trains of ship sections laboured through the monsoon rains, and the inevitable slowness of their progress controlled the pace of Alexander's own campaigning.

5. καὶ ξυνετμήθη κτλ. The techniques of building in sections had long been known in the near east (cf. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 136), and they were to be used on a more grandiose scale when Alexander had quadriremes and quinquiremes transported from the Phoenician coast to Thapsacus (7. 21. 3; Strabo 16. 1. 11 (741) = Aristobulus, *FGrH* 139 F 55-6; Curt. 10. 1. 19). That may have been the inspiration for Trajan's transport of ships from the forests of Nisibis to the Tigris (Dio 68. 26. 1; see above, 7. 2 n.). The


division of triaconters into the three sections only would have created enormous loads (Casson 54-5 estimates the length of a single-banked vessel at 75 feet), but the techniques existed to cope with them. At the *diolkos* near Corinth entire merchantmen were apparently hauled along a paved wagon road 6.5 km. long (Burford 11; cf. James Wiseman, *The Land of the Ancient Corinthians* (Göteborg 1978) 43-5); and there is ample evidence that column drums weighing up to eight tons were moved by multiple teams yoked in file. The loads hauled by Coenus' teams were commensurate, but the distance was extraordinarily long and the roads less carefully maintained than the Corinthian *diolkos*. Breakdowns and bottlenecks must have been frequent.

δομοῦ ὠφθη On Arrian's own account this is a misstatement. The reassembled fleet was not 'seen together' on the Hydaspes. A small flotilla did appear on the river (9. 3), but the majority of the ships were carefully concealed in the woods behind Alexander's chosen crossing point (12. 4) and were naturally kept from view until the moment of the crossing.

9. 1. καὶ Ἀλέξανδρός τε κατεστρατοπέδευσεν The site of Alexander's base camp is the most vexed question in the reconstruction of the battle. Arrian gives no precise indication of Alexander's direction of march from Taxila nor the distance between the capital and the river. That is provided by two other sources: (i) Strabo 15. 1. 32 (700) states that the march from Taxila was 'for the most part to the south' (τὸ πλεόν ἦν ἐπὶ μεσημβρίαν) as far as the Hydaspes and then veered more to the east as Alexander continued towards the Hyphasis (Beas). This gives only the roughest of approximations: the main camp on the Hydaspes was vaguely (but not directly) south of Taxila. (ii) Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 (= Baeton, *FGrH* 119 F 2a) gives the distance from Taxila to the Hydaspes as 120 Roman miles. The measurement was presumably made to Alexander's base camp, or possibly the city founded at the crossing-point (see below, 19. 4n.), but once again we should not look for precision. The distance was calculated along the main road, the course of which is unknown, and it represents Pliny's conversion of a figure originally given in stades. There may well be some rounding off.

From the early nineteenth century the above data have been applied to the modern course of the river Jhelum (see Map 8) and combined with various details from the battle narrative, where the sources describe Alexander's crossing, namely:

- (a) The crossing-point was 150 stades from the base camp (below, 11. 2).
- (b) At the crossing-point the river described a considerable bend



MAP 8. The modern topography around Jhelum

around a thickly wooded headland (below, 11. 1).

- (c) There was a deep ditch or ravine (*fossa . . . praealta*) close to the crossing-point (Curt. 8. 13. 17).
- (d) An uninhabited wooded island lay opposite the crossing-point (below, 11. 1) and there was another island beyond it, which Alexander took to be the east bank proper (below, 13. 2-3).

As a result two quite distinct localizations have emerged, both with serious weaknesses (for detailed bibliography see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 158-60). The most popular was advocated by Mountstuart Elphinstone as early as 1809, argued in detail by Sir Alexander Cunningham, and presented in definitive form by Sir Aurel Stein (*GJ* 80 (1932) 31-46, expanded in *Archaeological Reconnaissances in North-Western India and South-Eastern Iran* (London 1937) 1-26). According to Stein, Alexander forged south from Taxila, crossing the Great Salt range by the Nandana pass (which rises to 750 m., 550 m. above the Jhelum). The base camp was pitched near modern Haranpur, almost exactly 120 Roman miles from Taxila, and the crossing was made at Jalalpur nearly 30 km. (150 stades) upstream, where a significant ravine (the Kandar Kas) joins the river. This reconstruction has proved seductive and most recent scholars have opted for it without question (e.g. Fuller 184-5; Lane Fox 353-5; Green 389-90; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 458. Stein's final exposition even converted Georges Radet from his earlier negative position: *REA* 40 (1938) 421-6; cf. *REA* 37 (1935) 349-56). But the identification is vulnerable on several counts. Stein was unable to find a suitable bend in the river; his ravine (which Curtius claims was intended to conceal infantry and cavalry) must have been a torrent during the rains, and, worst of all, Stein does not begin to explain how the fleet could have been hauled in secret to the vicinity of Jalalpur. Ox-teams could never have used the Nandana pass or any pass over the Great Salt range, nor could they have taken an alternate route on the present course of the river without attracting the attention of the enemy. Alexander may well have been able to take his army by Stein's route but his navy must inevitably have been shipwrecked.

The other theory, most forcefully expounded by Vincent Smith (*The Early History of India*³ (Oxford 1914) 78-85) and Breloer (121-47), takes Alexander from Taxila to the Hydaspes by the quickest and easiest route, following the Grand Trunk Road. The site of the town of Jhelum is taken as the base camp, the point of crossing located upstream, according to Breloer in the vicinity of Fort Mangla, where the river makes a remarkable right-angle bend. But the distance from Taxila to Jhelum is well short of 120 miles (hardly more than eighty), the terrain east of the river broken and difficult, ill suited to a battle site, and, if the enemy occupied the area of Fort

Mangla, the reassembly of Alexander's fleet could never have escaped their attention (Stein, *Archaeological Reconnaissances* 20-1). These objections are cogent and make it virtually impossible that the crossing took place where Breloer located it, if the course of the river and the surrounding terrain were roughly comparable in antiquity.

There lies the crux. Stein was dogmatically certain that the river was substantially the same in antiquity as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (*GJ* 80 (1952) 42; see his reply to Tarn, quoted by Tarn, ii 198). His reason was that the river's course and configuration 'are largely determined by such permanent geographical features as the Jalalpur hill spur and the Pabbi range facing it'. As far as it goes, this is true. The course of the Jhelum is largely fixed until it descends into the plains and the scope for variation is relatively limited. The final bottleneck is the six-kilometre gap between the eastern outlier of the Salt Range and the western flank of the Pabbi range. Through this gap the river must always have flowed. But then comes the plain land. In more recent times the Jhelum has skirted its north-western extremities, describing a wide bow close to the Salt Range, but that need not have been (and probably was not) always the case. Geographers take it as axiomatic that the river ran more to the east in antiquity, forging more directly south from the town of Rasul at the gap (K. S. Ahmad and A. S. Abbasi, *Pakistan Geographical Review* 15/2 (1960) 46; H. Wilhelm, *Erdkunde* 20 (1966) 271). In that case the course of the river ran some distance away from Haranpur and Jalalpur, and the battle site proper should be located in the middle of the plain of Gujrat. Aerial photographs could help, but, as has been repeated *ad nauseam*, certainty will only come with the discovery of the site of Bucephala or Nicaea.

For the moment one can only be reasonably sure that Alexander's route followed the main arterial highway from Taxila to the Hydaspes (so Schachermeyr² 422 n. 515), which was the only route his fleet could reasonably take. That highway must have followed roughly the course of the Grand Trunk Road, the only route which avoids ascent and descent of the Salt Range, as far as the modern city of Jhelum. That is the modern crossing-point. In antiquity it could have been further south, and Alexander may have followed the west bank past the gap into what is now plain land. The base camp and the crossing-point (and with it the bend in the river) could all be located away from the modern course of the river and may defy identification for all time. The islands will certainly not be discovered, for they appear and disappear with each major flood (cf. *Punjab District Gazetteers* xxvii. A: Jhelum (1917) 10: 'the whole being subject to quick changes of diluvion and by accretion, due to the

vagaries of the stream'), and until modern times the configuration even of the main channels was constantly changing. There is more chance of finding the stream bed, but even that will only be confirmed by archaeological finds *in situ*.

ὅσα δὲ ἄλλα . . . Μακεδόνας An obvious but important point. Porus' problem was to prevent a crossing, and so he had to cover all likely crossing-points. That entailed placing garrisons along the entire stretch of river which was vulnerable. The remoter points, which could not be reinforced from the base camp at short notice, would need to be protected by relatively large contingents. In other words the main army with Porus could not be at full strength, and it was in Alexander's strategic interest to keep the Indian forces divided. Much of his own army, as Arrian states, was spread along the bank, some of the contingents inevitably far removed from base. It is not surprising that the list of forces crossing before the battle comprises only a fraction of the total army (see below, 11. 3, 12. 1-2). The elaborate game of bluff ensured that the armies on both sides were widely dispersed. Alexander could not concentrate his forces without revealing that a crossing was imminent nor could Porus without making a gift of the crossing

2. τὰ μὲν . . . πολέμια It is somewhat surprising that there was still hostile territory west of the Hydaspes. The submission to Alexander had not been universal (cf. Anspach 40 n. 125); and at least one of the local rulers apparently sided with Porus (or failed to pay homage to Alexander). One thinks of Spitaces, the nomarch who fell at the battle of the Hydaspes and whose territory may well have been located west of the river (see below, 18. 2 n.).

3. σίτος This was the time of the spring harvest. In modern times wheat has been sown in the Punjab between late October and mid-December and harvested between mid-April and mid-May (*Punjab District Gazelleers* xxv. A (Gujrat) 67). Alexander would have established himself on the Hydaspes just as the harvest was maturing (see below, 9. 4 n.), and he could requisition it at will.

τὰ τε πλοῖα Only a portion of the fleet can have been used for these demonstrations. The greater part of it was kept carefully concealed at the crossing-point (12. 4 n.), while a token force showed the flag and ultimately conveyed Craterus' forces across the river (11. 4-12. 1, 18. 1). Arrian combines, not very adroitly, two strategies—one to lull Porus into a false sense of security and a belief that there would be no crossing until autumn, the other to keep him constantly on the move in anticipation of a possible crossing. His sources may have stressed different plans, but they are not incompatible. Porus was encouraged to hope that there would be no crossing during the summer, but he also had to keep his forces dispersed. If he concentrated his army at base (see below), it would make the

victory more difficult once Alexander was over the river. The ideal, which Alexander seems to have achieved, was for Porus to string out his army at the various crossing-points but to relax his guard in the hope, but not the certainty, that the crossing would be indefinitely delayed.

The movements and counter-movements clearly began as soon as Alexander reached the Hydaspes. Curtius (8. 13. 12-16) mentions skirmishes on some of the riverain islands, fought between small groups of troops who swam over from either side. These were, as Curtius suggests, minor feints designed to keep the enemy on the alert. The appearance of the fleet increased the tension, but at the same time Alexander was giving contradictory signals, suggesting that he would wait for the autumn. Eventually the Indians relaxed their vigilance (Plut. *Al.* 60. 2; Polyae. 4. 3. 9) but their forces remained dispersed.

οὐδὲ ἐν τι . . . παρασκευάζεσθαι 'nor to select a single area suitable for defence and transfer there his preparations from all (other) quarters'. Alexander had to prevent a concentration of Indian forces at all costs.

4. πολλοὺς τε ὕδατος κτλ. There is a similar passage, based on Nearchus, at *Ind.* 6. 4-8. There the rise and fall of the Indian rivers is compared to that of the Nile, and the demonstrable accretion due to the monsoon rainfall supports an argument that similar conditions in Ethiopia are responsible for the flooding of the Nile (see below, 6. 1. 2 n.). In this passage the description is related to Alexander's campaign strategy and may well derive from Aristobulus, who was keenly interested in the seasonal changes in India (see note below: Aristobulus' authorship is assumed by Strasburger 43; Kornemann 70-1). Ptolemy presumably agreed on the basic facts but is less likely to have devoted an excursus to the phenomenon.

According to Curtius (8. 13. 8) the river was four stades wide in the area of Alexander's base camp. That corresponds to modern estimates of its breadth at high water, between 600 m. and 1.6 km. (*Punjab District Gazetteers* xxvii. A (Jhelum) 10), and for once Curtius' highly rhetorical description is unlikely to be much exaggerated. Arrian is quite correct to stress the muddy character of the water (*θολεροῦ* (not 'turbulent' as traditionally translated: Wirth's 'schlammiges' hits the mark) is clearly opposed to *καθαροὶ ἰδεῖν*, as in Hdt. 4. 53. 2); the Jhelum in particular is noted for the amount of silt it carries down from Kashmir, and the land around its banks is particularly fertile.

ἦν γὰρ ὥρα . . . ὃ ἥλιος The received text is gibberish: 'it was the time of year when the sun most turns in summer after its turning.' The majority of editors and translators are unperturbed, taking Arrian to be referring generally to the time of the solstice.

Anspach (40 n. 124) even thought that the sentence could be interpreted: *ad solstitium fere versus*, i.e. some time before the solstice. Although Roos tacitly approved, I do not see how the meaning can be extracted from the Greek. *μετὰ τροπᾶς* can hardly mean anything other than 'after the solstice', and, as it stands, Arrian's text appears to make the sun perform a second turn after the solstice proper. Sintenis accordingly proposed to read *κατὰ τροπᾶς* ('at the solstice'). That removes the absurdity but the sentence remains awkward and pleonastic. A more elegant emendation was provided by Krüger: ἡ *μετὰ τροπᾶς μάλιστα* <ᾶς> ἐν θέρει ('the season of year was the time approximately after the turning which the sun makes in summer'). The insertion of the relative pronoun is a simple change and brings the construction into line with Arrian's usage elsewhere (6. 21. 2; 7. 21. 2). It must, I think, be accepted. Even so, the sentence remains curiously awkward; *μάλιστα* must be understood as an approximation rather than a superlative, which is acceptable linguistically (cf. 7. 21. 4: ἀμφὶ Πλειάδων μάλιστα δύοσιν) but somewhat incongruous in a passage that apparently aims at chronological precision.

There is also an acute conflict of fact. Other evidence suggests that the battle of the Hydaspes was fought in spring, well before the solstice. Arrian himself (see below, 19. 3) dates the engagement to the Attic month of Munychion (April/May). That is clearly an approximation, but it coheres with other evidence. Our prime text, Strabo's digest of Aristobulus' and Nearchus' discussions of the monsoon rains (Strabo 15. 1. 17-19 (691-3) = *FGrH* 139 F 35, 133 F 18), has Alexander visit Taxila at the beginning of spring. There he first experienced the rains which intensified and became continuous after he crossed the Hydaspes and lasted until the rising of Arcturus, early in October. It is only hinted that the battle with Porus came in spring, shortly after the stay at Taxila, but there is an explicit statement when Strabo follows Nearchus (*FGrH* 133 F 18) in dating Alexander's crossing of the Acesines to the time of the summer solstice (*κατὰ θερινὰς τροπᾶς*; cf. Arr. *Ind.* 6. 5 (μέσου θέρος)). The Acesines lay considerably to the east of the Hydaspes, and it was (*pace* Brunt, *Arrian* ii 456-7) some time before Alexander left the area of the battle. His troops were allegedly given a month's recreation (Diod. 89. 6) and he himself fought a minor campaign in the territory of the Glausae (see below, 20. 2-4). That gave his transport teams the time to haul the necessary ships to the Acesines (see above, 8. 4 n.). The battle against Porus therefore occurred more than thirty days before the solstice, probably in the first weeks of May. How then can one explain this apparent rogue dating *after* the solstice?

In an acute footnote (423 n. 516) Schachermeyr² argued that Arrian's remark is misleadingly taken out of context. His source did

not date the battle itself but described the rising of the water-level in the Punjab rivers, placing the peak (correctly) after the solstice. Arrian used the description to explain Alexander's strategy at the Hydaspes but gave the erroneous impression that Alexander crossed the river at high water, after the solstice. In my opinion this explanation goes a long way towards the truth, but, given the garbled nonsense of the received text, one need not posit error or carelessness in Arrian. It is far more likely that there is a lacuna. Arrian's source, as Schachermeyr saw, gave an account of the annual rise and fall of the rivers of the Punjab, as we know Aristobulus did (Strabo 15. 1 18 (692)): the rise began with the spring storms and peaked during the monsoon rains, after the solstice (cf. *Ind.* 6. 5-8), when precipitation was continuous (*ἀθρόα*). This description would be very similar to that of the rise and fall of the Euphrates, which Arrian excerpts from Aristobulus at 7. 21. 2: low water comes in winter, and at the beginning of spring and above all at the summer solstice (*καὶ πολὺ δὴ μάλιστα ὑπὸ τροπᾶς ἄστυνας τοῦ θέρους ὁ ἥλιος ἐπιστρέφει*) it swells and bursts its banks. If we posit a lacuna in the present passage after *ᾧρα ἔτους ἧ*, the sense is much the same: 'it was the season of year when <after the winter drought the waters were rising. The process begins in spring and it climaxes> after the summer solstice (*μετὰ τροπᾶς μάλιστα*), when the rain is continuous.' In that case Arrian did *not* date the battle to the time of the solstice. He merely noted that the campaign took place as the rivers were rising and explained the seasonal changes in the water-level.

10. 1. εἰ πη λάθοι ὑφαρπάσας . . . πόρον 'in the hope that somehow he would gain the crossing by stealth, secretly and swiftly'. The terminology is carefully chosen: *ὑφαρπάζειν*, which has connotations of deceit and violence, looks forward to the opening words of 10. 3, *κλέψαι . . . τὴν διάβασιν* (cf. *Ar. Thesm.* 205: *κλέπτειν ὑφαρπάζειν τε*). There may, as has sometimes been argued (Abicht ad loc.; Kornemann 27), be an intentional echo of Alexander's proud declaration at Gaugamela that it was disgraceful to steal victory (see above, 3. 10. 2 with note). That is a sentiment which Arrian approves and voices in his own right: success is most admirable when it is achieved without subterfuge (*Cyneget.* 24. 4-5; *Tact.* 40. 11-12). But there is no implicit disapproval of Alexander's tactics at the Hydaspes. Later, in the peroration (7. 28. 3), he juxtaposes the two opposing facets of the king's generalship: what he did openly he did with the utmost daring, but when he needed to anticipate and steal the advantage from the enemy (*φθάσας ὑφαρπάσαι*) he was supremely clever at doing so. Open daring and covert deception are paired as equally admirable.

It is the context which determines the tone of the passage. At 3. 10. 2 Arrian simply takes an apophthegm from his sources, repeating its wording (cf. Plut. *Al.* 31. 12; Curt. 4. 13. 8) and approving the sentiment. Our present passage is more elaborate. The pervasive imagery of stealing is obviously borrowed from a famous section of Xenophon (*Anab.* 4. 6. 11–16; cf. 5. 6. 9) in which a surprise attack is compared to theft in civil life, and the terminology used by Arrian is strikingly anticipated (τοῦ ἐρήμου ὁρους καὶ κλέψαι τι πειρᾶσθαι λαθόντας καὶ ἀρπάσαι φθάσαντας). The metaphor is an elaborate literary echo, which underscores Arrian's admiration of the tactics of deception, admiration which he expresses overtly in the peroration (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 136–7).

2. οἱ τε ἵπποι κτλ. Compare the instructions to Craterus (11. 4), which also stress the impossibility of horses making a landing in the face of elephants. The inability of untrained horses to fight against elephants is a recurrent theme in antiquity. It is prominent in Ctesias' romance of Semiramis (Diod. 2. 17. 2, 19. 2–3 = *FGrH* 688 F 1), whose curious stratagem of dummy elephants was probably known to Alexander and seems to have been imitated by Perseus (Polyaen. 4. 21; Diod. 2. 17. 3; Zonaras 9. 22). Caesar himself took pains to accustom his cavalry to the sight, sounds, and—above all—the smell of the elephants they would encounter (*Bell. Afr.* 72. 4–5; Dio 43. 4. 1).

3. νόκτωρ παραγῶν The stratagem is often described (Plut. *Al.* 60. 2; Curt. 8. 13. 18–19; Polyaen. 4. 3. 9; Front. *Strat.* 1. 4. 9), but only Arrian emphasizes that the diversionary manoeuvres took place at night. According to Curtius (8. 13. 18) Ptolemy himself controlled the operation. If true, that would explain the vivid and detailed character of Arrian's description, but one would expect both Ptolemy and Arrian to have mentioned his role in the affair (see below, 11. 3, 13. 1 nn.).

ἐς ἔθος ... καθίστη Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 2) makes the same point in similar language (ἐθίζοντα ... μὴ φοβεῖσθαι) but he confines the commotion to the Macedonian camp—possibly an error of contraction on his part.

4. ἀλλὰ κενόν Krüger's emendation of the meaningless manuscript reading (ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον) is obviously right and conforms to Arrian's usage elsewhere (*Ind.* 31. 5: ἐλέγξαι κενὸν μῦθον ἐόντα).

11. 1. ἄκρα ... καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν νῆσος The description is elaborate and, if one accepts Krüger's emendation (ἴδη for εἶδει), strongly Herodotean in flavour (cf. Hdt. 4. 109. 2, 175). Arrian emphasizes the two geographical factors which gave the locality its potential for concealment—the bend in the river and the island (see Fig. 3). These two factors are carefully juxtaposed. The river




FIG. 3. Alexander's crossing of the Hydaspes, according to Arrian

described a tight bend, enclosing a wooded headland, and at the same time it broke into two channels, so that an island was formed at the apex of the headland. Uninhabited and wooded, it effectively shielded a long stretch of the bank from observation by Porus' scouts. The bend provided additional concealment. It is important to note that Arrian's description of the bend in the river as an *ἄκρα* does not imply that it was at all elevated. It was simply a long, thin elbow in the river, like the *ἄκρα* at the confluence with the Acesines, where Alexander salvaged his damaged ships (see below, 6. 5. 4, with *Parth. F* 63). That *inter alia* tells decisively against Stein's location of the crossing-point by Jalalpur where a spur of the Salt range does abut the river (*GJ* 80 (1932) 41) but there is no bend in the river and little room for Alexander's great concentration of ships and men (see above, 9. 1 n.). Other sources lay the emphasis either on the island (*Curt.* 8. 13. 17) or the wooded and desolate character of the location (*Metz Epit.* 59). The bend itself was less important; it helped conceal the crossing but was not vital. The same applies to

the ravine which according to Curtius ran close to the bank. It was not the primary factor in the choice of site, and Arrian (or his source) fails to mention it. Different features of the landscape would have been remembered in the various eyewitness accounts of the battle along with the essentials—the island, the forest, and the solitude.

ὕλῳδης . . . ἐρημίας An echo, which is surely conscious, of Thucydides' description of the island of Sphacteria (4. 29. 3: ὕλῳδους . . . καὶ ἀτρίβους διὰ τὴν αἰὲ ἐρημίαν). Arrian varies it with the substitution of the poetic ἀστιβής (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 8. 10; Plut. *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 3. 1.) for the rather colourless ἀτριβής, but his intention must be to recall Thucydides.

2. ἐς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίους *Metz Epitome* 59 also gives the figure of 150 stades for the distance between base camp and crossing-point, a rare coincidence between Arrian and the vulgate tradition. The distance as ascertained by the bematists will have been independently transmitted in the two traditions. Arrian, however, gives no indication whether the crossing-point lay upstream or downstream, nor does the *Metz Epitome*, which merely describes a march along the river (*secundum amnem*). On the other hand Frontinus (*Strat.* 1. 4. 9) states explicitly that Alexander crossed the river *per superiorem partem*, while Curtius (8. 13. 23) claims that, when Alexander crossed, the enemy's attention was focused on Ptolemy on the lower reaches of the river. Since Ptolemy's mission was to distract Porus from the actual crossing (Curt. 8. 13. 18), that would imply that Alexander went upstream. So the majority of commentators assume (Tarn i 94 n. 3; Radet, *REA* 37 (1935) 353; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 458; Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 127; though Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 158, remains agnostic). But the conclusion is insecure. Curtius is at best confused about Ptolemy's role (see below, 11. 3 n.), and Frontinus is contracted and unreliable: his account of the crossing proper (*Strat.* 1. 4. 9a) is a tissue of nonsense. It would be unwise to claim certainty on the basis of such fallible testimony.

φυλακαὶ . . . καθεστηκυῖαι These guard points are of course distinct from the larger forces sent to more distant points on the river (see above, 9. 1 n.). They were small groups stationed along the bank to give the impression of constant movement, particularly during the night. There was activity of some sort over a long stretch of the river; and a continuous string of fires provided a backdrop for the manœuvres by Alexander's main force, which moved bafflingly to and fro. The cordon would have extended beyond the crossing-point and the Indians' attention would have been diverted in both directions. That might help explain the puzzling variation in the sources which is noted above; Alexander crossed the river downstream

from his camp but upstream from the other extremity of his line of pickets.

3. φανερώς ... παρεσκευάζετο The majority of the fleet which had sailed openly on the Hydaspes (see above, 9. 3) was presumably on show at the base camp (cf. *Metz Epit.* 59). There was no shortage of vessels when Craterus finally made his crossing (see below, 18. 1).

καὶ Κρατερὸς ὑπελέλειπτο His role in the battle is confirmed by *Metz Epit.* 59–60, and it would seem that the vulgate tradition agreed in general outline with Arrian (it is most unlikely that there is a unique excerpt from Ptolemy in this portion of the *Epitome*). Some alleged contradictions do not in fact exist. Both Curtius (8. 13. 20–1) and *Metz Epit.* 58 claim that a certain Attalus masqueraded as the king, displaying himself before the royal tent in regal attire. This Attalus is not identified and there is no reason to infer (as is usually done: cf. Anspach 43 n. 131; Berve no. 181; see, however, Heckel 181) that he was the son of Andromenes, who was active outside the base camp (see below, 12. 1 n.). Attalus was a common enough name and it is likely enough that the king's double had little distinction other than his physical similarity. Curtius also implies (8. 13. 27) that Ptolemy was left at the base camp in charge of the forces there. Given the insistence of the *Metz Epitome* that Craterus had that role, it is unlikely that the error stems from Curtius' source. Most probably it arises from Curtius' own confusion; he may well have assumed that Ptolemy's diversionary forces (see above, 10. 3 n.) were the only troops active on the west bank and inferred that he had overall command.

τὴν τε αὐτοῦ κτλ. The forces with Craterus are almost as numerous as those with Alexander himself (see below, 12. 2). Apart from the 5,000 local auxiliaries (see above, 8. 5) he had two phalanx battalions, a single hipparchy, and horsemen from Parapamisadae and Arachosia. The latter were presumably recruited in the early summer of 327, after Alexander recrossed the Hindu Kush (see above, 4. 22. 3 with note), and served alongside the Bactrian and Sogdian horse which he took with him from the north. Ultimately cavalry was also recruited from the central Iranian satrapies: Drangiana, Arcia, and Parthyaea (see below, 7. 6. 3). They may, as is usually assumed, have been late arrivals, recruited after Alexander's return to the west, but equally they could have been brought by their satraps, Stasanor and Phrataphernes, when they reported to the king early in 327 (see above, 4. 7. 1, 18. 1 with notes). If they were present at the Hydaspes, they cannot have served under Alexander or Craterus, but that does not exclude their acting with the other diversionary forces along the river. At least one third of the army must have been elsewhere at the time of the battle (see below).

4. μέρος δέ τι ὑπολείφθη This is in fact what happened (15. 4);

Craterus was held at bay until the battle was over and the general flight had begun (18. 1).

The transition to direct speech is striking and paralleled at 5. 23. 7, a demonstrable excerpt from Ptolemy (*FGrH* 138 F 35). This led Jacoby to the conclusion that Ptolemy took scrupulous care to record the *ipsissima verba* of Alexander (*FGrH* ii D 499). His opinion has often been endorsed (e.g. Strasburger 43; Kornemann 72 n. 122; Pearson, *LHA* 204; Hammond, *Sources* 254-5; cf. Tonnet i 193), but it shows the most cavalier disregard of Arrian's stylistic independence of his sources. The reproduction of orders in direct speech is a familiar rhetorical device, used in a similar context by Curtius (8. 14. 15-16; see below, 16. 3 with note). It is particularly frequent in Xenophon, who also switches from indirect to direct speech to add dramatic spice (*Hell.* 2. 1. 25; 3. 5. 16; *Anab.* 2. 1. 9; 4. 1. 27). In all probability the transition to direct speech is a conscious imitation by Arrian. It places particular emphasis on the alternative which actually eventuated and underscores Alexander's forethought, which for Arrian was perhaps his most admirable strategic talent (7. 28. 2; cf. 2. 10. 3; 4. 2. 5; 5. 23. 5).

12. 1. Μελέαγρος τε . . . Γοργίας On the face of it nothing could be clearer. The mercenary troops, both infantry and cavalry, were divided between three commanders and instructed to cross the river in detachments when the battle had begun. Now, all three commanders are elsewhere attested in charge of Macedonian phalanx battalions (cf. 4. 22. 7, 24. 1), and there is no record of their regular troops in the detailed account of Alexander's dispositions. Accordingly there has been a persistent tendency to assume that the battalions *were* present with their commanders and associated with the mercenary cavalry (Droysen i² 2. 130; Anspach 45-6; Berve ii 93; Tarn ii 190-1; Schachermeyr² 424; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 98). Tarn indeed developed the idea and assumed that these troops were transported across the river and joined Alexander before the battle proper, so that the force which engaged Porus was much larger than that which initially made the crossing with Alexander. The theory has proved seductive (cf. Hamilton, *JHS* 76 (1956) 26-7; Hammond, *KCS*² 211; proper scepticism is voiced by Schachermeyr), but it flies in the face of the command reported by Arrian: they were to cross once the battle was in progress, not filter across beforehand. Tarn accordingly had to excise the last phrase (*ὅποτε . . . ἴδοιεν*) as a confusion in Arrian or Aristobulus. But the phrase is *not* a flat contradiction of *κατὰ μέρος*, implying that all were to cross at a given moment. How could they? Meleager and his fellow officers hardly had the naval capacity to transport their forces across the river *en masse*. Whatever the situation on the far bank, they would

necessarily cross with their troops piecemeal (κατὰ μέρος), the numbers in each group determined by the ships and skin rafts at their disposal. I assume that they did cross, as they were instructed, at much the same time as Craterus (see below, 18. 1 n.) and that, as Arrian repeatedly implies, the battle was fought exclusively with the forces Alexander had with him at the crossing.

The more substantial question is whether the phalanx commanders retained their *taxeis* at the Hydaspes. Arrian may indeed have omitted to record their presence, but there is no compelling reason to make such an inference. The record of troop units at the Hydaspes is very incomplete and the larger part of the army is not accounted for (see below). If, as seems incontestable, Alexander had divided his army at the outset of the spring campaign (see above, 9. 1 n.), it is reasonable that some of the phalanx battalions served away from base. Nor were the commanders inseparable from their *taxeis*. Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias had been detached in the summer of 328 and assigned to garrison duty in Bactria (see above, 4. 16. 1 with note), and, as the course of the battle was to show, Coenus could be transferred from the command of his battalion to head the cavalry on the left (see below, 16. 3 n.). It is safest to take Arrian at face value: the force between the base camp and the crossing point comprised mercenaries, who were temporarily assigned to the three phalanx commanders.

2. αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιλεξάμενος κτλ. As Arrian implies, Alexander's crossing force was select and small. At 14. 1 he gives precise figures: infantry a little under 6,000 and around 5,000 cavalry. The latter figure is credible enough, if a little on the small side, but it is generally supposed that the infantry fell far short of its paper strength, which Tarn (ii 193) estimates at 10,000 (cf. Hamilton, *JHS* 76 (1956) 26; Fuller 187; Green 393; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 98). Yet it is difficult to argue away Arrian's infantry figure, which he repeats (at 18. 3) and which clearly stood in his source. The assumption which is implicitly made is that Alexander embarked all the troops he took with him from his base camp. That is surely unwarranted. As Arrian himself states, he took as many as his transports would hold (see below, 12. 4). Even 11,000 men would have required a prodigious number of vessels and floats (see the comparative figures in Fuller 189-90) and many members of the striking force must have been left on the west bank of the Hydaspes. It should be no surprise that the numbers which Alexander deployed on the east bank were less than the nominal strengths of the units involved.

The enumeration of forces is not complete. On Arrian's own record only four Companion hipparchies out of a minimum of eight (see above, 4. 24. 1 n.) are mentioned and only four out of seven

phalanx battalions. Arrian may not have named all units that were involved (see above, 4. 22. 7 with note); but it is unlikely that he omitted contingents of Macedonian troops, and the figures for Alexander's force after the crossing give no scope for omission. The most likely hypothesis is that there is at least one major army division unaccounted for (see above, 9. 1 n.).

Δάας τοὺς ἵπποτοξότας The Dahae had formally surrendered to Alexander in winter 328/7 (Curt. 8. 4. 1-6; *Metz Epit.* 23; see above, 4. 17. 7 n.), and they presumably supplied a contingent before Alexander left Bactria (Berve i 151). It is unlikely that they were the only horse archers. The Massagetae (who are surely included among the Scyths) must have supplied similarly equipped troops. At least the entire Sacan contingent at Gaugamela comprised horse archers (above, 3. 8. 3); and Curtius (8. 14. 5) groups together *Scythae et Dahae* in exactly the position where Arrian (13. 4, 15. 1) locates the *hippotoxotai*. The figure of 1,000 which Arrian gives as the strength of the horse archers (16. 4) should apply to all the Sacae, not merely the Dahae.

καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας At 13. 4 the received text adds a contingent of javelin men (*οἱ Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ οἱ ἀκοντισταί*). Roos accordingly deleted the connective and took *οἱ ἀκοντισταί* as an appositional phrase ('the Agrianians, namely the javelin men'), as at 1. 14. 1 (see also 4. 25. 6, 30. 6 with notes). That is possible, but it is perhaps more likely that Arrian failed to include a small group of javelin men who were associated with the Agrianians (so Anspach 48 n. 131; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 485; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 100). They are blended in with the Agrianians in the initial list but separated from them after the crossing. Curtius (8. 14. 24) associates the Agrianians with a group of Thracians. The latter were more likely to be javelin men (Plut. *Alc.* 37. 3; cf. Berve i 136); they are not attested as archers. But the numbers must have been negligible, a very small fraction of the 6,000 infantry who successfully crossed the Hydaspes.

πολύ τι ἀπέχων This diversion must have prolonged the march to the crossing-point, which may have taken longer than the single day which is usually assumed.

3. ἐπληροῦντο τῆς νυκτός 'were being filled by night'. These operations must have begun some time before the crossing proper. The ships were all reassembled in readiness for embarkation, and it is most unlikely that the rafts were stitched together at the last moment, especially given that the materials had long (*ἐκ πολλοῦ*) been available. The imperfects should therefore be given their full force.

ὕδωρ τε ἐξ οὐρανοῦ See below, 13. 3. The storm is attested in all traditions, most vividly in the letter quoted by Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 4), which has it start after the main crossing and fancifully reports

casualties from lightning. Curtius (8. 13. 23) agrees that it had subsided before the crossing and that its sound and fury effectively obscured Alexander's preparations.

τῷ κτύπῳ . . . ἀντιπαταγούντων The passage is clearly modelled on Thucydides' description of the winter break-out from Plataea (Thuc. 3. 22. 1: *ψόφῳ δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσιέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγούντος τοῦ ἀνέμου*). For a similar echo see Dio 48. 48. 4 (and possibly Arr. *Parth.* F 62).

4. τῶν διφθερῶν ἐπιβάσα The horses themselves may have swum behind the rafts, as did Hannibal's at the crossing of the Rhône (Polyb. 3. 43. 4; Livy 21. 27. 9). Hammond (*KCS*² 210) is probably correct to infer that the rafts were towed by oared vessels, not left to the vagaries of the current.

13. 1. Πτολεμαῖος . . . Σέλευκος A coruscating list of future dynasts, whose collective destiny was committed to a single triaconter. Of these Lysimachus and Seleucus are mentioned for the first time in Arrian, with no hint as to how they reached their exalted status. The careers of both men are veiled in mystery. Lysimachus had been a Bodyguard since at least the time of Cleitus' murder (see above, 4. 8. 7 n.; Heckel 274, cf. *Historia* 27 (1978) 224-8, and *Klio* 64 (1982) 373-81, argues that his appointment dates back to Philip's reign). He was certainly highly connected: a noble from Pella (*Ind.* 18. 3) himself, he had one brother in the close entourage of the king (Curt. 8. 2. 35-6; Berve no. 774), and another, Alcimachus, proclaimed democracy in Asia Minor (see above, 1. 18. 1-2 with notes). Lysimachus, as we should expect, is attested close to the king during the hunt at Bazaira in the late summer of 328 (Curt. 8. 1. 14; see above, 4. 13. 2 n.), but there is no record of his previous activities, which were presumably distinguished.

Seleucus is even more obscure. He does not appear in the celebrated list of trierarchs at the Hydaspes (nor does any infantry commander other than Attalus, son of Andromenes), and apart from his domicile (Europus) and his parents (Antiochus and Laodice) nothing is reported of his origins (cf. J. D. Grainger, *Seleukos Nikator* (London 1990) 1-7; Heckel 254). The fact that he is a Companion proves that they were reputable, and Justin (15. 4. 3) is probably correct that Antiochus was one of Philip's most brilliant commanders. How or when Seleucus achieved his hypaspist command is beyond speculation, but it was a post which brought him constant exposure to danger in immediate proximity to the king. His later reference to his services under Alexander (Diod. 19. 55. 3) will have been perfectly justified, and his prominence is amply proved by the status of the bride he received at Susa (see below, 7. 4. 6). It is unfortunate that the vast majority of Arrian's references to the

hypaspists have nothing about their commanders. Otherwise Berve's simplistic verdict ('unter Al. durch nichts hervorragend') might have read very differently. Ptolemy, as always, had little interest in chronicling the successes of a rival dynast. The absence of record cannot be due to Arrian, who had a high opinion of Seleucus (see below, 7. 22. 5) and properly noted his role at the Hydaspes.

The headquarters group included Perdikkas, who did not accompany his hipparchy in the crossing, but surprisingly Hephaestion is not mentioned, despite the fact that he was a Bodyguard. Curtius (8. 14. 14) attests his presence in the battle, and, if that is correct, we must assume that he crossed the Hydaspes independently (Berve ii 172) of Alexander, perhaps at the head of the cavalry. Alternatively Curtius may be wrong and Hephaestion had been detached from his hipparchy to serve elsewhere (Droysen i* 2. 132 n. 1).

καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν οἱ ἡμίσεες As it stands, this is an absurdity. Half the *entire* hypaspist corps would amount to at least 1,500 men, who could never have been accommodated on a single triaconter. There may, as Brunt suggests, be some confusion by Arrian, but he was certainly not contracting a report of the boats returning for a second load, having transported half the contingent. Such an operation would have prolonged the crossing intolerably. It is more likely that his source was referring not to the whole body of hypaspists but to the hypaspists under Seleucus' direct command, who (it seems) formed an élite group within the *agema* (see below, 13. 4). If so, half that group was accommodated in the flagship, which may have been particularly commodious, and the rest carried on other smaller triaconters.

ἤλαυνον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν Πῶρον Porus would have received news of the crossing within two hours. If Arrian's account is correct, it disposes of the vulgate story that Porus first believed that reinforcements from Abisares were under way (Curt. 8. 14. 1; cf. Diod. 87. 2). It was clear that the enemy had crossed the river in strength, but it remained to be seen whether it was the main striking force. Hence the dispatch of a fast-moving cavalry force to delay its advance and report more fully on its composition.

2. ξυνέταττε τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐκβαίνοντας Alexander had contingency plans to cope with an immediate attack. His cavalry disembarked ready for action and combined with the élite of the hypaspists. They then moved ahead, prepared to engage and hold at a distance any enemy forces while the main body of infantry made its landing.

καὶ αὐτὴν μὲν μεγάλην 'and it too was large' (Brunt). Arrian's source here stressed that both islands (the observed and the unobserved) were of considerable dimensions. The first was clearly the larger (cf. Curt. 8. 13. 17: *amplior ceteris*), but the second was large enough to escape detection from the west bank. Yet it could not

compare with the first in size. The letter cited by Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 3-4) describes it as 'an island of no great size', and Aristobulus apparently termed it the small island, as opposed to the large island which screened the crossing (see below, 14. 3 n.). There is no necessary contradiction, but Arrian has not explained the nuances of his sources. What seems clear is that this passage, which emphasizes the comparative largeness of the second island, cannot derive from Aristobulus, who regarded it as comparatively small.

3. καὶ ἅμα ηὐξήκει κτλ. 'Alexander's letter' (Plut. *Al.* 60. 5) makes even more of the difficulties presented by this third arm of the river, claiming that it had become the principal channel. On the other hand the episode is not even mentioned by Curtius, who describes only the ship-borne crossing of the Hydaspes. Curtius' silence may well be fortuitous, but Arrian's account of this second crossing cannot be literally correct. If, as he states, there was a single ford, barely passable, the crossing will have taken an inordinately long time. The army would have contracted into a single column, the cavalry in single file or (at most) two abreast, and the far bank would rapidly have been churned into a morass (cf. Lane Fox 356). That made for very slow progress. Given a column of 5,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry (14. 1 below), one would have to reckon with a line of cavalry the equivalent of eleven km. long (cf. Engels 132), followed by a line of foot more closely compacted but still occupying a length of more than two km. Such a column, moving across the river at a rate of two km. an hour or less, would have required the entire day for the crossing, in which case the late fiction of a battle at the ford (below, 14. 4) would be not only possible but likely. Indeed a full night would need to elapse between the crossing and the battle, a pause which would make nonsense of all accounts of the campaign.

The rest of Arrian's narrative, particularly that based upon Ptolemy, presupposes a relatively short interval between the initial passage of the Hydaspes and the first engagement with Porus' son. Alexander made his ship-borne crossing, landed his troops, forded the second passage, and advanced some distance beyond it (see below, 14. 6 n.), all in the time it took for Porus to receive news of the crossing and send his son with a moderate force of cavalry and chariots to investigate. The clash cannot have come later than midday, some six hours after dawn, for Alexander still had to complete his march to the battlefield and win his battle before nightfall (cf. Plut. *Al.* 60. 11). If this chronology is accepted, then the second crossing cannot have been achieved by way of a single ford. There must have been several crossing-points, and the channel cannot have been running in a single, torrential spate. If the troops did sink to their chests, it can only have been at a single, particularly

deep trough. As so often, the difficulties are deliberately exaggerated. The stream was represented as virtually impassable, forded only by divine providence (cf. 3. 3. 4, 6. 26. 4 with notes). This scenario was improved by Aristobulus (see below, 14. 3), but the present passage cannot derive from him, as it depicts Alexander crossing from a large island and encountering no opposition. Rather it seems the work of Ptolemy, who presumably made the most of the minor difficulties his column encountered during the crossing and omitted to mention the army groups which crossed at other points.

ὕπὲρ τοὺς μαστοὺς So Plut. *Al.* 60. 7 (ἄχρι μαστῶν). The coincidence of detail in what is clearly an encomiastic exaggeration suggests that one account is based upon the other. Most probably it is 'Alexander's letter' which drew upon Ptolemy among other sources (see below, 14. 1, 15. 2 with notes).

4. τὸ τε ἄγημα κτλ. This account of Alexander's dispositions is seriously defective, and it is hardly possible that the text is sound. In the first place Arrian's account of the cavalry line (see note below) only deals with the right wing and the advance screen of horse archers. There is no record of the left and no mention of the Bactrian cavalry or of the two Companion hipparchies other than the select riders assigned to the right wing. Next Arrian's syntax is tolerable but somewhat awkward and atypical of his usage: ἐπιλεξάμενος has to be taken as an otiose pendant participle ('he led to the right the *agema* of the cavalry and the best men of the other hipparchies, selecting them') and the partitive genitive is somewhat harsh (one might expect ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἵππαρχιῶν, as at 4. 28. 8: ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς κουφοτάτους). The omission and the linguistic awkwardness together suggest a lacuna in the text, in all probability a hiatus after τῶν ἵππαρχιῶν, in which Arrian gave details of the frontal arrangement of the cavalry, including the composition of the left wing.

The arrangement of the foot is equally problematic, and Tarn (ii 191-2) argued for a deep-seated corruption, again on grounds of language and content. What is undeniable is that there is no reference to the two phalanx battalions which Alexander had with him at the crossing (above, 12. 2) and which can hardly have been left behind *in toto* on the west bank. Other grammatical points are less telling. ἐχομένους δὲ τούτων should perhaps strictly be in the singular (as at 3. 11. 9), but the looseness is exactly paralleled at 2. 8. 3 (τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις). In both cases Arrian refers to the men in the unit rather than the unit itself. The absence of the foot battalions, however, is peculiar, especially when one compares the considerable and intricate detail given for the deployment of the hypaspists. Instead of the usual division between *agema* and hypaspists in general we have a triple division: 'royal hypaspists' under

Seleucus, the *agema*, and the other hypaspists. There are various possibilities:

(i) The 'royal hypaspists' are a headquarters group, an élite within the *agema* which invariably protected the king when he was on foot (cf. Curt. 8. 2. 35). There is no other evidence for such an élite (except perhaps 7. 7. 1, where the hypaspists are listed before the *agema* and possibly denote a select group), but our evidence for the internal structure of the hypaspists is so limited that the argument from silence can have little value. The traditional view (cf. Berve i 122-4) that there was an élite guard within the guard cannot be refuted, and the difficulty at 13. 1 is best resolved if the number of men under Seleucus' command was relatively small. If the triple division of the hypaspists is accepted, then there is a second lacuna in the received text (after *ὑπασπιστάς* or conceivably *ἑνέβαινον*) in which the deployment of the phalanx battalions was described.

(ii) Hammond (*Historia* 40 (1991) 396-417, esp. 405, 413) has recently argued that the 'royal hypaspists' were distinct from the '*agema* of the Macedonians': there were *two* infantry *agemata* (see above, 1. 8. 3 n.), one from the hypaspists and the other the corps of court guards, which he believes distinct from the hypaspists (see above, 4. 8. 8 n.). This seems an intolerably clumsy arrangement, which breaks down irretrievably when one considers the detailed battle order at Gaugamela. There Arrian (3. 11. 9) places the hypaspist *agema* with the rest of the corps of hypaspists and has no reference to the other *agema*. For Hammond (416-17), who believes that his non-hypaspist *agema* was identical to the Silver Shields, this second *agema* was mentioned by Diodorus (57. 1-2) and Curtius (4. 13. 26). But then the hypaspists proper are omitted from the line of battle in Curtius and Diodorus (as the court guards are in Arrian), and the non-hypaspist *agema* is placed under the command of the hypaspist commander Nicanor. I fear this is a tissue of sophistry, designed to evade the simple and traditional assumption that Arrian's hypaspists *were* the Silver Shields of Diodorus and Curtius (see Atkinson 421). There is no reason to posit a second *agema*, and the *agema* of Macedonians can only be the *agema* of hypaspists.

(iii) The 'royal hypaspists' are identical to the totality of the hypaspists (as at 1. 8. 4 and 4. 24. 2; 3. 13. 6 may be different). This was Tarn's hypothesis, which has been generally accepted (cf. R. D. Milns, *Historia* 20 (1971) 189); but it required the postulation of a very complex corruption, which Tarn confessed himself at a loss to explain. If emendation is required, the most economical solution (suggested above, vol. i 83) is to delete *ὑπασπιστάς* (read *ἐχομένους δὲ τούτων τοὺς ἄλλους*), assuming that the word is an intrusive gloss (see above, 1. 14. 2, 2. 8. 9, 3. 11. 8 with notes). In that case *τοὺς*

ἄλλους must mean 'the rest of the foot', i.e. the two missing phalanx battalions.

The choice between (i) and (iii) is difficult. The latter gives the more economical explanation, but the language is harsh and elliptical. It is perhaps preferable to avoid emendation and accept that three groups of hypaspists are at issue. The term 'ῥῥῖαι hypaspists', like 'Companions' or 'Bodyguards', could denote a smaller or larger group—the hypaspists as a whole or that very small division of the *agema* charged with the protection of the king, which Seleucus commanded and to which Peucestas belonged (see above, I. 11. 8 n.).

ἐπέταξε τῷ ἵππῳ At 14. 1 Alexander immediately takes his cavalry ahead of the infantry. As Arrian states, the king had drawn up his army in anticipation of the advance (οὕτως ἐκτάξας) and from the outset the infantry was marshalled *behind* the cavalry. ἐπέταξε here must mean 'drew up after' (for this sense compare 3. 12. 1 with the note to I. 14. 1), and it balances προέταξε in the previous sentence. Horse archers came in front of the cavalry line, infantry behind. All translators, however, suppose that Alexander placed his foot troops *alongside* the cavalry. In that case Alexander immediately and inexplicably breaks the extended line he had so carefully marshalled (cf. 14. 1). So most commentators (e.g. Fuller 191, Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 99–100) assume without comment. Schachermeyr² (425 n. 518) at least saw the problem and supposed that Alexander formed an extended battle line at the news of the approach of Porus' son and sent ahead his cavalry once he became aware of the small size of the enemy force. That presupposes a misunderstanding in Arrian, who moves directly from the marshalling of the army (13. 4) to the advance (14. 1) without any indication that the tactical situation had changed. The defect is in Arrian's text, not his narrative (see note above). Thanks to the lacuna most of the cavalry dispositions are lost and the text reads superficially as though there was a single line of troops—in flat contradiction of what immediately follows.

ὥς ἐκάστοις . . . ξυνέβαινον 'as their individual commands happened to fall at that moment' (so Savinel). The reference cannot be to rotating hegemony, the regular changing of the position of honour (as at I. 14. 6), as is assumed by Tarn (ii 192) and embedded in the standard translations (Chinnock and both Loeb editions render ἡγεμονία as 'precedence'). What is at issue (as at I. 28. 3) is the order of contingents relative to each other, and the language used (ξυνέβαινον) suggests an element of chance. The troops had just crossed the Hydaspes and Alexander kept the units of the line in the order in which they had made the crossing. Time was short, and it was best to retain the haphazard formation which was formed at the landing rather than waste precious moments

reorganizing the order of units in the phalanx. This explanation applies either to the hypaspists or the phalanx battalions: Alexander kept the pentakosiarchies (hypaspists) or the *lochoi* (phalangites) as they were after the crossing and did not reorganize them into their more orthodox groupings in chiliarchies and *taxeis*.

κατὰ δὲ τὰ ἄκρα 'at the extremities' (i.e. the wings) 'of the phalanx'. The usage recurs at *Ecl.* 15. It is yet another borrowing from Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 7. 5. 4: *συνῆψαν τὰ ἄκρα*). The fact that it later recurs in Diodorus (19. 17. 6, 28. 3, etc.) and was probably used by Hieronymus does not entail that it also occurred in Ptolemy, to be slavishly copied by Arrian (as argued by Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 95, 100 n. 47).

[καί] οἱ ἀκοντισταί See above, 12. 2 note.

14. 1. τὸν μὲν πεζόν . . . ἔπρεσθαι 'Alexander's letter' as reproduced by Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 7) mentions the division of forces and the rapid advance of the cavalry (for twenty stades) but the calculations are presented rather differently: Alexander foresees the possibility of a limited sortie by the Indian cavalry alone and does not envisage a general flight. Even more than Arrian's sources (see above, 11. 4 n.) the letter emphasizes Alexander's prescience (Bauer (above, p. 262) 82-4) and seems an elaboration upon extant sources (cf. J. R. Hamilton, *PACA* 4 (1961) 17). But the general picture of the separation of cavalry and infantry is attested in Curtius (8. 14. 1) and is undoubtedly an agreed and authentic fact.

τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων The figure is repeated at 18. 2, where Arrian lists casualties in the battle. There he qualifies the statement, referring to the 6,000 'in the first assault'. That can only refer to the crucial battle, the only stage at which infantry were lost (see note ad loc.), and the losses suffered in the battle are contrasted with the (unrecorded) casualties inflicted during the pursuit. In that case the numbers are consistent: 6,000 infantry crossed with Alexander and 6,000 fought in the battle against Porus. There is no ground for emendation (Anspach's <δισμυρίων> ἑξακισχιλίων is preposterous) or for the assumption (see above, 12. 1 n.) that the crossing force was swelled by additional phalanx units before the decisive battle.

Ταύρωνι (Berve no. 741; Heckel 338) The name is very rare (mostly attested in Egypt in the Roman period (e.g. *SB* xvi 12885; *PAberd.* 86. 11; *OBodl. passim*); see also *SEG* i 214 (Açarnania), xxxii 565 (Thessaly)), and there can be little doubt that the toxarch is identical with Tauron, son of Machatas, who was honoured with *proxenia* at Eretria along with the royal secretary Myllenas (*IG* xii (9) 197; see above, 4. 29. 1 n.). He was clearly a Macedonian of distinction, possibly (but not necessarily) the brother of Harpalus and Philippus the satrap of northern India (above, 8. 3 n.). He is

attested in charge of Agrianians and mercenaries late in 331 (Curt. 5. 3. 6-10; see above, 3. 17. 2 n.), and it is possible that at the Hydaspes he had command of all the light infantry, not merely the archers.

The specific instructions to the archers are somewhat peculiar. They had been placed on the flanks of the phalanx (13. 4), but now they apparently break formation to follow on the heels of the cavalry. Arrian may have changed sources at 14. 1 and failed to resolve a minor variant. Alternatively Tauron could have taken one segment of the archers ahead to support the cavalry, leaving the remainder with the infantry. Both columns presumably needed their support.

2. ὥς πλείονα . . . τὸ ἔργον 'so that the slaughter in the retreat would be the greater and leave little work remaining for him'. The expression is difficult. As Abicht observed, one cannot find a parallel for the transitive meaning of ὑπολείπεσθαι. It is naturally taken as a passive with τὸ ἔργον; and Roos suggested turning the first phrase into a genitive absolute (πλείονος . . . τοῦ φόνου γενομένου). That makes the end of the sentence parallel to 4. 29. 5 (ὥς . . . οὐ χαλεπὸν ἐτι ἐσόμενον αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον) but it is hard to explain the corruption. For all its harshness the received text should probably be retained.

14. 3-15. 2. *The Preliminary Engagement with Porus' Son*

On this episode the sources were divergent. It was agreed that there was a preliminary engagement near the crossing-point, in which Alexander easily defeated a comparatively small force of chariots and cavalry led by a relative of Porus. The disagreement focused on two points: the size of the Indian force and the place of the engagement. There was a tendency to stage the encounter at the actual crossing, a clear touch of drama, adding an additional element of tension to the highly charged story of the second passage of the river. On the other hand the size of the Indian force differs sharply. Aristobulus mentioned only sixty chariots, and emphasized the potential danger to Alexander. The letter of Alexander gave 1,000 cavalry in addition to the sixty chariots (Plut. *Al.* 60. 8), Ptolemy doubled the figure, and Curtius (8. 14. 2) provides the maximum: 100 chariots and 4,000 cavalry. For once the disagreement provokes Arrian into a discussion of probabilities (the criticism of Aristobulus cannot be Ptolemy's, as is often assumed: see below, 14. 5 n.), concentrating on the implausibility of Porus' sending a force of chariots alone, too large and cumbersome for reconnaissance but too small to engage with the enemy. It is (for him) an incontrovertible argument and vindicates his preference for Ptolemy. But the criticism hinges on a single point, the size of the force. Arrian does not

consider the question of where the engagement took place. He implicitly accepts Ptolemy's variant tradition, assuming that his more credible statement of the size of the Indian force guaranteed the veracity of the rest of his account.

The truth of the matter is beyond disentanglement. Porus obviously did send a cavalry force large enough to harass the advance of the army which his scouts had reported crossing and with the mobility to report rapidly on its composition—was it the main striking force or was the army that was visible with Craterus the principal assault group? Given those considerations, all figures in the sources (except Aristobulus') are possibilities, and the actual number of cavalry sent by Porus may never have been known. They were routed before an accurate count could be made.

On the other hand the chariots, which were bogged in the battle or overhauled in pursuit (15. 2), would have been enumerated at leisure, and it is perturbing to find a radical disagreement on a matter of simple record. Ptolemy could well have inflated the figure, but it is unlikely that there is any further elaboration of the facts. He participated in the engagement and should have known where it took place; and what Arrian preserves of his account has no hint of difficulties. The Indians engage with the horse archers, give way when they see the size of Alexander's cavalry, and break in flight when he charges. It seems an uncontroversial and sober account, and Arrian was right to follow it. On the engagement see further Breloer 42-50, Kornemann 11-14, Fuller 190-1, Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 100-1.

3. Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ λέγει Aristobulus represented the Indian forces arriving before any of the Macedonians had completed the final crossing, so that the ford might have been successfully defended against them. It is clear that he minimized the size of the contingent with Porus' son, suggesting that the difficulties of fording the swollen Hydaspes were such that 300 or so Indians might have achieved a second Thermopylae. He cannot have been unaware of the tradition that the sixty chariots were supported by a substantial body of cavalry but chose to ignore it. That heightened the drama of the moment: Alexander's triumphal progress might have been checked had the Indians shown more heroism. It is also clear that Aristobulus made the most of the difficulties of the crossing and the achievement of the army in surmounting them. His account of the battle in general must have been very highly coloured. Lucian's story (*hist. conscr.* 12 = *FGrH* 139 T 4) that he described (and read to Alexander) a single combat between the kings is no doubt a happy invention, but it will have been invention based on the known traits of Aristobulus' work.

τὸν Πώρου παῖδα There is some doubt as to the identity of the Indian leader. Arrian, whatever source he uses, refers consistently to the son of Porus. Curtius (8. 14. 2) claims that the advance force was led by a brother of Porus, named *Hages*. Since Anspach (51 n. 145) it has become conventional to emend the name to *Spilaces* and identify him as the nomarch of that name, who is said to have fallen in the battle (see below, 18. 3 n.). That is a plausible (though unproven) hypothesis, but it does not justify the further assumption (cf. Berve ii 342, 358 no. 716, following Anspach) that 'Spitaces' shared the command with Porus' son. Most probably there was real uncertainty in the tradition. The advance force was known to have been commanded by a relative of Porus, one of many who fell in the battle, but there was no unanimity over his identity.

σὺν ἄρμασιν These Indian war chariots, which accommodated six warriors, are well described by Curtius (8. 14. 5). Their use was immemorially old and goes back to Vedic times (cf. S. D. Singh, *Ancient Indian Warfare* (Leiden 1965) 23-52).

πρὶν τὸ ὕστερον . . . Ἀλέξανδρον 'before Alexander made his later crossing from the small island'. It is clear that it is the second crossing which is at issue (τὸ ὕστερον). There is no need to 'correct' *μικρᾶς* to *μακρᾶς*, as was advocated by Schmieder and by many commentators since. That would imply that the second island was larger than the first, which it was not (see above, 13. 2 n.). Aristobulus was comparing the two islands and maintained (correctly) that the second was the smaller.

4. οἱ δὲ καὶ μάχην The author of the variant is not named, but the whole account is clearly fabrication, turning the actual insignificant engagement into a major battle between equipollent forces, its highlight a single combat between Alexander and the Indian leader. Jacoby (*FGrH* iiD 437) suggested that Chares of Mytilene might be responsible for the invention (he had a penchant for kings in combat (*FGrH* 125 F 4)). But we have no idea how Chares described the campaign of the Hydaspes. The romantic story in Gellius (5. 2. 4) need not be taken from him (as assumed by Jacoby, *FGrH* 125 F 18) and in any case differs from the variant in Arrian (there is no single combat and Alexander is not wounded). What we have is probably a late rhetorical fiction built up from the nucleus of Aristobulus. The fight at the ford is made to take place with dramatic consequences and becomes the climax of the entire campaign.

5. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐξήκοντα μόνον The wording is Arrian's own. It was a major achievement by Badian (*Studies* 257) to contest the conventional view that the criticism was taken directly from Ptolemy. That had been the unanimous conviction of earlier scholarship (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 506; Kornemann 12-14; Pearson, *LHA* 172-3), and it had the almost inevitable corollary that Ptolemy wrote after

Aristobulus (E. Meyer, *Klio* 21 (1927) 189). Badian's view has gained momentum in recent years (see above, vol. i 23 n. 25, to which add Breebart 36; Stadter 71, 215-16 n. 47; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 43 n. 4), but the traditional view is still found (e.g. Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 381; Wirth (in the Artemis edition) 925 n. 33). Tonnet (ii 300-1 n. 57) argues that we cannot be sure that Ptolemy avoided polemic and observes that Arrian has no objection to retailing the views of others as his own. The latter point may readily be conceded—and indeed one might lay some emphasis on *Ind.* 6. 6-8 (see above, 5. 6. 3 n.), where Arrian takes an argument from probability from Nearchus and uses it without acknowledgement as his own. But Tonnet does not address the peculiar structure of the passage, which Breebart had emphasized. Arrian isolates the figure of sixty chariots and adds a statement of probability; then he explicitly cites Ptolemy's figures for the Indian force. The logic of the passage is this: 'Ptolemy agrees on the command but gives a larger figure. Rightly so, for it is improbable that Porus sent his son with such a small contingent . . . But as a matter of fact Ptolemy alleges that Porus' son had 120 chariots and 2,000 horse.' Ptolemy is first paraphrased ('not with sixty chariots only') and then reproduced exactly. In between comes the argument from probability which confirms his figures, a portion of direct speech (Arrian never uses *εἰκός* in *oratio obliqua*: *Ind.* 6. 6 is clearly corrupt) sandwiched between the two reports from Ptolemy, which are expressed indirectly in the accusative and infinitive. The argument must be Arrian's own.

Such passages occur elsewhere, explicitly presented by Arrian as his own comment. He can adduce additional arguments from probability to buttress some statement of his source (2. 16. 6 (on Hecataeus); *Ind.* 25. 7-8 (on Nearchus)), support agnosticism (3. 3. 6; cf. 5. 1. 2 n.), or, as here, to justify the choice of one source over another (7. 14. 4-6; see further Breebart 62-6). The technique and phraseology is clearly borrowed from Herodotus (2. 27; 7. 239. 2) and from Thucydides in particular (cf. 6. 55. 1, with H. D. Westlake, *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969) 153-60), and the passage is clearly contrived as a literary device. Arrian feels that he can give one of his sources unqualified preference and follows classical precedent in doing so on grounds of internal probability (for an exact parallel see Dion. Hal. *AR* 9. 19. 3).

6. *φθάσαι δὲ περάσαντα* Arrian deliberately echoes and inverts 14. 3 (*φθάσαι ἀφικόμενον*). The language he uses to report Ptolemy implicitly controverts Aristobulus. If 'Alexander's letter' is correct (Plut. *Al.* 60. 7), the engagement took place some twenty stades from the crossing.

15. 1. *καὶ οὗτος λέγει* Arrian again signalizes agreement between

his sources (cf. 14. 5: λέγει καὶ οὗτος). The role of the horse archers was stressed in all sources, including Curtius (8. 14. 5), who agrees that the initial charge was delivered by the Sacae and Dahae (see above, 12. 2 n.). They were to do the same in the main battle (16. 4).

2. ὀξέως ἐπιπείσειν Curtius (8. 14. 5) claims that Perdiccas led a cavalry charge against the enemy right. That may be an authentic detail. It is likely enough that Perdiccas, the senior Bodyguard, commanded the left of Alexander's cavalry line (so Anspach 52), but Curtius' narrative is not beyond suspicion. He believed that the Macedonian foot took part in the battle (8. 14. 7). That may be a garbled reference to Tauron and his archers (above, 14. 1 n.), but there is clearly some confusion and Curtius' account cannot simply be grafted on to Arrian's (as is attempted by Anspach and Berve).

ἀλλὰ κατ' ἑλίας The Macedonians attack in column (see above, 4. 4. 7 n.), but probably not in wedge formation (as assumed in Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia* ii 413; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 100, cf. *Phoenix* 87 (1983) 216). The Indians at first thought that Alexander was leading his forces in extended line (ἐπὶ μετώπου) and that the narrow front indicated small numbers. When they realized that the front was in fact the head of a column and that a considerable mass (στίφος) of cavalry was approaching, they prudently opted for flight—but too late.

ἐς τετρακοσίους So 'Alexander's letter' (Plut. *Al.* 60. 8). The coincidence is another indication (see above, 13. 3 n.) that the compiler of the letter used Ptolemy as a source. If so, it is interesting that his figure for the casualties was accepted while that for the size of the force was rejected.

ὑπὸ πῆλου ἀχρεΐα Curtius (8. 14. 4–8) has a vivid, if not lurid account of the effect of the mud and rain, which his source rightly saw as an important factor in the battle (Curt. 8. 14. 19).

15. 3–7. *Porus' Dispositions for Battle*

3. ἐς τὸ καρτερώτατον Usually translated by some variant upon 'with his army in full force' (Brunt), but it is hard to see how the meaning can be extracted from the Greek. Krüger, followed by Abicht, resorted to emendation (ξὺν τῇς στρατιᾷ τῷ καρτερωτάτῳ), giving acceptable sense and an anticipation of the wording at 15. 4 (πρὸς τὸ καρτερωτάτον τε τῶν Μακεδόνων: 'against the strongest part of the Macedonian army'). But the emendation is radical and there is no identifiable cause of corruption. If the text is to stand, it can only be translated 'with great impetus' ('de vive force' Savinel), as with the parallel expression κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον (Galen 9. 219, line 12 (Kühn); cf. Hdt. 1. 212. 2; 3. 65. 6). Even so, the sense is

banal and the language harsh (the only parallel I can find is Phot. *Bibl.* 98^b1: εἰς τὸ καρτερόν κατώχυρωται). Emendation of some sort is probably required.

4. ἐξ τετρακισχιλίου ἰππέας κτλ. There is considerable variation on the size of the forces under Porus. Apart from Arrian, Diodorus (87. 2) gives the largest figures: 3,000 cavalry, 130 elephants, over 1,000 chariots, and 50,000 men. That is an estimate of the total forces available to Porus, not necessarily the actual army which faced Alexander. A smaller total, reported as present with Porus at the crossing, is given by Curtius (8. 13. 6) and *Metz Epil.* 54: 85 elephants, 300 chariots, and around 30,000 foot. On the other hand Plutarch (*Al.* 62. 2) claims that the Indians who fought with Porus amounted to 2,000 cavalry and 20,000 foot, but the context does not inspire confidence and it is clearly a minimum estimate. Arrian's figures cohere with Curtius and *Metz Épilome* in the matter of chariots and infantry, and the 4,000 cavalry corresponds to the cavalry figure given by Curtius for Porus' advance force (8. 14. 2). On the other hand his figure for the elephants seems grossly inflated (so Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 101), by far the highest estimate we have.

The reality is beyond our grasp. The one thing that is certain is that Alexander had superiority in cavalry (16. 2) and was able to envelop Porus' entire phalanx with cavalry and infantry in close formation (17. 7). From these data two conclusions emerge:

(i) Porus' cavalry was less numerous than Alexander's at the battle. The 4,000 given by Arrian can be taken as an absolute maximum, including the cavalry sent with Porus' son (Curtius erroneously implied that all the cavalry went with the advance force).

(ii) The Macedonian phalanx, no more than 6,000 strong (above, 12. 2, 14. 1 nn.), cannot have occupied a frontage wider than 700 m., if it was arranged eight deep with files a metre apart (cf. Devine 101). That would allow for less than fifty elephants in the Indian line, if it was comparable in length to the Macedonian array (see below, 15. 5 n.). This is a very rough estimate, but it does rule out Arrian's figure for the elephants as a blatant exaggeration. It also excludes the infantry figure of 30,000. Even if the Indian foot was massed in depth, it is virtually impossible that it was five times more numerous than the Macedonian phalanx and still occupied the same frontage.

5. τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐπὶ μετώπου The line of elephants is described in all sources: its visual effect not unlike that of a city wall, the elephants appearing like towers against a curtain wall of infantry (Diod. 87. 5; Curt. 8. 14. 13; Polyæn. 4. 3. 22; see below, 17. 2). According to Arrian they stood out slightly from the infantry line

and were spaced at intervals no less than 100 feet apart. Polyaeus gives a more credible variant of fifty feet, but even this can hardly be viewed as reliable. The Macedonians were not in a position to take accurate measurements of the spaces between the elephants, and the figures we have are clearly guesses based on highly coloured reminiscences of the engagement.

6. πρὸς τῶν ὀπλιτῶν προσβαλλόντων 'Arrian here envisages Porus' infantry attacking, which never in fact took place. The Indian strategy was entirely defensive, to repel Macedonian assaults, and Porus can never have been confident that his elephant line would not be directly attacked by the enemy foot. Ptolemy did not merely inflate the Indian numbers. He also gave Porus an offensive strategy to match the fictitious army size. The threat to Alexander was deliberately exaggerated to enhance the glory of the ultimate victory.

7. ὅσον . . . τοὺς λόχους 'at a distance which allowed their companies to be intruded slightly into the intervals'. The Indian infantry formed a line with the rear of the elephants: the front of the beasts projected outwards. They did not stand out separate from the infantry but were partly merged into the phalanx. Compare the dispositions of both armies at Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 28. 2, 29. 6; cf. 40. 1).

τὰ ἄρματα The chariots are nowhere mentioned in the subsequent battle. Diodorus (88. 1) is probably correct that they were neutralized by the Macedonian cavalry in the first stage of the battle. Given the slippery conditions (even on the sandy terrain Porus had chosen) they can have had very little effect (Curt. 8. 14. 19 (*humo lubrica*); cf. 4-8). Arrian later (18. 2) confirms that they were all destroyed.

16. 1-18. 3. *The Battle Proper*

16. 1. ἀνέπαυε τοὺς πεζοὺς Alexander had ample time to organize his battle line. Although he was obviously within sight, the Indian army did not advance to exploit the momentary confusion on the Macedonian side. Porus would not disrupt the defensive line he had constructed, and allowed the enemy to advance refreshed and in good order. His strategy was not necessarily 'supine' (Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 101). The Indian troops may not have been well enough trained to advance *en masse* with their line unbroken. His cavalry was no challenge to the Macedonians, and, if he advanced his infantry line, he risked creating the gaps that his defensive formation was designed to avoid.

3. Κοῖνον δὲ πέμπει κτλ. A *locus conclamatus*, perhaps the most vexed passage in the entire battle narrative. There are two complexes

of problems, centring upon the nature of Coenus' command and the interpretation of the orders he received.

(i) *Coenus' command*. Curtius (8. 14. 15) also has Coenus in charge of the Macedonian left. He was certainly separated from his infantry *taxis*, which formed part of the phalanx in the centre. But here (and nowhere else) he is given command of a hipparchy, which is described as 'his own' like that of Craterus (11. 4) and Perdiccas (22. 6), while the infantry *taxis* still bore his name and continued under his command after the battle (below, 21. 1). What is more, the hipparchy comes out of nowhere. There is no record of it in Arrian's detailed list of the units in Alexander's battle group. Various solutions have been suggested.

(a) Berve (i 109–10) argued that Coenus did in fact have two commands, a *taxis* of infantry and a hipparchy of cavalry. That produces a situation unique in the reign. No other individual is attested holding two commands simultaneously. Cleitus, whose *taxis* is mentioned at 12. 2, emerges in charge of a cavalry hipparchy after the Hydaspes (below, 22. 6; 6. 6. 4), but there is no evidence that he continued in his infantry command after the Hydaspes. Hammond (*CQ* 30 (1980) 466; cf. *KCS*² 299 n. 142) has recently excogitated a variant, which I find incomprehensible, whereby there was an exchange of commands—Craterus in charge of the hipparchy of Cleitus (two commanders of that name need to be postulated), and Coenus commanding in action the hipparchy of Perdiccas. Even if this unwieldy scheme were accepted (and it is imposed solely because of Hammond's conviction—against the evidence—that there were only four hipparchies, excluding the Royal Squadron, at the time of the Hydaspes), one is at a loss to see how Arrian comes to describe Perdiccas' hipparchy as Coenus' own. It was no more 'his' than that of Demetrius which also fell under his temporary command.

(b) Tarn (ii 146) maintained that Coenus was promoted to the command of a hipparchy at Taxila but that his phalanx battalion continued to bear his name, even though Coenus had ceased to be its commander. The parallel for that curious manoeuvre is the hipparchy of Hephaestion which continued to bear the name of the royal favourite after his death (7. 14. 10). But the honour paid to Hephaestion suggests that his case was unique. It cannot have had regular precedents.

(c) Anspach 54 suggested briefly that Coenus' hipparchy comprised the Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry which are mentioned at 12. 2 but never appear in the battle narrative. He did not argue the case, and apart from a slighting reference in Berve (ii 217 n. 1) to his 'törichte Behauptungen' I can find no discussion of his view. It seems to me highly probable. If we can lay any emphasis on Curtius

(see below), it would appear that the larger body of cavalry on the right with Alexander comprised the *agema*, the two hipparchies of Hephaestion and Perdiccas, and the horse archers. What was left for Coenus was the hipparchy of Demetrius and the Bactrian and Sogdian horse. The latter had connections with Coenus. During his successful winter campaign in Sogdiana (328/7) he had commanded native Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry (see above, 4. 17. 3 n.), who presumably remained attached to the army and crossed into India with it (above, 11. 3 n.). In that case some at least of the cavalry which Coenus led at the Hydaspes had served under him in the past, and Ptolemy presumably emphasized the connection, noting that he had the unit of Demetrius and the horsemen whom he had led in Sogdiana. That would explain Arrian's contracted and rather misleading phraseology. On this hypothesis Coenus was detached temporarily from his regular infantry command to lead the cavalry on the Macedonian left, cavalry which comprised troops whom he did not command on a regular basis but had led in the past.

(ii) *The tactical picture.* The orders to Coenus have been endlessly discussed, each discussion based on interpretation of Arrian's wording (for literature see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 156–8; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 102–5). In fact most of the difficulties are self-inflicted. Arrian's phraseology is relatively lucid and what the text states is coherent with other evidence. Two points are at issue, first Coenus' position in the line before the battle and secondly his orders for the battle.

(a) The initial position is clear enough. Alexander is drawing up his battle line. His foot has reached the battlefield and he draws it up in the centre, facing the elephant line but with instructions not to attack (16. 4). The first assault will be directed by himself from the right against the Indian left (*ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας*). As Tarn saw (ii 196 n. 1; so Hamilton, *JHS* 76 (1956) 27), that guarantees that Coenus was sent against the *enemy* right, i.e. to the Macedonian left (for an exact parallel see 3. 15. 1: *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν βαρβάρων*). Exactly the same picture emerges from Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 11: 'he ordered Coenus to attack the right'); and in Curtius (8. 14. 15) Coenus' instructions are to assail the right (*dextrum move*: for the idiom compare Curt. 10. 9. 17) while Alexander attacks the left (see Fig. 4a). All this is consistent and credible. Coenus commands the Macedonian left with a contingent of cavalry, in exactly the same position that Parmenion had occupied in the great battles of the early years. There is nothing surreptitious or secretive in his role, as is often assumed (e.g. Fuller 197; Green 397), on the basis that *ὡς ἐπὶ* in Arrian describes a feint ('as though to the right'). As Hamilton (*JHS* 76 (1956) 27–8; *contra* Bauer (above, p. 262) 71, Tarn ii 196)




FIG. 4. The cavalry engagement at the Hydaspes

long ago observed, that hypothesis contradicts Arrian's invariable usage: $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$ and $\acute{\omega}\varsigma \epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$ occur interchangeably (cf. Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 110–11 for statistics) and are often, as here, simple variants (cf. 3. 25. 1; 4. 27. 5; 7. 21. 7). What Arrian writes is quite unambiguous: Coenus was sent to take command of the Macedonian left.

(b) The orders are equally simple: 'when the barbarians saw the mass of cavalry facing them and rode along to meet it, he should follow closely in their rear.' Once again the wording is plain enough: $\tau\acute{o} \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \sigma\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\phi\omicron\varsigma$ can only mean 'the mass (i.e. large numbers) facing them'. The reflexive naturally refers to the immediate (plural) subject (cf. 4. 25. 3: $\epsilon\nu\acute{\iota}\kappa\omega\nu \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \kappa\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \sigma\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$); Hamilton's suggestion (*JHS* 76 (1956) 28, endorsed by Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 103) that it is indirect, referring to Alexander himself, is unwarranted (there is no clear instance (2. 23. 3 is ambiguous) of $\sigma\phi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ referring to a remote singular subject when there is a plural in close proximity, to which it can be meaningfully attached) and does not affect the general sense. The Indians still react to the superior body of cavalry massed against them. Arrian's wording echoes, perhaps consciously, that at 15. 2: when the Indian advance force saw the mass of cavalry with Alexander, they took flight. The cavalry on Porus' left are faced with a similar predicament, and they are envisaged reacting by riding along to meet the threat ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\pi\alpha\rho\iota\pi\pi\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$ is not used

elsewhere, but is clearly modelled on similar compounds in Xenophon (*Anab.* 4. 3. 17: ἀντιπαρήσαν; 4. 8. 17: ἀντιπαραθέντες). Here alone Arrian's meaning is somewhat obscured by his brevity, but the instructions to Coenus clearly imply a transfer of cavalry from the Indian right to the beleaguered left: he was to follow closely in their rear (cf. 14. 2: οὐ πόρρωθεν ἔξεσθαι αὐτῶν), and he is explicitly described doing so at 17. 1.

(c) The situation that Alexander foresees is not complicated. It is a simple response by the Indians to the threat of envelopment by superior numbers, a threat that could only be countered by transferring cavalry to reinforce the point of attack. It was a tactic which Eumenes was to use at Paraetacene with considerably more success than Porus. There his right wing was placed under pressure by flank attacks from superior numbers of horse archers—a situation identical to that at the beginning of the battle of the Hydaspes (Diod. 19. 30. 1–2; cf. Arr. 16. 4). Eumenes accordingly summoned the lightest cavalry from his left wing and attacked Peithon's horse archers, who (unlike Alexander's) had no support (Diod. 19. 30. 3–4). The Indian dilemma was more acute. The left wing threatened by Alexander would be overwhelmed without massive reinforcement, and it was a simple choice whether to abandon it to its fate or concentrate the cavalry against the main threat, leaving the elephants to defend the right. Coenus' instructions deal only with the second eventuality, and Arrian may well have given only one part of them (so G. T. Griffith, in Hamilton, *JHS* 76 (1956) 29–30), covering the situation which did arise (see above, 11. 4 n.). If the Indian move did not take place, Coenus would have to deal with any attack from the cavalry on Porus' right, or, more probably, stand firm while Alexander annihilated the Indian left. In fact the only situation for which Coenus needed specific instructions was the transfer of cavalry, and it is only slightly misleading of Arrian to present it as the *only* eventuality.

Σελεύκῳ καὶ Ἀντιγένῃ Curtius (8. 14. 15) also mentions three phalanx commanders but he omits Seleucus and includes a certain Leonnatus. Neither he nor Arrian has any reference to Cleitus, whose battalion participated in the battle and who ought to be named. Seleucus clearly commanded the hypaspists, or an élite group within the corps (above, 13. 4 n.), and Tauron was in charge of the light troops. Antigenes (Berve no. 83; Heckel 308–16) appears here for the first time, and in Arrian he only re-emerges in command of one of the phalanx battalions which Craterus took through the central provinces (6. 17. 3). Tarn (ii 146, 314) inferred that he was Coenus' son, who commanded his father's battalion at the battle and after Coenus' death. The latter cannot be true. Coenus' battalion

belonged to the *asthetai* (2. 23. 2), who were retained *en bloc* by Alexander after Craterus' departure (6. 21. 3), and it was apparently Peithon who took over its command (see below, 6. 6. 1 n.). The missing battalion whose command Antigenes assumed can only have been that of Cleitus, who was translated to a hipparchy after the Hydaspes (see note above, p. 294) and may have been indisposed during the battle. In that case it becomes most unlikely that he was Coenus' son (Tarn's argument rested upon an ingenious but highly uncertain emendation of Justin 13. 4. 17). Nor is it likely that he is identical to the mysterious Antigenes of Pellene (Plut. *Mor.* 339 B-D; Plut. *Al.* 70. 4-6; cf. Atkinson, in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* i 428-9; *contra* W. Heckel, *SO* 57 (1982) 57-9), who was renowned for his hedonism. It is, however, almost certain that this Antigenes is the future commander of the Silver Shields (first attested in that role in 321: Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 35), and he could be identified with the Antigenes who was elected a hypaspist officer in late 331 (Curt. 5. 2. 5). But there is no indication that he held a hypaspist command at the Hydaspes or later under Craterus. In all probability he only received his command of the Silver Shields in 322, when Neoptolemus (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1) was transferred from the hypaspists to the army in Armenia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 2).

Leonnatus, who is named by Curtius (8. 14. 15), is a mystery. He is hardly likely to be Leonnatus the Bodyguard (*contra* Heckel 99), but may conceivably be the son of Antipater who is attested trierarch at the Hydaspes (*Ind.* 18. 6; cf. Berve no. 467). If it was Antigenes who commanded Cleitus' battalion, this Leonnatus presumably had temporary command of Coenus' troops.

μη πρόσθεν . . . κατίδωσιν This is the crucial part of the instructions. The infantry phalanx is not to engage until there is visible confusion in the Indian line. Those instructions are carried out to the letter at 17. 3, where the phalanx advances as soon as the Indian cavalry fall back and disrupt their own line. Alexander's infantry was not to be exposed to Porus' elephants until the attack on the flank was well under way. While the enemy phalanx was intact, they stood their ground, untroubled by any assault from the Indian side. Porus' defensive strategy made that easy, for the Indian line could not be moved, in whole or part, without creating gaps which the Macedonian light infantry would exploit to deadly effect.

4. τοὺς ἵπποτοξότας See above, 12. 2 with note. The key role of the horse archers is emphasized in the casualty list (below, 18. 3). Their repeated attacks, impossible for the defenders to counter, created the confusion which Alexander exploited with his heavy cavalry. They could be effective at a distance or charge in at close range (*τῶν ἵππων τῇ ἐπελάσει*: for this terminology, used for the hit-and-run tactics of the horse archers, compare *Tact.* 44. 1). This harassment

prevented the Indian left changing formation to meet the challenge of Alexander's heavy cavalry. The Companions were able to manoeuvre to a position where they could make a direct charge against the Indian flank, which had been held immobile and disarrayed by the waves of attack from the horse archers. To a degree this was reproduced at Paraetacene, where Peithon's horse archers kept Eumenes' right wing in check (Diod. 19. 29. 1, 30. 2), but they had no heavy cavalry support. Unlike Porus, Eumenes could successfully transfer cavalry from his left and counter-attack as Alexander had done against the Sācan horse archers (Diod. 19. 30. 4; cf. Arr. 4. 4. 6-7). At the Hydaspes the Indians faced much greater odds and had no chance of countering the Companions.

κατὰ κέρας . . . ἐμβαλεῖν 'to attack the Indians in the flank' (so 3. 14. 6: κατὰ κέρας τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Παρμενίωνα ἐνέβαλλον). The debate over whether the Indians were in column (Tarn ii 196; Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 106-7; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 51) or not is pointless. Alexander, as Devine saw and Arrian states (see below), was forcing the Indians to extend their line, to prevent the Companions outflanking them. Ideally they would move in column and deploy into line before the attack, but the forays of the horse archers meant that their progress was haphazard and confused, neither a line nor a column—and vulnerable to a flank attack.

17. 1. ἀντιπαρεξάγοντες τῇ ἐλάσει 'were riding parallel to Alexander, extending their line to match his movement' (cf. Polyae. 4. 3. 22: Πῶρος ἀντιπαρήγε). The closest parallel is Plutarch's description of the envelopment of Brutus' left at Philippi: to prevent encirclement his commanders matched the enemy's movements (τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἀντιπαρεξάγοντων) and broke the line in half (Plut. *Brut.* 49. 6). The Indian concentration of forces was intended in part to fill the gap which would inevitably occur between phalanx and cavalry if Alexander's move to the right was countered. Ideally the reinforcements from the Indian right would filter into the gap as it opened and keep the line intact; but, as Alexander intended, the counter-manoeuvre by Coenus frustrated the operation.

κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἐπεφαίνοντο See above, 16. 3 n. Coenus and the Indian cavalry moved in the rear of the Indian phalanx. Veith's arguments (*Klio* 8 (1908) 137) that they passed in front, between the two armies, has been adequately refuted by Hamilton (*JHS* 76 (1956) 29-30; so Devine, *AncW* 16 (1987) 104-5). Had the Indian cavalry passed in front of the Macedonian line, presenting its right flank to Alexander's archers (and Agrianians), it is only too likely that it would have been decimated before it reached the opposite wing. Nor would Coenus' horses have been comfortable in the immediate proximity of the elephants. The transfer took place across

the rear of the Indian line and Coenus followed, perhaps in a wider arc (beyond the range of the Indian archers). There would have been a distinct hiatus. If the Indians managed their transfer carefully, it would have been largely complete before it became apparent to Coenus (compare Alexander's movements at Issus: above, 2. 9. 1 with note). By the time Coenus had reacted and taken his cavalry around the Indian rear the enemy cavalry would have largely merged into a single body, the new arrivals filling the gap which was gradually opening between the phalanx and cavalry (cf. Polyacn. 4. 3. 22). At Coenus' appearance the Indian cavalry had to interrupt this process and turn to face the new threat. That meant the creation of a second front facing directly away from Alexander (for the sense of ἀμφίστομος see above, 3. 12. 1 n.), and the result was total confusion.

2. οὐδὲ . . . ἐδέξαντο This crucial phase of the battle was won without Macedonian casualties (except to the non-Macedonian horse archers). The vulgate tradition accordingly records the bare fact of the successful charge before concentrating on the more sensational material of the elephant fighting (Diod. 88. 1; Curt. 8. 14. 17; Plut. *Al.* 70. 10–11). Both Plutarch and Curtius have Coenus direct his attack against the Indian right, and some of his cavalry may well have remained in position to launch a flank attack comparable to that of Alexander on the opposite wing.

κατηρ[ρ]άχθησαν . . . φίλιον The imagery of the phalanx as a defensive wall may have been common in the early Hellenistic period (cf. Diod. 18. 32. 1) and it may already have occurred in Ptolemy. But Arrian has extended the simile with a conscious Thucydidean echo (cf. Thuc. 7. 6. 3: κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα). The Indians were assimilated to the Athenians at Syracuse, who were also routed by a cavalry attack on their left.

3. ἀντεπήγον τῇ ἵπῳ 'began to direct their beasts against the cavalry'. So Curtius 8. 14. 18. This was a panic measure and destroyed Porus' careful defensive strategy. The elephants turned away from the Macedonian phalanx and allowed Alexander's infantry to take the offensive.

ἀκοντίζοντες καὶ . . . βάλλοντες Arrian writes (here and at 17. 6) as though the entire phalanx used javelins against the Indian mahouts. Curtius (8. 14. 24–5) has a slightly more detailed description of Agrianians and Thracian light infantry (see above, 12. 2 n.) attacking both elephants and drivers, and the men of the phalanx pressing home the confusion they created. This was presumably the situation on the wings, where the light infantry had been stationed for the approach march (above, 13. 4), but in the centre the phalangites had little or no support. They were equipped predominantly with the *sarisa* (Diod. 88. 2; cf. M. M. Markle, *AJA* 82

(1978) 496), but they may also have carried missile javelins (Diod. 100. 6; Curt. 9. 7. 19–21; cf. Markle, in *Μέγας Ἀλέξανδρος: 2300 χρόνια ἀπὸ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ* (Thessaloniki 1980) 246–52, 266), which they doubtless used to good effect. Alternatively they may occasionally have made casts with their *sarisae*, as the Theban hoplites did with their spears in emergency (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 52; cf. 4. 6. 11 with J. K. Anderson, in *Hoplites* 20–1) and Arrian's legionary troops were to do with their *kontoi* (*Ecl.* 26; cf. *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 270–1). But even the elephant riders were within lunging range of the Macedonian *sarisae* (see the representation on Alexander's 'Porus' decadrachms: below, p. 305), and the *sarisae* would very rarely be hurled. I prefer the hypothesis that the phalangites had javelins as a reserve weapon—just as (if Curt. 8. 14. 28–9 is correct) they were equipped with sickle-shaped knives (*κοπίδες*) to deal with the elephants' trunks.

Once more the passage is overlaid with Thucydidean echoes. *περισταδόν* ('standing around') is very rare in prose, and Arrian (like Jos. *AJ* 17. 262) is clearly imitating Thucydides' description of the slaughter at the Assinarus (Thuc. 7. 81. 4: *ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν*). Again the Indians take on the mantle of the defeated Athenians. *ἐκεράνιζε . . . φάλαγγα* 'made havoc of the Macedonian phalanx for all its density'. The language is strong—and Herodotean (cf. *Hdt.* 8. 86, 91), implying that the phalanx suffered severely from the elephant attacks. For once Arrian is less restrained than Curtius (8. 14. 26–8), who suggests that the casualties were relatively restricted—and his own casualty figures (below, 18. 3) indicate that the infantry suffered fewer losses than the cavalry. Arrian's desire for picturesque expression has perhaps taken him beyond the more sober description of his source. The elephants may temporarily have gained the advantage, but the carnage in the Macedonian ranks was not immense.

4. *ἐς μίαν Ἰλην* Coenus' cavalry naturally amalgamated with Alexander's Companions when the Indians first took flight, and they will have repelled the abortive sortie as a single body. Now, unchallenged by the enemy cavalry, the Macedonians made brief, destructive forays wherever the Indian line seemed most confused. The effect of the pressure, exerted by the phalanx on one side and the cavalry on the other, was to drive the elephants back into their own ranks, where their tormented manœuvring caused chaos. *ἀπελύοντο* 'broke off'. The use of *ἀπολύεσθαι* in this sense, the termination of an attack, is strongly Thucydidean (cf. Thuc. 1. 49. 3; 7. 44. 7, 63. 1 (where it is used in conjunction with *καταράσσειν*: see above, 17. 2 n.)), one of the many echoes in this carefully crafted chapter.

5. *καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐλέφαντες* Typically Arrian pays attention to the elephants, writing with considerable sympathy for their plight—

unlike Curtius, who views the creatures as engines of destruction and coldly records the appalling injuries they suffered (8. 14. 28–30). By contrast there seems genuine pathos in Arrian's description, pathos which recurs in his attitude to the trapped animals in the *Cynegeticus* (16. 5–6, 17. 4, 20. 3, 23. 4; cf. *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 234–7). The language is strong: ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἔκφρονες evokes some famous and dramatic parallels (Dem. 19. 198; Thuc. 2. 47. 4), and the final tricolon (ἐξώθουν . . . κατέκαινον) is particularly emphatic (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 4. 5). Arrian vividly evokes the agony of the tortured elephants and the horrors they involuntarily inflicted. He shows a sympathy for the vanquished—and a capacity to visualize their plight—which is signally lacking in modern accounts of the battle (see, however, Schachermeyr² 427; Lane Fox 360 is a masterpiece of youthful insouciance).

7. **συριγμῷ μόνον διαχρῶμενα** 'relying on their shrill trumpeting alone' (cf. *Tact.* 3. 3, 4. 6). In their exhausted state the elephants' only weapon was their voice, whose terrifying effect is underlined by Curtius (8. 14. 23). The deliberate retreat by the elephants, step by step, is assimilated by Arrian to a trireme backing water. This picture is dramatic and extraordinarily convincing; and the analogy may be taken from his sources (so Kornemann 75 n. 132), all of whom had experience of both elephants and warships. But Arrian uses the imagery of naval warfare elsewhere in his own right (*Cyneg.* 24. 5), and he had the imagination to impose it upon his source material. The technique of assimilating one type of warfare to another is one that he uses elsewhere (cf. Tonnet i 360) and is clearly influenced by Thucydides.

περιβάλλει ἐν κύκλῳ If Arrian's description is correct, Alexander was able to envelop the Indian phalanx. His phalanx in compact formation (see above, 3. 14. 3 with note; *PSI* 1284, col. ii. 11–14) matched the Indian line in extension, and the cavalry pressed on the flanks and rear. The visual effect would have been that of a letter D, with the Indian forces enclosed in the centre, a killing ground with elephants, horses, and men inextricably entangled (see Fig. 4b). The pressure from all sides created panic and the luckless troops in the centre of the phalanx must have been crushed *en masse*. Alexander's cordon of cavalry was relatively thin, easily broken by the desperate infantry, but it was able to surround the Indian phalanx. That has important implications for one's estimate of the size of Porus' army (see above, 15. 4 n.).

18. 1. Κρατερός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Cf. *Metz Epit.* 60. Arrian is clearly referring back to his earlier exposition at 12. 1. The troops who had been ordered to cross the river when battle was engaged did so. They began their crossing (ἐπέρων) when they realized that

Alexander had won a decisive victory. Attempts to avoid this clear conclusion and have the phalanx battalions of Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias cross the river before the battle result in contradiction. For Tarn (i 191) 'the other commanders' of the army were simply Craterus' subordinates, the phalanx commanders, Polyperchon and Alcetas (above, 11. 3). That is theoretically possible, but the wording is more consistent with a set of independent commanders, and in similar contexts (e.g. 4. 24. 7, 25. 5) Arrian makes no specific reference to subordinates. On the other hand one expects Arrian to note how the instructions to the commanders of the mercenary cavalry (12. 1) were carried out, and this passage gives what is required.

ἀκμήτεες ἀντὶ κεκμηκότων An echo, presumably deliberate, of the *Iliad* (11. 802, 16. 44). The terminology was reasonably common (cf. Dion. Hal. *AR* 8. 65. 3; Plut. *Cim.* 13. 1), but here it is especially apposite, an illustration of the Homeric dictum that the unwearied easily defeat weary troops. It also takes up the earlier narrative at 16. 1, underscoring the fact that Alexander achieved what Porus failed to do, and anticipates the rhetoric of Coenus' appeal at the Hyphasis (27. 8).

2. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν Ἰνδῶν As usual (cf. 3. 15. 6n.) Arrian's figures are the most extreme. Diodorus (89. 2) gives a total of 12,000 Indian dead (so *Metz Epil.* 61) and adds that there were 9,000 captured along with 80 elephants (so *Metz Epil.*). Arrian's casualties are larger in proportion to his larger estimate of Porus' army (see above, 15. 4n.). The actual figure cannot be quantified, but, given the carnage so graphically described in the previous chapter and the pursuit *à outrance* which followed, there can have been relatively few survivors.

Σπιτάκης ὁ νομάρχης (Berve no. 716) Arrian contrasts Spitaces with the two sons of Porus. He does not hint at any family relationship, merely stating that Spitaces was an independent ruler (see above, 8. 3n.) who held sway in the vicinity of the battle site, presumably on the western side of the Hydaspes (see above, 9. 2n.). That lessens the probability that Spitaces was the brother of Porus whom Curtius places in charge of the Indian exploratory force (see above, 14. 3n.). It is still more problematic whether Spitaces is to be identified with the 'Pittacus', who Polyaeus (4. 3. 21) claims was a relative (a cousin or nephew) of Porus and unsuccessfully attempted an ambush in a long defile. The details are obscure, unattested in any other source, and cannot easily be fitted into any reconstruction of the battle (for a valiant effort see Stein, *Archaeological Reconnaissances* 11, vastly improving upon Droysen i² 2. 126-7 and Berve). Nor is it (to me) certain that the incident, if historical, relates to Porus of the Hydaspes. What Polyaeus reports may have been a skirmish near

the territory of the homonymous cousin of Porus, east of the Acesines (cf. Hammond, *KCS* 300 n. 146). This second Porus fled in the face of Alexander's advance (see below, 21. 3 n.), but some of his family may have remained and resisted. 'Pittacus' may have been responsible for some of the minor actions recorded by Arrian between the Acesines and Hydraotes (see below, 21. 6 with note).

ξύμπαντες As it stands, Arrian's text states that all Porus' officers were killed. Given the special attention paid to the elephant riders (17. 3), who included Porus' chief dignitaries (Curt. 8. 14. 9), and the fact that the entire chariot corps was immobilized, it would not be altogether surprising if the battle made a clean sweep of the Indian officers. Diodorus (89. 1), however, mentions 'the most eminent of the commanders', implying that there were survivors. Krüger also argued acutely for a lacuna in Arrian's text, which all subsequent editors have accepted. Arrian's reference to the captured elephants follows rather curiously: it looks as though some statement about the human captives has fallen out (Diod. 89. 1 lists 9,000 prisoners-of-war alongside the 80 elephants). The phrasing (ἐλήφθησαν δὲ καὶ) ought to be balanced by similar wording in the preceding sentence (cf. 17. 7: κατεκόπησαν . . . ἐκόπτοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πεζοί), and Arrian most likely included an estimate of captives, 'so many in all' (for οἱ ξύμπαντες used in that sense compare 7. 14. 10; *Ind.* 19. 7). In that case the lacuna should be marked before rather than after ξύμπαντες.

3. τῶν δὲ ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον The casualties are, as usual, implausibly low. It is true that the horse archers with their hit-and-run tactics (above, 16. 4) may have suffered negligible losses, and the Companions initially met with no resistance (17. 2). But the final stages of the battle, when the cavalry formed a cordon around the Indian phalanx (17. 7), must have involved heavy fighting. Twenty Companion deaths is a very low figure, and it is hard to see why the non-Macedonian cavalry suffered losses ten times more heavy. It would make more sense if the twenty losses were those of the *agema* alone. The ratio would be more reasonable, and the aggregate would be close to the figures in the vulgate (280 Diodorus; 300 *Metz Epit.*). On the other hand the phalanx losses (see note below) are unbelievably small, if the picture of the elephant fighting has any validity. The vulgate figures (700 Diodorus; 900 *Metz Epit.*) have more verisimilitude.

τῶν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ γενομένων 'those who had participated in the first attack'. Arrian writes as though there was a wave of attacks, as there was at the Granicus (see above, 1. 15. 2, 16. 4), and several discrete sets of casualties occurred. This is hardly consistent with his battle narrative, in which the infantry first engage at a relatively late stage (17. 3) and continue in action until

the battle ends. Unless the source for the casualties is quite distinct from the main source for the battle, we can only assume that the 'first attack' is the main battle (the first engagement to involve infantry) and is contrasted with the second attack by Craterus and the mercenary commanders, in which the Macedonian casualties were minimal or non-existent. In any case Arrian's wording confirms that the 6,000 infantry who crossed the Hydaspes remained 6,000 until the battle was fought and won (see above, 12. 1, 14. 1 with notes).

18. 4-19. 2. *The Surrender of Porus*

This famous episode is reported in some form by all sources (Plut. *Al.* 60. 12-16; Diod. 88. 4-7; Curt. 8. 14. 31-46; *Metz Epit.* 60-1; Justin 12. 8. 5-7). With the sole exception of the *Metz Epitome*, which could well be garbled, they emphasize the heroism of Porus and the intensity of his resistance, all of which redounded to the credit of his conqueror, who spared and promoted a worthy adversary. That was clearly the official view at the Macedonian court, symbolized on the great decadrachms issued at the end of Alexander's reign (cf. M. J. Price, in *Studia Naster* i 75-85; P. Bernard, in *Orientalia Tucci* i 65-94; argues that they were struck in 317/6 BC by Eudamus). There Alexander and Porus are depicted in single combat, Alexander lunging up with a *sarisa* and Porus retaliating with a javelin from the front of his elephant (cf. Bernard 77-9). Other aspects of the defeated army (archers and war chariots) were commemorated on companion issues of tetradrachms, but the *pièce de résistance* was the scene with Porus, and his defeat was celebrated as the crowning glory of the campaign. The reverse of the decadrachms is quite explicit: Alexander appears in the guise of Zeus, complete with thunderbolt, and he receives a crown from the hands of Nike.

The literary sources were more realistic. Apart from the whimsical story in Lucian (*hist. conscr.* 12 = *FGrH* 139 T 4), which has Aristobulus read to Alexander an eulogy of his single combat, they show Alexander keeping his distance (see below, 18. 6 n.) and communicating through intermediaries. Arrian has perhaps the least embellished account, in part grounded upon autopsy, and is relatively unsensational when describing the wounds suffered by Porus. The emphasis is upon Alexander's magnanimity, his repeated efforts to save Porus, and his appreciation of Porus' mettle. Any (or all) of Arrian's sources may have been used for the episode, but the stress on Alexander's receptiveness to individual merit would have been particularly appropriate for men (like Ptolemy and Nearchus) who had enjoyed promotion at his hands.

4. *μὴ ὄτι . . . γενναίου* The contrast is significant and repeated in a later extract from Nearchus (6. 13. 4 = *FGrH* 133 F 2), where it epitomizes Alexander's behaviour at the Malli town. Both kings are described in the same terms, except that there is a pejorative element to Nearchus' description: Alexander's exposure to danger was the role of a soldier rather than a general. The implicit contradiction is resolved by a passage of Plutarch (*Pelop.* 2. 7-8). In matters of minor importance it is imperative that the general does not imperil himself by playing the part of a soldier but where the issue is crucial, his involvement must be total (cf. Polyb. 11. 2. 9-10; Onasand. 33. 5). Porus was right to risk his life when his kingdom was at stake, but Alexander was foolhardy in exposing himself at the Malli town (for the sentiment see E. L. Wheeler, in *Hoplites* 150-4). Given the striking repetition of terminology, it is certainly possible that both passages of Arrian derive from Nearchus, but one cannot exclude the phraseology being Arrian's own, superimposed upon material derived from different sources.

λυπηρὸς πλανώμενους Not 'wandering in distress', as in the Loeb and all modern translations. *λυπηρός* has the sense of 'causing distress' (cf. *Ind.* 34. 5), and, if the text is to stand, it must be understood that the elephants were in a pitiable state, distressing for the onlooker (cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 34. 3). The word is used in this sense in a memorable passage of Thucydides (7. 75. 3), and it might be a conscious imitation (see below, 19. 1 n.). Krüger suggested various emendations (*λυγρούς*, *λυπρούς*, *καματηρούς*), all flat and unconvincing. The manuscript reading is best left alone.

ἐξάρχων . . . τῆς φυγῆς Cf. 2. 11. 4, 3. 14. 3, 22. 4 with notes. The contrast between Porus and Darius could go back to Arrian's source, but it is most likely his own addition. There is an internal link at 19. 1 below, where he refers allusively to his description of Issus, and that can hardly be derivative.

5. *τετρωμένος δὲ τὸν δεξιὸν ὄμων* The single wound in Arrian contrasts with the multiple wounds in other sources. Curtius (8. 14. 32) records no less than nine in Porus' back and chest (cf. Diod. 88. 6; Plut. *Al.* 60. 13; Justin 12. 8. 5). The precise description of Porus' corselet which Arrian provides rules out these more imaginative accounts. His armour rendered him invulnerable except to shoulder wounds, and the depiction on the Alexander decadrachms is consistent. It shows Porus with his right arm raised to hurl a javelin, and the shoulder area has no apparent cover (the surviving exemplars are, however, too worn for one to put much faith in this observation). The protection of the shoulder and under-arm was a perennial problem. Xenophon (*Eq.* 12. 6-7) discusses in some detail the various unsatisfactory contrivances to cover the exposed area when the right arm was raised for a cast, and the vulnerability of the

shoulder seems to have caused difficulties in every army (see above, 1. 15. 7). Porus' armourers, for all their metallurgical skill, had not solved the problem, which was particularly acute for the Indian king, raised above the general level of the battle with his uplifted shoulder an easy mark.

περιττός . . . ἄρμονίαν 'remarkable in its strength and jointure'. *ἄρμονία* does not refer to the fitting of the corselet against Porus' body, as is usually assumed (e.g. Raphelius, Abicht, McGrindle, Savinel, Wirth), but denotes the smooth fitting of its component parts (so Chinnock). That is the usage elsewhere. In Herodotus (2. 96. 2) *ἄρμονίη* is the seam between planks in a ship, in Plutarch (*Mor.* 494 B) the interstice between thorns in the halcyon's nest. In this context it presumably refers to the joints between the components of a corselet of plate armour. Arrian's source possibly described the type of armour termed *loha-patta*, a coat of iron plates without cover for the arms (*Arthashastra* 2. 18. 16–17; cf. P. C. Chakravarti, *The Art of War in Ancient India* (Dacca 1941) 178–9). In Porus' corselet the joins were particularly well crafted and impenetrable to missiles.

τότε δὴ . . . ἀπεχώρει Porus gives up the fight after his wound, and Alexander gradually talks him into surrender. There is a hint of this tradition in Curtius (8. 14. 35–7), but the consensus of the other sources is that Alexander actually intensified the assault on Porus and his remaining entourage (Diod. 88. 5; *Metz Epit.* 60; Curt. 8. 14. 38) and that his capture alive was accidental. For Arrian's source Alexander deliberately spared a valiant antagonist and virtually called off the attack (see below, 18. 7), just as he took pains to save the mercenaries at Miletus 'because they appeared to him both valiant and loyal' (1. 19. 6) and—a far more sinister instance—the defenders of Massaga (see above, 4. 27. 3 with notes). This was a tradition which would have appealed to the huntsman in Arrian, who deliberately called his dogs off the hare after a good chase and regretted their killing a valiant adversary (*Cyneg.* 16. 5–7).

6. πρῶτα μὲν Ταξίλην Curtius (8. 14. 35) claims that Alexander dispatched the *brother* of Taxiles and did so only after his own horse had died under him. He also states that Porus transfixed his interlocutor with his last javelin. This is clearly a romantic elaboration, but it seems clear that the intervention was recorded by more than one source and may well have a nucleus of truth.

7. οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῷδε . . . χαλεπός Alexander's forbearance under provocation is stressed here, as it was in the account of his attack on Thebes (see above, 1. 7. 10 n.), a passage based on Ptolemy, who may have made a feature of this alleged character trait. Curtius (8. 14. 38) states the opposite: Alexander gave orders not to spare any

of the enemy who offered resistance and directed an attack upon Porus.

Μερόνυ Meroes (Berve no. 518) is not attested elsewhere, and nothing is known of his background. One assumes, given his long-standing friendship with Porus, that he was one of the local rulers by the Hydaspes who joined Alexander's army perforce (see above, 5. 8. 5, 11. 3). Meroes' intervention is apparently unique to Arrian. There may be a reference to it in the *Metz Epitome* (60), which has Porus surrender after what seems an appeal to throw himself on Alexander's mercy, but the text is desperately corrupt and the interpretation rests on wholesale emendation. Otherwise there is unanimous agreement that Porus did not surrender voluntarily but collapsed from his wounds.

κατέβη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Elsewhere Porus' elephant plays a more prominent role. In Diodorus, Porus simply faints through loss of blood and slides from the elephant's back (88. 6; cf. P. Goukowsky, *BCH* 96 (1972) 473-502). The story is more elaborate in Curtius (8. 14. 38-40), who describes Porus swaying on the elephant's back, so that the mahout has the beast drop to its knees—and subsequently makes the elephant attempt to rescue Porus from his captors. In Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 13; so *Mor.* 970 D, *Ael. NA* 7. 37) the elephant itself realizes that Porus is incapacitated, lowers him to the ground, and gently extracts the javelins from his body. This is a classic example of elephant solicitude, comparable to instances reported by Megasthenes (*Ind.* 14. 4; Strabo 15. 1. 42 (705) = *FGrH* 715 F 20), and the story has obviously been embellished with successive accretions of romance. The single wound attested in Arrian and apparently supported by autopsy has become a series of wounds which ultimately cripple Porus to the point that he requires medical attention from his devoted beast. Beneath the various layers of elaboration there remains a single substantive difference. Either Porus submitted to persuasion and surrendered voluntarily or he was incapacitated by his wound(s) and fell into Macedonian hands against his will. Both stories may have been current from an early date.

19. 1. ὑπὲρ πέντε πήχεις Porus' gigantic stature is frequently the subject of comment. Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 12) gives his height as four cubits and a span; Diodorus (88. 4; so *Metz Epit.* 54) offers a round figure of five cubits and adds that Porus had a chest measurement twice the size of other stalwart Indians. That confirms that Porus was exceptional even among the relatively tall Indians (see above, 5. 4. 4 n.), as Diodorus emphasizes when he stresses the size of Sopeithes, an impressive figure over four cubits in height (71. 7: Tarn ii 170 absurdly suggested that the two rulers were measured by

different standards, a long and short cubit). At four cubits and a span (6 ft. 9 in./2.05 m.) Porus would have towered above his subjects, as much a giant as Peter the Great (over 2 m. in height) in seventeenth-century Russia. His physical appearance clearly predisposed Alexander in his favour. Conversely under similar circumstances at Gaza the repulsive appearance of the commander was allegedly a significant factor in his atrocious treatment (Hegesias, *FGrH* 142 F 5).

οὐ δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ A conscious imitation of Thuc. 4. 34. 1 (recurring at 6. 16. 2) but also designed to recall the description of Darius at 2. 10. 1. Porus at the Hydaspes was the polar opposite of the Persian king at Issus.

ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός . . . καλῶς ἡγωνισμένος A somewhat empty remark, in which Kornemann divined the words of Ptolemy (75, 'hier spricht unser königlicher Autor zu uns'). If there is an echo here, it comes from the apophthegm ascribed to Philip (Plut. *Mor.* 178 E), in which he assured Alexander that having many competitors for the kingdom he would need to prove himself worthy of it (*πολλοὺς ἔχων περὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἀνταγωνιστὰς γενοῦ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*). By any criterion Porus had shown himself a man of courage and, if that was the mark of a king, he deserved his kingdom.

2. βασιλικῶς μοι χρῆσαι Porus' reply and Alexander's reaction are described in almost identical words by Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 13; cf. *Mor.* 181 E, 332 E, 458 B). The context is the same, and it is clear that Arrian's addition *λόγος ὅτι* does not denote a transition from his major source. Rather it emphasizes the most striking point. The story clearly comes from Ptolemy or Aristobulus (so Brunt, *Arrian* ii 59 n. 2; *contra* Hammond, *Sources* 108-9). The similarity of wording might suggest a common source between Arrian and Plutarch (in that case Aristobulus—or conceivably Nearchus), but the exchange was clearly famous, reported in similar terms in the *Metz Epitome* (61) and Themistius (*Or.* 7. 88 D-89 B), and the wording may have been standard. The only variant comes from Curtius (8. 14. 41-5), who presents a highly rhetorical exchange between the two kings: Porus is asked how the victor should deal with him and replies that he should learn the lesson of the day, namely the fragility of fortune. The result is the same. Porus is spared and eventually promoted, but the word play on the meaning of kingship is lost.

Despite the simplicity of Arrian's language its meaning is not apparent. *βασιλικῶς* might be taken subjectively or objectively: 'treat me as a king' or 'treat me as a king would'. The latter is the interpretation of the *Metz Epitome* (61: *de se ipso ut regali animo consuleret*), and the weight of parallels (e.g. Dion. Hal. 4. 78. 5, 80. 5; Plut. *Publ.* 1. 3) is in its favour. However, the meaning could be taken both ways, and the protagonists may well have done so. Porus

could have asked to be treated like a king, and (through the medium of translators) Alexander took it as a request for him to behave like a king and reacted accordingly, assuming in Aristotelian terms that benefaction was the ultimate duty of kingship (*Pol.* 3. 1285^b4-7, 1286^b3-11; cf. Schachermeyr, in *Entretiens Hardt* 22 (1976) 49 ff.) and perhaps remembering Isocrates' injunction (2. 37) to be conscious of kingship in all his actions and do nothing unworthy of it. In practical terms, then, there was no difference between acting as a king and treating Porus as a king. All was indeed encapsulated in the single word.

The episode may have had some importance for its exemplary value. The treatment of distinguished captives was an issue of intermittent importance under the Successors. Antigonos was clearly under something of a cloud for his execution of Eumenes, Cassander still more for the trial and execution of Olympias, who had surrendered to his mercy (Diod. 19. 50. 5; Justin 14. 6. 5)—her death was the first item in the indictment by Antigonos (Diod. 19. 61. 1; Justin 15. 1. 3). Later, when Seleucus repented of the regal reception he gave to the captive Demetrius Poliorcetes (Plut. *Demetr.* 50. 1-4) and had him interned, his behaviour was unfavourably compared with that of the Getic dynast Dromichaetes who entertained and then released his royal prisoner, Lysimachus (Plut. *Demetr.* 52. 6: βασιλικῶς ἀλόντι Λυσιμάχῳ χρησάμενον). In such contexts Alexander's treatment of Porus could be cited as an object-lesson: the preservation and promotion of a bitter enemy had singularly beneficial results. It was a case of magnanimity rewarded and could serve as propaganda to castigate those who failed to follow his salutary example.

3. καὶ ἄλλην ἔτι χώραν As Curtius (8. 14. 45) confirms, this is a prospective note. Arrian's source mentions that Porus was reinstated as ruler of his own realms (so Diod. 89. 6; Justin 12. 8. 7). Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 15) adds that he was given the formal title of satrap, in recognition of his vassal status (see above, 4. 22. 7 with note). The extension of the kingdom came gradually, as Porus proved his loyalty and administrative value, and Arrian notes the successive territorial grants over the campaigns of 326/5 (5. 20. 4, 21. 5, 29. 2) with a final retrospective statement of Porus' position at the time that the fleet embarked on the Hydaspes (6. 2. 1). Here it comes as the culmination of Alexander's magnanimity and necessarily anticipates the factual record of the donations. All other sources make it the climax of the story (Plut. *Al.* 60. 15; Curt. 8. 14. 45; *Metz Epit.* 61; cf. Strabo 15. 1. 3 (686)) and stress the size of the territory which accrued to Porus.

μηνὸς Μουνυχιῶνος The month of Munychion seems to have fallen between mid-April and mid-May during the archon year 327/

6 (cf. W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, Mass. 1931) 371, 429; B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Year* (Berkeley, Calif. 1961) 98–101). That corresponds fairly well to the actual time of the battle which was fought something over a month before the summer solstice (see above, 5. 9. 4 n.). How Arrian reached his dating cannot be elicited. It is possible that one of his sources gave a dating by the Macedonian calendar (cf. Plut. *Al.* 75. 6 = *FGrH* 139 F 59) and that he converted into the Attic calendar of his own time (see above, 3. 15. 7 n.). E. Grzybek, *Du calendrier macédonien au calendrier ptolémaïque* (Basle 1990) 39–44 (cf. H. Hauben, *CE* 67 (1992) 147–50), has argued that the Macedonians observed a complex procedure whereby there was an intercalation (of a second Hyperberetaios) in alternate years, and so (as is demonstrably the case with Gaugamela) Arrian would occasionally date an event a month too late. This scheme seems to require too much rigidity and hypothesizes that there was a regular calendric procedure, when the only explicit evidence (Plut. *Al.* 16. 2, 25. 2) suggests that Alexander tampered with the calendar at will. What is more, the result of Grzybek's calculations is to bring down the date of the battle against Porus by a month, to March/April 326, which seems too early. It would have the effect of bringing Alexander to Taxila before the beginning of spring, against the explicit evidence of Aristobulus (Strabo 15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35). Regular, invariable systems are best rejected, and it must be conceded that Arrian's method of dating is not known and need not have been uniform. For major events he could have taken, and probably did take dates from a separate chronographic source (so Brunt, *Arrian* ii 457), whose accuracy—as with all such compilations—was haphazard.

19. 4–6. *The Foundations of Nicaea and Bucephala*

4. ἵνα δέ . . . Βουκεφάλαν Arrian makes two distinct statements, one about the location and the other about the nomenclature of Alexander's cities. They were founded at the battle site and at his crossing-point on the west bank of the Hydaspes (ἐνθεν ὁρμηθεὶς ἐπέρασε); and one was named Nicaea in honour of his victory, the other Bucephala in memory of his deceased stallion. The separation of the two clauses is annoying and makes it practically impossible to determine which city was founded on which side of the Hydaspes. The consensus of critical opinion (e.g. Krüger; Abicht; Chinnock; Radet, *REA* 43 (1941) 34; Hammond, *Sources* 112) is that Arrian's τὴν μὲν means 'the former' and that consequently Nicaea was founded on the battle site. That is a possibility, but hardly certain. Arrian can use μὲν to refer to the second, not the first item of a pair

(e.g. *Praef.* 2: Πτολεμαῖός τε καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος . . . ὁ μὲν ὅτι συνεστράτευσε . . . Ἀριστόβουλος; for the general principle see Denniston 370-1), and τὴν μὲν could here mean 'the latter'. Quite possibly Arrian himself had no idea which site was which. He may be combining notices about the foundation of the cities after the battle (cf. 20. 2, below) and their naming, which is said to have taken place later in the year, when the Indus fleet was about to sail (Diod. 95. 5; Curt. 9. 3. 23). His wording may be intended to be non-committal.

Other sources give little assistance. Most allege that Alexander contemplated a double foundation immediately after the battle and confirm that the sites were to be on opposite banks of the Hydaspes (Strabo 15. 1. 29 (698); Curt. 9. 1. 6; Steph. Byz. s.v. Βοῶς Κεφαλαί). Diodorus (89. 6) repeats Arrian's location but from the vantage point of the battle site: one city was founded across the river, at the crossing-point, the other where Alexander was, on the field of victory. The only statement which links a name to a site comes from Stephanus of Byzantium (loc. cit.), who has Alexander found Bucephala 'where his horse died after he had crossed and fought'. This implies that Bucephala was built on the battle site, but it could be a guess, based on the tradition that Bucephalas carried Alexander at the Hydaspes, which though credible (see note below) is not above suspicion. Tarn (ii 236-7; *GBI* 245-6) found what he thought was corroborative evidence in Ptolemy (the geographer), who placed Bucephala in the sector 'around the Hydaspes', not in the area between the Indus and Hydaspes, where he located Taxila (*Geog.* 8. 1. 45). But this is inconclusive (cf. Radet, *REA* 43 (1941) 35-9). I see no reason why a foundation beside the Hydaspes should not have been listed in its ambit, whichever bank it occupied. It has been suggested that the name Nicaea most naturally denotes the site of the victory (so Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 170; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 61 n. 5); but one might also argue that Alexander honoured his steed with the more prestigious location and gave the name Nicaea to the city at the crossing-point, underlining the fact that the successful passage of the river was the most important factor in his victory (see below, 20. 1). Only the discovery of the sites and their identification by epigraphical finds will solve the problem conclusively. The later history of these foundations is obscure and unhelpful. Aelian (*NA* 16. 3) refers at second hand to reports of the mynah bird, which came from the Macedonians settled at Bucephala and elsewhere. That proves merely that the city was successfully established. Otherwise only an isolated note in the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (§ 47; cf. Casson, *PME* 81, 204) attests the survival of Bucephala into the first century AD.

Arrian here gives the city-name Bucephala as a feminine singular

form (so Diod. 95. 5; Steph. Byz.), whereas at 29. 5 it is neuter plural (for other variants see Radet, *REA* 43 (1941) 33-4 n. 5). Corruption in either passage is unlikely, and it is most probable that Arrian failed to reconcile the differing nomenclature of his sources.

ἐς . . . τοῦ Βουκεφάλα τὴν μνήμην Plutarch (*Al.* 61. 1) claims that Bucephalas died some time after the battle (which would cohere with the vulgate tradition that the city of Bucephala received its name after the battle), and contrasts the majority view that he died of wounds with Onesicritus' version (*FGrH* 134 F 20) that he succumbed to old age and exhaustion. It is Onesicritus' version which Arrian retails, including the clearly false detail (see below) that the horse died at the age of 30. There are two interesting consequences:

(i) Arrian either used Onesicritus directly or through an intermediary which gave a virtual transcript. Elsewhere there is little or no trace of Onesicritus. In the *Indike* the two citations of his work (*Ind.* 2. 6, 6. 8) demonstrably come at second hand from Eratosthenes (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 45-6). The same might be the case here (Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 477 suggests that it was Aristobulus who transmitted the material), but it is arguable that Onesicritus' account was famous and Arrian did on rare occasions use it directly. Plutarch implies strongly that Onesicritus was exceptional in attributing Bucephalas' death to natural causes, and, if his account was transcribed by an author as familiar as Aristobulus, one would have expected the contrast to be less sharply expressed.

(ii) If the story of Bucephalas' death from old age was uniquely preserved in Onesicritus, its credibility is not high. Admittedly the extant reports of his wounding in the battle come from sources of little reliability (Diod. 95. 5; *Metz Epit.* 62; Gell. 5. 2. 4; and the variant at Arr. 5. 14. 4), but Plutarch makes it clear that the majority of sources accepted the tradition. Nor is it intrinsically incredible, given that Onesicritus' figure for the horse's age was a gross exaggeration, designed to make horse and owner coeval. If Bucephalas was about 30 in 326, then clearly he could not have participated in the fighting, but on more realistic estimates (see below) it was quite possible that he bore the king for part at least of the battle at the Hydaspes (cf. Curt. 8. 14. 34-5).

5. ἀμφὶ τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη So Onesicritus *ap.* Plut. *Al.* 61. 2 (*τριάκοντα ἔτων*), perhaps inspiring the pleasing fantasy of the Arabic Alexander Romance which had Bucephalas conceived on the same day (and from the same source) as Alexander himself (cf. A. R. Anderson, *AJP* 51 (1930) 9). If this were remotely true, it would entail Alexander breaking Bucephalas when the horse was at least 10 years old, a rather late stage for his intractable behaviour to be tolerated (Plut. *Al.* 6. 1). The story of the taming of Bucephalas

(which may derive ultimately from Chares: cf. *FGrH* 125 F 18 with Jacoby's note; *contra* Hammond, *Sources* 23, guessing at Marsyas) presupposes a gap of some ten years in age between horse and rider, nearly fifteen if one accepts the figure of the Alexander Romance (Ps.-Call. 1. 17) for Alexander's age at the time.

πρὸς μόνου Ἀλεξάνδρου This is generally agreed: cf. Gell. 5. 2. 3; Pliny, *NH* 8. 154; Diod. 76. 6; Curt. 6. 5. 18.

σημεῖον . . . ἐγκεχαραγμένη This is the explanation of the old lexicographers (*Etym. Magn.* p. 207. 50 ff.; Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 23; cf. Anderson, *AJP* 51 (1930) 3-5), who explain the term as a Thessalian name for a type of horse branded with a bull's head to authenticate its pedigree; and Bucephalas was allegedly of Thessalian origin, from the stud of Philonicus of Pharsalus (Pliny, *NH* 8. 154; Plut. *Al.* 6. 1). The literary evidence is now supplemented by an Athenian archive of lead tablets from the fourth and third centuries BC which gives some twenty-five brand names, including Bucephalas—there are nine examples of the name, one of which, like Alexander's horse, was of black colouring (J. H. Kroll, *Hesperia* 46 (1977) 86-8, 138; *contra* K. Braun, *Ath. Mitt.* 85 (1970) 251-67). This is certainly the correct derivation of the name. Other suggestions are fanciful conjectures. Only Arrian (and the derivative *Excerpta Vaticana* 183) record the ox-head 'star'; other sources have imaginative and bizarre alternatives (listed by Anderson, *AJP* 51 (1930) 6-7).

6. ἐν τῇ Οὐξίων χώρᾳ This episode is deliberately withheld from its chronological position in the narrative, like Alexander's treatment of Darius' wife, which is also recorded retrospectively (4. 19. 6-20. 3). In both cases Arrian illustrates a character trait (here Alexander's intense attachment to his horse) and gives an extreme instance of the quality in question. Which of his sources provided the subject-matter is beyond elucidation, but there is no trace of qualification (compare λόγος κατέχει at 4. 20. 1), and the likelihood is that it comes from one of his principal authorities. What Arrian records coheres in outline with our other reports of the incident (Diod. 76. 5-8; Curt. 6. 5. 18-21; Plut. *Al.* 44. 3-5); Alexander loses his horse, threatens genocide, and the horse is duly returned. The few additions, in particular the allegation that Alexander began to put his threat into effect (Diod. 76. 8; Curt. 6. 5. 20), are compatible with Arrian's account; but there is one major difference, the location of the episode. In Arrian it occurs in the land of the Uxii, in the western Zagros between Susa and Persepolis (see above, 3. 17. 1 nn.), while the other sources place it on the southern shores of the Caspian, in the territory of the Mardi (see above, 3. 24. 1 n.). At least one of the traditions is in error. The divergence probably arose from confusion between two peoples named Mardi, those on the Caspian and those of southern Persis, located in the Zagros due

south of the Uxii (cf. Briant, *État et pasteurs* 62–4, 70–1). Arrian's source presumably placed the incident in the context of the campaign against the Persian Mardi early in 330 (Curt. 5. 6. 17–19), and either located it close to the territory of the Uxii or regarded the Mardi and Uxii as the same predatory tribe (cf. *Ind.* 40. 6; Strabo 11. 3. 6 (524) = *FGrH* 133 F 1g). If that is correct, it would follow that the reports locating the theft by the Caspian stem from a single common source (Cleitararchus), which attached the episode to the wrong locale. Otherwise the error (as assumed above, 3. 24. 2 n.) must be ascribed to Arrian's source, which would tell against his use here of Ptolemy or Aristobulus. Both should have had clear recollections of the theft of Bucephalas, whereas Cleitararchus used second-hand reports and could have been misled.

πάντας ἀποκτενεῖν Plutarch (*Al.* 44. 4) is even more explicit: all the offending people, women and children included, were threatened with death (cf. Diod. 76. 7: πανδημεὶ κατεσφαγμένους). That is clearly how Arrian understands his source. He underlines the message with two emphatic demonstratives (τοσῆδε . . . τόσος): Alexander was prepared to go to any lengths to recover his horse, and the barbarians took him at his word. There is an implicit approval of the projected genocide, which rings harsh to moderns ears; but in the Roman context brigandage and contumacy were cardinal sins, and could justify the annihilation of an entire people (cf. Dio 67. 4. 6). Augustus (*RG* 3. 2) prides himself that he preferred to preserve rather than exterminate peoples who could safely be granted indulgence. The qualification is eloquent. According to Arrian, Trajan had decided on the extermination of at least one recalcitrant people (*Parth.* F 79); and in a work directed to Hadrian, Arrian himself threatens an insubordinate Pontic tribe with destruction (*Peripl.* 11. 2). He clearly considered Alexander's behaviour justifiable, if not commendable.

καὶ ἐμοί . . . Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκα It is Alexander's attachment which justifies the encomium of Bucephalas. He is given the honour 'on account of Alexander', just as the Ten Thousand acquire their reputation *Ξενοφώντος ἔνεκα* (1. 12. 3). In another context Arrian can immortalize the memory of one of his own hunting hounds (*Cyneg.* 5. 6; cf. *ANRW* ii 34.1 (1993) 234–5); but, as his language makes clear, it is an exceptional tribute and it occurs in a specialist monograph on the chase. The dignity of history required restraint, and it excites comment that Cato left Roman generals anonymous but referred to a Carthaginian elephant by name (Pliny, *NH* 8. 11 = Cato F 88 (Peter)). Arrian makes an exception for Bucephalas, but not for Alexander's dogs, Peritas and Triakes, who also featured in the literature (cf. Plut. *Al.* 61. 3 with Hamilton's note ad loc.; Pollux 5. 42 (= *FGrH* 115 F 340), 46). The king's affection for his


horse was outstanding, and the horse accordingly receives a unique testimonial.

20. *From the Hydaspes to the Acesines*

20. 1. τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐπινίκια This is the sole reference in Arrian to victory celebrations (but see Diod. 40. 1, 72. 1; Curt. 3. 12. 27), and there is no way of identifying the deities which he honoured (see below, 6. 3. 2 n.). If we may believe the vulgate tradition (Diod. 89. 3; Curt. 9. 1. 1), Alexander made a special feature of sacrificing to the Sun which had given him victory over the eastern lands. That is not incredible in itself. Alexander had sacrificed to the Sun after the eclipse on the eve of Gaugamela (above 3. 7. 6 with note), and the Sun could well have featured among the deities honoured by regular sacrifices. But the sacrifice according to Diodorus and Curtius had a wider significance. It marked the end of conquest in the east, and is evidently connected with the tradition that Alexander considered the Ocean close at hand and easily accessible from the Hydaspes (Diod. 89. 5; Curt. 9. 1. 3; *Metz Epit.* 63; Justin 12. 7. 4). If true (see below), the ambition was minimized by Alexander's sources, which credit him with more limited and achievable aims (see below, 5. 25. 2 n.).

2. ἐπὶ τοὺς προσχώρους . . . Ἰνδοῦς Other authorities (Strabo 15. 1. 29 (698); Diod. 89. 4-5, 90. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 4) place Alexander's activities after the Hydaspes in the heavily timbered mountain country adjacent to the realm of Porus (see Map 9). That is quite consistent with Arrian's account. The people attacked by Alexander were presumably an independent mountain tribe located between the Hydaspes and Acesines somewhat to the north of the battle site (Strabo loc. cit.). According to all other sources the main object of the expedition was to fell timber, which was subsequently floated down the Hydaspes and converted into Alexander's river fleet. Arrian has no record of this activity, an omission which has been considered anomalous (Anspach 62 n. 190). However, the quest for timber is not inconsistent with his campaign report (cf. Schachermeyr, *Innsbr. Beitr. zur Kulturgeschichte* 3 (1955) 126-8; D. Kienast, *Historia* 14 (1965) 181-2) and may even have been noted by his sources. If so, Arrian suppressed all reference to the fleet building at this stage, reserving the theme for the emphatic opening of Book VI (for parallels see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 58-60).

Alexander had already conceived the idea of exploring the course of the Indus, but there was necessarily a delay while the timber dried and the fleet was built (Schachermeyr 127). In the interval Alexander intended to press eastwards towards the Ocean, so the vulgate tradition alleges (see note above). That is a project Alexan-



MAP 9. The Punjab. Present-day topography with (inset) conjectural approximation of the river system in the eighth century AD. (*By permission of Cambridge University Press*)

der could well have envisaged, given the conventional view endorsed by Aristotle (*Meteor.* 1. 350^b22), that the eastern Ocean was within easy range of the Hindu Kush, and it is possible that even as late as the battle of the Hydaspes he had not been disabused (see my observations in *ΤΟΠΟΙ* 3 (1993) 413–22). In that case Alexander had two objectives, conquest of eastern India as far as the Ocean and subsequently exploration of the southern Indus valley. The second is deferred by Arrian, presumably for compositional reasons, while the first is omitted altogether. It was a theme not found either in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. Their silence is an argument against its historicity but hardly a strong argument. Neither author apparently mentioned Alexander's short-lived belief that the Indus and Nile were interconnected (see below, 6. 1. 1–5, derived from Nearchus), and it may have been uncongenial to them to record the king's geographical delusions, those at least which were proved delusive. On the other hand the vulgate tradition is clear, explicit, and consistent with Aristotle's geographical framework. It is best accepted.

ὄνομα δὲ ἦν . . . οὗ μοι μέλει The variant is trivial, like that at 4. 3. 5; and Arrian recorded it for stylistic reasons ('probably . . . mere caprice', Brunt, *Arrian* ii 62 n. 2), maybe to dwell on the exotic sound of the names. He was certainly not reacting negatively to criticism of Aristobulus by Ptolemy (so Pearson, *LHA* 173). Rather he was following the precedent of Herodotus, juxtaposing variant traditions and declining to judge between them (cf. *Hdt.* 2. 104. 4; 3. 122. 1; 5. 45. 2). Arrian has chosen a matter of no importance, and the passage reads as a superfluous display of erudition. It does not follow that Ptolemy and Aristobulus were otherwise unanimous in their nomenclature, for unresolved variants can be readily detected throughout Arrian's work (see above, vol. i 17). This single variation is included as a curiosity.

3. ἀπὸ φάλαγγος ἐκάστης Arrian here uses *phalanx* as a synonym for the vastly more frequent *taxis* (so 5. 21. 5). There is no obvious motive for the variation, and it is most likely that he is adopting the terminology of his source (so Brunt ad loc.). If so, it is almost certain that the passage as a whole is derived from Aristobulus (see above, 1. 14. 2 n.), who is adduced first in the variant immediately preceding. The conventional wisdom (based on guesswork) that it is taken from Ptolemy (cf. Strasburger 43, after Jacoby; Kornemann 77; Tonnet i 213) is therefore mistaken.

4. πεντακισχιλίων . . . ὑπὲρ τοῦς μυρίους The population of the Indian cities was the subject of frequent comment among the Alexander historians. Arrian later (6. 2. 1) claims that there were 2,000 cities between the Acesines and Hyphasis; and a particularly famous note, twice repeated by Strabo (15. 1. 3 (686), 33 (701); cf. Pliny,

NH 6. 59), mentions 5,000 cities, each larger than Meropid Cos and lying between the Hydaspes and Hyphasis. The latter passages have been ascribed to Aristobulus (Tarn ii 32-3 n. 3) or, more credibly, to Onesicritus (Pearson, *AJP* 73 (1952) 75, *LHA* 106; S. N. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos* (Göttingen 1978) 57), whose birthplace, Astypalaea, lay close to Cos. But it remains a problem why any author should have selected Cos as a standard of comparison if it were not expected to be familiar to his readers. Local patriotism is hardly sufficient reason. It is more likely that our anonymous author wrote at a time when Cos was sufficiently in the public eye for its size to have been familiar. If so, the obvious occasion is the winter of 309/8, when Ptolemy himself made the island his court, and it was there that Berenice presented him with his heir, Philadelphus (Diod. 20. 27. 3; *FGH* 239 B 19; Theocr. 17. 63 ff.). At that time Cos with its citizen body of perhaps 9,000 (Sherwin-White 164) might have been seen as a typical example of a medium-sized city (cf. Diod. 20. 76. 2), and any author (not excluding Ptolemy himself) might have adduced it.

The figures presented for the cities of the Glauganicae/Glausae presuppose a population close to half a million, which must be a vast exaggeration, comparable to the general inflation of the size and population of Porus' kingdom (see above, 5. 8. 4 n.). Either of Arrian's principal sources could have been responsible.

Ταξίλη δὲ διαλλάττει This reconciliation was apparently short-lived. The quarrel had reopened by the time Alexander returned from the Hyphasis and was this time palliated by a marriage pact (Curt. 9. 3. 22). Taxiles had reason for resentment. He had no tangible return from the victory at the Hydaspes, while his enemy was rewarded by vast acquisitions of territory, and Porus' position as paramount ruler beyond the Hydaspes contrasted unfavourably with his own under the *de facto* control of a Macedonian satrap (5. 8. 3 n.).

Alexander's movements are hard to establish. It was attested that Taxiles accompanied him on his campaign into the mountain country (Strabo 15. 1. 29 (699)); and Anspach (62 n. 190; so Brunt, *Arrian* ii 461) assumed that he was dispatched directly home from the territory of the Glauganicae/Glausae, while Alexander moved east to the Acesines. Arrian does not explicitly mention a return to the battle site; but nothing in his narrative excludes it, and in the vulgate tradition the meeting with Abisares' envoys appears to take place at the site of the twin foundations (Curt. 9. 1. 6-7; cf. Diod. 90. 4). It was simple enough for Alexander to follow the Hydaspes south from the area of his felling operations and join forces with Craterus and the rest of the army (see below, 21. 4 n.).

5. παρά τε Ἀβισάρου This embassy and its reception are attested in

the vulgate tradition (Diod. 90. 4; Curt. 9. 1. 7-8; *Metz Epit.* 65). Abisares, despite his earlier overtures to Alexander (above, 5. 8. 3 n.), had not renounced his alliance with Porus. It is not surprising that he hastened to offer his unconditional surrender, nor that Alexander insisted on his appearance in person. For the next episode in the diplomatic exchange see below, 5. 29. 4.

6. *παρὰ τῶν αὐτονομῶν Ἰνδῶν* Arrian frequently refers to the many 'autonomous' peoples in the Punjab (5. 21. 5, 22. 1-2, 24. 6-8) and the southern Indus (6. 6. 1, 14. 2, 15. 1, 21. 3-4; cf. *Ind.* 12. 5). In all cases these are peoples without kings, the Aratta of the *Mahabharata* (Lassen ii² 166-7; Anspach 69-70 n. 221). Which of the many autonomous communities approached Alexander on this occasion can hardly be determined. There is a possibility that they included the Cathaci, who are said to have 'defected' (24. 6: *ξυναφειστώσας*) from Alexander and perhaps had sent embassies of submission. However, Alexander regarded all India as his by right (see above, 4. 22. 7 n.), and resistance was *ipso facto* defection. The only autonomous peoples who can be confidently excluded are the Oxydracae, who apparently made no overtures before Alexander's invasion of the Malli lands in 325 (see below, 6. 14. 2).

παρὰ Πύρρου (Berve no. 684) This notice is repeated retrospectively at 21. 3, where the background is given in full. Arrian here is merely noting the presence of the embassy; he explains its significance later. There is no reason to suppose different sources for the two passages (Schwartz, *RE* ii 913 (so Strasburger 43) ascribed this report to Aristobulus, the latter to Ptolemy).

This Porus, as appears below (21. 2-3), ruled territory between the Acesines and Hydraotes. Like the more familiar Porus (see above, 8. 4 n.) he was probably king of the Pauravas, who must be conceived in two groups on either side of the Acesines with two eponymous rulers (Anspach 63-4 n. 197). He is alleged to have been a cousin of the western Porus (Strabo 15. 1. 30 (699); Diod. 91. 1) and like most of Porus' neighbours he was at loggerheads with him and clearly had great expectations of his defeat. His ambassadors arrived at the time that Porus received his first territorial grant (the land of the Glauganicae/Glausae) at Alexander's hands, and we may well believe that his disillusionment was painful (cf. 21. 3 below).

7. *Φραταφέρνης . . . Θράκας ἄγων* Phrataphernes (see above, 4. 18. 2 n.) had now fulfilled at least part of the commission he received at Nautaca (winter 328/7). He had occupied Hyrcania and arrested or expelled its deposed satrap. Now he was returning to report, and brought the Thracians of his satrapal army to rejoin Alexander. Nothing was recorded of a satrapal army when Alexander first settled Parthya and Hyrcania (see above, 3. 22. 1), but,

once the war against Bessus began and Parthyaëa was attacked by Bessus' counter-satrap, Brazanes (see above, 4. 7. 1 n. with *JHS* 101 (1981) 21), troops must have been attached to Phrataphernes' command. The most likely hypothesis is that some of the Thracians, who comprised the bulk of the garrison forces of Media (see above, 3. 19. 7 n.), were transferred to Parthyaëa. Now that the situation in the satrapy had eased, Phrataphernes returned his troops to the main army and reported on his progress. Phrataphernes himself returned promptly to his satrapy, where he is attested late in 325 (see below, 6. 27. 6 n.). His troops remained in India, to be annexed to the command of Philip, son of Machatas (6. 15. 2; Curt. 10. 1. 2). Alexander, it seems, had little love for his Thracians, and it comes as little surprise that he later decimated the Median garrison army (Curt. 10. 1. 8).

καὶ παρὰ Σισικόττου . . . ἀφεστηκότες A much disputed passage. The manuscript reading *σισίκου* was identified as a corruption of *Σισικόττου* by both Gronovius and Blancardus, and the correction is surely certain. However, Sisicottus was appointed garrison commander around Aornus (above, 4. 30. 4 n.) while the satrap of the lands west of the Indus is explicitly named as Nicanor (above, 4. 28. 6). Now, Nicanor is never again mentioned after his appointment, and Philip, son of Machatas, was subsequently given command of his satrapy (6. 2. 3). It is an attractive hypothesis to identify Nicanor as the 'hyparch' killed by the Assaceni, assuming that Arrian has simply used the term as a synonym of satrap (see Bosworth, *CQ* 24 (1974) 57). This is the simplest and most popular solution (Berve nos. 556, 707; Badian, in *CHIran* ii 465 n. 2; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 65 n. 8; cf. Bosworth, *Antichthon* 17 (1983) 38 n. 6), but there are problems:

(i) The passage inverts the normal relationship: Sisicottus is satrap, Nicanor hyparch. That is hardly softened by Badian's assumption that Sisicottus was temporary acting satrap after Nicanor's death, or by the indubitable fact that Sisicottus as commander of the area around Aornus might have been termed satrap (cf. 4. 30. 4 n.; 7. 7. 1). Even if we assume that 'hyparch' is a simple synonym, Arrian implies that Sisicottus and Nicanor were equals.

(ii) In an Indian context hyparch ought to denote a local ruler. Given the dozen or more references to hyparchs in the text from 4. 22. 7 onwards, it would be perverse for Arrian to have used the term to refer to a Macedonian satrap.

(iii) Nicanor was satrap of all the territory between Parapamisadae and the Indus (4. 28. 6). The Assaceni of the Swat valley were only one of the peoples under his sway, and it was an inaccuracy to term him satrap (or hyparch) of the Assaceni alone.

These considerations suggest a tentative solution, already adum-

brated by Anspach (65 n. 200). The hyparch killed by his subjects was the native ruler of the Assaceni. Now, the fate of the ruling house after the fall of Massaga is obscure. It seems certain that the previous ruler was dead by the time his capital was taken (see above, 4. 25. 7 n.), and the surviving members of the family were honourably treated (above, 4. 27. 4 n.). Alexander probably nominated a ruler from within or without the royal family, who then held sway under the general supervision of Nicanor. Hated as a quisling, that ruler was subsequently murdered at the first opportunity. The news was conveyed by Sisicottus, whose command lay adjacent to the heartland of the Assaceni (above, 4. 28. 1 n.). In that case his title 'satrap' is loosely applied but understandable. He controlled the area around Aornus (above, 4. 30. 4) and might well have been regarded as a minor satrap from Alexander's perspective.

There remain the problem that nothing is heard of Nicanor, the satrap of western India, and the fact that the revolt was put down by the satraps respectively of eastern India and Parapamisadae. The most likely explanation is that Nicanor's behaviour in the crisis had not inspired Alexander with any confidence in his abilities, and the punitive expedition was placed in other hands. There is a clear parallel in the suppression of the Areian revolt in 329. Then Alexander had sent an expeditionary force from Arachosia and ordered the satrap of Parthyaea, Phrataphernes, to intervene from the north (above, 3. 28. 2 n.). The actual satrap of Areia, Arsaces, is omitted from the command. He is not mentioned during the campaign and was subsequently deposed and arrested for culpable negligence (3. 29. 5, 4. 7. 1 nn.; cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 21). In 326 also the man on the spot may have failed in Alexander's eyes. The expeditionary force which he sent from the Hydaspes was in the hands of the nearest satrap, who may well have been physically present at court (*ἐκπέμπει*); and Tyriespis (above, 4. 22. 5), like Phrataphernes in 329, was instructed to attack from the north. The results of the intervention were satisfactory. By October 326 Philip, son of Machatas, had returned to the Hydaspes and his command was extended to the borders of Bactria, incorporating the satrapy of Tyriespis (see below, 6. 2. 3 n.). The Assaceni were presumably subjugated once more, and Philip annexed the command of his unsuccessful colleague, much as Stasanor in Areia had extended his own rule to Drangiana (Curt. 8. 3. 17; cf. *JHS* 101 (1981) 22-3).

8. ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀκεσίην Alexander crossed Porus' lands, obviously without incident, to reach the next major obstacle, the river Acesines (modern Chenab). The time of the crossing, around the solstice, was reported by Nearchus (Strabo 15. 1. 18 (692) = *FGrH* 133 F 18; cf. *Ind.* 6. 5), and both he and Aristobulus gave a vivid picture of the flooding around the crossing-point, which forced the

Macedonians to evacuate their campsite (Strabo loc. cit., cf. *FGrH* 139 F 35). The river was clearly in full spate (Aristobulus claims some forty cubits above the low-water mark), and a formidable obstacle. In the great flood of 20-1 July 1893, its flow reached the colossal figure of 700,000 cubic feet per second (*Punjab District Gazetteers* xxx.A: Shahpur (1917) p. 3), and even in normal years it could 'present a continuous sheet of water from 1½ to 2 miles in breadth, with a maximum depth of 20 feet and a velocity of ten miles an hour' (*Punjab District Gazetteers*: Gujrat (1892-3) p. 7). It is not surprising that its crossing caused Alexander severe difficulties.

Arrian explicitly cites Ptolemy's description of the river crossing (*FGrH* 138 F 22), which was clearly detailed and vivid, but passes over Aristobulus altogether and only uses Nearchus in his discussion of the flooding of the Punjab rivers (*Ind.* 6. 4-5). Ptolemy is adduced for a single purpose, to corroborate Arrian's earlier estimate of the size of the Indus (see above, 5. 4. 2 with notes), and Arrian allows himself another argument from probability: if the Acesines was fifteen stades wide at its widest point (20. 10), then it was probable that the Indus itself averaged a width of forty stades (cf. 6. 14. 5 for a similar argument). Apart from the figure the details in Ptolemy are of little importance to him. The picturesque account of the crossing is included because it shows the river in spate and justifies the inference that the crossing took place at its greatest breadth. Strangely Arrian has little interest in the appalling weather conditions which Aristobulus and Nearchus described in detail and Ptolemy can hardly have ignored, although they clearly affected Macedonian morale and were a significant factor in the mutiny at the Hyphasis. His focus is the achievement of Alexander, and the general conditions of campaigning were of very secondary importance, to be adduced only when they were exceptionally colourful or highlighted Alexander's qualities of generalship.

μόνου τῶν Ἰνδῶν ποταμῶν The general statement is doubtless correct. However, other sources did give precise figures. Arrian himself (6. 4. 2) takes from Nearchus the statement that the Hydaspes was nowhere less than twenty stades in breadth. That figure was less easy to reconcile with his preferred estimates of the width of the Indus and is passed over without comment.

ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων . . . διφθερῶν Alexander's transports at the Hydaspes were conveyed across country to the Acesines (see above, 5. 8. 4 n.), where they were reused. The convoy clearly required a matter of weeks (5. 9. 4 n.) and took place during the campaign against the Glauganicae/Glausae.

καχλάζειν Cf. 6. 4. 4, 5. 2. A strongly poetical word, adduced by Plutarch (*Mor.* 747 D) as a prime example of onomatopoeia.

9. οὐκ ὀλίγους . . . διαφθάρηναι A sign that casualties on the

Macedonian side were reported in passing by Ptolemy (see in general vol. i 28). Arrian includes the detail solely because it is part of the general description of the turbulence of the river. Otherwise it would not have been considered worthy of record. Similarly the monsoon rains themselves are mentioned once retrospectively (5. 29. 5), where they impact upon Alexander's own actions. Their effect upon the men is consistently ignored by Arrian.

10. ἐς τεσσαράκοντα σταδίους See above, 5. 4. 2 n. The corroborative argumentation is simple enough: if the Acesines was fifteen stades wide at its broadest extent, then it is reasonable that the Indus averaged forty and even contracted to fifteen on occasion. However, the major premise of the argument is explicitly based on inference (τεκμαίρομαι). Ptolemy did not state that Alexander chose the crossing-point where the current was least tumultuous. That is Arrian's contribution. He assumes that Alexander would have chosen the broadest available crossing-point, even though Ptolemy stressed the force of the current. Another inference might have been that haste, not considerations of safety, determined the choice of the crossing-point.

21. *From the Acesines to the Hydraotes*

21. 1. Κοῖνον μὲν . . . ἀπολείπει Alexander's army was fragmented. There is no previous reference to the troops who were deputed to convey provisions. However, at 21. 4 there is an equally isolated reference to foraging activities by Coenus and Craterus east of the Acesines. No source explains Alexander's dispositions, but certain points are clear. Both Coenus and Craterus were behind Alexander's main army group and are conceived as operating together. It is probable that Craterus was in charge of the division allocated to the collection and transport of grain (so Schachermeyr² 430-1; *Innsbr. Beitr. zur Kulturgeschichte* 3 (1955) 129). He received the commission after his work at the sites of Bucephala and Nicaea (above, 20. 2) and arrived at the Acesines some time after Alexander. Coenus remained with the fleet, which he had already moved from the Indus to the Hydaspes (above, 5. 8. 4 n.), and supervised the transport of troops and provisions across the swollen Acesines—a difficult and dangerous task. Once united, the two army groups forged ahead to the Hydraotes. How long they remained separated from the main army remains a problem. As has often been observed (e.g. E. Badian, *JHS* 81 (1961) 20 n. 24; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 88 n. 1), Tarn (ii 287) was in error to assume that Coenus never left his post at the Acesines (see below, 6. 2. 1). Arrian himself attests Coenus foraging beyond the Acesines, and at 5. 22. 6 he records that the battalions of the *asthetairoi* were present at the siege of Sangala.

Now, the one battalion of the *asthetairoi* explicitly upon record is that of Coenus (above, 2. 23. 2, 4. 23. 1 nn.), and in all probability Coenus had overhauled Alexander by the time of the crossing of the Hydraotes. It is only too likely that the lesser Porus burnt whatever transports he used to cross the Hydraotes (cf. 3. 28. 9 for Bessus at the Oxus), so that Alexander was forced to wait for his own vessels to be hauled from the Acesines. In that case there was necessarily a delay, during which the foraging parties reunited with the main army. After the crossing of the Hydraotes there was a new division, and this time Coenus' battalion formed part of Alexander's main army group (cf. 4. 25. 6 n.).

It is interesting that Alexander considered it worth the labour of transporting grain by land and ferrying it across the Acesines. Presumably the great reserve of grain which he had accumulated at the Hydaspes (above, 5. 9. 3 n.) was not yet significantly depleted, and it was shipped across two flooded rivers to supplement the supplies acquired en route by routine foraging.

2. Πῶρον δέ . . . ἀποπέμπει Porus returned to participate in the sack of Sangala (see below, 24. 4) and brought his remaining elephants. We must assume that Alexander campaigned with an accumulating elephant division (cf. 4. 22. 6, 27. 9, 30. 8; 5. 20. 5, 29. 4; 6. 2. 2; Berve i 154-5), and he clearly transported elephants across the swollen rivers of the Punjab. If Hannibal's experiences at the Rhône (Polyb. 3. 46; Livy 21. 28. 5-12) are any guide, it was a truly Herculean task. The beasts later returned with him from the Hyphasis to the west (6. 17. 3) and served as a regular *agema* (Phylarchus, *FGrH* 81 F 41; cf. 7. 3. 6; Diod. 18. 27. 1).

ἐξηγγέλθη πεφευγέναι For the earlier overtures, see above, 20. 6 n. It was probably Porus' acquisition of the territory of the Glauganicae/Glausae (above, 20. 4) which unsettled his namesake and drove him to flee his kingdom. His ambassadors will have reported Alexander's favourable treatment of the greater Porus, and it is not surprising that he felt threatened. Diodorus (91. 1) agrees that the eastern Porus left his kingdom and fled to the land of the Gandaridae (or Gandaritae), which can only be the realm of the Nanda kings in the Ganges valley (cf. Diod. 93. 2-3, 94. 1; 2. 37. 2-3; Curt. 9. 2. 3). He was leaving the Punjab altogether and soliciting aid from the greatest power in northern India. A notice of this kind may underlie Strabo's statement (15. 1. 30 (699)) that the second Porus' realm was named Gandaris. It is certainly possible that Strabo contracted his source misleadingly and confused Porus' destination with his starting-point. Otherwise one must assume that Porus' home territory had the same name as his place of exile.

Alexander regarded this flight as defection (21. 5: τοῦ ἀφεστηκότος) and clearly considered the previous overtures as unconditional

surrender. Porus' flight was totally unacceptable, and Alexander made it a matter of priority to overhaul him. But he failed to prevent his escape across the Hydraotes, and Porus presumably succeeded in reaching the Ganges valley. He would have been an embittered exile, intent upon wresting his lands from his more successful namesake, and his representations, which doubtless stressed the weakness of the western lands, may have been one of the factors which encouraged Chandragupta to launch his invasion of the Indus valley.

τὸν κακόν Arrian adds an evaluative judgement, which might come from his direct source (cf. 3. 6. 7, on Tauriscus). In that case the emphasis would be on Porus' disloyalty to Alexander. But the comment could be Arrian's own (cf. 7. 23. 6, 8 on Cleomenes), contrasting the courageous Porus of the Hydaspes (cf. 19. 2: ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός) with his cowardly namesake, who fled his realm rather than meet Alexander in person.

4. ἐπὶ τὸν Ὑδραώτην The Parushni of the Vedas and Iravati of classical Sanskrit, now the Ravi. In modern times it has been regarded as the most sluggish of the five rivers of the Punjab, but in the mid-nineteenth century it had a different course and was reported much stronger and narrower, unfordable at all seasons (*Punjab District Gazetteers xxx.A: Lahore* (1916) 3-5). Arrian's description, as wide as the Acesines but slower flowing, is circumstantial and probably accurate. The river was a decisive obstacle, not to be traversed without river transport, and Alexander's pursuit of the lesser Porus was necessarily interrupted. Arrian has jumped ahead in his narrative, referring to the terminal point of the pursuit, and later (21. 6) adds a note describing the incidents during the advance to the Acesines.

φυλακὰς ὑπέλιπεν An interesting point. Alexander was moving fast, and the terrain was only partially pacified. There was obviously a danger that isolated parties of foragers would be attacked, as had happened in Sogdiana in 329 (above, 3. 30. 10), costing Alexander a siege and a wound. Now there were regional control centres which could support and protect isolated or heavy-laden groups.

5. Ἡφαιστίωνα μὲν ἐκπέμπει So Diod. 91. 2. The text reads as though Alexander had not touched the actual kingdom of the second Porus but had driven directly to the Hydraotes, hoping to intercept the fugitives. Hephaestion was now sent to enforce the annexation of the country, a task which he successfully completed, and returned to headquarters before the Hyphasis mutiny (Diod. 93. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 35). There can have been little, if any, resistance. For Hephaestion's later commission in the territory see below, 5. 29. 3.

φάλαγγας δύο See above, 20. 3 n. Once again it looks as though the detail is taken from Aristobulus. One cannot reconstruct the use

of sources with any certainty, but it is a possibility that Arrian used Ptolemy for his account of Porus' flight and Alexander's pursuit, and grafted on additional material from Aristobulus.

τῷ Πώρῳ ἄρχειν ἐγχειρίσαι See below, 24. 8, 29. 2. The autonomous Indians clearly lost their autonomy, even when they surrendered voluntarily. Subjection to an approved authority (in this case the incomparable western Porus) was to be the norm in Alexander's India (see above, 5. 2. 2 n.).

6. προχωροῦντι . . . κατεστρέψατο Arrian's use of the present participle ('as he was advancing beyond the banks of the Hydraotes') suggests that the surrenders occurred while Alexander was on his way to the Hydraotes. Most communities capitulated and continued to do so. However, there were isolated instances of resistance and flight, which Arrian implies occurred for the first time after leaving the Hydaspes. The qualification (ἥδη δέ) is significant and is repeated at 6. 4. 2, where the first fighting of the river journey is similarly underlined.

The march to the Hydraotes was, then, relatively peaceful. Things changed after the crossing, when Alexander marched off immediately to deal with the Cathaei (22. 3). News of their hostile intentions would have reached him while he was *en route* to the Hydraotes (22. 1: ἐν τούτῳ), and he moved immediately to the offensive.

22. 1–24. 8. *Between the Hydraotes and the Hyphasis: The Capture of Sangala*

These chapters are usually taken as a unitary whole and ascribed to Ptolemy (Jacoby, *FGrH* 138 F 35; Strasburger 43; Kornemann 79–80; Pearson, *LHA* 202–4). The central description of Ptolemy's night victory (23. 6–24. 3) is surely autobiographical, but we cannot exclude some of the details elsewhere having been taken from Aristobulus (cf. F. L. Holt, *AncW* 5 (1982) 39–40). The campaign in general was widely reported. Curt. 9. 1. 14–25 records the siege of Sangala and its sequel in rather different terms from Arrian (but in agreement with Polyæn. 4. 3. 30), and the brief outline in Diod. 91. 2–4 seems different again (cf. 22. 2 n.). There was a variety of colourful material, and Arrian may well have blended the accounts of his principal sources in a single narrative.

22. 1. τοὺς καλουμένους Καθαίους Since Lassen (ii² 167) the Cathaei have been identified with the Sanskrit Katha, and they have tended to be located near Lahore or Amritsar (cf. Anspach 68–9 n. 219; Seibert, *Eroberung* 159 n. 15). But the location rests upon the highly dubious assumption (see above, 21. 4 n.) that the Hydraotes followed the same course in ancient and modern times. The sole fact we have is that the capital, Sangala, lay something over three

days' march from Alexander's crossing-point (below, 22. 4 n.), and until the crossing-point is pin-pointed, the city's location will remain an enigma (see below, 23. 4 n.).

The problem is hardly helped by Strabo (15. 1. 30 (699)) who apparently names the kingdom of Sopeithes Cathaca and cites variant reports placing it between the Hydaspes and Acesines or alternatively east of the Hydraotes. It seems certain that he has confused the two monarchs named Sopeithes, who like the two kings of the Pauravas had quite distinct territories (cf. Berve nos. 734-5; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 123-5). The realm of the western Sopeithes (see below, 6. 2. 2) was described by Onesicritus (*FGrH* 134 F 21; Brown, *Onesicritus* 52; Pearson, *LHA* 105-6), that of the eastern monarch by Aristobulus and the writers of the vulgate tradition (see below, 24. 8 n.). Only the western kingdom, if Strabo is correctly transmitted, could have been named Cathaca. Arrian makes it abundantly clear that the eastern Cathaei were autonomous, and Diodorus (91. 4) and Curtius (9. 1. 24) are explicit that the cities subjugated by Alexander lay outside the territory of the eastern Sopeithes.

2. καὶ τοῦτοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ It is clear that the preceding verb (*ἐνομιζοντο*) must be understood: 'the Oxydracae had the same reputation as the Cathaei.' The old vulgate translation, dating back to Facius, wrongly has the passage state that the three tribes were allies (*cum iis consentire Oxydracas*). In fact it is the shared qualities of military daring which are emphasized, and there is no implication that there was any military or political connection. However, the Malli territory straddled the Hydraotes in its lower reaches (cf. 6. 7. 1, 8. 2), and the Malli and Oxydracae were directly or indirectly threatened by the joint expedition of Porus and Abisares. Mobilizing the forces west of the Acesines, the two dynasts presumably enlisted the assistance of the independent peoples between the Acesines and Hydraotes (above, 21. 5) to attack their more powerful neighbours east of the Hydraotes. The invasion could well have provoked collective resistance whether or not there were formal treaty relations between its victims. However, the Cathaei stood alone against Alexander and no assistance from elsewhere is recorded in any source. The Malli and Oxydracae offered no provocation on this occasion, but their reputation was such that it determined Alexander to subjugate them (see below, 6. 4. 3). If they had successfully defied Porus and Abisares, that very success was sufficient to direct Alexander's attention fatefully upon them.

ἀναστήσαντας 'enlisting' (not, as Gronovius argued, 'depopulating'). The expression is one of Arrian's many imitations of Thucydides (cf. Thuc. 3. 7. 3; 4. 77. 2, 90. 1).

3. Πίμπραμα . . . Ἀδραϊσταί Elsewhere the gentile name is transmit-

ted as Ἀδρεσταί (Diod. 91. 3; so Justin 12. 8. 9; Oros. 3. 19). Lassen (ii² 167–8 n. 4; Anspach 69–70 n. 221) suggested plausibly that it is an approximation to the Sanskrit Arashtra, the Aratta (kingless peoples) of the *Mahabharata* (above, 20. 6 n.). In that case the generic name has displaced the specific name of the people. The autonomous peoples of Arrian may also be identical with the Aratrii of the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (§47; cf. Casson, *PME* 204), who are listed in the same general context as Alexander's Bucephala. That does not help with the location. Pimprama is not mentioned by name elsewhere and eludes identification.

4. προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ Diodorus (91. 2) suggests that the Adraistae were more troublesome, and some cities needed to be taken by force. Curtius (9. 1. 14) also mentions a city which was invested and forced to surrender. That may be Arrian's Pimprama, in which case either he or Curtius is inaccurate, or (perhaps more probably) Arrian has not recorded all the action in the area.

τῇ τρίτῃ Arrian is clearly taking his calculation from the surrender of the Adraistae. On the following day Alexander rested his army, and the day after that he began his advance (προὔχωρει) to Sangala. As often happens (cf. 1. 5. 5, 2. 6. 1 nn.), Arrian's account of the march is defective. He has Alexander reach Pimprama on the second day from the Hydraotes. Then there is an indefinite interval while he reduces the Adraistae to submission. Next comes a rest day and then the departure for Sangala. There is no implication, as is generally assumed (Anspach 70), that he reached his destination that same day, still less that the day in question was the third from the Hydraotes (Droysen i² 2. 150; Lassen ii² 167–8).

προτεταγμένοι ἦσαν The hostilities, it seems, followed the same order as the siege of Massaga: first an engagement with the defenders outside the city (cf. 4. 26. 1–4), next a period with the city invested and siege engines under construction (Curt. 8. 10. 30–1; see above, 4. 26. 4 n.), and lastly the assault proper. Sangala fell relatively quickly, and the final stage is briefly told (below, 24. 4). Arrian's narrative (like Curtius') focuses on the picturesque detail of the fight for the wagons and the abortive Indian attempt to break the siege, which Ptolemy described at length to enhance his own role.

ὥς τριπλοῦν . . . ἀμαξῶν 'so as to have a triple rampart of wagons thrown forward in defence'. The expression is highly rhetorical and somewhat forced. Arrian is looking forward to Alexander's conventional use of the double palisade in the siege of Sangala (below, 23. 6, 24. 1; cf. 1. 7. 10; 2. 1. 2; *Ind.* 33. 10) and chooses his metaphor appropriately. The three lines of wagons, closely packed and roped together (Curt. 9. 1. 17), had the appearance of a triple palisade—even more so if, as is likely, they were pushed on their sides to present a more immovable barrier.

6. τὴν Κλείτου ἵππαρχίαν Cleitus' hipparchy is mentioned again during the Malli campaign (6. 6. 4), and there can be little doubt that Cleitus had recently been transferred from his phalanx *taxis* (above, 4. 22. 7 n.) after it fought with distinction at the battle of the Hydaspes (above, 12. 2, cf. 16. 3 nn.). Perhaps he immediately succeeded a cavalry commander who died during the battle.

τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας The Agrianians are placed in a most unorthodox position, in the middle of the line between two segments of the phalanx. Elsewhere they are kept separate, usually with the archers, as in the analogous attacks on Sagalassus (1. 28. 4) and Massaga (4. 26. 4), and they are regularly used as flanking troops, again with the archers (cf. 2. 9. 2, 4; 3. 12. 2-3). It is most likely that Arrian has misplaced them on this occasion, perhaps misinterpreting a statement in his source that they were located at the end of the line (i.e. to the right of the cavalry *agema*). They cannot have been sandwiched between two groups of phalanx troops, losing the mobility which was their greatest asset.

τῶν πεζεταίρων As usual the manuscript reading is ἀσθηταίρων, and the reference is to the *asthetairoi*, the phalanx troops from Upper Macedonia (above, 2. 23. 2, 4. 23. 1 nn.). Goukowsky, *REA* 100 (1987) 245-6, has used this passage in support of his theory that each battalion had its own *asthetairoi*, its *corps d'élite*, and assumed that Alexander's army at Sangala was a remnant of the force he had taken against the Glauganicae/Glausae, which did comprise selected troops from each phalanx (above, 20. 3 n.). But it is erroneous to interpret Arrian as an uninterrupted campaign narrative with all troop detachments meticulously recorded. In fact there are many pauses, particularly at the river crossings, when Alexander's scattered forces regrouped and dispersed again in new detachments (21. 1, 4 nn.). By the time Alexander was ready to cross the Hydraotes his army may have been intact except for the expeditionary force sent out with Hephaestion (21. 5 n.). The *asthetairoi* at Sangala as elsewhere were whole battalions (those of Coenus, Alcetas, and Polyperchon), and Perdicas, who commanded them on this occasion, had for years led a battalion of *asthetairoi*.

7. οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀπισθοφυλακίας The rearguard has not been previously mentioned (cf. 3. 23. 5), but it clearly comprised a substantial body of Macedonian cavalry and infantry which could be immediately integrated with the main body of troops. One assumes a minimum of a battalion of infantry and a hipparchy of cavalry, possibly in the hands of Craterus, who would have overhauled Alexander at the Hydraotes (above, 21. 1 n.).

πυκνότεραν τὴν ξύγκλεισιν For the terminology see above, 17. 7 (with note). Alexander increased the solidity of the phalanx by

interjecting files from the incoming units, filling the line with more combatants (cf. *Tact.* 25. 2-3, *Asclep.* 10. 17; *Ael. Tact.* 29). It was a simpler variation of the elaborate expansion of the phalanx before Issus (cf. 2. 8. 2 n.).

23. 1. ἐπιβεβηκότες ... ἡκροβολίζοντο This is the feature of the battle which Curtius emphasizes (9. 1. 15-17), stating that the unorthodox tactics of the Indians inflicted casualties and caused some disarray among the Macedonians. However, Alexander's troops attacked the wagons from the sides and dislodged the defenders. This is not formally inconsistent with Arrian, who concentrates upon the impracticality of attacking the wagons with cavalry. We may well believe also that once the phalanx reached lunging distance the Indians were easily dislodged from the first barrier of wagons. The critical area was the gap between the first and second rows of wagons, where the Macedonian phalanx was necessarily broken into small groups (below, 23. 2) and was vulnerable to attack. Curtius on the contrary concentrates on the picturesque details of the breaking of the first line of wagons and ignores the more dangerous fighting which followed.

2. πρὸ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων Anspach's emendation (ἀπό for πρό), which Roos admitted to his apparatus, implies that the Indians still fought defensively from their wagons. That is a misinterpretation. The Indians were in front of their wagons to deal with the Macedonians as they penetrated the first barrier, attacking them while they were still in haphazard order (ἀτάκτως). Once this defence was broken, it was pointless to repeat the exercise at the third barricade. The Indians lost, but the fighting must have been murderous, and many of the disproportionately large number of Macedonian wounded (below, 24. 5) may have come to grief here.

3. φυγή ... κατεκλείσθησαν So Curt. 9. 1. 17, claiming that the Indians suffered 8,000 casualties. That is not impossible.

4. λίμνη The shallow lake is also mentioned by Curtius (9. 1. 14). In the nineteenth century, identifications of Sangala were based on the contemporary occurrence of lakes (for a survey of locations see Anspach 68-9 n. 219; B. N. Law, *East & West* 19 (1969) 403-4), on the comfortable assumption that the ancient and modern topographies were identical.

καὶ ἅμα εἰκάσας ... εἶκασε Alexander's calculations are first explained, then shown to be vindicated by the event. This is a recurrent feature of Arrian's narrative (cf. 1. 27. 7; 2. 10. 3; 4. 2. 5) and is found in three other passages which are securely ascribed to Ptolemy (1. 1. 10; 3. 18. 9; 4. 29. 5). It was presumably important for him to demonstrate that his king's successes were not mere

chance or the gift of the gods: they were the result of creative planning—helped by the efforts of his subordinates.

6. **χάρακί τε διπλῶ** The complete investment of the city would have required several days, as would the construction of the siege engines. As he does in his narrative of Massaga (above, 4. 26. 4 n.), Arrian slurs over this central stage of the operation, concentrating on the two abortive Indian sorties, which Ptolemy clearly emphasized.

7. **χιλιαρχίας τρεῖς** See above, 4. 30. 6 n. It is difficult to establish what fraction of the hypaspists these three chiliarchies comprised, but it is unlikely that it was the entirety or even the majority of the corps. Alexander had word of a break-out focused upon the weakest point of his fortifications. Ptolemy was placed at the point he *conjectured* (**εἰκαζε**) to be most vulnerable. However, the entire circuit of walls still needed to be covered, and multiple sorties would be anticipated. Ptolemy may have had the largest detachment, but there must have been other concentrations of troops, not merely in the general vicinity.

8. **οὐδὲ** For the transition into direct speech see above, 5. 11. 4 n. Arrian represents the king inspecting the fortifications with his staff and addressing them personally, first Ptolemy, the chief agent, and then the rest of the officers. They are represented simply as supporting Ptolemy, but the instructions are somewhat more general. The commanders are instructed to go to the scene of conflict 'wherever the trumpet summons you'. That could be a reference to the sector controlled by Ptolemy: the other commanders are directed to the specific point at which the trumpet sounds. However, it is more likely that Alexander envisaged a break-out at several points. Ptolemy's position was the most vulnerable, but the sortie might take place elsewhere, in which case the noise of battle and trumpet calls might come from any point within the fortifications.

9. **ἀποστατήσω δὲ οὐδὲ ἐγώ** Alexander stresses the inspirational effect of his presence (cf. 2. 23. 4; 4. 29. 7). His words do not necessarily stress the particular importance of Ptolemy and the danger of this single position (so Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 24). He declares that he will be present at *any* threatened point.

24. 1. **καὶ τοῦ χάρακος . . . τείχους** 'He gave orders for the stakes of the palisade which had been cut [cf. 4. 29. 7] but not yet implanted to be piled in heaps at various points between the lake and the city wall.' The traditional vulgate translation had Ptolemy rebuild portions of the palisade cut down by the Indians in an earlier sortie. Despite Gronovius' brilliantly scathing note it was transmitted from edition to edition down to Chinnock and has infected the Loeb translation (Savinell and the Artemis edition have it right). Arrian depicts Ptolemy taking unused stakes and piling

them in random heaps (*συννήσαι* is a conscious Herodoteanism: cf. Hdt. 1. 34. 3; 2. 135. 4). The wagons commandeered from the scene of the Indian defeat were arranged crosswise in a rough line and the gaps partially closed by piles of stakes. The intention was to channel the Indian sortie through a limited number of narrow apertures so that it could be repelled economically (cf. 24. 3).

2. ἀμφὶ τετάρτην φυλακὴν There is again a standard note (most recently repeated in the Artemis edition, 929 n. 49) alleging that Arrian has imposed the Roman system of four night-watches upon the conventional Greek practice of three watches. Whatever the earlier Greek system, four watches was a recognized division in the fourth century BC (Aen. Tact. 18. 21; cf. P. Pattenden, *Rh. Mus.* 130 (1987) 164–74), and the evidence of Curtius proves that four watches were the norm in Alexander's army. The fourth watch was the last before dawn (Curt. 7. 2. 19–20); and, when Alexander struck camp in response to the eclipse of the moon at 9.12 p.m. on 20 September 331, he did so 'at the second watch' (*secunda vigilia*, Curt. 4. 10. 8). That presupposes a division of the night into four watches (three hours long at the time of the equinox). There is no reason to doubt that Arrian reproduces the terminology of Ptolemy. The Indians, who had failed in one sortie at the second watch, before midnight (above, 23. 5), now waited until the last division of the night, when the besieging forces were most vulnerable to fatigue. But Ptolemy had exploited the majority of the night for his preparations, and his defences were unpleasantly effective.

ἐν τούτῳ Grundmann 257 suggested emending to ἐν ταύτῳ ('at the same time'). That intensifies the immediacy of the action: the trumpet signals and Ptolemy's attack were simultaneous. The manuscript reading is comparatively clumsy, and can only refer back to the Indian advance (ἐφέροντο); 'while this was happening'. Grundmann's emendation is more forceful and gives the best interpretation of Ptolemy's actions. He did not wait for reinforcements but attacked as soon as his trumpeters sounded the alarm.

3. ἐς πεντακοσίους Seibert, *Ptolemaios* 24–5, noted that any casualties suffered by Ptolemy have been absorbed into the total figure for the siege (below, 24. 5). Possibly so, but there is no reason to think that Ptolemy's detachment suffered significant casualties. The Indians he killed were in disarray after stumbling through his barricade in the dark. Those who fell were easy prey, and the majority turned back into Sangala without coming to grips with the enemy. The victory was achieved more by careful preparation than by fighting, and it is the preparation and its dramatic results that Arrian stresses.

4. Πῶρος ἀφίκετο See above, 5. 21. 2 n. Porus' movements provide a rough chronological check. He had to return from the

Acesines to his capital where he collected his elephants and mustered 5,000 troops, not an easy task after his defeat. Then he followed Alexander's route, transporting troops and elephants across the Acesines and Hydraotes, still swollen in their summer spate. He must have been several weeks at least behind Alexander, who was clearly delayed both at the Hydraotes and on the way to Sangala (see above, 21. 1, 22. 4 nn.).

τὰς κλίμακας ἐν κόκλῳ So Curt. 9. 1. 18 (*scalis undique admotis*). It is implied that the city was captured without serious difficulty, without any need for the siege engines to become operational. However, the capture of Sangala took place at the height of the torrential monsoon rains (Diod. 94. 3; see below, 29. 5 n.), and the scaling of the walls must have been a slippery and hideously dangerous business. We may well believe that there were large numbers of Macedonian wounded (see below), and the foul conditions during the capture were probably responsible in part for the carnage which ensued in the city. I am not convinced that the numbers of Indian dead are 'obviously exaggerated' (Brunt, *Arrian* ii 79 n. 1). Sangala had been deliberately chosen as a mustering centre for the Cathaei (above, 22. 4), and the military population, which was clearly massacred *en bloc*, may well have numbered close to 20,000.

5. οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος For a similar discrepancy between deaths and wounded, compare 1. 20. 10 (with 3. 15. 6) where the special circumstances are identified. Here there is no reference to the monsoonal conditions, which Arrian's source may have covered in the description of the storming of the city. What is striking is the size of the Macedonian casualties. The 100 dead at Sangala are equal to the total of casualties admitted at Gaugamela (3. 15. 6), more than the infantry losses at the Hydaspes (5. 18. 3), and on the figures given for the wounded some 10 per cent of the troops present at Sangala suffered some injury. The siege obviously took a high toll in Macedonian suffering, and it is not minimized by Arrian's source (hardly in this case Ptolemy). Once again the parallel of Massaga suggests itself (above, 4. 26. 4, 7 nn.). Arrian seems to have combined the essentially eulogistic account of Ptolemy with a version more appreciative of the costs of conquest.

Λυσίμαχος ὁ σωματοφύλαξ See above, 13. 1 n. The biographical note about a prominent actor in the era of the Successors is a rarity. Ptolemy was sparing in references to his contemporaries, those at least who survived the reign of Alexander (see above, 3. 15. 2 n., for the omission of Perdikkas from the list of the wounded at Gaugamela), and the emphasis on Lysimachus might be another indicator of a change of source.

6. Εὐμενὴ τὸν γραμματέα (Berve no. 317; Heckel 346-7) This is the first explicit reference to Alexander's chief secretary Eumenes.

Son of Hieronymus, a dignitary of Cardia and friend of Philip (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3; Nepos, *Eum.* 1. 3; cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* 8-9), he won the confidence of Philip and was employed as his confidential secretary from 342 BC (Nepos, *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). He preserved his position throughout Alexander's reign, and, though he is never credited with a Macedonian domicile (cf. *Ind.* 18. 7), he ranked among the great figures of Alexander's court. His enmity with Hephaestion (below, 7. 13. 1, 14. 9 nn.) was famous, and his hostility to Antipater dates back to the time of his intimacy with Philip (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7). On a more positive side he stood as Ptolemy's equal at Susa, when he married one of Artabazus' daughters (below, 7. 4. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 7), and he succeeded to the command of Perdikkas' hipparchy when Perdikkas was promoted to the chiliarchy as Hephaestion's successor (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Nepos, *Eum.* 1. 6; see below, 7. 14. 10 n.).

It is clear that Eumenes' eminence came primarily from his secretarial functions, which gave him constant access to the king, and the celebrated gibe of his enemy, Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6), proposes that his weapons were his pen and writing-tablet. But command of Perdikkas' hipparchy cannot have come from nothing and the formidable military expertise which made him one of the great generals of the age was hardly the product of observation alone. The role of Myllenas at Aornus (above, 4. 29. 1 n.) proves that secretaries could take part in active service and did so with distinction. Eumenes also could have served with his king in the Companion cavalry, and it is arguable that he needed to do so to maintain his credibility in Macedonian circles. The command in India is the only recorded appointment he received before inheriting Perdikkas' hipparchy, and it is reported in similar terms by Curtius (9. 1. 19) and Plutarch (*Eum.* 1. 5). It required an interesting combination of functions. The primary task was to communicate with the Indians and persuade them to surrender, and Eumenes must have had significant experience with interpreters since Alexander's first contact in Sogdiana with the Indian rulers. But it was more than a diplomatic mission. The 300 cavalry under his command was a significant force and there was obviously a danger that he would come under attack. He needed military as well as diplomatic and negotiating skills. On the other hand the purely military task of devastating the territory of the recalcitrant Cathaei was delegated to Perdikkas (Curt. 9. 1. 19).

7. ἡδὲ γὰρ ἐξηγγέλθη Curtius (9. 1. 18) claims plausibly that the survivors from Sangala brought the news of the capture to the neighbouring towns. The effect was immediate, and the populations had clearly been evacuated before Eumenes arrived to talk them into surrender. As had been the case with the peoples of Gandhara

(above, 4. 23. 2 n.) and the second Porus (above, 21. 2 n.), Alexander refused to countenance passive resistance. He harried the refugees with the utmost ferocity, as an object-lesson to others who might be tempted to prefer flight to submission.

ἀσθενεῖα ὑπελείποντο The massacre of these sick stragglers was a calculated piece of terror. It may have had a political end, and was not murder for its own sake (like the Persian massacre of the Macedonian invalids at Issus: above, 2. 7. 1); but it is certainly one of the more repulsive acts of the campaign.

8. πάλαι μὲν . . . προσχωρήσασι There is no indication which Indian peoples are involved. They may be the Adraistae, whose surrender was to some extent voluntary (above, 22. 4 n.), but Arrian could be referring to a new set of autonomous Indians who accepted Alexander's rule after Sangala. In that case there is a truncated allusion to the vulgate tradition (Curt. 9. 1. 19-23; Polyae. 4. 3. 30; Diod. 91. 4), which has Alexander take a series of towns by negotiated surrender immediately after the capture of Sangala. If the story is true (and there is no reason to contest it), Alexander may well have rewarded these communities, which recognized the benefits of surrender, with the territory of the deluded and recalcitrant Cathaei.

Arrian is extremely brief at this point of the narrative, moving immediately from Sangala to the Hyphasis. Other sources (Diod. 91. 4-93. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 24-36; *Metz Epil.* 66-8) have Alexander move first to the kingdom of Sopeithes (see above, 22. 1 n.) and then to the lands of Phegeus, close to the Hyphasis. Both dynasts welcomed him and offered hospitality. Apart from Tarn (ii 280-4), who for his own purposes dismissed Phegeus as 'a mythical ruler', modern scholars have accepted the fuller itinerary and the historicity of the rulers who entertained Alexander (Lassen ii² 170-2; Anspach 73-7; Schachermeyr² 432-3; Seibert, *Eroberung* 160). Rightly so. In the first place the fuller tradition supplements a gap in Arrian. The return of Hephaestion after pacifying the territory of the second Porus (above, 21. 5 n.) is duly recorded while Alexander was in mid-course between the domains of Sopeithes and Phegeus (Diod. 93. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 35). It fell in the hypothesized gap in Arrian and is naturally omitted from his narrative. Secondly there is evidence that Aristobulus at least mentioned the meeting with Sopeithes. He described the prowess of the Indian hunting dogs ([Plut.] *pro nob.* 19 = *FGrH* 139 F 40), which were a feature of the kingdom of Sopeithes (Strabo 15. 1. 31 (700); Diod. 92. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 31-4; *Metz Epil.* 66), and possibly gave an account of the visit to Sopeithes' court. One must inject a note of caution, for Aristobulus apparently stated that the dogs were *sent* as a present (so Pliny, *NH* 8. 149; cf. Acl. *NA* 8. 1) while the other sources have Sopeithes make his gift in

person. The two traditions are not inconsistent. Aristobulus perhaps represented Sopeithes sending a number of dogs as a preliminary token of submission (cf. 4. 22. 6; 5. 3. 5, 8. 3, 20. 5), while the other sources described the more munificent gift which he later made in person. It is reasonable to conclude that Aristobulus did refer to Alexander's reception by Sopeithes and that Arrian ignored his report.

It is clear that Arrian had little or no interest in events between Sangala and the Hyphasis. His reasons are likely to have been compositional. The capture of Sangala was the last military action before the mutiny and makes an emphatic prologue. He states in a memorable phrase that Alexander would continue to fight as long as there were enemies left, and points the contrast between the king and his troops, the one fired by conquest and ready to pursue the war indefinitely and the others already demoralized by danger and fatigue and dreading more of the same (25. 2). The antithesis would be spoiled if between Sangala and the Hyphasis there was an interlude of comparative ease and soft living. Arrian is deliberately selective (cf. 20. 8 n.), and his sources may have recorded far more than he chose to report.

24. 8–29. 5. *The Mutiny at the Hyphasis*

Arrian's account is probably a conflation of his primary sources, including Ptolemy, who is cited in passing (28. 4) for a suspicious point of detail and was probably used throughout the narrative (Kornemann 78–81, *contra* Strasburger 44; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 532). The speeches, of course, are a different matter (below, 25. 2 n.). Apart from Arrian the vulgate tradition is remarkably consistent, most fully represented by Curtius (9. 2. 1–3. 19) and Diodorus (93. 1–95. 2) and more sketchily touched upon by Plutarch (*Al.* 62), *Metz Epitome* (68–9), and Justin (12. 8. 9–17). Elsewhere Diodorus twice refers to Alexander's decision not to cross the Hyphasis (2. 37. 3; 18. 6. 1), and his source may well have been Hieronymus of Cardia (see below). Interesting additional *aperçus* are provided by Strabo 15. 1. 27 (697) and Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 (= *FGrH* 119 F 2a).

Modern discussions have tended to focus upon the problem of the Ganges and the limits of Alexander's geographical knowledge (below, 25. 1, 26. 1 nn.): Tarn, cf. ii 275–85 and *JHS* 43 (1923) 93–100; E. Meyer, *Klio* 21 (1927) 183–91; Schachermeyr, *Innsbr. Beitr. zur Kulturgeschichte* 3 (1955) 123–35; D. Kienast, *Historia* 14 (1965) 180–8. The fullest general treatment is the essay by F. L. Holt, *AncW* 5 (1982) 33–54. See also Droysen i² 2. 156–65; Wilcken 185–7; Schachermeyr² 434–52; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 170–5; Green 407–11; Lane Fox 367–72; Hammond, *KCS*² 218–20.


8. Πῶρον μὲν See above, 24. 4. The fact that Porus was allowed to garrison the cities which had surrendered and employ his own troops in the process is a clear indication that Alexander already intended to make him overlord of the territories east to the Hyphasis, even though he was only confirmed in that role after the retreat (below, 29. 2).

According to the vulgate tradition (Diod. 93. 2-3; Curt. 9. 2. 5-8; *Metz Epit.* 69) Porus was present during Alexander's reception at Phegeus' court (see above) and amplified Phegeus' reports on the Nanda kingdom. If that is correct, we must assume that Porus was sent to garrison the newly acquired cities when Alexander left for the Hyphasis.

ἐπὶ τὸν Ὑφάσιν The Hyphasis is the Sanskrit Vipāś (modern Beas), mentioned by Panini (4. 2. 74; cf. V. S. Agrawala, *India as Known to Panini* (Lucknow 1953) 44). Arrian's spelling is consistent, whereas Strabo equally consistently refers to the river as Hypanis in a number of passages, including an explicit citation of Aristobulus (15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35). Tarn (ii 32; so Brunt, *Arrian* ii 460-1) accordingly argued that Hypanis was Aristobulus' name for the Beas, but we cannot be so sanguine. Both Arrian and Strabo have selected a single name for the river and imposed uniformity. Even when they use the same source (e. g. *Ind* 6. 1; Strabo 15. 1. 37 (702)) they retain their standard nomenclature. It is impossible to pin-point which source used which form. The only clue is supplied by Diodorus, who refers to the river as Hyphasis in the context of Alexander's campaigns (93. 1) but calls it Hypanis when he digests Megasthenes in Book II (37. 4 = *FGrH* 715 F 4). Diodorus followed his sources and preserved the variant nomenclature, whereas Arrian and Strabo had more occasion to mention the river and imposed uniformity.

The Hyphasis was at least as formidable an obstacle as the other Punjab rivers. Diodorus (93. 1) claims that it was seven stades broad and six fathoms deep, figures which cohere remarkably with early twentieth-century descriptions of the Beas; around 1.5 km. wide at flood time and up to 10 m. deep (*Punjab District Gazetteers* xx.A: Amritsar (1914) 2-3).

οὐδέ . . . πολέμιον The sentiment could be derived from Aristobulus, who emphasized Alexander's absolute drive to conquest (below, 7. 19. 6 n.; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 56). However, it is a theme which Arrian enunciates in his own right and with considerable force (7. 1. 4). Even if he has adapted it from his immediate source, he makes quite original use of it and shapes his narrative around it. He looks ahead to Alexander's speech (26. 1), where the king is insistent that there is no limit (πέρας) to either labour or empire, and also to Coenus' insistence (27. 4) that there *should* be a



MAP 10. India east of the Hyphasis

term to toil and danger. What is more, Arrian's phrasing echoes and inverts Alexander's exhortations at Issus (2. 7. 6). There victory is finality, the enjoyment of empire and the end of labour, whereas at the Hyphasis there is an endless vista of war and conquest.

25. 1. τὰ δὲ δὴ πέραν κτλ. The reports of conditions beyond the Hyphasis fall into three classes:

(i) Arrian reports a rich and populous land with an aristocratic constitution and an army of elephants far superior to that possessed by any other Indian people (so Strabo 15. 1. 36 (702)).

(ii) The vulgate tradition (Diod. 93. 2-3; Curt. 9. 2. 2-6; *Metz Epil.* 68; cf. Plut. *Al.* 62. 2-3) has a remarkably consistent story that Phegeus (above, 24. 8 n.) reported the existence of the Ganges, which was only reached after a desert transit twelve days' long, and beyond the Ganges he mentioned the Prasii and the Gandaridae, ruled over by King Xandrames (see Map 10). The latter had a formidable army, including a vast number of elephants. There is some variation in the transmission of names, and the figures for the army differ slightly (4,000 elephants in Diodorus, 3,000 in Curtius, and 6,000 in Plutarch); but the substance is identical in all sources.

(iii) Two notes in Diodorus (2. 37. 2-3; 18. 6. 1-2) clearly resume the same story, dealing with the Gandaridae (Tyndaridae at 18. 6.

1) of the Ganges plain,¹ whose elephant army, 4,000 strong, was so formidable that even Alexander gave up his plan of campaigning against them.

Traditions (ii) and (iii) are independent. It might be argued (e.g. Goukowsky on 18. 6. 1; Hornblower, *Hieronimus* 86) that Diodorus merely repeated the vulgate story from Cleitarchus which he digested in Book XVII, grafting it on to the material from Megasthenes in Book II and Hieronymus' Gazetteer of Empire in Book XVIII. However, there is a contradiction of fact. In Book XVII Alexander responds positively to the challenge from the elephants, while in the other two passages he is deterred. Secondly there is no reference to the Prasii, who are coupled with the Gandaridae in all the sources for tradition (ii). It seems most likely (as argued by Meyer and Kienast) that Hieronymus mentioned the Gandaridae in his Gazetteer of Empire, observing that they deterred Alexander from invasion, and Diodorus resumed the material in an anticipatory note in Book II. He demonstrably anticipated material from Cleitarchus (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 10), and there is no reason why he should not have done the same with Hieronymus.

Two separate traditions reported the existence of the Gandaridae east of the Ganges and an elephant army numbered in thousands. The vulgate sources also mention the Prasii, who were explicitly named by Megasthenes at the heart of Chandragupta's empire. The capital, Pataliputra, lay in their territory (*Ind.* 10. 5; Strabo 15. 1. 36 (702) = *FGrH* 715 F 18). It seems certain that the report of Phegeus dealt with the contemporary Nanda kingdom, centred at Pataliputra, and gave vague but largely accurate information about it. The only outright error appears to be the reference to the twelve-day desert crossing. Between the Beas and the Jumna there is no desert in modern times, least of all in the monsoon season; and the Thar desert, which does separate the lower reaches of the Indus basin from the Ganges and extends to a width of some 360 km., does

¹ T. R. Robinson, *Ancient History Bulletin* 7 (1993) 84-9, has argued that the river mentioned at Diod. 18. 6. 2 is not the Ganges and the name should not be imposed upon the text. However, the figure of 30 stades which Diodorus gives for the breadth of the river (2. 37. 2; 18. 6. 2) is precisely attested for the Ganges (Strabo 15. 1. 35 (702)), and its description, 'greatest in the area', is wholly appropriate for the Ganges (above, 4. 1 n.), certainly not for the Hyphasis/Beas, which Robinson (88-91) considers the river of Diodorus. Nor are the Gandaridae misplaced, as Robinson 89 maintains. Even if one rejects the vulgate tradition (ii) of Phegeus' report (Robinson 98-9), we have an independent notice in Pliny (*NH* 6. 65-6), which locates the Gandaridae (*Gangaridae* MSS) on the Ganges and gives a total for their army which is at variance with both Diodorus (tradition iii) and the vulgate (ii). Similarly Ptolemy, for what he is worth, places the Gangaridae (*sic*) at the mouth of the Ganges (*Geog.* 7. 1. 81). There can be no serious doubt that the Gandaridae were situated in the Ganges plain or that Alexander received informed reports about them.

not reach the latitude of the Beas (see fully Kienast, *Historia* 14 (1965) 186–7). Some confusion certainly exists. It may originate in earlier Greek reports of a vast desert to the east of the Indus valley (Hdt. 3. 98. 2; cf. Hecataeus, *FGrH* 1 F 299; A. Dihle, *Entretiens Hardt* 35 (1990) 52). If Alexander and his staff enquired directly, it is likely enough that Phegeus described the Thar desert and gave information about the various routes eastwards, both the northern, sub-montane itinerary and the desert crossing to the south. Alexander's interpreters may have garbled the information, and by the time it reached Cleitarchus, the two routes were blended into one. But Cleitarchus preserved a modicum of accurate information, relating to the Ganges river system (below, 26. 1 n.) and the great monarchy of the east. It is grossly implausible that Alexander was ignorant of both (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 172; Badian, in *CHIran* ii 465–6).

On the other hand Arrian does not mention the Ganges in the context of the Hyphasis mutiny, and he seems to be describing an aristocratic system of government, not a central monarchy. There is a superficially simple explanation: Arrian's source described only the peoples immediately proximate to the Hyphasis, and did not refer to the kingdom of the Nandas further east (so Tarn ii 280; Kienast, *Historia* 14 (1965) 185–6; *contra* Schachermeyr² 433 n. 527). That is not in itself a contradiction of the vulgate tradition. Alexander will have received many briefings of conditions beyond the Hyphasis, informed and detailed about the immediate vicinity, more vague and inaccurate when remoter lands and peoples were at issue. The vulgate tradition, then, might document the vaguer reports on the distant Nanda kingdom, while Arrian's source concentrates on the conditions immediately beyond the Hyphasis. But Arrian focuses on the uniquely strong elephant army which Alexander would face, and the elephants of the Gandaridae are the central theme of the other traditions (Meyer, *Klio* 21 (1927) 187). Such an army is hardly likely to have been found or anticipated in the lands neighbouring the Hyphasis. What is more, Arrian's report does not stand in isolation. Its essence recurs in Strabo (15. 1. 37 (702)), in an excursus on the lands beyond the Hyphasis, which are agreed to be the best in India. Strabo then lists a number of exaggerations due to ignorance, including a report of an aristocratic system of government with a representative council of 5,000, each member of which provided the commonwealth with an elephant. That reads remarkably like Arrian's aristocratic polity with its unsurpassed elephant army.

The source for Strabo's comments is an enigma. The surrounding chapter is a series of alleged exaggerations, the majority ascribed explicitly to Megasthenes, who is cited by name a few lines before (Strabo 15. 1. 36 (702)). Usually the passage on Indian aristocracy

is divorced from Megasthenes (so Schwanbeck *ad loc.*; Timmer 234), since Strabo expresses himself indefinitely (λέγουσι, 'they say') and only cites Megasthenes explicitly for the next detail, on the physique of tigers. The context could be a typical miscellany of criticism, digested from Eratosthenes (above, 4. 3 n.), in which Megasthenes was the principal target but other authors, including Arrian's source at 25. 1, were indicted. Arrian is clearly aware of the critique, which he exploited in the *Indike*. He repeats Strabo's comment that the land beyond the Hyphasis lent itself to exaggeration (*Ind.* 6. 1) and instances Megasthenes' description of the miraculous river Silas (Karttunen 186-9), which Strabo also adduces in the same context (15. 1. 38 (703); cf. *Ind.* 6. 2). In that case he was clearly aware of Eratosthenes' criticism of his chosen source but still retailed its substance without qualification.

Whatever source Arrian used, it clearly envisaged a great coalition of aristocratically governed states, which supplied a common elephant army. The description cannot be confined to the immediate vicinity of the Hyphasis. It must refer generally to the entire population east of the river. How can that be reconciled with Phegeus' report in the vulgate with its insistence on a central monarchy? The only feasible explanation is that Arrian's source did not focus upon the Nanda monarch at the top of the pyramid but described the system of city government which Megasthenes was to describe with evident admiration. In the Mauryan kingdom the multifarious city officials were carefully selected, 'in wisdom and justice the most distinguished of all' (*Ind.* 12. 6-7; cf. Strabo 15. 1. 49-51; Diod. 2. 41. 4). Such a polity, where the commons were carefully controlled by a hand-picked élite, could well be described in Arrian's words (πρὸς γὰρ τῶν ἀρίστων ἄρχεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς) or even characterized in Strabo's terms as an aristocracy. In such a context it was superfluous to mention a king (particularly the unimpressive Xandrames), because the city government guaranteed a disciplined, warlike populace. For Arrian's source the excellence of their internal government, not their monarchy, made the eastern Indians worthy opponents. The two traditions, then, represent different perspectives. Both emphasized the large numbers of elephants Alexander would encounter, but the vulgate gave more specific details about the dominant peoples and their paramount ruler, while Arrian described the government at city level and stressed its excellence.

ἐν κόσμῳ πολιτεύοντας A conscious echo of the description of the polity of Nysa (above, 1. 6). The emphasis on order (i.e. absence of civil disturbance) is frequent in Arrian, and is regarded as the epitome of good government, 'achieved when the governors are themselves conscientious' (cf. 6. 27. 5; 7. 23. 2). For Arrian (and his source) the eastern Indians are too virtuous *not* to be included in

Alexander's empire. Like the Ariaspans (3. 27. 4), the Abii (4. 1. 1), and the Nysacans themselves, their merits can only grace the regime of their overlord.

μεγέθει . . . ἀνδρεία As the text stands, the phrase refers to the elephants of the east, not only numerous but exceptional in size and courage. But the reading has been challenged. Elsewhere in Arrian (and in Herodotus whom he imitates) μεγέθει μέγας/μέγιστος stands as a complete entity (cf. 5. 19. 5; 7. 12. 1, 23. 1; Hdt. 1. 203. 1; 7. 117. 1). It has long been suspected that a superlative qualifying ἀνδρεία has been lost (the elephants were greatest in size and outstanding in courage: so Ellendt, Krüger, and Abicht), and, if there is a lacuna, it may well be longer than a single word. Indeed the phrase, as Chinnock thought, could refer to the Indians rather than their elephants and may be a repetition of the testimonial Arrian gives them elsewhere (4. 4 n.).

2. πόνους . . . καὶ κινδύνους See above, 24. 8 n. Here the Macedonian complaints are summarized in the form in which they are later expounded in Coenus' speech (cf. 26. 3-4: πέρας . . . τοῖς πόνοις καὶ κινδύνοις), and the Macedonian war-weariness later itemized by Coenus (26. 5-6) is here briefly alluded to (ἐξέκαμνον ἤδη). The narrative prepares the ground for both Alexander's speech and Coenus' reply, and in fact provides the gist of their contents. Arrian expresses himself in generalities, but his skeletal outline is filled by other sources. Strabo (15. 1. 27 (697)) records three reasons for Alexander's halting at the Hyphasis: adverse omens (see below, 28. 4 n.), the recalcitrance of his troops, who were now refusing to tolerate the toils of campaigning, and—the most potent factor in their demoralization—the continuous monsoon rain. The picture is embellished by Diodorus (94. 2-3), who describes the effect on weaponry, clothing, and morale of the seventy days of continuous rain. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this description (dismissed by Hammond, *Three Historians* 63, as the product of Cleitarchus' imagination), which would easily account for the 'damp collective *cafard*' (Green 402) that descended upon the Macedonians. Arrian agrees that the Macedonians had lost their enthusiasm but largely ignores the environmental conditions. They are subsumed under the toils of campaigning, and it is fear of the future (as at Plut. *Al.* 62. 2), not present exhaustion, which provokes Alexander's troops to express their discontent.

ξύλλογοί τε ἐγίνοντο There is no other reference to these gatherings, impromptu protest meetings such as are attested in other armies on the brink of mutiny (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 5. 7. 2; Tac. *Ann.* 1. 16. 3). Instead Diodorus (94. 1) refers to the exhaustion of the troops and Alexander's realization that they would need to be cajoled into advancing. That is compatible with, and almost presupposes,

his having wind of the meetings in his camp. In addition Diodorus (94. 4) states that Alexander attempted to sweeten the mood of his troops by allowing them to plunder the rich riverain territory and promising benefits to their dependents. That is certainly a detail from Cleitarchus, not a supplement from a secondary source (*contra* Holt, *AncW* 5 (1982) 43-4), and is not incredible. Indeed it is reminiscent of Alexander's actions at the Hydaspes (above, 9. 2). Our information is extremely sketchy, and much of the original source material will have been omitted from the extant accounts. Arrian documents the increasing tension among the rank-and-file, culminating in the king's intervention, while Diodorus focuses upon the atrocious conditions and Alexander's attempts to raise morale. The two traditions are independent, but hardly incompatible.

τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν τάξεων As in earlier speeches (2. 7. 3, 16. 8; 3. 9. 3, 5) Alexander addresses a gathering of commanding officers, a natural enough proceeding in a polyglot army. The source on all occasions is likely to be Ptolemy, an eyewitness of the proceedings. Diodorus (94. 5) on the contrary writes of a plenary assembly of troops, while Curtius (9. 2. 12) has the soldiers called to a *contio*. The vulgate tradition clearly envisaged a gathering of rank-and-file which was exclusively Macedonian (cf. Curt. 9. 2. 30), whereas Ptolemy mentioned only a representative meeting of commanders (see below, 28. 1-2 nn.).

It is clear that Ptolemy reported little or nothing of the substance of the proceedings, for the speeches which follow in Arrian are almost wholly divorced from their setting. There is a perfunctory reference to the context of the council in Coenus' speech (below, 27. 2). Otherwise both Alexander's oration and Coenus' response read as orations to a plenary assembly. Both speeches are in fact elaborate expansions of the attitudes enunciated at 25. 2: the reported dangers are a stimulus to Alexander's ambition, while the troops are demoralized by past toil and unwilling to face more. The content is mostly elaborate and empty rhetoric, with themes recapitulated from the earlier narrative, including anachronistic Eratosthenean geography (26. 2). Arrian's procedure is matched by Curtius (9. 2. 12-3. 15), who reports two speeches by Alexander and a response by Coenus. Curtius also embroiders his earlier narrative, but his Alexander discounts the dangers beyond the Hyphasis, arguing that they are exaggerated and easily overcome thanks to earlier experiences; and his Coenus refers back to the Cleitarchean picture of the miseries of the monsoon rain (Curt. 9. 3. 10-11). In both authors the speeches are interconnected, with Coenus rebutting and inverting arguments propounded by his king, and they are clearly rhetorical exercises, enlarging and expanding what their authors see as the key factors in the crisis, but in no sense reports of what was said or claimed to be

said. It seems that no source recorded the content of the debate on this crucial occasion. On the other hand it was an opportunity to air the subject of Alexander's imperial ambitions, which were such a standard item in the Roman rhetorical schools (Sen. *Contr.* 7. 7. 19; *Suas.* 1. 1, 4, 8-9). Arrian has in fact produced a debate on the limits of empire which has as little to do with its setting as the speech before the siege of Tyre (above, 2. 17 n.).

See further Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 123-34, discounting any direct source for Arrian's speeches (cf. Breebaart 81-6). Others have argued that a nucleus was supplied by Ptolemy (Kornemann 148-51; Holt, *AncW* 5 (1982) 43), by Aristobulus (Brunt, *Arrian* ii 532), or by both (Hammond, *Sources* 258-60).

3. **Μακεδόνες τε καὶ ξύμμαχοι** On other occasions the commanders of the allied troops (and mercenaries) were part of the group which received Alexander's exhortations (2. 7. 3; 3. 9. 3), and Ptolemy probably recorded that they were summoned to the Hyphasis council. However, allied troops tended to have Macedonian commanders (cf. 1. 14. 3, 29. 3, etc.), and the council of officers must have been more homogeneous than their commands. But Arrian has Alexander direct his words to the troops, and even the exordium creates the atmosphere of a plenary meeting (cf. Kornemann 149).

4. **εἰ δὲ Ἰωνία κτλ.** The listing of Alexander's conquests was a standard *topos*, often taken to excess in the rhetorical schools (Sen. *Contr.* 7. 7. 19). Arrian supplies no less than two catalogues in Alexander's Opis speech (7. 9. 6-8, 10. 5-7), both carefully tailored to the context (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 105-7). Here the list begins with a simple enumeration of peoples annexed to the Empire, proceeds with a number of geographical boundaries transcended (25. 5), the catalogue now marked by emphatic asyndeton, and ends with the rivers of the Punjab. Two themes are combined, the acquisition of empire by labour and triumph over natural obstacles, a combination which is resumed and developed at 26. 1-2; and the catalogue ends dramatically with the present problem, the crossing of the Hyphasis. Curtius also alludes to the conquests, listing the victories in the field as proof of Macedonian superiority against overwhelming numbers (9. 2. 23) and demonstrating that the Macedonian numbers were swelled by the conquered peoples of Central Asia (9. 2. 24). These are independent variants on a common *topos*. Similar material is used, but the rhetorical purposes are totally different.

Λιβύη τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ The reference is to Cyrene (cf. Paus. 10. 13. 5), which is linked with Egypt at 7. 9. 8. Arrian is certainly inaccurate. In 331 the people of Cyrene had sent an embassy and gifts to Paraetonium (Diod. 49. 2-3; Curt. 4. 7. 9), but the result was a

treaty of friendship and alliance, not incorporation in the Empire (Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 72, 251). Arrian did not mention the embassy when he described Alexander's journey to Siwah, but it is certainly possible that it was noted in his source and retained by him for future reference (Kornemann 149 n. 126; Brunt, *Arrian* ii 231 n. 7). On the other hand Arrian may be expressing himself loosely. He clearly has in mind his report of the administrative division of Egypt, in which the annexes of Libya and Arabia were placed under separate governors (above, 3. 5. 4 n.), and he may have wrongly inferred that the Libyan *nome* of Egypt included Cyrenaica. In the more elaborate Opis speech Arrian goes further and has Cyrene like Egypt fall into the Macedonian ambit without a blow.

5. τὰ ὑπὲρ τὰς Κασπίας πύλας κτλ. The terminology is repeated (and conflated) at 7. 10. 6. Here Arrian takes Alexander's line of march eastwards from Media and lists the natural obstacles: first, the Caspian Gates, which formed the eastern boundary of Media (Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 35; cf. 3. 20. 3 n.), then the Caucasus (Hindu Kush) which divided Parapamisadae from Bactria (3. 28. 5-7; 5. 3. 3, 5. 3-4), next the Tanais, the boundary between Europe and Asia (3. 30. 9), and finally the territory beyond the Tanais, outside the Persian empire. The catalogue becomes rapid and impressionistic, the change in tempo marked by asyndeton (cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* 102 for the repetition of the definite article).

After the Tanais and the crossing of the continental boundary, the catalogue rather strangely retraces its steps, south to Bactria and west again to Hyrcania and the Caspian Sea, and at the end of this segment of the list the Caspian has an emphasis which is denied it in the campaign narrative (cf. 3. 23. 2). However, its importance is emphasized at 26. 1, where the Caspian is linked with the eastern Ocean as a gulf of the circumambient sea. Arrian's list of conquered territories reaches its first climax at the great sea. Alexander's men have already reached the Ocean in the north (and Arrian's campaign narrative implicitly prepares us for it by terming the Caspian the great sea: 3. 23. 1, 29. 2 with note); now they are on the verge of doing so in the east.

ἐπὶ τὴν ἔρημον A recurrent feature of the earlier narrative (4. 6. 5, 17. 2, 7). Its recapitulation here underlies the fact that the Macedonians had occupied all the productive land to the north.

6. ὧν γε οἱ μὲν προσχωροῦσιν κτλ. Arrian summarizes his own account of events between the Hydaspes and Hyphasis, concentrating on the events after the fall of Sangala, where the land of the evacuated cities was given to Porus and the communities which surrendered voluntarily (cf. 24. 8). The rhetoric glosses over

the Indian resistance and reads as though there had been no battle at the Hydaspes or siege at Sangala.

26. 1. *πέρας . . . φέρουσιν* This is a critical sentence, epitomizing the philosophy of the speech, that hardship is a necessary condition of achievement, and it is taken to its logical conclusion at 26. 4. The sentiment is as old as Greek literature; a famous passage of Xenophon (*Mem.* 2. 1. 18–34) adduces in turn Hesiod (*Erg.* 287–92), Epicharmus, and Prodicus' myth of the choice of Heracles. It was also proverbial that Sparta's glory rested upon a foundation of toil and peril (Thuc. 1. 123. 1; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 16: *τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐκτῆσατο οὐ ῥαθυμοῦσα, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλουσα καὶ πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν*). These are passages which must have been familiar to Arrian (cf. also Xen. *Cyrop.* 7. 5. 75–80) and possibly inspired him to ascribe the sentiment to Alexander. It is certainly not incongruous on his lips, given his attested passion to outstrip all possible rivals, and Arrian himself cites Nearchus' story of the consolation Alexander derived from the Aeschylean tag that action and suffering are concomitant (6. 13. 5 = *FGrH* 133 F 2). However, there is no counterpart in Curtius, and the dictum reads more like a moralizing *topos* than anything that can have been voiced in the historical context of the Hyphasis (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 128).

ἐπὶ ποταμόν τε Γάγγην . . . θάλασσαν The Ganges and the eastern Ocean have not been previously mentioned in the campaign description, and here Arrian is not simply rehearsing material from the earlier narrative, as Curtius does in the parallel portion of his speech. His Alexander claims to have reached the threshold of the Ocean (9. 2. 26, 28), clearly a repetition of the vulgar tradition which explicitly reports that ambition as early as the Hydaspes (see above, 20. 2 n.). In contrast Arrian's statement comes out of nowhere and cannot be attached to any other part of his work. It is formally inconsistent with the geography of Eratosthenes, which Arrian uses in the next sentence, for Eratosthenes had estimated that India extended some 16,000 stades from west to east (above, 6. 3 n. with Fig. 2). There are two possibilities: either Arrian has used late rhetorical material of the type he exploits for his *logoi* (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 75–83) or he has drawn on one of his historical sources (see below, 27. 5 n.). If it was the latter, the most likely choice is Nearchus. Nearchus was clearly interested in Alexander's geographical concepts and explained his misapprehensions (cf. Bosworth, *TOΠΟΙ* 3 (1993) 413–24). In particular he described the delusion over the Indus–Nile link (below, 6. 1. 2–6 with notes), and might easily have stated that Alexander believed Aristotle's theory (*Meteor.* 1. 350^a22–3) that the eastern Ocean was close to the Hindu Kush, even though he, Nearchus, was aware that it was a four-month

journey across the Indian plains (*Ind.* 3. 6; Strabo 15. 1. 12 (689)). The crux is the authenticity of the tradition that Alexander intended to reach the eastern Ocean, and that cannot be formally settled. There is, however, no negative evidence except the general silence in Arrian's campaign narrative, and there is an almost overwhelming probability that Alexander was aware of the existence of the Ganges by the time he reached the Hyphasis (above, 25. 1 n.). The proximity of the eastern Ocean could well have been a theme stressed by Nearchus and reserved by Arrian for this climactic passage of the speech.

ξυναφής φανείται The conjunction of the Caspian and the eastern Ocean is Eratosthenean doctrine (Strabo 2. 5. 18 (121)). Eratosthenes theorized about four gulfs of Ocean: the Caspian, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. The model is clearly adapted by Arrian with the addition of the mouth of the Ganges as a fifth gulf, and it is clearly anachronistic. Eratosthenes, it seems, acknowledged the Ionian geographers as his forerunners (Plut. *Al.* 44. 2; cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 119), and it is possible that Alexander and his staff were aware of the theory; but clearly it was not standard doctrine, and Alexander was in doubt about the nature of the Caspian until the end of his days (7. 16. 2). Arrian is developing his own ideas on a grand scale (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 130–2), and his reference to the Ocean as the end of empire inspired the excursus on the circumambient Ocean. The model yet again may be Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (8. 6. 21) where the boundaries of Cyrus' empire are defined by heat, cold, water, and desert, and the Persian Gulf and Black Sea are explicit limits of empire. In Arrian this becomes more grandiose with Eratosthenes' model being used to define the area open for annexation. The Ocean itself is the term of conquest, as it was in Roman imperial thought (Plut. *Pomp.* 38. 2–3, *Caes.* 58. 3; Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 130 (§95)).

2. εἰς Λιβύην περιπλευσθήσεται A reference forward to the tradition of the Last Plans and the circumnavigation of Africa which Arrian discusses in similar terms at 7. 1. 2–3 (cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 190–7). Once more he has taken material from the body of his work and redeployed it in the speech. Whether or not Alexander had as yet conceived the project of conquest in the west (above, 4. 15. 6 n.) is irrelevant. Arrian is not following a particular source but combining diverse and chronologically incompatible material in a rhetorical mosaic, and no item can be used in isolation.

οὐσπερ ... θεὸς ἐποίησε Again a *topos*, reminiscent of Xerxes' boasting in Herodotus (Hdt. 7. 8γ. 1–2). If, which is likely, Arrian was aware of the parallel, he has given his Alexander a strikingly hubristic expression. But the thought was a rhetorical commonplace

(Sen. *Suas.* 1. 2: *idem sunt termini et regni tui et mundi*) and need have no ulterior connotations.

3. πολλὰ μὲν μάχιστα κτλ. Here Arrian refers back to 25. 1 and uses the material to invert a standard *topos*. The usual argument (Cestius, *ap.* Sen. *Suas.* 1. 8) was that Alexander should pause and reorganize what he had won, but Arrian makes the possibility of revolt a reason for advance. Unless all potential rebels are subjugated there can be no security from rebellion—a variation on the general sentiment at 24. 8 which introduces the debate. Arrian may have in mind details like the help given by the desert Sacae to the Sogdian insurgents and the role played by the mercenaries in the siege of Massaga (4. 26. 1 n.). There was some justification for the principle, somewhat reminiscent of Alcibiades (Thuc. 6. 18. 3), but, had Alexander himself believed it, he could never have left Europe.

4. ἡδὺ καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν A memorable climax. Capping the sober admonitions of Tyrtaeus (F 6. 1–2) and the more rhapsodic expression of Simonides' ode to the dead of Thermopylae (Page, *PMG* 531), it evokes the most celebrated line of Horace (*Odes* 3. 2. 13): when its reward is everlasting glory, death itself is sweet. The sentiment is appropriate enough to Alexander, and may even have occurred in some form in Ptolemy (see below, 6. 9. 5); but its elaboration here is certainly Arrian's own work.

5. οὐκ ἐν Τίρυνθι κτλ. The reference to and comparison with Heracles and Dionysus was almost mandatory in this context (Curt. 9. 2. 29, 4. 21; Sen. *Suas.* 1. 1–2). Here it is particularly apposite, elaborating on the motif of glory through labour and looking forward to the theme of the next section, the mediocrity of achievements at home. The general sentiment is already found in Epictetus (*Diss.* 3. 26. 31–2), where Heracles through his labours becomes the real ruler of mankind while Eurystheus, the titular king of Argos and Mycenae, could not even control himself. It is the same theme of virtue through labour, which Arrian has adopted and fused with his earlier discussion of immortality as the reward of virtue (above, 4. 8. 3, 10. 6 nn.).

γενέσθαι ἢ δοκεῖν The note of scepticism has been taken as evidence that Arrian discounted the whole notion of apotheosis by achievement (e.g. Tonnet i 549). Rather it is co-ordinated with the earlier debate on *proskynesis*, which centred upon the ambiguous status of Heracles, the hero god (above, 4. 11. 7 n.). It was not merely Callisthenes who was sceptical about Heracles' claims to divinity: Anaxarchus had explicitly ranked Alexander above Heracles in the hierarchy of merit (4. 10. 6), and Arrian is deliberately placing a note of disparagement in Alexander's mouth. Heracles' merits were such that he might only *seem* a god among men (Arist. *Pol.* 3. 1284^a10–11); Alexander's own were by implication greater,

as his capture of Aornus proved, and his title to apotheosis less disputable. The flavour of hubris is again evident.

ἐπέκεινα τῆς Νύσης . . . ἀνάλωτος Deliberate repetition of earlier terminology (4. 28. 1; 5. 1. 2).

6. τὰ ὀλίγα τοῖς πολλοῖς The theme of the proximity of the Ocean (26. 1) is taken up again. It is not inconsistent with the stress on the many bellicose peoples this small interval contained (26. 3), but the two *τοποὶ* sit uneasily together.

Θρᾷκας . . . Τριβαλλοὺς This combination of peoples recurs in similar language in the Opis speech, where they are presented as traditional enemies of Macedon (7. 9. 2; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 109–10). Here they are easy opponents (the stress is on ἀπόνως). They could have been repelled without effort and Macedon might have enjoyed comfortable peace—but there would have been no glory (see also Curt. 9. 6. 19). In effect Arrian lists the enemies defeated in 335 (1. 1. 4–5; Curt. 9. 6. 20) and discounts the achievement. However, it is a peculiarly appropriate theme for Alexander, a personal variation on the choice of Achilles (*Il.* 9. 410–16).

7. εἰ μὲν ὑμᾶς . . . ἦγον The phrasing is reused at 7. 10. 1, in a more elaborate and allusive context (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 104–5). The general sentiment is trite enough, but there may be a subtle touch of irony. It was one of Cleitus' complaints, reinforced by a bluntly apposite quotation from Euripides (*Andr.* 693), that the achievements of the Macedonian rank-and-file were ignored and unrewarded (see above, 4. 8. 5 n.). Alexander is here denying what Cleitus died for asserting.

οὐκ . . . προεκάμνετε Looking backwards to 25. 2 and forwards to 27. 6. The terminology is striking and poetical (Aesch. *Eum.* 78) but also used technically of hunting dogs who flag before the kill (Pollux 5. 64), an apt expression for the author of the *Cynegeticus*.

9. ὑμεῖς αὐτῆς σατραπεύετε Cf. 7. 9. 9, where Alexander addresses the assembly of Macedonians as satraps. In both cases it is a rhetorical generalization, enlarging on the simple fact that the governors of the conquered territory were by and large Macedonians. But the sentiment is not particularly appropriate at a time when Alexander was establishing Porus as the equal of Macedonian governors elsewhere (cf. 18. 3, 21. 5, 24. 8, 29. 2; 6. 2. 1).

ζηλωτοὺς τοῖς ἀπερχομένοις An echo of the promise of Cyrus to the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 7. 4), where those who return after the campaign will be the envy of those at home. Alexander here contrasts the felicity of the troops who remain to continue the campaign with the frustration of the men who choose to return. At 7. 8. 1 and 10. 5 he comes closer to the original sentiment in Xenophon.

27. 1. **ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα** 'this and things like this'. A favourite turn of phrase (3. 10. 1; 4. 12. 1; 7. 3. 6), foreshadowed in Xenophon (*Hell.* 2. 4. 42). Hammond (*Sources* 259) contrasts Arrian's categorical presentation of Alexander's speech (cf. 25. 2: **ἔλεξεν ὥδε**) and the more qualified reporting of Coenus' (**ἔλεξε τοιάδε**, cf. 28.1: **τοιαῦτα εἰπόντος**); and he infers that the king's speech was more firmly attested than that of his marshal. I would argue rather that there is conscious stylistic variation, as there is in the short dialogue between Alexander and Callines at 7. 11. 6-7, where (*pace* Hammond, *Sources* 291) it is hard to believe that one part of the exchange was more faithfully recorded than the other. Such variation occurs in Xenophon (*Anab.* 7. 7. 4), who uses **ταῦτα** and **τοιαῦτα** in close proximity, referring to the same speech. In Xenophon (cf. *Hell.* 6. 4. 5-6), as in Arrian, the two words are practically indistinguishable in meaning.

πολὸν μὲν χρόνον σιωπῇ The silence is vividly evoked by Curtius, who ends Alexander's speech with a protest against the absence of applause (9. 2. 30) and expands Arrian's simple request for a response into another piece of rhetoric (31-4), which is likewise greeted by silence (9. 3. 1). There is clearly a common tradition, probably based on fact. The scenario resembles the vulgate account of the reception of Darius' peace proposals (Diod. 54. 4; Curt. 4. 11. 10-11), and, if we may believe Ephippus (Athen. 12. 538A = *FGH* 126 F 5), the general atmosphere at court in Alexander's last years was silence born of fear. Arrian's phrasing may owe something to Herodotus (7. 10. 1: reaction to Xerxes), but the situation is likely to be historical. An excruciating silence such as this would never be forgotten by anyone who witnessed it.

Κοῖνος ὁ Πολεμοκράτους Cf. 28. 1; Curt. 9. 3. 3, 16, 20. There can be no doubt that Coenus was present at the Hyphasis (above, 21. 1 n.) and expressed the grievances of the men, which as a battalion commander he was well placed to do. Coenus himself had not had an enjoyable campaign in India. He had the laborious task of conveying the Indus fleet to the Hydaspes (8. 4 n.), played a key role in the battle against Porus (16. 3, 17. 1), supervised transport across the swollen and dangerous Acesines (21. 1), and endured the brutal siege of Sangala with his battalion (22. 6 n.). He, if anyone, could be forgiven for campaign fatigue.

Whether there is a deeper political aim (as argued by Badian, *JHS* 81 (1961) 20; *Studies* 199-200; less sharply in *CHIran* ii 466) must remain *sub judice*. Coenus was clearly aware of the dangers inherent in representing the rank-and-file against the wishes of his king, but he was hardly appropriating the army as a means to power, as Meleager was to do at Babylon. Rather, the sentiments of the troops had become dangerous, verging on mutiny, and the king had to be made fully aware of the depth of the crisis. Coenus may

have felt that he had sufficient *auctoritas* to carry their cause without compromising his own position (see, however, 28. 1 n.).

The speech which follows is closely related to Alexander's in both sentiment and vocabulary, just as Curtius' Coenus answers and rebuts his Alexander. But other than outline there is nothing in common between Curtius and Arrian. They give us independent rhetorical compositions, based on the single known fact that Coenus represented the cause of the Macedonian troops. Otherwise the inspiration for Arrian seems to derive from the rhetorical schools. His speech bears a strong resemblance to Cestius Pius' formula for dissuading Alexander from sailing the Ocean (Sen. *Suas.* 1. 8; cf. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 127-8), and the model may well be standard.

2. ἀλλὰ πείσας Coenus begins with a *captatio benevolentiae* (compare Curt. 9. 3. 5), as was recommended in addresses to a despot (Sen. *Suas.* 1. 8: *nihil... nisi cum summa veneratione regis*). He refers explicitly to Alexander's own exordium (25. 8) and turns it into a *topos*, the absence of arbitrary rule in Macedon which Callisthenes stresses for his own purposes (4. 11. 6 n.) in his *proskynesis* speech.

οἱ καὶ προτιμώμενοι Coenus takes Alexander's conclusion (26. 7-8) but inverts its sentiment. He belongs to the privileged élite, not the unprivileged masses—an implicit contradiction of Alexander's claim that the rewards of conquest were the perquisite of all. Arrian's Coenus comes close to Cleitus' viewpoint (above, 26. 7 n.).

3. οὐδέ . . . τὰ καθ' ἡδονήν A necessary disclaimer, also found in Curtius (9. 3. 15), where it comes more naturally, in a plenary assembly before the men Coenus claimed to represent.

ἀπροφάσιστον τόλμαν A particularly subtle Thucydidean echo, if intended. It recalls the famous passage on Corcyrean *stasis* (Thuc. 3. 82. 6), where faction (τὸ ἐταιρικόν) is held to be a closer tie than family because of its members' greater willingness to take risks without qualification (ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν). As a *hetairos* of Alexander, Coenus implies that he has followed his king without reservation and is closer than any kinsman, but there is an underlying suggestion that unqualified devotion might not be a good thing. The context of the allusion provides the sting.

4. πέρας τι ἐπιθεῖναι This is the crux of the speech, answering Alexander's proud claim that there are no limits to virtue and its achievements (26. 1). Coenus uses another Thucydidean echo (cf. Thuc. 7. 42. 2), and again inverts Alexander's sentiment: the very magnitude of the achievement demands that a limit be set (for a similar expression in a different context see Curt. 9. 6. 10-11).

ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολελείμμεθα This flight of fancy culminates at 27. 6 (ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν). It implies that the Macedonian army had been literally whittled away to a skeleton force, ignoring the vast

reinforcements down to 331 and the continued recruiting of mercenaries. Arrian's rhetoric is totally contrary to fact. Far from declining in numbers, the Macedonian rank-and-file increased and were more numerous at Opis in 324 than they had been at the crossing of the Hellespont (*JHS* 106 (1986) 2-9; *contra* Hammond, *JHS* 109 (1989) 63-8).

5. *Θετταλούς ... ἀπὸ Βάκτρων* This is not 'wrong' as Tarn (ii 290) stated, following Krüger and the consensus of commentators. The reference is clearly to the *second* dismissal of the Thessalians, which took place at the crossing of the Oxus in Bactria (above, 3. 29. 5). By 'Bactra' Arrian clearly means to refer to the *satrapy* (cf. 7. 16. 3: Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 129), and he is literally correct about the dismissal. He is also alleging low morale as the reason for demobilization. That is not outright mutiny (as argued by C. A. Robinson, *AHR* 72 (1957) 335 n. 59), rather lack of enthusiasm (as at 6. 9. 3). It might have been a detail already present in his source which he reserved for Coenus' argument here, but equally it could be Arrian's own inference, based on the fact that the Macedonians discharged at the Oxus are described as *ἀπόλεμοι*. That could well have suggested war-weariness.

οὐδὲ ... ἐκόντες μένουσι This does not necessarily (as Tarn argued) display foreknowledge of the later mutinies of the Greek settlers in the upper satrapies (Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* 249-50). It was a theme which Arrian was to develop in his *History of the Successors*, and he must have been aware of the dissatisfaction of the settlers. Even the sources he uses make it clear that not all Greek colonists were volunteers (see below, 29. 3).

6. *ὡσαύτως ἐρρωμένοι* The history of the Silver Shields in the great battles after Alexander's death is sufficient refutation of this piece of rhetoric (cf. Diod. 19. 41. 2, 43. 1), not to mention the epic performance of the Perdican prisoners in Asia Minor (Diod. 19. 16. 1-5).

ξύμπασιν ποθος μὲν The anaphora is emphatic. Coenus takes up Alexander's *ποθεῖ ἀκοῦσαι* ('desires to hear') at 26. 1 and replies: our desire is not to know the limits of conquest but to see our families (cf. Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 53-4). The triple repetition of *πόθος* leaves no doubt in the matter. This is a theme which Arrian certainly found in his sources (above, 5. 2. 1 n.), in particular Nearchus, but its emphatic formulation here is his own work.

7. *ἐς τὸν Εὐξείνιον* Again a reference to Alexander's speech (26. 2), where the context suggests the circumnavigation of Africa. Arrian's Alexander has no serious intention of returning home and only voices the possibility as an afterthought (26. 8: *ἢ ἐπανάξω*). He views future conquests from the perspective of Asia, a logical continuation of his expansion to the Ocean. Coenus by contrast sees the

return as a precondition of further conquest, and chooses his alternatives accordingly. At 4. 15. 6 Alexander defers the expedition to the Black Sea until his return to Greece (cf. 7. 1. 3), and Arrian is probably influenced by that tradition here. Similarly Carthage is seen as a primary objective from the Greek perspective, whereas at 26. 2 North Africa is secondary to the circumnavigation of Africa.

8. ἄκμητες ... κεκμηκότων See above, 18. 1 n. Once more there may be conscious irony in Arrian. Coenus' sentiment is prefigured in the *Iliad* (16. 44) by Patroclus, who like Coenus himself was on the eve of death (see below, 6. 2. 1)—and Homer (*Il.* 16. 46–7) refers directly to his imminent demise.

διὰ τὸ ἀπείρατον A common *lopos*, memorably expressed by Pindar (γλυκὺ δὲ πόλεμος ἀπείροισι: F 110 Snell), who is quoted in the scholia to two Thucydidean passages (1. 80. 1; 2. 8. 1), both doubtless familiar to Arrian.

9. ἡ ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν σωφροσύνη This is Arrian's theme at 4. 7. 5 and throughout the great digression (cf. 4. 9. 1, 8, 11. 9, 14. 2). Coenus is dissuading his king from hubris and commending the type of moderation Arrian himself had eulogized in Alexander's treatment of the Persian princesses (4. 19. 6, 20. 2). Not surprisingly the admonition leads directly to a warning about the changeable nature of divine favour. Lack of *sophrosyne*, Coenus implies, may lead to retribution. The message is again trite and time-worn, a repetition of Solon's warning to Croesus (*Hdt.* 1. 32. 1–2). It fits the fantasy world of the schools better than the entourage of Alexander.

28. 1. θόρυβον γενέσθαι Arrian's narrative moves in and out of indirect speech as it does with the Pages' Conspiracy (4. 13. 1–5), the Philotas affair (3. 26. 2–3), and the visit to Nysa (5. 1. 3 ff.). As usual, it probably reflects some disquiet over the material he records (so Hammond, *Sources* 260). The citation from Ptolemy (28. 4) is presented with some scepticism, and Arrian may well be uneasy about the picturesque description of the reaction to Coenus' speech. Curtius (9. 3. 16–17) has a similar version, stressing the favourable reception of Coenus and adding that other senior officers made similar pleas. In Arrian they go no further than applause and tears, while in Curtius the opposition is more general and articulate.

ἀχθεσθεῖς Curtius emphasizes Alexander's anger, so great as to prevent him remonstrating with his officers (9. 3. 18, retaining the manuscript reading *mitigare*). It cannot be doubted or discounted. The opposition at the Hyphasis was the most public and serious demonstration of dissent that Alexander experienced, far eclipsing the debate over the Euphrates frontier, which he eventually won (see above, 2. 25. 1–3 with notes). Arrian's language is strong. Coenus' freedom of speech (*παρησία*) is reminiscent of Callisthenes,

whose *παρρησία* is characterized as misplaced and the cause of Alexander's hatred (above, 4. 12. 7). *παρρησία* implies opposition and was the dominant characteristic of the outspoken and abrasive Epictetus (*Ep. ad Gell.* 1. 2). It is a trait which Arrian himself admires in its place (cf. *Succ.* F 23, on Demosthenes), but he had no doubt that it was anathema to Alexander. It is the same with the passive resistance (*ὄκνος*) of the other officers. Arrian implicitly refers back to Alexander's speech (25. 5: *τί ὀκνεῖτε*), and later has the king allude to it at Opis with fine contempt (7. 10. 7: *εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς ἀπωκνήσατε*). *ὄκνος* came close to cowardice (cf. *Il.* 5. 817; *Thuc.* 2. 40. 3), and was as contemptible in Alexander's eyes as *παρρησία* was objectionable. The phrasing is Arrian's own, chosen carefully for maximum impact, but it presumably reflects the sentiment of his source, which left no doubt that Coenus and his associates had offended deeply, if not mortally. It leaves a question mark over Coenus' death at the Acesines not too many days after his intervention (see below, 6. 2. 1 n.).

2. *ξυγκαλέσας αὐτοῖς* The second council is mentioned in Arrian alone, but its content, reported in indirect speech and presumably taken from his narrative source, is embedded in Curtius' second speech for Alexander (*Curt.* 9. 2. 34). There may well be a common source (Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 126-7). The sentiment is natural enough and repeated in essence in the Opis speech (7. 10. 5-7; cf. *Curt.* 10. 2. 27-9), but there it is a contemptuous dismissal. Here there is an element of bluff (Brunt, *Arrian* ii 92-3 n. 1). Alexander repeats his intention to advance, come what may, and tries to shame his men into following. It is a credible enough challenge and probably historical.

3. *ἐς τὴν τρίτην* So Curtius 9. 3. 18-19. The period of angry seclusion is reminiscent of the three days of remorse after Cleitus' death (above, 4. 9. 4). Badian (*CHI* ii 466-7; cf. *Studies* 198) plausibly suggests that Alexander remembered his troops' reaction in 328 and hoped for another display of hysterical devotion.

οἶα δὲ ἐν ὄχλῳ The deprecatory phrasing is Thucydidean (cf. *Thuc.* 4. 28. 3; 6. 63. 2) and the sentiment Tacitean (cf. *Tac. Ann.* 1. 28. 2). The formulation is Arrian's own, ironically resumed at 29. 1, and is hardly, as it stands, an analysis of military psychology direct from Ptolemy (so Kornemann 79). Ptolemy probably alluded to Alexander's hopes for a change of mind, but the comment is Arrian's imposition.

4. *ἐνταῦθα δὲ λέγει Πτολεμαῖος* (*FGrH* 138 F 23) The emphasis is deliberate and ironical. Alexander did something one would expect him not to have done (*οὐδὲν μείον*: cf. 5. 10. 1; 7. 25. 5), and he did it precisely at the point when it was most unexpected, when the Macedonians showed no sign of budging. Once again the emphasis

comes from Arrian, voicing his scepticism of Ptolemy's report that Alexander sacrificed as though he were fully intent on the crossing. For Arrian the king had already capitulated, and the sacrifices could only be a contrived sham.

Ptolemy, it would seem, reported Alexander's intentions in sacrificing as genuine and implied that it was the unfavourable outcome which deterred him from proceeding. This was a theme known to Strabo (15. 1. 27 (697)), who mentions unfavourable results from divination (μάντεια) as one of the reasons for Alexander's change of course. One should not be too cynical in assessing such evidence: the Ten Thousand at least regarded such sacrifices with deadly seriousness (Xen. *Anab.* 6. 4. 19–22, 25). However, there were techniques for circumventing unfavourable omens (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 6. 6. 36), and Alexander himself had been fairly cavalier in the past (cf. 2. 27. 1; 4. 4. 3). At the Hyphasis there was apparently a single sacrifice, and Alexander complied with a single adverse report. It indicates that he had already decided to withdraw and arranged to do so at the overt bidding of the gods. Ptolemy clearly stressed the public justification, but nothing suggests that he overlooked the army's refusal to proceed.

29. 1. πρὸς σφῶν μόνων νικηθῆναι If this is an authentic record, it was a very dangerous witticism, striking at Alexander's most cherished claim, his invincibility. It was to be publicized in his issue of decadrachms from Babylon (see above, 5. 18. 4n.), and Demosthenes himself proposed that Alexander be honoured at Athens as the unconquered god (θεὸς ἀνίκητος: cf. Hyp. c. *Dem.* col. 32; Goukowsky i 60–6). Had his Macedonians boasted that they had conquered him, it would have flouted his propaganda that he had bowed to the gods alone and challenged him to prove his superiority. The events at Opis were to be his answer.

δώδεκα βωμούς These altars are mentioned in all traditions. In the vulgate they are part of a grandiose fabrication, at the centre of a gigantic camp, all dimensions of which were of more than human size (Diod. 95. 1–2; Curt. 9. 3 19; Plut. *Al.* 62. 7–8; *Metz Epit.* 69; Justin 12. 8. 16). Whatever the truth of the details of the camp (cf. Goukowsky on Diod. 95. 2, arguing that they were a stratagem to deter a possible counter-offensive from the east), there is no doubt about the historicity of the altars. They were apparently mentioned by the bematists (Pliny, *NH* 6. 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a) in a context misunderstood by Pliny, who places them on the east side of the Hyphasis in flat contradiction of the omens forbidding the crossing. Plutarch, however, claims that the kings of the Prasii later made regular crossings (from the east) to sacrifice on the altars in Hellenic style (*Al.* 62. 8; see also the fantasy of Philostratus, *VA* 2. 43), and

there is no reason to contest the statement. The romance of Alexander lived long in India (cf. *Peripl. M. Erythr.* § 41 with Casson, *PME* 200). Chandragupta himself is said to have respected Alexander's memory (Plut. *Al.* 62. 9) and may have begun the tradition.

Arrian states that the altars were both a thank-offering to the gods and a memorial to his achievements (cf. Diod. 95. 2). The first explanation recalls the twelve altars Alexander purportedly established at the Hellespont before he crossed into Asia (Justin 11. 5. 4). These first altars were founded *in vota belli*, and the votive offerings were now matched by the immense thank-offerings at the eastern boundary of his conquests. Strabo (3. 5. 5 (171)) claims that the altars were erected to emulate Heracles and Dionysus. It may be that Alexander intended his monument as an eastern counterpart to the Pillars of Heracles (cf. Diod. 4. 18. 4; Wilcken 187; Schachermeyr³ 442), but he was more likely to have been influenced by the tradition that Heracles and Dionysus had established altars on the Syr-Darya to mark the northern limits of their wanderings (Pliny, *NH* 6. 49). He had found what purported to be traces of Dionysus' monuments (Curt. 7. 9. 15; see above, 4. 4. 8; 5. 1. 6 nn.), and was probably inspired to erect a more impressive and permanent structure.

κατὰ τοὺς μεγίστους πύργους Diodorus (95. 1) suggests that the altars were cubic structures with sides of 50 cubits. That is somewhat smaller than the dimensions of the largest siege towers, attested 80 cubits high, or even 96, in the case of Demetrius' celebrated *helepolis* (figures in Marsden, *Technical Treatises* 86–7). But even Diodorus' report suggests a colossal construction work. Alexander had the necessary labour force but hardly the time in the few days he spent at the Hyphasis (see below), and Arrian can hardly be correct that the work was finished when he made his sacrifices there. Most probably he laid the foundations and left impressed natives to complete the work under the supervision of an expert construction team. It was probably finished by the beginning of the river voyage in the autumn and survived into the Mauryan period (Plut. *Al.* 62. 7). No traces have ever been found by modern investigators, and the altars may well have been demolished during the intervening millennia.

2. Πῶρῳ ἄρχειν προσέθηκεν The notice is repeated at 6. 2. 1. In neither passage is there any reference to a Macedonian satrap, whereas Plutarch (*Al.* 60. 15) asserts that Porus' title *was* satrap (see above, 4. 22. 6 n.). In other words he was subordinate to Alexander but nobody else. Alexander seems to have discarded any plans for imposing direct control over the lands west of the Hydaspes. They were combined in a large kingdom ruled by his favourite native

dynast, satrap under Alexander but king to his subjects. The same was to occur with Porus' former ally, Abisares (below, 29. 5).

ἐπὶ τὸν Ὑδραώτην The vulgate tradition (Diod. 95. 3; Curt. 9. 3. 20; *Metz Epit.* 69; Justin 12. 9. 1) agrees that Alexander followed the same route back to the Acesines but gives no particulars. Arrian is hardly more informative and, if there was any difficulty at the crossings (cf. 20. 8-9, 21. 6), we do not hear of it.

3. καὶ ἐνταῦθα . . . ἐτάχθη There is no reference to city foundation in the earlier report of Hephaestion's mission to pacify the lands of the second Porus (above, 21. 5 n.). Such a procedure was standard practice in newly subjugated territory (cf. 4. 24. 7) and it could have been included in Hephaestion's original instructions. It may, however, have been a secondary commission. When Hephaestion reported the success of his expedition (Diod. 93. 1; Curt. 9. 1. 35), he might have been instructed to return and fortify one of the Indian cities close to the Acesines and turn it into a regional control centre. If so, the work was done by the time Alexander retraced his steps.

ὅσοι ἐθέλονται . . . ἀπόμαχον Arrian's usual formula (see above, 4. 4. 1, 24. 7 n.). The local natives were presumably the 'willing' agrarian work-force and the veteran mercenaries the ruling élite. Interestingly there is no reference to Macedonian settlers (cf. 7. 21. 7), and the omission can hardly be fortuitous. Alexander was not inclined to risk further unrest among his phalanx troops by denying some of them any prospect of return to Macedon.

τὰ ἐπὶ τῷ κατάπλῳ παρεσκευάζετο The text reads as though Alexander began his preparations on the Acesines, as is implied by Diodorus (95. 3) and Curtius (9. 5. 21). That cannot be true. The consistent testimony of Nearchus (6. 1. 1, 3. 1; *Ind.* 18. 1, 19. 1) is that Alexander's fleet was built on the Hydaspes, and there is explicit support from Aristobulus (*τὴν ναυπηγίαν ἐπὶ τῷ Ὑδάσπῃ*; Strabo 15. 1. 17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35). There is no alternative. The timber for the ships was cut in the forests north of Porus' domains and floated down the Hydaspes (Strabo 15. 1. 29 (698); see above, 20. 2 n.). It is virtually impossible that there was any comparable activity on the Acesines; we have no evidence of any fleet other than that mustered on the Hydaspes. There is, then, a degree of unclarity or inaccuracy in the sources. Cleitarchus, it seems, jumped from the crossing of the Acesines (which was the most turbulent and memorable of the Punjab rivers) to the construction of the fleet, and omitted to mention that Alexander had moved on to the Hydaspes. Something similar has happened in Arrian. His source seems to have gone directly from the population of Hephaestion's city to the preparations for the river journey, and Arrian followed the narrative without

realizing (or caring) that the scene had shifted from the Acesines to the Hydaspes.

That is easiest to explain if 29. 3 as a whole is an insertion. One source described Alexander's return across the rivers, with Abisares' envoys meeting him by the Acesines, and another mentioned the action at Hephaestion's city before turning to the shipbuilding on the Hydaspes. The join is not very competently crafted, and Arrian's narrative looks forward for an instant to the Hydaspes before reverting to the Acesines. The sources can only be very tentatively identified. Schwartz (*RE* ii 913; so Strasburger 44) suggested that the reception of Abisares (29. 4) came from Aristobulus, and the reference to the rain damage at 29. 5 would also come naturally in Aristobulus' work, which made much of the monsoon conditions (*FGrH* 139 F 35). In that case the insert at 29. 3 most probably comes from Ptolemy (as the similarity of the colonization description at 4. 24. 7 would suggest).

4. Ἀρσάκης (Berve no. 147) Arsaces is not mentioned elsewhere, and his domains, clearly adjacent to Abisares', cannot be located (cf. Lassen ii² 174 n. 2; Anspach 88 n. 275 for a guess). He was probably an independent princeling, like Doxares (5. 8. 3 n.), and attached himself to the embassy of his powerful neighbour.

νόσῳ ἀδύνατον Abisares was to die within a year (Curt. 10. 1. 20), and his illness was clearly not diplomatic. So Alexander's envoys (not mentioned in the earlier report at 20. 5) were able to confirm, and the king waived his insistence that Abisares appear in person (20. 5 n.). But Abisares' fortunes now improved dramatically. No longer threatened with military intervention, he was given satrapal status comparable to that of Porus (29. 5). He was plenipotentiary in his own lands, and Arsaces was placed under his authority, much as Porus had acquired the territory of the Glauganicae/Glausae (20. 4). One suspects that Porus had pressed the cause of his old ally (4. 27. 7, 5. 22. 2 nn.) and persuaded Alexander to accept his good faith. 5. φόρους In the narrative of the Indian campaigns tribute is only mentioned once again, at 6. 14. 2 (capitulation of the Oxydracae), but it must have been mandatory throughout Alexander's Indian domains, imposed on all local rulers, including Taxiles and Porus. How it was assessed and paid we can only guess.

πρὸς τῶν ὀμβρῶν This is Arrian's single explicit reference to the monsoon rains of 326 (see above, 20. 8 n.), and it is inserted parenthetically, to explain why Alexander had to refurbish his new foundations (on which see 19. 4 n.). The rain damage is eloquent testimony to the intensity of the deluge, which Aristobulus alleged was continuous during the march to the Hyphasis (above, 25. 2 n.) and the journey back to the Hydaspes. It peaked at the solstice (20. 8 n.), and only subsided at the rising of Arcturus, late in September (Strabo 15. 1.

17 (691) = *FGrH* 139 F 35). Alexander began his reconstruction work at this point, taxing his fatigued troops even further. That and the shipbuilding will have engrossed his energies for the next two months. Book V appropriately ends with Alexander at work on the cities which commemorated his Indian triumph, and we are ready for the ceremonial opening of Book VI with the voyage to the Ocean in the forefront.

APPENDIX

Arrian's Use of Nearchus

Arrian used Nearchus extensively, so much so that Nearchus can be defined as his third major source, ranking alongside Ptolemy and Aristobulus. The *Indike* is virtually an adaptation of Nearchus' work from chapter 18 onwards, and in the earlier part of the monograph Nearchus is combined with Megasthenes in a composite account of Indian geography and ethnography. In the Alexander history he is cited less frequently (6. 13. 4, 24. 2; 7. 3. 6, 20. 9), but in every instance the citation comes as an integral part of the exposition, and it is clear that he was excerpted as a narrative source, not merely adduced as a variant. Cross-comparison with Strabo enlarges our knowledge considerably. It proves that Book VI opens with an extensive borrowing from Nearchus, on Alexander's short-lived identification of the Indus and the Nile,¹ and the greater part of Arrian's account of the crossing of the Gedrosian desert can be securely attributed to Nearchus.² Indeed Jacoby (*FGrH* 133 F 32-3) argues plausibly that Nearchus is the primary source for large segments of Book VI.

On this hypothesis Arrian's statement in the *Praefatio* (3) is not strictly true. It reads as though all reports other than those of Ptolemy and Aristobulus are to be presented as *legomena* only (ἐστὶ

¹ 6. 1. 2-6; cf. Strabo 15. 1. 25 (696) = *FGH* 133 F 20. See my discussion in *ΤΟΠΟΙ* 3 (1993) 413-20. The attribution to Nearchus has recently been contested by Hammond (*Sources* 262-4), who claims that there is no direct use of Nearchus in the opening chapters of Book VI. Some scepticism had been evinced in the past (e.g. by Kornemann 152-4), but Hammond even denies that the passage on the identification of the Nile and the Indus derives from Nearchus. In his view Arrian drew upon Aristobulus and conveyed an element of doubt by his use of the accusative and infinitive. This is part of his general thesis that Arrian constructed his narrative (exclusive of *legomena*) solely from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. But even Hammond allows exceptions to his rule (e.g. 275: 'Arrian continued with the finite tense (*sic*), although he was still reporting *legomena*'), and it is surely beyond reasonable doubt that the first chapter of Book VI is based on Nearchus. Arrian and Strabo are complementary: each supplies material which makes the other more comprehensible. There is no internal contradiction, and the similarity of vocabulary is hardly coincidental (ἔδοξεν ἐξευρηκέναι τοῦ Νεῖλου τὰς ἀρχάς, Arrian; εὗρηκέναι δόξαι τὰς τοῦ Νεῖλου ἀρχάς, Strabo). It seems perverse to deny that there is a common source.

² 6. 24. 2-25. 6; cf. Strabo 15. 2. 3-6 (721-2). Nearchus' authorship was powerfully argued by Strasburger (*Studien* i 449 ff.) and has been widely (but not universally) accepted (cf. Brunt, *Arrian* ii 475-6; G. Schepens, *AncSoc* 20 (1989) 22-4). The case will be fully presented in my commentary ad loc.

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δὲ ἃ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλων . . . ὡς λεγόμενα μόνον . . . ἀνέγραψα). But this is a general rule. Arrian is classifying sources by their reliability, separating contemporary eyewitnesses from later, more suspect authorities, and he does adhere to his practice in the earlier books of his Alexander history. When he came to interweave pieces of Nearchus, his methodological preface may have been written, and he felt it unnecessary to change the wording. Arrian approved of Nearchus. He names him alongside Eratosthenes and Megasthenes as a superior authority for things Indian,³ and on his own criteria Nearchus would rank alongside Aristobulus, a contemporary of the events who wrote after the king's death and had no obvious interest in propagating falsehood. In the early chapters of Book V Arrian draws directly from both Nearchus and Eratosthenes, redeploying material which he uses in other contexts in the *Indike*. The other named citations continue the pattern. They adduce material relevant to the campaign narrative and find their place in the Alexander history, while the purely autobiographical material and the information on Indian curiosities is reserved for the *Indike*. Nearchus is clearly an important strand in the narrative of the later books, and the question arises how far back we can trace his influence. The citations themselves are no guide, for Arrian demonstrably uses material from Nearchus before he first adduces him by name. He draws upon him in the geographical excursus in Book V (cf. 5. 4. 4, 6. 3-6 with notes), as he does at the opening of Book VI, and there is every reason to believe that Nearchus provided a significant part of the historical narrative.

At this point we are confronted by a paradox. Nearchus is the best-known but perhaps the most elusive of the lost historians of Alexander.⁴ Thanks to Arrian and Strabo we have a wealth of individual details, but there is no framework in which to set them. We have no indication of the dimensions of Nearchus' work. Not a single fragment is attributed to a numbered book, and even the title is a mystery. The usually accepted '*Paraplus of India*', which Jacoby (*FGrH* 133 F 1) prints in parenthesis, is a guess, based upon

³ Arr. 5. 5. 1 (cf. 6. 28. 6); *Ind.* 17. 6. Arrian does not suggest (*contra* Hammond, *Sources* 262) that he uses Nearchus exclusively in the *Indike*. Rather he delimits the content of the *Indike* (customs, curiosities, and the *paraplois* of the Outer Ocean) and restricts himself in the larger work to material relevant to Alexander's achievements (ὅσον ἐς τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα ἀποχρῶν). That leads him directly to excerpts from Eratosthenes (5. 5. 2-6. 3) and Nearchus (5. 6. 4-7), which he claims are sufficient background for his narrative purposes (5. 6. 8). He does not debar himself from using them elsewhere.

⁴ For bibliography see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 14-15. The most influential discussions are W. Capelle, *RE* xvi 2135-54; Pearson, *LHA* 112-49; Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 159-214. On the question of personal bias see Badian, *JCS* 24 (1975) 147-70 and my observations in *Zu Alexander d. Gr.* i 541-66.

prejudice.⁵ It is assumed that the work was autobiographical, describing the progress of Nearchus' fleet from the Hydaspes to Susa, and that the abundant geographical and ethnographical material was superimposed upon the personal narrative. But there is an obvious danger in assuming that the details which are ascribed to Nearchus in the extant sources are representative of the entire work. Even what we have suggests that Nearchus' work went well beyond his own experiences. He did not cross the Gedrosian desert, but he gave a vivid report of the sufferings of the troops who did. He was not at Persepolis to witness the death of Calanus, but he described the event in some detail (Arr. 7. 3. 6 = *FGrH* 133 F 4). The fact that Arrian reproduced his account of his voyage at such length in the *Indike* is probably misleading. It is taken out of its context and treated as a unified whole because of its special status, an eyewitness description by the principal actor in the events. As such it has a coherence and continuity that we do not find elsewhere.⁶ Other portions of Nearchus were excerpted much more selectively, and the material relating to Alexander himself or to Indian institutions was combined with the rest of the tradition. It is not so easily detected and cannot be used to reconstruct the outline of the lost work. Nearchus may have described Alexander's own progress as fully as he described his own, but only a fraction of the information he gave will have been used in the sources.

The starting-point of the work is indeterminate. It *may* only have begun with the building of the river fleet late in 326, but that is another guess, anchored to the hypothesis that the voyage was the primary theme of Nearchus' work. However, Nearchus did refer to earlier events. He mentioned the monsoon conditions at the crossing of the Acesines in midsummer 326.⁷ This was probably contained in a digression on the summer rains in northern India, but there is no reason why the digression should not have been attached to a campaign narrative, stressing the difficulties caused by the monsoon

⁵ Cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD 445 (so Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 163-4). The fact that Arrian refers repeatedly to Nearchus' παράπλους is no indicator of the title (any more than Theophrastus' ἀνάπλους at *HP* 4. 7. 3). The word is one of his favourites; with its cognates it is used no less than twenty-nine times in his work, not merely with reference to Nearchus (e.g. 2. 1. 2; 7. 20. 7). It is perhaps relevant that Androsthenes of Thasos entitled his work Παράπλους τῆς Ἰνδικῆς (*FGrH* 711 F 1), but there is no evidence that Nearchus' work had any close resemblance to Androsthenes', other than its record of geographical and botanical phenomena.

⁶ Strabo's references to Nearchus' ocean voyage (15. 2. 11-14 (725-7) = *FGrH* 133 F 1b-d) are sporadic and capricious, dealing with the colourful episodes of the encounter with whales and the magic island of Nosala, and adding details about the mouth of the Persian Gulf and the language of the Carmanians. One could never have inferred from them the breadth of narrative that Arrian's more continuous excerpt reveals.

⁷ Strabo 15. 1. 18 (692) = *FGrH* 133 F 18; cf. Arr. *Ind.* 6. 4. See above, 5. 20. 8 n.

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downpour in the context in which they occurred. If Nearchus referred to the summer campaigns of 326, he may have dealt with earlier events, and the absence of explicit citations in our extant sources could well be fortuitous. The fragments of Onesicritus make an interesting comparison. If we had only Strabo's citations, we should assume that Onesicritus' work was primarily devoted to the Indian expedition and its sequel,⁸ with perhaps a comparative digression on Bactrian institutions (Strabo 11. 11. 3 (517) = *FGrH* 134 F 5). It is only Plutarch (*Al.* 8. 2, 15. 2) who informs us that Onesicritus dealt with events at the beginning of the reign and in fact only reached the campaign in Hyrcania in Book IV (*Al.* 46. 4). And but for Diogenes Laertius (6. 84 = *FGrH* 134 T 1) we would have no inkling of the extraordinary title of Onesicritus' work⁹ and the fact that it was modelled upon Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. With Nearchus, who is almost exclusively preserved in Arrian and Strabo, we are even more at the mercy of the vagaries of the tradition, and arguments from silence are particularly perilous. It may be true, as is universally asserted, that he did not write a complete history of the reign, but equally we cannot be certain that he began his work late in the Indian campaign. He had been at court since winter 329/8 (see above, 4. 7. 2) and was an eyewitness of events, which he had some interest in recording.

The possibility exists that Arrian drew upon Nearchus before the demonstrable extracts in Book VI. He did so without acknowledgement in the geographical excursus on India, and he could also have used Nearchus for detail to supplement his campaign narrative. Without controls such as Strabo provides there is little chance of certainty, and all attributions must be conjectural. However, there are rare occasions on which Arrian records details which are inconsistent with the known traits of his other major sources. Rather than gloss over Macedonian hardships and casualties he sometimes emphasizes them, as Nearchus demonstrably did in his description of the Gedrosian desert, and it is arguable that Arrian supplemented the reticent campaign narratives of Ptolemy and Aristobulus with more colourful and revealing details from Nearchus. I have identified two passages in the body of the commentary, the fall of Sangala (5. 24. 4-5) and the siege operations at Massaga (4. 26. 6-27. 1), and there may well be others. Arrian gives the occasional clue when he cites

* Of the thirty-eight fragments accepted by Jacoby (*FGrH* 134) no less than seventeen, including the lengthiest and most informative, come from Strabo, and all but six relate to events subsequent to the invasion of India.

⁹ *How Alexander was educated* (πὺς Ἀλέξανδρος ἡχθῆ). Pearson's attempt (*LHA* 88-90) to deny the traditional interpretation and emend the text (ἀνῆχθῆ for ἡχθῆ) is refuted by Hermogenes, *Progymn.* 7. 28, describing the *topoi* of encomia: εἴτα ἡ ἀγωγή, πὺς ἡχθῆ ἢ πὺς ἐπαιδεύθῃ. See also Pédech, *Historiens compagnons* 75.

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multiple but anonymous authorities, as in his account of the murder of Cleitus (4. 8. 8-9) with its report of a third tradition alongside Ptolemy and Aristobulus. On very rare occasions the material he uses can be correlated with known passages of Nearchus (see 5. 1. 1 n., on the tradition of the visit to Nysa). These are suggestions only, but I believe that they have cumulative force and justify a working hypothesis. We should reckon seriously with the possibility that Nearchus covered much more than his naval expedition and indeed began his work before Alexander's invasion of India. If so, his influence on Arrian may be more pervasive than has been suspected hitherto.

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